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Abstract: Liberalism, Nationalism and anti-Semitism in the 
'Berlin anti-Semitism Dispute J 0(187911880, a thesis submitted 
to Middlesex University in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Marcel Stoetzler 
This thesis analyses the series of newspaper and journal 
articles and pamphlets published in 187911880 which constitute 
what came to be called the 'Berlin anti-Semitism dispute'. They 
were written by the German historian and politician Heinrich von 
Treitschke and some of the political and academic figures who 
responded to his anti-Jewish statements, and they discuss the 
anti-Semitic movement and the place of Jews in German society 
at that time. 
Treitschke's texts have been seen as crucial to both the 
development of modem anti-Semitism in Germany and the 
emergence of a distinctly German form of nationalism. But the 
debate which they provoked also reveals a great deal about social 
and political thought at that time, and in particular the 
relationship between anti-Semitism and liberalism; most of the 
contributors were liberals like Treitschke, or opponents of 
liberalism. 
As well as providing a close reading of the debate in a full-
length study (something which has not been done before) this 
thesis also analyses it in terms of the wider issues of nationalism 
and liberalism. What emerges from this material is a conceptual 
weakness of liberalism in its relation to anti-Semitism and Jewish 
emancipation. Both Treitschke's support for anti-Semitism and 
the ambivalence evident in the views of his opponents are shown 
here to be rooted in the contradiction between inclusionary and 
exclusionary tendencies inherent in the nation-form. To the 
extent that liberal society constitutes itself in the form of a 
national state, it has to guarantee, or produce, some degree of 
homogeneity or conformity of a national culture. This necessity 
leads Treitschke to embrace, and his critics to be unable to fully 
oppose, anti-Semitism. In this respect the thesis aims to provide a 
starting point for a critical assessment of current debates on 
nationalism vs. patriotism, ethnic minorities and 'multi-cultural 
society' . 
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1.1 Liberalism, nationalism and anti-Semitism in the Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit: the thesis suggested 
In November 1879, the German historian and National-Liberal politician, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, editor of the Preussische JahrbiJcher, a prestigious and 
widely read scholarly-political journal, made some remarks in the concluding 
section of a review of current affairs in that journal that sparked what later came 
to be known as the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, the Berlin Anti-Semitism 
Dispute. 1 Treitschke reflected on the anti-Jewish activities of some groups and 
individuals, particularly in Berlin, in a way that was generally understood to 
support and applaud the 'anti-Semitic' cause - a term that had only been coined 
in the same context earlier the same year. What I will subsequently refer to as the 
Streit is the series of pamphlets and newspaper articles published in Germany 
late in 1879 and throughout 1880-81 in response to the remarks made by 
Treitschke. The respondents included the philosopher Hermann Cohen, the social 
scientist Moritz Lazarus and the historians Heinrich Graetz and Theodor 
Mommsen. Treitschke wrote replies to some of his critics, some of whom replied 
in tum, to the effect that the whole material of the Streit constitutes a multi-
layered, network-like 'poly' -logue on differing notions of the German nation, the 
role in it of the German Jews, and how 'German' the latter are. My analysis is 
based on the contributions by sixteen individuals, many of them figures whom 
the German public then held in high regard. Most contributions combine polemic 
with scholarly argument. The material's overall length is the equivalent of a 
small book. My thesis is the first study of the topic which combines a close and 
systematic reading of the source material with a theoretically informed 
interpretation. 
The analysis and evaluation of the Streit about Treitschke's remarks on the 
Jews is of particular interest for two reasons: 
~ firstly, Treitschke's texts are notorious as the source of catchy anti-Semitic 
formulations (such as 'The Jews are our misfortune') and are generally 
acknowledged as crucial for the development of modem anti-Semitism in 
Germany. However, despite its notoriety the Streit has so far never been 
analyzed in a full-length study. 
1 The text is documented in English translation in 4.1. 
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>- Secondly, Treitschke's position is full of ambivalence and cannot easily be 
dismissed as that of an extremist, racist, illiberal demagogue. He is 
interesting particularly because he was a figure of the centre, not the margins 
of society. His opponents, some of whom were or had been friends, 
colleagues and/or political allies, acknowledge this either implicitly or 
explicitly and demonstrate difficulties in coping with Treitschke's 
ambivalence as well as the fact that they belong to the same social and 
political milieu. In the Streit, nationalist liberals respond to a fellow 
nationalist liberal's anti-Jewish remarks, while both sides remain committed 
to defending and helping to consolidate the newly founded German nation-
state. 
The emphasis of my discussion is on the Streit as a whole rather than on 
Treitschke's or any other single contribution. The text material is analysed with a 
view to its paradigmatic character for the discussion of modem society and 
history. My aim is not, however, to arrive at a 'theory of anti-Semitism'. It seems 
unlikely to me that such a theory could possibly be formulated, given the 
incoherent nature of the object. I suggest, however, that the analysis of specific 
instances of anti-Semitic attitudes or activities within their specific contexts -
including most crucially how they were opposed or responded to - can contribute 
a lot to theorizing the nation and liberal state and society, which in tum are 
necessary preconditions for understanding anti-Semitism. 
While the interventions in defence of emancipation - in particular 
Mommsen's - have sometimes been referred to as a victory of liberal values 
against illiberalism, it has also often been pointed out that both sides shared 
assumptions about the national state, emancipation and the status of cultural or 
ethnic minorities. In this sense, it has been felt - in particular by some in the 
Jewish community of the time - that much of what has been responded to 
Treitschke confirmed rather than challenged the fundamental premises of his 
position. My analysis will confirm this view and show that - Treitschke's 
embarrassment and temporary silence on the issue after 1881 notwithstanding-
the Streit highlights a conceptual weakness of liberalism in its relation to anti-
Semitism and Jewish emancipation. 
My exploration of the Streit concentrates on two main questions: how does 
Treitschke - a liberal historian, political theorist and politician - come to give 
5 
support to anti-Semitism, and why - as this thesis will demonstrate - do the 
liberal critics of Treitschke's position remain ambiguous in the ways they 
address the issue? The analysis of the Streit that I propose looks for the answers 
to these questions in the relation between anti-Semitism and state, nation and 
national culture, i.e. institutions and structures central to liberal society. 
The gist of my thesis is that Treitschke's support for anti-Semitism is rooted 
in the contradiction between inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies inherent in 
the 'nation-form,.2 National states refer to and presuppose the existence of a 
national culture. To the extent that liberal society constitutes itself in the form of 
a nation-state,3 it has to guarantee, or produce, some degree of cultural 
homogeneity or conformity - i.e. it has to enforce the assimilation of not-yet-
conforming elements. If a considerable minority seems not to be assimilating, the 
nation-state's representatives will inevitably ask whether this minority is 
prevented from assimilating, refilses to, or is in itself unable to assimilate. 
Exactly these questions are pivotal to the Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute. 
I suggest that Treitschke's support for anti-Semitism is a symptom of 
contradictions intrinsic to liberal society, by which is understood a modem form 
of society characterised by the duality and interplay of a 'civil society' and a 
'liberal state'. Anti-Semitism develops from within, it is not a challenge coming 
from somewhere 'outside' that society and its values. To the extent that anti-
Semitism is anti-liberal, it is an element of the self-negation of liberal society. In 
anti-Semitism, liberal society revokes its promise to gradually expand 
emancipation to all groups of the population. 
Liberalism is understood here to be a tradition of modem thinking that is as 
much concerned with individuals (rights-bearing subjects who are owners and 
sellers of commodities)4 as with how best to construct the state they form in line 
with their specific needs and interests. Liberal theory often asserts, and always 
2 I take this word from Balibar (1991 a;b). 'Nation-form' implies that 'the nation' is a social form, 
i.e. the form taken by a specific kind of (modem) state and society. 
3 In the same vein, I understand 'the state' to be the specific (institutional) form taken by a 
specific society. This use of the concept 'form' implies, vice vel:W, that society in its totality is 
understood to be the 'essence' of the state, i.e. the social-historical dynamism whose specific (if 
not exclusive) institutional expression is 'the state'. 
4 At the very least, the commodity is that of labour-power. 
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implies, that in order to make it meet the needs of an association of individuals of 
selfish interests the state must be provided with an ethos of belonging and a sense 
of 'us', which is typically referred to as 'the nation'. Liberalism without some 
form of nationalisms is therefore an impossibility. 
The Berliner Antisemitismusstreit followed the coining of the word 'anti-
Semitism' and the emergence of an 'anti-Semitic movement' (although it 
predated its development into differentiated and programmatically articulated 
political organization). It was in the first place a debate about the nascent anti-
Semitic movement and did not involve the protagonists of this movement as 
participants.6 This reflects the specific social location of the Streit: mainly 
professors, politicians, priests and rabbis exchange extended and elaborate 
statements. The social exclusiveness of most of the contributors and their style 
must have limited the immediate impact of the debate, but it also contributed to 
its long term relevance: the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit features members of 
the educated elite in an effort to make sense of a new key-word that had been 
coined in a lower middle class milieu and had populist connotations. In a society 
that held scholars and intellectuals in as high prestige as the German Reich in 
Bismarck's time, such an exchange was bound to have a lasting impact. 
On the face of it, the case of anti-Semitism seems anachronistic: the Jews 
were being attacked for something that most of them were just in the process of 
ceasing to be - distinctly Jewish. Indeed, many contemporaries saw anti-
Semitism as a temporary revival of 'medieval' superstition. However, despite its 
anachronistic and irrational appearance, anti-Semitism was 'modem' in the sense 
that it referred to and drew its meaning from contemporary social reality. The 
most widely noticed ambivalence in Treitschke's argument was that between the 
demand for the Jews to accelerate their assimilation and - at the same time - the 
(less explicitly stated) demand for their social exclusion. Anti-Semitism 
responded to the twin process of Jewish emancipation and assimilation. The 
5 I consider 'patriotism' a near-synonym that differs only insofar that it tends to carry an implicit 
claim to a high degree of individual, rather than collective, commitment. This seems to be an 
echo of the original implication of a personal relation to a pater patriae; the word Landesvater is 
still used in German along with Vater/and. 
6 The only exception was Naudh. 
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discussants of the Streit argued about whether anti-Semitic agitation would push 
the Jews to accelerate (Treitschke's view) or would obstruct and slow down 
assimilation (most others' view). 
The subject of the thesis that aims to situate the question of 'anti-Semitism' 
within that of (modem) state and society is located at the intersection of several 
scholarly discourses: the social and political history of the emancipation of the 
German Jews and the 'anti-Semitic' reaction against it; the social and political 
history of the German state; the intellectual history of nationalism and liberalism 
in Germany; and the social theory of the modem state and its relation to society 
and individual in liberal theory. 7 
7 I include only texts written in 1879, 1880 or 1881 which refer to one of Treitschke's statements. 
The initial working through of the text material resulted in a list of concepts on which the Streit is 
pivoted. These are introduced historically-conceptually in Part One. The presentation and 
discussion of the text material in Part Two is designed to throw light on each of these concepts 
and their interconnections. Part Three aims to draw together Parts One and Two. 
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1.2 Review: The 'Berliner Antisemitismusstreit' in the literature 
Despite its fame, the number of contributions that deal specifically and in 
detail with the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit is small, and even within their 
number only few discuss more than one or two of the contributors, usually the 
better known ones, namely Treitschke, Mommsen and Graetz, followed by 
Cohen and Lazarus. 8 Nevertheless, some reference to the Streit can be found in 
almost every publication on anti-Semitism, in most publications on German-
Jewish history, in many on German history, in some on the history of liberalism 
and that of German historiography, and in contributions on individuals like 
Treitschke or Mommsen. This contradiction between on the one hand, the 
semblance of familiarity and on the other hand, a shortage of detailed and 
specific presentation and examination, characterizes the state of the scholarship 
on the Streit. 
The 'Berliner Antisemitismusstreit' is widely seen as an event of decisive 
significance for 
• the development or emergence of 'modern anti-Semitism', i.e. the 
transformation of 'traditional Jew-hatred' into whatever different 
authors suggest is its late nineteenth century variant or successor; and, 
• the development of liberalism, usually of German liberalism in 
particular, and its relation to nationalism. 
The questions or perspectives that most commonly inform discussions of the 
Streit are: 
• Is Treitschke's concern mainly with the nation-state, with religion or 
with race? 
• Was Treitschke's intention to contribute to an acceleration of 
assimilation, or was he aiming at the exclusion of the Jews? 
• Was Treitschke a liberal or had he stopped being a liberal at some time 
before? 
• In what way did Treitschke's intervention change the 'respectability' of 
anti-Semitism? 
8 Discussions of the Streit that include a larger number of contributors are few (Boehlich 1965b; 
Meyer 1966; Claussen 1987; Lenk 1988; Abraham 1992; Hoffmann 1997; Langer 1998; Salecker 
1999). A detailed textual analysis has only been done for Treitschke's first contribution (Holz 
2001). 
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• How different is Mommsen's position from Treitschke's? How different 
are Lazarus' and Cohen's positions from Treitschke's? How do all of the 
former relate to Graetz? 
• Was Treitschke's intervention (in respect to any of the issues listed 
above) novel and original, or is it merely a particularly visible articulation 
of something older or more general? 
Furthermore, almost all contributions note that there is some form of 
'ambivalence' in Treitschke's position (and many state the same for Mommsen). 
However, not much has explicitly been said about the nature of that 
'ambivalence', nor is there much systematic discussion of how nationalism, anti-
Semitism and liberalism relate to each other. 9 
Very few authors see Treitschke without qualification as a representative of 
racist anti-Semitism; Boehlich (1965b)lo states that Treitschke's views are not 
essentially different from those of clerical and racial anti-Semites, Berding 
(1988)" argues that Treitschke rejected racial and clerical anti-Semitism only 
verbally. Rose (1992)12 similarly calls it a 'dishonesty' for Treitschke to argue 
for assimilation when at the same time he finds it to be not really possible. 
9 The more theoretically informed contributions are Claussen 1987; Abraham 1992; Claussen 
1994a; Salecker 1999; Holz 200l. 
10 In his postscript to the edited volume, 'Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit' Walter Boehlich 
emphasizes that Treitschke formulated an 'anti-Semitism that could claim not to be anti-Semitic' 
(1965b:238). He points out that Treitschke did not think of himself as an anti-Semite 'but his 
opponents as well as his supporters did' (ibid.:240). He implicitly suggests that the 'liberal 
sounding' elements in Treitschke's language are but rhetoric and argues that 'decidedly anti-
Semitic utterances' can be found in Treitschke's writing as early as 1866 (ibid.:242). Boehlich 
asserts that Treitschke's anti-Semitism is 'a variant of speculative nationalism' (ibid.:243). 
II Helmut Berding describes the Streit as a 'prelude' to the anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1880s. 
He points out that Treitschke's relationship to Jewry and Judaism had always been 'ambivalent' 
(Berding 1988: 113). He argues that in the changed climate of 1879, Treitschke's support for 
emancipation was gradually eclipsed by 'discontent' with the Jews not having 'totally 
amalgamated with the German majority' (ibid.: 114). Berding asserts that, although Treitschke 
rejected the more explicitly racist articulations of anti-Semitism, 'he used the same phrases to the 
same effects' (ibid.:114f). 
12 Paul Lawrence Rose mentions Treitschke as a representative of 'the statist approach to the 
Jewish question' (Rose 1992:90), apparently implying a distance from what is the main theme of 
his book, the 'German revolutionary tradition' of anti-Semitism (a rather unhelpful category that 
seems to be adapted from Jacob L. Talmon's theory of the allegedly 'totalitarian' character of the 
'Jacobin tradition' of European political thought [cpo ibid.:382], into which he includes 'Kant, 
Marx, Humboldt, Herder, or Wagner' [ibid.:381]). Rose underlines that Treitschke 'was willing 
to confer civil rights on the Jews' in exchange for 'destruction of their Jewish identity' (ibid.:90). 
As long as the latter had not been completed, however, and in proportion to it, Treitschke 
'insist( ed) (like Dohm) on continuing a certain measure of administrative discrimination against 
them'. Rose points out 'a certain dishonesty' in this position, since Treitschke also believed that 
complete assimilation was actually impossible for the Jews. 
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Almog (1990) 13 acknowledges that Treitschke held racial views but was only 
intent on reducing the Jews' influence for the sake of national cohesion. 
By contrast, there are some who understand Treitschke not to have employed 
a concept of race at all; these include Meyer (1966),14 Pickus (1994),15 Kohn 
(1961),16 Stem (1977),17 Schulze (1996)18 and Hammerstein (1995).19 All of 
them see Treitschke' s concern being with the nation (religion being a subordinate 
issue). Liebeschuetz (1962)20 argues that Treitschke asserts religion for merely 
secular, namely nationalist ends. Zucker (1972/1 holds that for Treitschke, like 
for Mommsen, nation and religion were intertwined issues. 
13 Shmuel Almog states that Treitschke only 'seemingly dissociat(ed) himself from the crude 
manifestations of antisemitism in its vulgar form' (Almog 1990:34) while actually welcoming 
them. However, he 'did not seek to alter the status of the Jews, merely to reduce their influence' 
(ibid.:35). Almog depicts Treitschke as driven by a concern about 'mass immigration from the 
East' and its effects on national cohesion. 
14 Michael A. Meyer asserts that 'Treitschke's criticism of German Jewry arises neither from 
racism nor from a desire to strengthen Christianity' but mainly from a concern 'with the strength 
of the nation' (Meyer 1966: 144f): 'Since he equates diversity with divisiveness, he must consider 
the Jews a distinct danger to German national life ' (ibid.: 145). 
15 Keith H. Pickus argues that the distinction Treitschke makes between the Sephardic Jews in 
France, England and Italy on the one hand, and the 'Ostjuden' in Germany on the other hand 
indicates that Treitschke's anti-Jewish outlook is not based on a concept of race. Pickus argues 
that it is only the national character of Germans and of 'Eastern Jews' that makes impossible the 
latter's assimilation to the former (Pickus 1994:68). 
16 Hans Kohn emphasizes that Treitschke 'never went so far as other German writers of the 19th 
century' nor participated in any 'excesses' (Kohn 1961 [1946]: 116). 
17 Fritz Stern sees Treitschke's stance as 'but a reassertion of his devotion to the German state'. 
Like Stocker, Treitschke 'professed as much worry about German weakness as about Jewish 
strength' (Stern 1977:512), but 'neither Treitschke nor Stocker was a racist; all that Treitschke 
asked for was a Christian German nation. Outsiders were enemies, clever and unscrupulous 
outsiders were worse enemies' (ibid.). 
18 Hagen Schulze stresses that unlike the racial anti-Semitism of Chamberlain and Gobineau, 
'Treitschke's anti-Semitism was confined to the argument of national integration' (Schulze 
1996:258). He sees Treitschke's articles as part of a process in which 'popular anti-Semitism, 
nourished by economic factors, was combined with acute cultural anti-Semitism as Jewish 
emigrants from the East ... made their way into Western Europe'. 
19 Notker Hammerstein sees 'Treitschke's malicious as well as somewhat naIve attack on the 
Jews' (Hammerstein 1995:54) as the characteristic expression of the 'confused mind set' of the 
German educated classes (Bildungsbiirgertum) that believed that true intellectuality had to be 
rooted in community and belonging. Treitschke was driven by 'self-opinionated nationalism' not 
by 'racial-antisemitic convictions'. 
20 Hans Liebeschiitz emphasises that the 'core ofTreitschke's polemics is the Jewish '" will to 
preserve their own identity' (Liebeschiitz 1962: 172). 'Treitschke had persuaded himself that it 
was necessary to fear the Jews for the sake of the political future of the German monarchy' 
(ibid.: 179). Liebeschiitz underlines that both Treitschke and Mommsen 'demand undivided 
loyalty' to the modern nation-state (ibid.) and holds that Treitschke's 'emphasis on the religious 
aspect ... raises a problem' when at the same time 'his leading ideal, the power and health of the 
state, belonged to the secular sphere' (ibid.: 173). For Liebeschiitz, 'Treitschke did not profess a 
philosophy of racialism' (ibid.: 156). 
21 Stanley Zucker underlines that for Treitschke as well as Mommsen, 'Christianity and modem 
nationalism were so intertwined that to be truly a national, one had to become a Christian' 
(Zucker 1972:237). 
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Pulzer (1988)22 argues that Treitschke gave a merely indirect service to 
(racial) anti-Semitism by promoting aggressive national pride. Dorpalen (1957i 3 
also stresses the predominance of nationalism when he notes that anti-Semitism 
had been latent in Treitschke's writings but became virulent only when it seemed 
opportune in a context defined by a concern with the nation. Mosse (1966)24 
writes that Treitschke's concern was nationalism but with a growing racial 
tendency. Iggers (1971 )25 as well as Reemtsma (1992)26 also point to a 
22 Peter Pulzer writes that 'the Jewish question' was only a minor issue in Treitschke's writing: 
'His main services to anti-Semitism were indirect: he helped very materially to spread the type of 
coarse, brassy, aggressive national pride which, in the German context, was part of the emotional 
complex with which anti-Semitism was associated' (Pulzer 1988:243). Pulzer sees the 'evolution 
of his [Treitschke's] thought, from Saxon liberal to the high priest of Pruss ian ism (which) 
excellently illustrates the tragic cleavage which entered between the German Liberal and national 
traditions after 1866' as the background of Treitschke's role in the Streit (ibid.:240). 
23 Andreas DOIpalen asserts that Treitschke had maintained in the 1860s 'an attitude of 
condescending tolerance towards the Jews' (Dorpalen 1957:241). Neither conservative attempts 
to discredit economic liberalism as Jewish nor Catholic attempts to denounce the 'Kulturkampf 
as a Jewish maneuver 'made any noticeable impression on him' (ibid.:242). Only when 
'antisemitism became a weapon of the Bismarck camp, did he feel called upon to intervene'. 
Dorpalen seems to imply that anti-Semitism had been latent in Treitschke, but became an issue 
only when it became opportune in the larger political context. But Treitschke 'shied away from 
the consequences of his [newly acquired] beliefs' (ibid.:243): still too much ofa liberal, he did 
not support legal discrimination. 
24 George L. Masse writes that the 'ambivalence' in Treitschke's position 'derived from his 
national considerations as well as his rejection of the total racial context' (Mosse 1966:200). 
Although Treitschke started out from the liberal belief in and support for assimilation, he 
gradually replaced this with the notion of Jewish unassimilability, which tends to lead towards a 
concept of racial particularity. Mosse emphasizes the relevance of the concept of 'youth' in 
Treitschke's thinking: Germany is a young nation; therefore she is still developing her strength 
and is less able to assimilate strangers (ibid.). Mosse concludes that Treitschke's anti-Semitism 
was 'v6lkish' with a tendency to becoming increasingly racist (ibid.:201). 
25 Georg Iggers sees Treitschke's anti-Semitism in the context of his increasing 'social 
conservatism' and points to a shift in his assessment of German Jews in the succesive volumes of 
his 'German History in the 19th Century': Treitschke still 'condemned exaggerated xenophobia 
and Deutschtumelei of the' gymnasts' (Turner) and fraternities' and restricted his anti-Jewish 
remarks to criticisms of the financial power of some Jewish companies in the second volume 
(published in 1882), but in the third volume (1885) the Jews were depicted as 'an element 
destroying German culture' (Iggers 1971 :76). Although this seems to suggest a shift in 
Treitschke's attitude, Iggers also points out that both motives were present in Treitschke's writing 
at least as early as in 1869 (ibid.:73). Iggers argues that while Treitschke on the one hand 
explicitly attacks 'Ostjuden' (not assimilated 'Westjuden'), this apparent rejection of the 
terminology of race is undermined when on the other hand he attacks assimilated Jews as 
'German speaking Orientals' (ibid.). 
26 Jan Philipp Reemtsma points out that Treitschke 'argues explicitly as a Christian' (1992:307). 
He asserts that Treitschke's anti-Semitism is as much religious as it is nationalist. Treitschke, so 
Reemtsma, does not attack legal emancipation nor does he demand conversion. When Treitschke 
demands that the Jews 'become Germans', he 'merely reformulates in a nationalist manner an 
idea that had formed the basis of many approvals of Jewish emancipation: giving up one's own 
traditions is the price for the ending of civil discrimination' (ibid.:308f). Reemtsma concludes 
that Treitschke's argument is anti-Jewish but appears not to be racist. However, Reemtsma also 
states that racialism is a 'subliminal (unterschichtige) line of argument' with Treitschke 
(ibid.:309). 
12 
subliminal racism. Salecker (1999) argues that Treitschke's concern was 
primarily with 'culture'. 27 
Abraham (1992/8 sees Treitschke using the concept of race but asserts that 
he argued for miscegenation not for 'racial purity'. Claussen (1987)29 sees 
Treitschke's anti-Semitism as instrumental to an attack on the left wing of the 
National-Liberal party. Rosenberg (1930)30 argues that Treitschke wants to 
27 Hans-Joachim Salecker asserts that in the context of the Streit, the Judenfrage was a 
Kulturfi'age not a Rechtsfi'age (Salecker 1999:395). The question was whether or not the Jews 
made adequate use of their civil rights, and whether they needed to be taken care of by the state in 
a specific way 'like criminals or those of ill health'. He writes that Treitschke was not, however, a 
racist (ibid.: 133). 
28 Gmy A. Abraham holds that Treitschke's attitude towards the Jews 'contains both liberal and 
anti-Semitic elements' (Abraham 1992:93). It involved 'a subtle blurring of attributes of the 
traditional Jew and the assimilated Jew, respectively, into a single image' (ibid.:93f). Not unlike 
Stocker's or Marr's, it combined 'many of the old, Christian-inspired charges' with 'new, 
essentially secular fears of national diversity' (ibid.:94). However, Treitschke's argument that 
complete assimilation is impossible and his 'willingness to live with this situation' shows that 
'Treitschke is less than intolerant' (ibid.:95). Abraham points out that 'not far in the background 
in these discussions was the Mischvolk idea' (ibid. :97), i.e. the conception widespread in the 19th 
century (and subsequently taken up by Max Weber) that a nation draws strength from having 
mUltiple cultural or racial origins. While most liberals interpreted the Mischvolk idea culturally, 
Treitschke and Cohen argued for racial mixing. Treitschke is therefore 'not a proponent of race 
purity'. Abraham points out that Treitschke's 'proposals for legislative exclusion of Jews' were 
designed to further 'miscegenation' (ibid.). His presentation implies that all sides 'proceeded on 
the assumption that national social unity was one of the most, if not the most, pressing needs of 
the time'. Their difference lay in the understanding of 'whether national "culture" is pluralist or 
unitary' (ibid.). 
29 Detlev Claussen asserts that Treitschke 'articulates the contradictions of German liberalism: in 
the conflict between nationality and liberality, the national remains triumphant' (Claussen 
1987: 130). He points out that Treitschke's opponents, like Treitschke himself, cannot but argue 
'within the national framework'. Claussen suggests that this reflects the fact that liberal 'social 
progress' - although theoretically not national in character - has to realize itself within the limits 
of the concrete historical framework, which is that of the nation-state. 
30 Arthur Rosenberg points out that Treitschke 'demands very little from the German Jews' 
(Rosenberg 1930:78), namely assimilation and modesty. But although his program is 'apparently 
very harmless', Treitschke wants 'to prepare the ground for his own political and social world-
view' by rejecting what Treitschke calls 'Jewish-German mixed culture'. Treitschke saw in 
Christianity the 'rejection of the bourgeois spirit' while he saw in 'the Jew' its 'most obvious 
(auffalligste) embodiment' (ibid.:80). Rosenberg links the Streit to an identity crisis of the 
German educated classes after 1871 when not the (organized) bourgeoisie but the Prussian state 
and military apparatus appeared to be the backbone of German national success. A part of the 
academic 'support troops of the bourgeoisie' now re-interpreted the bourgeoisie as greedy, 
particularist materialists and gradually endorsed an (invented) aristocratic life-ideal: 'aristocratic 
man does not indulge in haggling and usury but obediently serves Emperor and Fatherland. He 
does not mock but he believes. He secures discipline and morality in household and family, in 
community and state' (ibid.:80). 'Treitschke and his comrades in mind (Gesinnungsfreunde)' 
attacked 'the Jew' so heavily 'because they want to liberate themselves from the "Jew" that 
inhabits themselves'. Rosenberg distinguishes academic anti-Semitism from the economic anti-
Semitism of the lower middle classes. Unlike the lower middle classes, academics were not 
threatened economically due to the restrictive and conservative routes of access to academic 
positions. Rosenberg also points out that anti-Semitism has not been a defining characteristic of 
Bismarck's outlook nor that of the aristocracy in general- dislike of Jews (but also of Gentile 
bourgeois homines nov;) notwithstanding. Furthermore, Bismarck's struggle against the Liberals 
did not indicate a 'fundamental split with the bourgeoisie' (ibid.:82f). Rosenberg's analysis 
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promote a specific worldview in which the Jews represent 'bourgeois man'. 
Rosenberg interprets Treitschke's argument as rooted in an identity crisis of a 
section of the German educated classes who were under the impression that the 
Prussian aristocracy not the German bourgeoisie was leading the new state and 
aimed to reposition themselves on the winning side by adopting an 'aristocratic 
life ideal' opposed to bourgeois materialism and greediness (which the bourgeois 
seemed to share with the working class). 
Few authors judge that Treitschke had clearly 'distanced himself from the 
liberal tradition (Kampe 1987).31 Nipperdey/Riirup (1972)32 argue Treitschke 
opposed 'modem liberal society'; Hackeschmidt (1997)33 asserts that 
Treitschke's demand for assimilation was 'hypocritical' since assimilation had 
already happened to a large extent. 
Ragins34 writes that Treitschke was 'a liberal with impeccable credentials' 
(Ragins 1980: 15) whose concern was neither with race nor with religion but with 
the Jews' maintaining their national traits. Treitschke attacked the Jews from 
within liberalism. Lindemann also notes that Treitschke was a 'liberal in the 
implies that Treitschke's position is rooted in over-assimilating to the anti-liberalism of 
Bismarck's politics due to misinterpreting the nature of German Imperial society. 
31 Norbert Kampe holds that Treitschke's position in the Streit marked 'the end point ofa ten-
year process of distancing himself from Liberalism' (Kampe 1987:46). Kampe evaluates 
Treitschke's 'claim to be keeping his distance from Radauantisemitismus' as merely rhetorical 
(ibid.:47). 
32 Thomas Nipperdey and Reinhard Riirup see Treitschke's anti-Semitism as a 'fundamental 
criticism of the principles and manifestations of modem liberal society' (Nipperdey/ Rurup 
1972: 136). Treitschke's anti-Semitism is both nationalist and anti-liberal and 'a symptom of the 
splitting off of radical and integral nationalism from the liberals' moderate nationalism' 
(ibid.: 146). 
33 Jorn Hackeschmidt sees Treitschke's text as 'blowing up the floodgates' and as 'paradigmatic 
for the outbreak of a latent anti-Semitism' (Hackeschmidt 1997:81 f). 
34 Sanford Ragins writes that Treitschke criticized the Jews not for racial or theological reasons, 
but for 'maintaining national traits that were alien to the German character' «Ragins 1980: 14f, 
italics in the original). While Jews 'should have equal rights in the state, he maintained that 
membership in the German nation was a different matter'. However, because Treitschke saw 'no 
room for double nationality' on 'German soil' (ibid.: 16), the Jews had to fully assimilate into the 
German nation (their membership in the state notwithstanding) or else emigrate. Ragins asserts 
that 'Treitschke's assault was particularly serious' not so much because of his high prestige, but 
'because it was an attack on the emancipated Jew mounted from within liberalism' (italics in the 
original). He 'was in truth the spokesman for a major tendency within German liberal Protestant 
circles' (ibid.: 16f). For them, 'Christianity still had to be the foundation of the state by acting as a 
moral and educational force suffusing all areas of life with religious self-consciousness' 
(ibid.: 17). Germany was to them a Kulturnation, based in Christian (i.e. Protestant) culture. 
Ragins emphasizes that also those liberals who were less or not at all interested in 'a strong 
Christian presence' confirmed the 'necessity for homogenization', quoting Mommsen as the most 
'illustrious' example. 
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lunkerized sense of the time', his argument was 'relatively sober and intelligent' 
and not racist (Lindemann 1997: 133).35 
Lindemann's assessment recalls that by Franz Mehring (1882)36 who wrote a 
fierce polemic against Stocker's anti-Semitic party in which he contrasted 
Treitschke favourably to Stocker: 
It was a serious political obligation to bring into the open the hatred that 
was smoldering under the ashes, before its invisible ravages had affected 
the noblest parts of our national organism. To have done this, and in the 
only dignified manner possible, namely with manly frankness and 
scientific seriousness, is the great and unforgettable contribution of 
Treitschke. This patriotic deed not only meet objective opposition, often 
from equally honorable motives - I mention only Cohen's high-minded, 
serious rebuttal; it also had to suffer the most disgusting vilification. This 
was a wretched attempt at intellectual terrorism (Gesinnungsterror) all the 
more contemptible since it tried to sail under a 'liberal' flag and usually 
originated with people who for their part made the most extensive, not to 
say intemperate, use of the right of free speech (quoted from the translation 
in Massing 1949:313-6). 
35 Albert S. Lindemann writes that most of what Treitschke brought up in 1879-1880 'had already 
been widely discussed by liberal intellectuals in the 1860s'. Treitschke merely reformulated the 
common liberal concerns that many Jews 'seemed unwiIIing to sacrifice enough of their sense of 
separateness' in order to blend into the German nation (Lindemann 1997: 132) 'in a more forceful 
language - and in a much more emotion-filled context'. Treitschke was like most liberals 'tom 
between the demands of personal liberty and those of state power'. As 'a later generation of 
Zionists' would confirm, Jews 'did indeed have significantly different cultural traditions from the 
rest of the population' (ibid.: 136), which makes the Jewish question for Lindemann a 'real 
problem'. Lindemann writes that 'conceivably, if men of the caliber of Treitschke, Cohen, and 
Mehring had set the tone of the debate in the ensuing generation, some happier resolution or at 
least diminution of the tensions between Jews and non-Jews in Germany at this time might have 
emerged' (ibid.). Lindemann does not agree that Treitschke 'set the tone' of the anti-Semitic 
discourse. Although Treitschke's 'concern about retaining the purity of the German spirit and 
protecting German unity' (ibid.: 137) contradict his professions of toleration, Lindemann finds 
valid Treitschke's claim that the fact that the German nation is 'a young nation' that has been 
'defenseless against alien manners for so long' explains and partly legitimizes the anti-Semitic 
agitation (ibid.: 137). Lindemann asserts that 'German Jews themselves, in seeking to limit the 
influx of Ostjuden in Germany, had often made points similar to those ofTreitschke, especially 
that Jews from Eastern Europe were too much attached to the idea of Jewish nationhood to be 
absorbed into German national feeling' (ibid.: 138). He adds that some 'prominent Jewish 
observers' judged 'even harsher' than Treitschke or Marr the tendency of wealthy Berlin Jews to 
show off their newly acquired riches. 
Lindemann's presentation is directed by his desire to make the point strongly that the anti-
Semites of the 19th century were not 'proto-Nazis' and that anti-Semitism was not a quasi 
inherent trait of a specific 'German culture' (as e.g. Rose [1992] argues). Similar to writers from 
the Marxist tradition (Massing, Horkheimer, Adorno, Claussen), Lindemann presents anti-
Semitism as part of the normality of liberal society. Due to the absence, though, of a clear 
critique of liberal society (that would have to include that of anti-Semitism) some of 
Lindemann's formulations could be misconstrued as apologetic of anti-Semitism. 
36 Having been a Lassallean, Mehring did not join the Social Democratic Party in 1875 because 
of its predominantly Marxist orientation and kept aloof from it until the mid-l 880s (Massing 
1949: 185t). After this date he became one of the party's most influential intellectuals. 
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The thrust of Mehrings article is to oppose Treitschke's reasonable treatment of 
the issue to Stocker's unreasonable and irresponsible way: 
For it is evidently one thing to analyze the Jewish question as a 
contemporary phenomenon under scientific, historical, psychological, 
social aspects; and another to make it the substance of political party 
strategy, of political mass agitation, carrying it as an immediate issue into 
groups who can react to it only emotionally and not with reason .... For the 
danger of 'unleashing the beast' is nowhere greater than here. The Jewish 
question brings into play the three most potent sources of hatred known in 
history: a religious, a racial, and a class conflict (ibid.). 
In a similar vein, the National-Liberal Gustav Freytag contrasted in his famous 
text' On anti-Semitism, a Pentecostal contemplation' (1910 [1893]) 'the patriotic 
complaint of a well-meaning man of sincere intentions' to the concerns of 'angry 
and discontent agitators' (Freytag 1910: 12).37 Niewyk (1990)38 argued that 
Treitschke merely aimed at accelerating' amalgamation', and that also the liberal 
'notables' in their anti-antisemitic declaration most of all complained that anti-
Semitic demagoguery slowed down the process of assimilation.39 
Bab (1988)40 argued that Treitschke broke from the liberal tradition, but still 
stood 'unconditionally' behind legal emancipation. Wolff (1984)41 saw 
37 Freytag does not name Treitschke as this 'well-meaning man' but the allusion is quite clear 
from the context. 
38 Donald L. Niewyk argues for a clear cut distinction between 'the most common brand of 
antisemitism in the Second Reich' (Niewyk 1990:338) and Nazi-style racism. He asserts that the 
position held in common by Treitschke, Stocker, Wagner and de Lagarde was 'more a demand to 
accelerate the pace of amalgamation than a threat of reprisal'. He underlines that anti-Semites in 
1879 and the defenders of Jewish emancipation had more in common than the former have with 
later Nazi-style anti-Semites. 
39 The 'Declaration of the notables' is printed in Pulzer (1988: 326f). 
40 In Julius Bab's book, 'Life and death of German Jewry' (written in 1939, but only published in 
1988) Treitschke's text is seen as 'the first case of an intellectually eminent German breaking 
from the liberal tradition (der erste Bruch eines geistig hervorragenden Deutschen mit der 
liberalen Tradition)' and as 'much more important' than the anti-Semitic writings by, for 
example, Glagau and Marr (Bab 1988:71). Nevertheless, he emphasizes Treitschke's distance 
from National Socialism with the drastic remark that Treitschke would 'without doubt end up in 
the concentration camps of the Third Reich' (ibid.) - although his formulation, 'the Jews are our 
misfortune' sits on the front page heading of every copy of the Nazi publication, the 'Sturmer'. 
Bab asserts that Treitschke 'unconditionally' rejected the limitation of the constitutional rights of 
the Jews and 'was critical merely of the literary attitude of the Jews' and their 'lack of 
nationalism' (ibid.:72). Bab, who had been an intluentialleft-liberal cultural and theater critic in 
Berlin in the years before and after WWI, adds that he was himself for many years a friend of 
Treitschke's daughter, who was 'an equally passionate patriot as her father' and even let pass a 
part of Treitschke's private library into his own 'Jewish hands'. He quotes this as evidence for the 
complete lack of an anti-Semitic spirit 'in today's meaning of the word' in Treitschke's 
household. 
41 Theodor WolfJin his book 'The Jews' (written in 1942/3 but only published in 1984) makes 
fun ofTreitschke's affirmation that he did not want to see Jewish emancipation reversed. Wolff 
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Treitschke still within the humanistic tradition, which prevents him from 
attacking legal emancipation. Abraham (1992) finds Treitschke's argument both 
liberal and antisemitic, but 'less than intolerant' (Abraham 1992:95). Hoffmann 
sees Treitschke as a 'formerly liberal' (Hoffmann 1997:225). Lenk holds that 
Treitschke turned away from liberalism around 1866 (Lenk 1988:28) but finds 
race thinking is not dominant in his argument (ibid.:31). 
Massing (1949) relates Treitschke's anti-Semitism to his vision of 
nationalism.42 Holz (2001) argues that Treitschke's 'national anti-Semitism' is a 
specific 'post-liberal' world-view that is not strictly anti-liberal since it still 
argues in a historical, secular and national fashion - fundamental features of 
liberal reasoning.43 In Holz's account, Treitschke's 'ambivalence' is presented in 
such a way that the ethnic-ontological undercurrent of his reasoning was held 
remarks sarcastically: 'Not even on Treitschke can one rely .... Compared to today's standards, 
what half-heartedness, what hesitation, what inability to get away from Humboldt's humanistic 
spirit, from culture! A little thunder, a few lightnings, and Treitschke confesses to the acquired 
rights, to the fact of emancipation!' (Wolff 1984: 119). 
42 Paul W. Massing writes: 'Treitschke's anti-Semitism was anchored in his nationalism, but this 
nationalism was still related to some of the traditional values of Western civilization. For him the 
national state was the most worthy object of an individual's devotion. As a consequence, 
Treitschke thought that Jews were dangerous because he felt that they remained aloof from the 
state and the Protestant monarchy. He believed that they were undermining the heroic idealism 
that had brought about the Reich. The frame of reference of his anti-Semitism was the conflict 
between the state and the individual, between unity and liberty, authoritarian decision and 
parliamentary compromise. It held out to Jews the possibility of complete national and social 
integration if they would side with the forces of national self-assertion' (Massing 1949:76). 
43 Klaus Holz provides a detailed analysis of the wording and semantic structure of Treitschke's 
first statement. Holz writes that Treitschke's is a founding text of a specific 'Weltanschauung 
(world view)' that he refers to as 'nationaler Antisemitismus' (ibid. passim). Within the broader 
category of 'national anti-Semitism', Holz characterizes Treitschke's position as 'post-liberal 
anti-Semitism' (ibid.: 12). Holz locates Treitschke's anti-Semitism in the context of the 
campaigns against Catholics and socialists as well as the policy of Germanization in Alsace 
Lorraine and against the Polish minority (ibid.: 169), all of which aimed to promote 'national 
unity' by creating 'interior enemies'. He argues that 'national anti-Semitism' meant the 
'integration into a world-view' (zu einer Weltanschauung verdichtet werden) of all oppositions 
towards whatever was considered 'un-German'. Holz argues that Treitschke's (modem, national) 
anti-Semitic 'world-view' is both, 'anti-liberal' and 'post-liberal' insofar as it 'inherited some 
essential characteristics of the liberal world-view' (ibid.: 171): it is 'historical, national and 
secular'. Treitschke's 'attractivity' (ibid.: 172) was that he was 'not a conservative or clerical' but 
'a formerly liberal' thinker who challenged the liberals' 'predominant emancipatory self-
perception ... from within'. Holz emphasizes that Treitschke's 'respectable (salonHihiger) anti-
Semitism' and Stocker's 'anti-Semitism of the street (Radauantisemitismus)' shared much of 
their 'semantic structure' (Sinngehalt) (ibid.: 173). What prevented Treitschke from calling for 
taking back legal emancipation was the fact that it would have destabilized the Reich, and this 
would have conflicted with the functional place of anti-Semitism within Treitschke's apologism 
of the German Reich. Holz concludes that 'post-liberal anti-Semitism' takes up and stresses the 
older liberal demand for the Jews to assimilate, while it re-evaluates the other side of the older 
liberal position, legal emancipation, without challenging it directly. Holz further notes that there 
is also a notion of an 'ethnic-ontological' moment in Treitschke's position that differentiates 'the 
Jews' from 'the (Christian) Germans' and can not be overcome by assimilation. He argues that 
these two dimensions of Treitschke's text remain un-reconciled. 
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back by its national-statist framework: Treitschke could not allow himself to 
come to the conclusion that emancipation be revoked because this would have 
destabilized the national state and its constitution. Langer too sees Treitschke's 
anti-Semitism as functional to his nationalism.44 Claussen sees as Treitschke's 
underlying aim the desire to homogenize (vereinheitlichen) 'antagonistic 
capitalist society' (Claussen 1987: 132) with the strong national state as the goal. 
Treitschke wants the necessity of assimilation to be pronounced 'consciously as 
an imperative' while his liberal opponents 'from Harry Bresslau through 
Bamberger to Mommsen' assume 'assimilation and integration into the national 
state' to take place 'spontaneously (naturwuechsig),. Claussen likens the two 
positions to 'the moderate and the brutal face of bourgeois society' (ibid.: 134). 
The 'liberal arguments against Treitschke' are limited by the 'illusion of a 
perpetually moderate form of nationalism'. 
Pulzer (1988) sees the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit as the manifestation of a 
cleavage between nationalism and liberalism that developed after 1866. 
Talmon (1965) sees Treitschke's anti-Semitism as the 'watershed' signifying the 
emergence of modem anti-Semitism as a definite ideological system in which 
lew-hatred would have a crucial place.45 
44 Ulrich Langer discusses the Streit as paradigmatic for the relationship between liberalism and 
anti-Semitism in Treitschke's thinking (Langer 1998:292). He emphasizes the (usually 
unacknowledged) fact that Treitschke's initial statement on the anti-Semitic movement was 
embedded in a discussion of domestic as well as international politics stressing the particular 
urgency of 'harmony between crown and people' (Langer 1998:303). Langer stresses as the 
decisive element of Treitschke's argument that he saw anti-Semitism as a necessary and 
inevitable moment of the process of strengthening national consciousness (ibid.:306). He 
concludes that although 'Treitschke's anti-Semitism lacked racist-Darwinist traits', it was 'no 
coincidence' that 'fanatical anti-Semitic nationalists like Naudh' applauded his contribution 
(ibid.:319). Langer concludes that the Streit was both, a 'deep caesura' in Treitschke's political 
biography and a 'turning point in the development of German liberalism' (ibid.:385) making the 
question oflegal equality of the Jews a touchstone separating' conservatives and far right wing 
National Liberals' on the one side, 'determined liberals with a mind for emancipation' on the 
other side. Langer concludes: 'Treitschke's personal responsibility lies on the one hand in 
pretending not to embrace the crude anti-Semitism of the anti-Semitic parties but on the other 
hand to stylize himself as the chosen interpreter of the national spirit (erwiihlten Auguren des 
Volksgeistes),. Langer sees as Treitschke's ultimate motivation his 'deep fear that the Germans' 
national and religious identity was in danger' (ibid.:385). 
45 Jacob Leib Talman asserts that 'Treitschke may be looked upon as a watershed between the 
traditional hatred of the Jews and modem theoretical anti-semitism' (Talmon 1965: 142). 
According to Talmon, Jew-hatred is 'rather a peripheral and empirical matter' for the former 
while in the latter it becomes 'a central point in a definite ideological system'. 'Modem 
theoretical anti-semitism' questioned 'the fundamental assumptions of Christianity in respect of 
the unity of mankind, the brotherhood of men, each created in the image of God. The who Ie of 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition had to be thrown overboard'. Talmon suggests that this was 'only a 
short step' from Treitschke's intermediate position (ibid.: 143). 
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That Treitschke made anti-Semitism 'respectable', seems to be the one thing 
everybody agrees on. Respectab1efor whom, is rarely clarified; the formulations 
differ considerably: for Langer (1998:385),46 anti-Semitism became respectable 
for the bourgeoisie, for Boeh1ich (1965b:23 7) for the educated classes, for Meyer 
(1966:144) for academia. Stem (1977:512) alone argues that Treitschke made 
anti-Semitism part of patriotism. Nipperdey and Rurup state that Treitschke 
made the anti-Semitic movement 'respectable (gesellschaftsfahig), in the sense 
of making it 'an issue for the general public (publizistischen) discussion' 
(Nipperdey; Rurup 1972: 138). Pu1zer points out that Treitschke was the most 
important academic to shed respectability on anti-Semitism since other authors 
like Rohling and Duhring 'were altogether too extreme and dotty' (Pu1zer 
1988:240). 
Bab (1988:74) and Wo1ff(1984:117ff) made enthusiastic remarks on 
Mommsen,47 and also Kampe sees him as the defender of enlightenment and 
tolerance (1987:47). Mosse held the view that Mommsen 'castigated' Treitschke 
for his nationalist views (1966:202), while Dorpa1en wrote that he 'gently 
slapped his hand' (1957:244). Wehler finds that Theodor Mommsen 
'campaigned uncompromisingly against the "delusion" (Kompromiss1os zog er 
gegen den "Wahn" zu Felde) .. .' (Wehler 1995:928). 
Pickus writes that Mommsen rearticu1ated the Enlightenment argument about 
Jewish 'character defects' that needed amelioration (1994:68). Berding holds that 
for Mommsen, the values of liberalism were still superior to nationalism 
(1988:115). Langer finds Mommsen's intervention 'a true masterpiece of 
liberally minded political publicizing' although 'even' Mommsen's liberalism 
had its limits (Langer 1998:320f).48 Liebeschuetz found that Mommsen 'hates 
46 Langer (1998:306) states that Treitschke made the anti-Semitism 'of the street', not anti-
Semitism sans phrase 'sa10nHihig'. 
47 Bab quotes Mommsen's assertion that the German Jews are indeed Germans and concludes 
that 'these magnificent words that betrayed once more in Germany the ideas of a free mind of 
genuine historical awe are today [i.e. 1938] more than worth listening to (diese prachtvollen 
W orte, in denen die Anschauung eines freien Geistes von echter geschichtlicher Ehrfurcht sich 
noch einma1 in Deutschland kundtat, sind heut mehr a1s je horenswert' (Bab 1988:74). 
48 Langer notes that Mommsen 'insisted with a courage (Zivilcourage) that was impressive-
although this should have gone without saying for a liberal- that the Jews were Germans' 
(ibid.:321). Langer points, though, also to the 'ambivalence' that can be found 'even' in 
Mommsen's argument: 'like Treitschke', Mommsen appealed to the Jews to accelerate their 
assimilation. 'The limitations of even a determinedly progressive (aufgekHirt-kampferischen) 
liberal of the nineteenth century become apparent here: he sees the continued existence of a 
particular minority that is bound together by religion and tradition ( ... ) as a danger for the 
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the use of religion as an instrument of political restoration, while he advises the 
Jews to drop their separate existence' (1962:180). 
The general tendency of the literature is, however, to stress the 
commonalities between Treitschke's and Mommsen's positions. Stem (1977) 
notes for example that 'even Mommsen' saw conversion as the fair price to be 
paid for emancipation. Meyer (1966) asserts that pluralism seemed a danger for 
Mommsen, and that also Cohen and Bresslau held views close to Treitschke's; he 
points to Bamberger who considered the 'Christian state' a 'lesser evil' than the 
socialist state - a view that Bamberger shared with Treitschke.49 
Abraham (1992) points out that Mommsen was 'no more pluralist than 
Treitschke'. While both see nation based on unitary culture, Mommsen 
reproaches Treitschke merely for escalating social antagonism (1992:104).50 Low 
(1979)51 also asserts that Treitschke and Mommsen equally reject ethnical 
pluralism as the basis for the national state, but deploy different tactics towards 
existence of a society that is modeled on the ideal of the nation and the national state. He has not 
yet managed to progress towards (sich durchzuringen vermochte) the belief in the [possibility of] 
a peaceful coexistence of different religious and cultural milieus on an equal footing' (Langer 
1998:322). 
49 Meyer notes that the 'Jewish reaction' to Mommsen was 'quite critical' because Mommsen like 
Treitschke 'could see only danger in cultural pluralism' (Meyer 1966: 168). Meyer writes that 
Manuel Joel 'rushed into print with a hastily conceived open letter' that 'possessed little intrinsic 
merit' (ibid.: 146) while Lazarus' speech displayed 'considerable ingenuity in showing the logical 
inconsistencies of any argument that would make the Jews a special case' (ibid.:147). Meyer 
underlines that Lazarus makes Judaism 'fit the pattern of the Christian denominations', while 
strongly arguing for cultural pluralism. Bresslau's statement, Meyer writes, 'is entirely devoid of 
any independent conception of a Jewish future' and 'sympathizes with Treitschke's desire that 
the Jews hasten the process of their own amalgamation into the German nation' (ibid.: 149). 
Meyer states that Hermann Cohen's 'conception of German culture was much closer to 
Treitschke's own than was that of Lazarus or even Bresslau' since for Cohen, 'Kantian thought 
provided a common faith which could be shared by all Germans'. The Jews should maintain 
'their own forms ofre1igious worship' but strive for spiritual and physical unity with the German 
nation (ibid.: 151). Meyer points out that Treitschke 'was well pleased with Cohen's position' 
while the Jewish press regarded it 'more as a betrayal than a defense'. Bamberger's pamphlet, 
however, was received favorably without exception within the Jewish press (ibid.: lS3f). 
50 Abraham emphasizes that 'Mommsen's statement is important because it shows the limits of 
German liberalism at the time on the question of so-called national minorities' (Abraham 
1992: 101). In Mommsen's use of the Mischvolk concept, 'ethnic pluralism seems to be a 
transitional phase in the development of modem nations. What separates Mommsen from 
Treitschke, is that Mommsen finds that Treitschke's 'demagoguery' escalates the antagonism of 
groups. 
51 Alfred D. Low writes that Treitschke and Mommsen engaged 'in ideological combat with each 
other' merely about 'tact and tactics' He asserts that 'the nineteenth-century German demand ... 
for the assimilation and ultimate merger of the Jews with the Germans sprang also from the 
seemingly progressive, liberal, and national program for a strong, unitary, homogeneous nation. It 
aimed at the demise of all territorial, cultural, national, and religious peculiarities and differences' 
(Low 1979:411). Low argues that most Germans including many Jews 'held that any alien 
nationality on German soil had the duty to work towards its own cultural and national extinction' 
(ibid.:412). 
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promoting assimilation. Ragins (1980) stresses that Mommsen also saw the 
necessity for homogenization; Ragins sees Lazarus restating emancipation 
ideology. 52 Geismann argues that Mommsen as well as Cohen failed to defend 
liberal principles against Treitschke.53 Hoffmann sees Mommsen's contributions 
as emblematic for the inability ofliberals to oppose modem anti-Semitism for 
two reasons: firstly, liberals like Mommsen rejected 'cultural pluralism', and 
secondly, liberalism could not explain the 'dynamism of the anti-Semitic 
movement' because 'liberalism lacked a theory of its own crisis' (Hoffmann 
1997:249). 
Bacharach (1980)54 writes that Lazarus harbored 'spiritual racism' and 
'spiritual chauvinism' and points to the Herderian influence on him; he writes 
that Cohen went even further in the anti-liberal direction and demanded racial 
unity for the state. Langer (1998) however stresses in Lazarus the 'rejection of 
narrow minded nationalism'. He notes that Bresslau and Cohen are closer to 
Treitschke's position than Mommsen whose position is ambivalent.55 Lindemann 
52 Ragins understands Lazarus' speech as 'an eloquent restatement of emancipation ideology and, 
in particular, of the Jewish understanding of German nationalism'. He 'reaffirmed Jewry's long-
established self-perception of the compatibility of Jewish identity with full German identity' 
(Ragins 1980:30). Ragins notes that Lazarus' position 'was to underlie all subsequent 
justifications of Jewish self-defense' . 
53 Georg Geismann criticizes Mommsen's demand for 'toleration of Jewish particularity' 
(Mommsen 1965b:223) as inconsistent with the concept of liberal right: 'Wherever there is right, 
the talk of toleration is suspect and dangerous' (Geismann 1993:379). He argues that Cohen's 
failure to oppose Treitschke is 'incomprehensible and shocking' (ibid.:372). He states that the 
Kantian philosopher Cohen should have been expected to defend the liberal notion that the state 
is obliged to 'grant' civil rights to every citizen because human right included a claim to civil 
rights (ibid.:373). Geismann concludes that the Streit - given that nobody actually opposed 
Treitschke's relinquishing of any concept of universal right - marks the final stage of a long 
decline of the tradition of jus naturalism (Geismann 1993:380). 
54 Walter Zwi Bacharach points out that Lazarus' demand that the Jews should cultivate 'a 
feeling of belonging to the German people' logically presupposes that 'belonging' is to a high 
degree subject to choice (Bachrach 1980: 199). On the other hand, though, he raised an argument 
that 'did not differ much from "spiritual racism'" (ibid.; Bacharach translates Lazarus term 
'Stamm' [tribe] as 'race') and displayed 'a form of spiritual chauvinism' of a Herderian kind 
(ibid.:200). Bacharach points out that Cohen in his response to Lazarus even went beyond the 
form of 'chauvinism' displayed by Lazarus; he 'yearned for national unity within which "racial 
unity" (Raceneinheit) would prevail' (ibid.). Cohen, as Bacharach underlines, stressed 'physical 
singularity' as part of a 'more sublime inner unity' promoting the development of 'the racial 
type'. Bacharach concludes: 'Naturally we must not attribute to Hermann Cohen racist trends of 
thought such as those spread by racial antisemitism. But we cannot ignore his use of this 
dangerous form of argument. The vagueness and the undefined quality of these phrases led to an 
ambivalent understanding of Cohen's words, and it is this very ambiguous, mystical quality 
which comprises the theory of national racism' (ibid.:200f). 
55 Langer sees Lazarus' speech as a strong and influential rejection of 'narrow-minded 
nationalism' (Langer 1998:308f). He presents Cassel's position as 'a plea for the restoration of 
occidental cosmopolitan Christianity against currently thriving cosmopolitan nihilism' adding 
that the latter's 'pre-Christmas' appeal did not have far-reaching effects (ibid.:312). Langer 
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(1997)56 stresses that Mommsen, Cohen and Bamberger agreed with Treitschke's 
judgement of Graetz. Hamburger (1968:219) writes that the 'most militant 
(kampferischste) refutation of Treitschke's pamphlet' was by Paulus Cassel. 
underlines that Bresslau agreed with Treitschke's ideas about the necessity of assimilation and 
merely criticized Treitschke's reference to anti-Semitism as counterproductive (ibid.:313f). 
Further, Langer mentions that Cohen 'subscribed to a similar metaphysics of the state' as 
Treitschke did (ibid.:316). Langer agrees with Bamberger's interpretation that Treitschke's 
turning nationality into a 'cult' (ibid.:317) was instrumental to his struggle against liberalism. 
56 Lindemann confirms Treitschke's (and others') assessment that 'the sense of Jewish 
superiority' expressed in the eleventh volume of Heinrich Graetz's 'History of the Jews' 'was at 
times narrow and excessive' (Lindemann 1997: 140). Lindemann clearly overstates the point 
when he writes that 'compared with it, Treitschke's history of the Germans may be described as 
generous in spirit'. On Graetz's method he says: 'Graetz conceived Jewish history as the 
unfolding of an immanent idea and was inclined to minimize the notion of productive interplay 
between Jew and Gentile'. 
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1.3 The historical background 
1.3.1 Liberalism 
1.3.1.1. The concept of 'liberalism' 
Many discussions of the concept of 'liberalism' suggest a distinction be 
made between liberalism as a 'world-view,57 or a tradition of thought, and 
liberalism as a political program, set of practices, a movement or even - most 
narrowly - as the name of a political party with specific values and goals. 58 
Arblaster (1984: 11 ff) suggests that only such positions ought to be called liberal 
in the full sense of the word that pursue specifically liberal goals and values -
such as individual rights and freedoms, limited government, religious toleration, 
free-market economics - against the backdrop of the specifically liberal world-
view, namely methodological individualism, secularism, confidence in the use of 
reason, confidence in progress. This definition acknowledges that goals that are 
57 This means a notion of 'human nature', a theory of society, of history and especially of the 
relation between 'man', society and history. 
58 Extracting an encompassing definition of the concept of 'liberalism' from the existing literature 
is extremely difficult. Janik writes that liberalism is best understood as a relational element within 
a dynamic range of concepts (Janik 1996:66) from 'reactionary' through 'conservative' and 
'liberal' to 'radical'. Whatever in any given moment in time may be the precise meaning of any 
of these concepts depends on how all of them are related to each other by discursive practice. 
Janik writes that 'liberalism' is a concept of the type of 'essentially contested concepts' that 
constitute a specific kind of discussion, and a range of disagreements that are considered as 
legitimate within the framework of that discussion (ibid.:67). In this sense, a definition of the 
concept can only be given by taking account of the different forms of dissent about what it means 
both, amongst adherents ofliberalism and between the latter and their opponents. However, even 
such a very' liberal' way of defining the concept needs some minimum degree of normative 
definition to start with. 
George L. Mosse for example distinguishes 'Liberal thought' - in particular individualism 
and the concept of Bildung as an unending process - from 'Liberal politics' (Mosse 1987:XIV). 
Jarausch and Jones write that liberalism is not only 'an organized political movement' but also 'a 
set of cultural attitudes, social practices, and economic principles' (Jarausch/Jones 1990:13). 
Friedrich Meinecke reflected on the same phenomenon when he noted in 1927 that liberalism had 
by that time become a ferment of political and intellectual normality to such a degree that 'one 
either ignores or takes it for granted' (quoted in Vierhaus 1982:784). This reflects the fact that 
Liberalism as a political program, or even a political party, came into existence only after a 
significant portion of what could be called 'liberal society' had already been realized, such as the 
splitting oftraditional social order into separate spheres - the economic, the political and 'the 
social' (the latter being that which is left from 'traditional society' after 'economy' and 'politics' 
have been established as separate spheres). While liberalism as a political program can only 
meaningfully exist within the context of bourgeois, liberal society, that society may have been 
brought about by people who were not 'bourgeois liberals'. Langewiesche (2000:xiii) notes for 
example that before the era of the founding of the German Reich the calls for 'economic 
liberalism', i.e. the freeing of 'the economy' from 'shackles of all kinds' did not typically come 
from people called 'Liberals'. This important aspect of the historical process has been obscured 
by the notion - itself a piece of liberal ideology - that a 'rising bourgeoisie' ended or transformed 
the ancien regime (with or without recourse to some event called 'bourgeois revolution'). 
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typically pursued by liberals can also be pursued by people who have different 
(for example socialist or conservative) world-views, and also that liberal 
presuppositions (in terms of world-view) can lead to 'illiberal conclusions' (as in 
the case of Hobbes). 
If one accepted this proposition, a large part of political thought and praxis in 
the context of modem society could be interpreted as if on a sliding scale that 
includes liberals who pursue illiberal politics, 'properly liberal' (ideal-typical) 
liberals and non-liberals who - in an almost ironic sense - contribute crucially to 
the materialization of the aims of liberal politics. One of the pivots of both, 
liberal thought and liberal political praxis, is the invocation of progress and 
harmony. All major divisions within the liberal tradition can be understood as 
differences about what exactly needs to be done, or needs to be avoided, to 
further progress and harmony. Within that proposition, a very large array of 
policies can be, and has been, accomodated.59 
However, the existing scholarly literature is far from any generally accepted 
systematization but tends to address any or all of the above under the category 
'liberal' without bothering too much with definitions.6o 
59 Wallerstein plays on the twofold meaning of the term 'liberalism' with his suggestion to 
distinguish between 'lower case' and 'upper case' liberalism. He argues that, on the one hand, 
(lower case) liberalism is 'the global ideology' or 'the geoculture ( ... ) of the modem world-
system' (Wallerstein 1995: I), 'which is at heart nothing but modernity' (ibid.:90), on the other 
hand, a particular movement or party within this framework (upper case Liberalism). He stresses 
that all over Europe, since around 1848 Liberals and Conservatives came to a form of 
'reconciliation' based on the recognition by Liberals of the centrality of protecting property and 
the Conservatives' recognition of the utility ofliberal reform for Conservative purposes 
(ibid.:87). The more (lower case) liberalism succeeded in becoming 'the dominant ideology of 
the world-system', Liberalism disintegrated. Ironically, the success of (lower case) liberalism 
'was in fact put into effect by the combined effort of conservatives and socialists'. 'Enlightened 
Conservatives' like Disraeli and Bismarck 'were willing to make the great leap that the Liberals 
never dared to make' (ibid.: 101). For example, it was not typically Liberals who first broadened 
the suffrage - which, after the event, has nevertheless been interpreted as implicit in the liberal 
world-view. Much more than the extension of suffrage, the transformation of existing states into 
modem nation-states was a pivotal liberal issue that was also initially resented by Conservatives 
as well as Socialists. However, 'the "outlying" zones' (in a geographical as well as social sense) 
of what were to become national societies could only effectively be integrated into their 
respective nation-states by socialist and conservative movements in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century (ibid.:l0l). 
60 An 'ideal-typical' liberal writer, in Arblaster's sense, would be Charles de Montesquieu who 
suggested a set of pragmatic measures to ensure liberty (such as separation of powers, 
constitutional 'checks and balances') based on a discussion of human society (Janik 1996:70ff). 
Especially the fact that Montesquieu looked for ways to adopt the example of English political 
institutions by adapting them to the specific and different historical conditions (of France, in his 
case) rather than plainly emulating them makes Montesquieu paradigmatic for what much later 
would be called 'National Liberalism' (ibid.). 
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My discussion of the concept 'liberalism' starts from the question, who 
formed it and with what meaning, and proceeds to identify the concept's pre-
history - i.e. the history of the concept before the word was first used in the 
period of the American and French revolutions - and to how it subsequently 
branched out into more differentiated concepts and uses. 
Liberalism as an explicitly political programme is a product of the 
experience of the American and French revolutions. In this context and 
immediately after, the word referred to those who opposed the restoration of the 
ancien regime (Vierhaus 1982:743) and advocated careful reform 'in keeping 
with the times'. Before that, however, the word 'liberal' meant the attitude or 
views that would typically, or even naturally, be held by any benevolent, 
generous, reasonable, unprejudiced, educated, morally and emotionally balanced 
person - characteristics that would in the bourgeois age be thought of as those of 
an independent, sovereign bourgeois individual (ibid.:745).61 The modem 
political concept 'liberal' preserved and exploited its pre-modem and pre-
political meaning.62 
In Germany, at least from the 1780s, the word 'liberal' was used as referring 
to a concept of 'liberty' conceived of in a vaguely natural-law sense as a natural 
human property. In this context, 'liberality' means as much as non-partisanship63 
and all the conclusions that one is assumed to arrive at if one is a truly non-
partisan, i.e. liberal thinker. This was underpinned by the Enlightenment 
assumption that proper, un-distorted thinking cannot but lead to the recognition 
of (natural-law) truth.64 
61 The Latin word 'liberalis' had the two meanings, 'to do with liberty' and 'generous; as is 
proper for a free born man'. 'Liberalitas' was noble, liberal-minded and generous attitude' 
(Vierhaus: 1982:745), a characteristic of an individual that referred not to the political but to the 
public sphere. It was connected to prestige and public standing. Under Caesar, it became a 
political term denoting 'Caesarian' spending politics. 
62 Because liberal individuals were in reality propertied (until in the 20th century the extension 
and redefinition of citizenship changed this semantic field) the concept has always had a class-
connotation which bourgeois liberals usually did not deny: they asserted, though, that pursuit of 
the particular interests of the bourgeoisie are for the benefit of the general good (ibid.:742). 
63 This notion is not unlike what liberal sociologists like Weber would a century later call 
'objectivity' or 'value-freedom (Wertfreiheit'). 
64 In an essay attached to his translation of Burke's 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' 
from 1793, Friedrich Gentz advocated a 'continuous, liberal, non-partisan (partheylosen) 
multifaceted thinking about the nature and the fundaments of bourgeois society (bi.irgerliche 
Verbindung),. Friedrich Schiller referred in the same year (in his 'Letters on aesthetic eduation') 
to 'liberal thinking' as thinking that is free of limitations and prejudices and able to abstract from 
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The political programme of liberalism was formed in France during the 
years following 1795, i.e. the governments of the Directoire and Napoleon. It 
refers primarily to the politics of the Gironde and the upper bourgeoisie in their 
struggle - against royalist reaction on the one side, egalitarian popular 
movements on the other side - for ending the 'revolutionary passions' and 
securing what had been achieved (Vierhaus 1982:749). 
Under the restoration in France the word 'liberal' was generally used with 
negative connotations. In 1819, however, the first copy ofajoumal, 'Le Liberal' 
was issued (Vierhaus 1982:751 ).65 
The liberal historian Augustin Thierry, 'refracting the historical perspective 
of his principal source, David Bume, through the experience and ideology of 
France after the Revolution' (Cornninel 1987:60), presented middle class 
'industry' (i.e., industriousness) as the 'progressive force of civilization' that has 
been 'hampered' for a long time by 'parasitic wealth and indolence; by tradition, 
privilege, and ignorance; by special interests and arbitrary injustice' (ibid.:61).66 
one's own position (Vierhaus 1982:747). Also in the same year, Schiller remarked in a letter that 
current events in France showed that humanity was not yet mature enough for 'the liberal regime 
of reason' because 'bourgeois liberty' is only appropriate when a higher degree of 'human 
liberty' is already achieved. In another letter, he described a 'liberal government' as one in which 
one (monarchical) will rules in such a way that 'the individual citizen can persuade himself that 
he lives according to his own principles and preferences (der einzelne Burger sich doch uberreden 
kann, dass er nach seinem eigenen Sinne lebe und bloss seiner Neigung gehorche),. It should be 
noted that for Schiller the point is that the individual can 'persuade himself, i.e. is not persuaded 
by somebody else. Schiller does not question that the monarchical will rules, the point is how it 
rules. Friedrich Schlegel reasserted the classic, Stoic conception of liberality in his famous 
'Athenaeumsfragment 441 ' that emphasizes spontaneous immunity against narrow-mindedness 
or hate: 'Liberal ist, wer von allen Seiten und nach allen Richtungen wie von selbst frei ist und in 
seiner ganzen Menschheit wirkt; wer alles, was handelt, ist und wird, nach dem Mass seiner Kraft 
heilig halt, und an allem Leben Anteil nimmt, ohne sich durch bechriinkte Ansichten, zum Hass 
oder zur Geringschiitzung desselben verftihren zu lassen'. Friedrich Gentz contributed in 1795 the 
Wissenssoziologie of the concept: he wrote (echoing the 'doux commerce' topos common in the 
18th century and formulated by Hume for example in his 'Of Luxury' [1752]) that in the big 
trading places, 'together with that of business, the intellectual horizon is extended (erweitert sich 
mit dem Geschiift auch der Gesichtskreis)" and more commercial interaction brings 'more 
liberality into the appreciation of things and human relations'. 
65 At the same time the concept gained currency in England, apparently first as an import from 
Spain (in its Spanish word-form) where it had - under the Napoleonic influence - developed into 
a political party name that implied the affirmation of the ending of the ancien regime, defence of 
individual rights and liberties, and warning of the dangers of social equality. It was thus 
understood as being progressive and conservative at the same time. In England a journal called 
'The Liberal' first appeared in 1822. For the first time in 1847 the Whig party was officially 
referred to as 'the liberals' (ibid.). 
66 Thierry described the English Revolution in the following terms: 'One could say that the 
rallying cry of the two armies were, on one side, idleness and power, and on the other, industry 
and liberty: because the idlers, those who wanted no other occupation in life than pleasure 
without pains, of whichever caste, enlisted with the royalist troops, to defend interests 
conforming to their own; whereas those families from the caste of the former [Norman] 
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Before the 20th century, the term 'economic liberalism' did not exist. While 
today, classical political economy is usually recognized as a constitutive element 
ofliberalism, the former's authors did not know the word 'liberalism', nor was 
their overall thinking identical to that of 19th (let alone 20th) century liberals. 
Nevertheless, as Walther (1982:787) argues, there are important enough links 
and commonalities between classical political economy, and the intellectual and 
(later) political movement that subsequently became known as liberalism, as 
there are between both and the Enlightenment. 19th century 'liberals were in 
greater agreement on economics than on politics': while their ideas about for 
example the most desirable form of state diverged widely, they all 'believed that 
the civic rights of man included the liberation of his productive energies' 
(Hamerow 1969: 152). All liberals abhorred the vision of 'lotus-eating indolence' 
(ibid.: 158), the enemy of 'industriousness'. Freedom of movement - of capital as 
well as of labour - and freedom of enterprise is one common denominator of all 
forms of liberalism. 67 
The two concepts 'free-trade' and 'liberalism' seem to have converged 
explicitly not before the movement around the British 'Anti-Com-Law-League' 
that was founded in 1838 by Manchester industrialists.68 The doctrine underlying 
the mass pamphlet literature of this movement69 made generous use of the word 
'liberty'. However, political liberals in Germany at the time tended to reject what 
they saw as 'economism': even if they embraced free trade policy, they tended 
not to see it as a generic recipe for any social and political problem as 
Manchester campaigners often did. Supporters of liberal political ideas and 
conquerors that had been won over to industry joined the party of the commons' (quoted ibid.). 
The army of 'industry and liberty' was of course also known as the third estate or 'fa nation' 
(Sieyes). 
67 The 'Preussische Jahrbiicher' wrote in 1860 that only 'some reactionary politicians of half 
juridical, half theological complexion' could want to defend credit restrictions (Hamerow 
1969:162). 
68 It existed until 1846 when the Com Laws were abolished. By that time it had developed into a 
mass movement with associations all over the country (ibid.:798f). 
69 It was only later referred to as the 'Manchester School'. It is probable that the concept was 
brought into the German discussion by Lassalle who first learned it from Marx (ibid.:806). Also 
the term 'liberal economics' was first used by Lassalle in 1864 as another word for free trade 
politics with a wider resonance. He wrote also about 'the political and the economic bourgeois 
doctrine'. In the 1870s there are more references for this use of the term 'liberal'. A systematic 
use of the concept of 'liberalism as economic doctrine, party and epoch concept' can be found in 
the Social Democratic press, for example in Bebel's writings. Bamberger (1878) (in 'Deutschland 
und der Socialismus') was the first writer in Germany who tried to use the term 'Manchester 
liberalism' in an affirmative, positive sense, without much success. The first textbook of 
economics that referred to 'economic liberalism' was published in 1895 (Walther 1982:810). 
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supporters of what in the 20th century would come to be called 'economic 
liberalism' were not necessarily the same persons, nor were they always co-
operating.7o 
1.3.1.2 German Liberalism before 1848 
In Germany the constitution of parliamentary parties was slower than in 
England or France, so that the concept of liberalism retained for a longer period 
both its Napoleonic and the older, 'pre-political' meanings. There was much talk 
- pro and contra - of liberal ideas, spirit, principles and politics, but not of 
'liberals' or a liberal party. The differentiation into liberals and radicals, or 
liberals and democrats (soon to be followed by that between democrats and 
socialists), also hardly occured before 1848.71 In the restoration period, 
'liberalism' turned into a portmanteau concept for everything the Metternich 
system found dangerous.72 It tended to be equated with 'Jacobinism' to the effect 
that most of those who wanted to claim a moderate middle ground position did 
temporarily not anymore use the word 'liberalism' to this purpose. 
The partial realization of liberal bourgeois society73 made the pursuit of 
liberal politics a possibility, but it became a necessity only after the early liberal 
70 It is only from a post even tum, theoretical perspective they can be recognised as historically 
and logically belonging together. 
71 The journal' Allemannia' defined in 1816 a liberal government as one that provides and 
protects legally the freedoms of commerce, person and opinion, promotes and furthers economic 
wellbeing, and guarantees equality in jurisdiction and taxation, gains for the people independence 
and dignity through its foreign policy and creates an army that is based on honour and patriotism. 
Such a government would be 'a warranty for the development of the national character of the 
people' (Vierhaus 1982:755t). In the same year, the journal 'Neue Allemannia' published a 
longer article that discussed the concept 'liberal' in more detail. It argued that the neologism was 
not vain fashion but a relevant addition to the vocabulary because no other word captured exactly 
the same meaning. Interestingly, the author suggested that the English language was able to use 
'gentlemanly' instead of liberal, but no equivalent existed in German. It aimed to refute 
allegations the new word was dangerous and rebellious arguing that it merely expressed all that 
the good, patriotic and noble-minded citizen, 'the independent and active member of the big 
political family', would wish. It admitted that 'liberal ideas' could be misused, but this was not 
reason enough to condemn these ideas that are 'innate to every good and honest mind' 
(ibid.:757). 
72 In a text from 1819, the conservative Adam Muller rejected both extreme legitimism and 'so 
called liberalism', which he identified as a standpoint preoccupied with immediate economic 
benefit (ibid.:758). Another conservative writer attacked the 'moneyed as well as scholarly 
arrogance (Geldhochmut and Gelehrtenhochmut), of liberalism. Franz von Baader (in a text from 
1825) saw liberalism as an atheistical and despotic agent of the disintegration of the European 
states. 
73 The concept 'bourgeois society' is slightly ambivalent as it denotes on the one hand, a more 
general category (the community of family fathers, owners of property, as opposed to 'the state', 
28 
optimism that 'progress' (i.e., liberal economics plus some state led reform 
exerted by expert bureaucrats) will sort out things automatically fell victim to 
(post-Napoleonic) reaction. The 'bureaucratic liberalism' of the reform period 
constituted a link between enlightened absolutism and constitutional liberalism, 
but it also first created the social conditions for the emergence of a middle class 
that could subsequently formulate 'constitutional liberalism' (ibid.:4).74 
The groups that embraced liberal positions before and around 1848 included 
not only - and not even primarily - merchants, shopkeepers and industrialists but 
also artisans, peasants, students and trainees (Sheehan 1978:46). These were 
groups that were both dedicated to the existing order and hopeful for the 
developing changes, despite the uncertainties they would bring. At this time, 
liberals were typically people who vacillated between old and new. This 
positioning made them prone to policies that would embrace the promises of the 
new but safeguard them against its risks, especially against what came to be 
known as 'the social question': they advocated co-operatives, various forms of 
self-help and educational associations as well as state intervention and 
regulation. After 1848, these differences tended to become more clearly 
articulated in organizational differenciation; the more the optimistic belief that 
the (quasi automatical) extension of the middle classes and their social and 
political organisations would 'prevent revolution' eroded, the louder became the 
calls for the state to help. 
whatever the specific historical form and content of either may be), and on the other hand, the 
specific form that bourgeois society (in the generic sense) has in the bourgeois period, i.e. (much 
more specifically) the society of right-bearing, commodity-owning and -selling individuals facing 
the modern state. I usally mean modern bourgeois society when I write 'bourgeois society'; only 
when I want to emphasize the modern in distinction from other (,pre-modem') forms of 
bourgeois society, I use 'modern' or 'liberal' bourgeois society. 
74 In the first place, 'the programmatic drafts outlining the future society of citizens of the state 
were not produced by the middle classes of the towns' who were organized and thinking in a 
traditional stiindisch way, 'nor by a [capitalist] "bourgeoisie" which did not yet exist in Germany, 
but by a non-stiindisch intelligentsia' (ibid.:6) - the academically trained people that Hegel 
thought of as the 'universal class'. The Prussian bureaucratic liberals might have been staunch 
free traders but they did not see any point in creating public representation for a population that 
was rather traditional and generally less 'liberal' than the Prussian bureaucrats themselves were. 
However, equal suffrage was rarely on the liberal wish list. Liberals always held that 
representation should be organized in a way that prevented the 'rule of those without assets' 
(ibid.: 12). Also gender equality was not usually part of the liberal agenda. Authority of the 
pateljamilias reasoned with reference to nature (ibid.:22). Within the family, there is no contract 
between equals. The patriarchal relationship within the family complements the 'social contract' 
that liberalism claims rules outside it. 
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Central to the beliefs of early liberalism was 'the expectation that the middle 
classes would successively absorb all other classes of society and thus be able 
'automatically' to provide mediation and synthesis for society as a whole. The 
emergence of the proletariat seemed - at that time - as a merely temporary 
phenomenon that could be either patronized and embraced, or else fought and 
defeated easily. Pro-emancipation liberals expected the workers to become de-
proletarianized, well behaved and educated citizens in much the same way that 
they expected the Jews to become 'de-Judaized' German citizens (Langewiesche 
2000:13). 
Liberals in the Rhineland (a province of Prussia) where industry was most 
developed departed as early as the 1830s from the notion of the 'classless society 
of citizens' and argued that the leading role in society should be played by 
'reputable merchants and manufacturers', that industry was the 'true basis of the 
state' and that 'where industry is strong as a force, so too is political power and 
freedom' (ibid.:20). This is the background against which the (subsequently 
hegemonic) combination of free-market policy and Prussianism, the notion that 
Prussia was the locomotive for the establishment of 'English conditions', 
originated. 75 
For this new perspective within the liberal movement, the quick creation of a 
national economic sphere was more important and more promising for liberty 
than the rather old-fashioned and legalistic 'yearning for a constitution' 
75 The 'early-liberal' idea ofa harmonious society in which 'citizens' peacefully worked together 
for the 'common good' was transformed rather than abandoned in the process; it was modernized, 
as it were. The rapid development of capitalist industrialization obviously led to the adoption of 
political economy in some shape or form, and the variant that proved most popular in Germany 
was Bastiat's theory of 'economic harmony'. Oppenheim wrote in 1861 that Frederic Bastiat in 
his 'Harmonies economiques' (originally 1850, German in the same year) had developed 'like 
nobody before nor after him' 'the organism of labouring society' 'objectively' 'This is the 
science of the modern state' (quoted in Seeber 1965:33). In particular Hermann Schulze-
Delitzsch was known as a follower of Bastiat, but it seems Bastiat was generally in Germany 
more popular than in any other country at the time. Bastiat argued that 'all legitimate interests are 
in harmony' (ibid.:34) Because nature created the individual for living in society, the laws of 
society cannot be in contradiction with the (natural) laws that govern the individual (ibid.:35). 
The notion of separate or even antagonistic class interests should be rejected, while the notion of 
'self-help and education (Selbsthilfe und Bildung), should be central to social reform. Bastiat's 
concept of 'economic harmony' is closely related to his rejection of classical political economy's 
labour theory of value (Smith, Ricardo) since the concept of surplus value (and its appropriation) 
inevitably implies the concept of class antagonism. In a form ofliberalism based on Bastiat's 
theory, separate working class organization will appear as unnatural disturbance of a presupposed 
natural harmony (while liberalism based on classical political economy might be more prepared 
to aim to defuse separate class interests by recognizing them, and accept independent social and 
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(ibid.:21). The more the latter seemed to be going nowhere, the more the new 
dynamism, based on industrial and merchant bourgeoisie, and thus national 
liberalism gained hegemony. This change in the character of liberalism meant the 
decision to trust in the dynamics of capitalist development rather than in 
reformist state action. 
Early liberalism conceived of the bourgeoisie as the focal point of a process 
in which the totality of society would become bourgeois and for which the 
constitutional state and the destruction of traditional social relations would be 
decisive instruments. However, instead of a 'classless society of Buerger' the 
liberal bourgeoisie built, and was faced with, bourgeois class society. Reality-
most clearly the class antagonisms of 1848 - forced the liberal bourgeois to give 
up some rosy illusions about their own doings; the choice was between hoping 
for a classless, or for a bourgeois society. 
1.3.1.3 1848 and the emergence of 'National Liberalism' 
'1848', from the perspective of the future National Liberals (Dahlmann, 
Gervinus, Droysen, Haym, Sybel and others), 'was really about preventing a 
revolution and bringing into one their hopes for a Prussian-led and liberal unified 
Germany' (Berger 1997:28f). For this, the nation should 'sacrifice some of its 
domestic liberty' for receiving in return 'an increase in power and prestige 
abroad' as Haym wrote then (quoted ibid.:29). The crucial problem lay in 
squaring their ambitions for a liberal united Germany with the fact that Prussia 
was economically but not politically libera1.76 
political organisations of the working class as partners in the process of creating 'economic 
harmony' through negotiation and bargaining). 
76 On March 10, 1848, the Bundestag established a committee of seventeen 'generally trusted 
men', actually a representative selection of the notables ofliberalism, in order to draft a new 
Imperial Constitution on the lines of moderate liberalism (Langewiesche 2000:28). They 
attempted to create a federal nation-state based on the consensus of the existing dynasties, with a 
commitment to basic rights but without reference to the democratic and popular movements. The 
liberals failed because the revolutionary movement was not at that point strong enough to 
frighten the dynasties into accepting the liberal option of constitutional monarchy. However, at 
the same time it became too strong for the liberals to maintain a claim of being the sole advocate 
of social change. As a result, the liberals had to sit down together with republicans and democrats 
- in the spring meetings of the national movement and in the Frankji,rter VOIparlament - and 
had to accept some repUblican elements to be integrated into the 'Old Liberal' draft of the 
Imperial Constitution. The Liberals (led by Heinrich von Gagem) managed to maintain the 
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Before 1848, the liberals who subsequently formed National Liberalism - for 
example Dahlmann - 'expected Prussia to be absorbed in Germany', being 
'rejuvenated' by the breath of liberal, 'free German life' and even being 
'dissolved into its various provinces which would become in their own right part 
rejection of 'revolutionary law' displacing 'traditional law' and abolishing the individual states 
and their dynasties (ibid.:32). Propagating 'order and unity' against 'disorder and anarchy' 
(Gagern, Welcker) the liberals managed to safeguard legal continuity (ibid.:33). However, the 
more victorious the liberals (assisted by moderate democrats) remained on the one front-
defeating revolution - the less victorious they were on the second front: defeating reaction. When 
the defeated republicans around Hecker and Struve subsequently led a second, more determined 
revolutionary wave in April 1848 (fatally limited to a few regions), the liberal members of the 
Bundesversammlung supported the dynastic governments to deploy federal troops against them. 
Frightened by the Paris February revolution, and parallel events in Vienna, the liberals pointed to 
the benefits of constitutional monarchy as enjoyed in England and Belgium (ibid.:37). 
As soon as the Paris February revolution was mirrored by a first popular assembly in Berlin 
in March, the bourgeoisie began organizing a militia (Dressen 1999:74). The unwillingness of the 
Berlin and Prussian bourgeoisie to side with the revolution saved the Pruss ian regime that was 
subsequently able to decide militarily the situation in the southern states where popular 
movements faced much weaker governments. A leaflet from end of May 1848 made the point 
succinctly: 'The liberal militias/ Can quickly turn malicious (Denn aus der freien Biirgerwehr/ 
Wird leicht ein Freiheits-Wiirger-Biir)' (ibid.: 113). It is important to add that a situation (March-
July 1848) that was characterized by weakness of the bourgeoisie and temporary collapse of the 
aristocracy was decided in favour of the status quo through contradictions on the side of the 
proletariat. While some workers defended their own 'moral economy' (to use Thompson's [1991] 
expression), others had already begun to internalize the standards and values of the bourgeois-
liberal order (they saw disciplined, productive labour as something to be proud of and considered 
the existence ofa class of people who 'give work' to workers as a necessity) and preached 
moderation to themselves. The second, new class contradiction (the capital relation) that grew 
next to and transformed the older one (the class contradiction between the two surplus-
appropriating classes) took not the form of a clear-cut antagonism - bourgeois vs. workers - but 
manifested itself also in contradictory behaviour on the side of the workers which gave the 
bourgeoisie the time necessary to recover its agency. 
A counter-revolutionary publication from August 1848 declared that the revolution had been 
caused by 'aliens, Jews and lousy literati' (ibid.: 128). The authors of this publication obviously 
intended to build the defeated lower bourgeois and workers a bridge home into the status quo: 
they were not to blame for their attempt at a revolution, after all. 
It took liberals and moderate democrats until the end of March 1849 to complete a 
compromise constitution. When the Prussian King refused to accept the Imperial crown, the 
liberals withdrew from the process and refused to support the ensuing battles that tried to force 
the princes to accept the compromise that liberals and democrats had found in between 
themselves, the Reichsverfassungskampagne (Langewiesche 2000:46). 
The war that followed the second proclamation of the republic in Baden by Lorenz Brentano 
in 1849 - after the Frankfurt National Assembly had capitulated before the German princes - is 
crucial for the understanding of German liberalism (Kohn 1960: 137). The republic of Baden was 
supported by a majority of the population and fiercely defended against impossible odds. When 
the Prussian military finally won in a series of massacres, 80 000 democrats and left-liberals fled 
Baden and a similar number fled the Palatinate and Rhineland. Reading Engels' account of the 
war (Engels 1982 [MEW7]) with its mixture of admiration for the heroic popular effort and scorn 
for a half-hearted bourgeois leadership that could not decide fighting reaction efficiently - with a 
view to the emerging democratic and proletarian challenge - gives an impressive sense of what 
was the historical background against which 'National Liberalism' emerged. 
Kohn suggests that the German liberals 'in their haste to establish national unity' wasted the 
revolutionary momentum when they called for a National Assembly in Frankfurt/Main. Instead, 
they could have followed the alternative path of calling for assemblies in all German states, 
formulating demands for reform that would have reflected actual power relations in each specific 
context. This is what had happened in Switzerland after the rebellions in 1831 (ibid.: 138). 
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of the united Germany' (Kohn 1960:139f). Droysen declared 'at the end of 1848, 
in the midst of the popular uprisings' (ibid.) that he saw in the Prussian army 'a 
great moral force'. Dahlmann declared in January 1849 (in the context of arguing 
for offering the Imperial crown to the Prussian king) that 'our urge for liberty ... 
does not primarily aspire to liberty; to a greater degree it lusts for power which 
has so far been denied to it' (ibid.:141).77 A good expression of the liberals' 
unhappy consciousness is Gabriel Riesser's commene8 that given 'the sorry 
choice between the despotism of the princes and the so-called democrats', 'the 
victory of a despotic, even bloody reaction might be the lesser evil; but I dread 
the rule of a people which could be happy to see that victory' (Langewiesche 
2000:55). 
The liberals of 1848/49 had expected 'the Immaculate Conception of 
German liberty from princely generosity (von freigebiger Fuerstenhand), wrote 
Ludwig Bamberger in 1866 (Bamberger 1866:4/9 against the dominant tendency 
of German liberalism. This 'dogma of Aft-Gotha', that liberty could be gained 
without revolution,80 was subsequently developed into a scientific doctrine by 
'the school of Neu-Gotha' (ibid.:5). The main thrust of this tendency (of which 
Treitschke is a main representative) is 'limitless contempt for the French 
Revolution as well as for France'. Bamberger agrees with Treitschke's claim that 
'a nation comes into existence only in the state, i.e. the large state (Grossstaat), 
(ibid.:7), but rejects 'Neu-Gothaer' unconditional support for the Prussian 
monarchy. 
The liberal position according to which national unification had to precede 
the liberalization of domestic policy was a result of how the liberals experienced 
77 Kohn argues that the discussion concerning Poland in July 1848 was 'one of the most 
important turning points' in which the sea-change became apparent. The province of Poznan had 
been given to Prussia in 1815 on the Congress of Vienna 'as an autonomous province, preserving 
its Polish character'. The older liberal position that a Polish nation state should be restored was 
only maintained by a minority in July 1848, while a majority appealed to 'the right of conquest 
by plough and sword' (ibid.: 142f) and voted for annexation. This decision anticipated the other 
two territorial questions that would become decisive issues over the following decades, 
Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine. 
78 Riesser had been the vice President of the National Assembly. 
79 Ludwig Bamberger, 'Uber Rom und Paris nach Gotha, oder: die Wege des Herrn von 
Treitschke', Stuttgart 1866 (Ebner) 
80 On the congress at Gotha in June 1848 the majority of moderate liberals including Heinrich 
von Gagern, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Karl Mathy decided to pursue the small-German, 
Prussian option for the unification process (cp. Langer 1998:214). 
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the events of 1848. Since any invocation of popular support would inevitably 
have resulted in power-sharing with democrats and republicans, liberals could 
only hope that an emerging imperial central power would defeat the cohort of the 
particularist German princely dynasties militarily. The only serious candidate for 
this job was Prussia, which made support for Prussian expansionism the only 
strategy to modernize and liberalize state and society in the German realm 
without giving in to what the liberals saw as mob rule. It seemed to them that the 
liberal cause could only be advanced in a unified effort after unification, while 
the liberal forces in each individual state would remain powerless against 
reaction and conservatism as long as any encouragement of popular radicalism 
was to be excluded. In order to sail with the wind of progress and Zeitgeist, one 
large sail was needed that would capture this wind, rather than many small ones 
that are difficult, if at all, to coordinate. Left wing liberals, and also many south 
German liberals, held against this view that the unified state - if founded on 
illiberal principles - would merely be an even greater enemy ofliberty. 
The shock the liberal bourgeoisie suffered from the insurrections of the 
emerging proletariat in 1848 made those who had been more determined liberals 
or democrats redefine their general strategy and aspirations. The way this 
rethinking affected all aspects of the liberal program is emblematically expressed 
in the famous remark by Richard Wagner from 1850:81 
All our liberalism was a luxurious play ofthe mind82, and so we talked 
about83 the liberty of the people without knowing that people, actually 
resenting any actual contact with the people. And so, our enthusiasm 
(Eifer) for the emancipation (Gleichberechtigung) of the Jews also came 
from a mere idea84 rather than from real sympathy (Wagner 2000: 144f). 
This statement by Wagner (a former radical turning anti-Semite) illustrates a 
more general phenomenon: liberals were strongly affected by the experience of 
'actual contact with the people' and that their 'liberty' might mean a challenge 
not only to aristocratic domination, but to the existence of the - at the time still 
precarious - bourgeois order. This experience shed doubt on the desirability of 
SI From his essay 'Das ludentum in der Musik'. 
82 The 1850 version of the text reads 'luxuri6ses Geistesspiel'; in the revised 1869 version ( that 
became much more influential than the original text) 'luxurious' is replaced by 'not so far-sighted 
(nicht sehr heBsehendes),. The passage is from the second paragraph of the original text. 
83 1850: 'disputierten'; 1869: 'we enthused ourselves (wir ... uns ergingen)' 
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popular 'liberty' in general, and this affected the whole liberal 'ticket'. Every 
item on that 'ticket' had to be re-examined in the light of the changed societal 
constellation. The legal betterment of the Jews was no exception.85 
The liberal view of democracy as a threat to 'bourgeois society' led liberals 
to accepting 'temporary' despotism and warfare: Treitschke, whose writing 
career begins in this context, demanded - a characteristic formulation of the 
National-Liberal position - 'a powerful, purely German86 state, in which this 
particularist nonsense is forced to submit to a centralizing force' (quoted in 
Langewiesche 2000:59). This strategic demand was underpinned by the belief 
'that when the genuinely national unity of our people has been achieved, any 
unnatural constitutional form could only be short-lived.' Compromise with 
Bismarck was 'not a capitulation of liberalism but the attempt to create a new 
basis for the representation of bourgeois interests' (Winkler 1978: 10).87 Its 
successes in the 1860s and 70s seemed so impressive that National Liberals 
failed to consider the possibility that Bismarck might one day chose other 
partners. 88 
The most influential analysis of the prospects for liberalism after 1848 was 
Ludwig August von Rochau's 'Principles of Realpolitik' published in 1853 'to 
widespread liberal acclaim' (Langewiesche 2000:61).89 The general message 
could not get lost on the liberals: 'Only through the exercise of power is what is 
84 1850: 'blossen Gedankens'; 1869: 'a general idea (allgemeinen Gedankens)' 
85 It is important to distinguish two elements in Wagner's statement: 1) liberal-bourgeois 
disappointment about 'the people'; 2) Wagner's projecting this disappointment onto 'the Jews'. 
While the liberals had good reasons to be 'disappointed' by 'the people', there has not been 
anything in the actual contribution by Jews to 1848 that would justify Wagner's - and other 
disappointed liberal democrats - anger. In Wagner's case, the projection of anti-popular anger 
onto 'the Jews' seems to be a way of constructing a concept of 'the people' that the disappointed 
liberal can refer to affirmatively: blaming 'the Jews' exonerates 'the people' and restores 'the 
people' as a positive point of reference. 
86 This meant, a state without multi-national Austria. 
87 Bismarck himself said in 1849: 'Protective tariffs are a protection against the freedom of the 
people to buy where it seems most economical and convenient.' (Massing 1949:31) Marx, too, 
defended free trade against Friedrich List and his south German liberal followers (Szporluk 
1988). Even around 1870 'all Germany was for free trade' (Massing 1949:31). 
88 Sybel in a text from 1847, Baumgarten in his 'Self-Criticism' from 1866 and Treitschke in a 
text from 1869 argued that the preservation of a monarchical veto against parliamentary 
suggestions was necessary to defend bourgeois interests against both clerical reaction and 
proletarian revolution (Winkler 1978:8f). National Liberalism was antifeudal, anticlerical and 
antisocialist (ibid.: 12). 
89 Ludwig August von Rochau was as a student a participant in the storming of the Frankfurt 
Hauptwache in 1833, he became 1871 a member of the Reichstag (Dressen 1999:200f). 
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right appointed to rule.' Right without power was like 'castles in the air' .90 
Rochau writes that liberals would have needed to use revolutionary violence but 
could not because it would have swept away rather than reformed monarchical 
rule. A strong state had to merge together with the 'national spirit' in order to 
create a Germany that could 'laugh in the face of any threat of war or revolution' 
(ibid.:62). Rochau suggested that rather than seeking compromises with 
democrats and republicans - as in 1848 - the liberals should trust in the' spirit of 
the age' being on their side and constitutionalism being the 'opinion of the 
century'. In Breuilly's words: Realpolitik 'made sense only if one firmly believed 
in progress and that history was on one's side' (in the foreword [xi] to 
Langewiesche 2000). 
Some liberals did not think that economic progress would automatically 
usher in a politically liberal policy but thought that reactionary Prussia needed 
actively to be defeated in order to help progress to materialize. The pro-Pruss ian 
liberals, however, believed that Prussia would become a liberalizing force despite 
itself: although Prussia followed its own egoistic interests (the extension of 
territory and power), it would inevitably and unintentionally tum into a blind tool 
of the common good of bourgeois society by creating the conditions for capitalist 
progress to unfold. Once the dynamic of progress was unleashed and irreversible, 
it would sweep away its reactionary midwife (the Prussian warrior state for 
which the Weltgeist would - after completed unification - not have any further 
use).91 The famous text by Hermann Baumgarten from 1866, 'German 
Liberalism: A self-criticism' (first published in Preussische Jahrbuecher of 
which Treitschke was then the editor) merely reinforced and eloquently 
reformulated the general tendency ofliberalism in Germany.92 It was on this 
platform that in 1867 the National-Liberal party was founded. 93 
90 This must not be confused with 'might is right'. The Nietzschean perspective is altogether 
different because it claims that 'right' originates in material power relations (a sort of criticism of 
idealism), while Rochau says that right minus might equals empty talk. His claim is that idealism 
also needs guns. 
91 The double irony is that in the velY long run this trajectory came true: Germany is now a 
hegemonic modem liberal power, but her journey included historical experiences of the most 
illiberal kind in dimensions that not even the most ruthlessly Machiavellian National-Liberal 
could have anticipated. 
92 Baumgarten wrote in 1870: 'Unity, power of the state, national independence are the highest of 
all political goods' (Kohn 1960: 182). During the 1870s he developed second thoughts, and by 
1882 he became a fierce critic of Treitschke's second volume of the 'German History' 
(ibid.: 183). Similarly Theodor Mommsen turned from enthusiastic Bismarck supporter to sceptic: 
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When liberals and democrats realized they needed the accomodation with the 
ruling powers to defuse the 'social threat', those items on the liberal 'ticket' such 
as support for the Polish cause and for Jewish emancipation that could be 
dispensed with were either given up completely as in the Polish, or put on the 
back burner as in the Jewish case.94 
1.3.1.4. Liberalism and the renewed threat of revolution 
After 1848, the threat of revolution was defeated but reaction ruled. In the 
following two decades society had - silently but effectively - changed to such an 
extent that anti-bourgeois reaction was defeated while proletarian revolution 
seemed the more threatening: two decades of socio-economic development 
(capitalist modernization in the absence of liberalisation of government and of 
the form of the state) had reversed the situation. Liberal society produced ever 
more evidently a new class of people who showed tendencies to become 
in 1885 he wrote in a letter 'I wish to be forgotten by this spineless nation as quickly as possible'. 
Kohn is full of scorn for the late misgivings of leading National-Liberals like Mommsen: 'Even 
in his last years '" he continued to live in the illusion, typical of a German National Liberal, that 
Germany's unification through Bismarck's Prussia could have established a free society. So he 
turned in the l880s against the German nation which had followed his own precepts. He sat in 
judgement over the nation. He never sat in judgement over his own nationalism. .. '. At the time 
when it would have mattered, he had 'found that the Frankfurt Constitution was too democratic 
and not sufficiently centralized'. In 1865 he suggested that 'necessity and the nation both speak 
in the categorical imperative, and as the nation-state can heal every wound, it is also entitled to 
inflict every wound ' (ibid.: 184). 
Most importantly, perhaps, Mommsen contributed to the authoritarian spirit of German 
society with his glorification of Julius Caesar in his 'Roman History', which was obvious for 
every reader to have contemporary overtones. After having met Napoleon III in 1863 Mommsen 
wrote in a letter that he envied the French for having 'such a grand criminel' and wished fate 
might 'throw one' to the Germans (ibid.: 186). Kohn comments dryly: 'Fate was soon to be so 
unkind as to fulfill Mommsen's wish'. 
93 In 1859 the 'National Association' (Nationalverein) was founded as a 'one-point' coalition 
uniting liberals and democrats 'by avoiding a programme of domestic policy' (Langewiesche 
2000:83). The 'Progress Party' (Fortschrittspartei) was formed in 1861 by left wing members of 
the older 'Liberal Party' and some moderate democrats. It gained considerable popUlarity by 
opposing the increase of military spending but lost much prestige when it gave in to Bismarck 
(who became Minister President in 1862) in the 'constitutional conflict' (1862-66). After the war 
against Austria (1866) the right wing split off and founded a 'National Party' that subsequently 
fed into the 'National Liberal Party' in the Reichstag of the Federation (Massing 1949:210). 
94 The strength of this conviction is most impressively illustrated by the fact that - as Hamburger 
writes - almost without exception Jewish deputies of all German states - even in countries that 
were predominantly anti-Prussian such as Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Hessen (Hessen had nine 
deputies in the first Reichstag in 1871, seven of whom National Liberals, three of whom Jewish 
including Ludwig Bamberger) - fought for the kleindeutsche Reich under Prussian leadership 
(Hamburger 1968:249). Gabriel Riesser said in 1849 (in the speech that was instrumental in 
convincing the National Assembly to vote for hereditary monarchy and against the secret and 
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dangerous to this form of society, and had to be appeased with concessions -
degrees of participation in the distribution of surplus value - while at the same 
time the necessities inherent in the expanding accumulation of capital had to be 
met - an increasingly difficult balancing act. 'Economic harmony' could no 
longer simply be postulated, it had to be created, 'never quite knowing how 
many concessions were too much, or how few were too little' (Wallerstein 
1995:97).95 
The liberals expected that 'economic harmony' would first of all realize itself 
at the level of civil society, in the bargaining and contracting of legal subjects, 
but not exclusively: liberals, just like conservatives and socialists, understood 
well that the 'invisible hand' needed some degree of help from the visible hand. 
The point was that state intervention and social reform ought not to empower the 
wrong people. 
In 1874 Mommsen said in a speech that Social Democracy was 'the mean 
enemy of all noble human kind, the gospel of the necessary abolition of all 
civilization, the oligarchy of the mob' (quoted in Kohn 1960:187).96 Bamberger 
in his 'Germany and Socialism' (1878) argued against an appeasement of Social 
Democracy in any form because in his view, the German bourgeoisie was too 
equal ballot) that German unification was a priority from the achievement of which Jewish 
emancipation will follow by necessity (Hamburger 1968: 182). 
95 Some liberals tended to accept the freedom of association also for the working class, and 
argued for better general education (financed through cutting other unproductive state 
expenditure) (Langewiesche 2000: 107). They saw the right to strike as a contribution, not a threat 
to the 'harmony of classes'. Likewise, liberal supporters of universal (male) suffrage had a self-
conscious view of the workings of bourgeois society and argued that giving suffrage to the 
workers was not very dangerous because, as Schulze-Delitzsch argued for example, the 'great 
social interests ... will automatically prevail', and the man 'who stands at the head of an 
important industrial establishment, the man who by his intelligence surpasses a great part of his 
fellow citizens, the proprietor of a large estate ... are powers in life which assert themselves of 
their own accord' (Hamerow 1969: 178). Schulze-Delitzsch understood well that the fundamental 
structure of bourgeois society, once established, would not be possible to abolish by electoral 
means. On the other hand, liberal opponents of universal male suffrage tended to argue that the 
masses were 'not ripe yet'and that a democratically empowered mob (stupid either by nature, or 
as a result of millennia of unnatural despotism) might derail the natural progress to the 
harmonious utopia of bourgeois society. In this vein, the moderate liberal Johannes Miquel 
complained that 'universal suffrage forces us to wage a difficult struggle against the stupidity of 
the masses' (quoted ibid.: 165). 
96 Eugen Richter wrote in his 'The Fortschrittspartei and Social Democracy' (1878): 'Let us 
always consider the Progress Party's struggle with other parties to the right as a side issue, and 
remind our friends as well as other parties that our main task is to defeat our common enemy, 
Social Democracy' (quoted in Seeber 1965 :42). As early as 1877 there were liberals who called 
for stricter legislation against Social Democratic 'Demagoguery' (ibid.:43). It was generally 
feared that acknowledging Social Democracy would inevitably make it stronger. 
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weak to be able to assimilate Social Democratic workers. 97 Treitschke demanded 
after the attempt on the life of the Kaiser in May 1878 that the nation's 
parliamentary representatives ought to go about the 'extermination (Ausrottung) 
of Social Democracy' irrespective of the legal subtleties involved (Winkler 
1978: 18). When parliament subsequently discussed legislation that was meant to 
do exactly that, the liberal response was mixed. Only a small minority within 
liberalism warned against panicking about the 'red menace' and suggested 
prioritizing the defence of democratic and liberal rights. Anti-democratic and 
anti-liberal suggestions made in the anti-socialist demagoguery 'bounced back on 
the liberals like boomerangs' (Seeber 1965:46). Liberals themselves had 
significantly contributed to the panic atmosphere of 1878 that led to the massive 
electoral defeat of the liberal parties. Their own anti-socialist arguments had 
prepared the ground for the anti-liberal government strategy.98 The liberals' 
consent to the Sozialistengesetz (in its toned down second version)99 was 'not 
merely opportunistic' (Sell 1953 :265). Tactical considerations were underpinned 
by the more fundamental position that 'the privilege ofliberal freedom' should 
not be granted to those whom the liberals saw as the enemies of liberal 
freedom. too 
If the demonization of Social Democracy was almost universal amongst 
liberals, the attitude towards state-led social reform was more mixed. In the 
97 Bamberger saw the Social Democratic Party as a mere product of universal franchise - which 
he disapproved of - and as an ally of reaction against bourgeois society. He applauded the 
massacre of the Paris Commune and praised the English working class for not making any 
demands that would challenge the existing social order. 
98 Seeber stresses that 'the principle of the Rechtsstaat' already had repeatedly been violated by 
the majority faction of both liberal parties in the contexts of the Kulturkampf as well as the 
regulations concerning the civil rights of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine (ibid.:47). When 
Lasker (and Richter and Hanel from the Progress Party) spoke out against the Sozialistengesetz 
they already represented only a minority (although a minority that still was able to get the 
majority to support their position - in the first instance). Only in 1886 did liberals vote against 
the law at a point when it had become obvious that it did not work against Social Democracy 
anyway, but did good service against liberalism. 
99 Only Treitschke and Rudolf Gneist voted for the first version of the Sozialistengesetz 
(Langewiesche 2000:209). 
100 The fate of liberalism in Germany was indeed 'tragic' as Sell (1953) famously formulated, but 
in a more literal sense than he intended to say. The liberals' hybris - the delusion that leads to the 
tragedy's unfolding - consisted in equating democracy and republicanism to proletarian mob rule 
and expecting that bourgeois society by necessity would, sooner rather than later, hand over the 
commanding posts to representatives of the bourgeoisie even in the absence of parliamentary 
government and universal franchise. They failed to comprehend the full logic of the form of 
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second half of the 1870s in Germany, 'reformism was the fashionable creed of 
the day' (Massing 1949:21). Reform organizations mushroomed with various 
suggestions how to solve 'the social question', a shorthand for both the destitute 
situation of the urban and rural poor and the threat of their disaffection with 
church and state that followed from the former. 'All this reform activity 
essentially aimed at restoring the confidence of the working man in the 
government and at making the position of the lower middle classes more secure' 
(ibid.). While the industrial workers tended to be unimpressed by being 
patronized by priests and professors, the middle classes - who had for the 
preceding half century supported liberalism against the conservative concept of 
'the Christian state' - were looking towards state support in respect to both their 
own economic distress and the threat of a revolutionary working class 
challenging private property. 
The group of academics nicknamed the Kathedersozialisten ('Socialists of 
the lectern') 10 1 , proponents of state-led social reform, belonged to all kinds of 
political persuasions but were united by a rejection of 'Manchester' liberalism. 102 
The Kathedersozialisten had to fight on two fronts. On the one hand, they were 
opposed by Manchester liberals, most prominently Bamberger and Oppenheim 
who dismissed their teachings as 'purely class hate propaganda'. 'Less 
expectedly' (Sell 1953:259), they were was also fiercely attacked by 
Treitschke. 103 
society whose sole representatives they thought they were: it is in this sense that they were tragic 
heroes. 
101 The term had been coined sarcastically by Oppenheim. 
102 Their institutional base, the 'Verein fUr Sozialpolitik' was founded in 1873. It emphasized in 
its beginnings rural problems and tended to stress the role of Jews in rural small scale credit as a 
particular problem (Massing 1949:218). Massing holds however that the Verein was not 
straightforwardly anti-Semitic. 
The German state-socialist reformist tradition was immensely productive and influential. 
Victor Aime Huber first developed a state socialist conception (Sell 1953:256); Gustav Schmoller 
presented the history of the Prussian monarchy as that of a benevolent, socially mediating 
institution; Adolf Wagner developed from a Manchester liberal into a far right wing conservative 
(and anti-Semite, main co-operator of Stocker) under the influence of the state-socialist ideas of 
Karl Rodbertus. Wagner was the editor of the journal 'State Socialist [Staatssozialist], (Pulzer 
1988:44). Lujo Brentano was a Kathedersozialist with a more comprehensively liberal 
background: having lived some time in England, he understood that workers would stop being 
hostile to liberal ideas if they were granted the freedom of coalition, and so he saw trade 
unionism as the key to social reform. The basic program of Kathedersozialismus consisted of 
three elements (Sell 1953:258f): economic freedom cannot be absolute; the economy must obey 
ethical as well as practical demands; the state must intervene to provide a degree of social justice. 
103 However, Treitschke had signed the invitation to the founding meeting of the Vereinfiir 
Sozialpolitik in 1872. For Treitschke's attitude on this issue see chapter 1.4.1. Lasker, who was 
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As the brief presentation of the development of liberalism in Germany 
should have demonstrated, liberal anti-Manchesterism is not a contradiction in 
terms. At any point in its history, liberalism could accomodate fundamental 
opposition to what was widely seen as 'English conditions'. This is of particular 
importance as a background to the discussion of the relation of liberalism to anti-
Semitism. Although the more notorious cases (Richard Wagner, Bruno Bauer, 
Wilhelm Marr; see chapter 1.3.6) of liberals or radicals who turned into anti-
Semites might first appear as isolated cases explicable on an individual level, 
they do represent one of the lines of development of liberal-democratic 
reflections on the processes of capitalist modernization in Germany. A good 
illustration of this is a comment that was published in the National-Liberal 
journal Grenzboten in 1879: 
Manchester radicalism is as anti-national as ultra-montanist and socialist 
radicalisms are. Its delusion (Wahn) is the cosmopolitan free trader society, 
the atomistic cosmic fog (Weltnebe1), that has some kind of a core 
preventing it from total disintegration (Zerfliessung) only in the power of 
English capital (quoted in Winkler 1978:19). 
The anti-Liberalism of this (also notoriously anti-Semitic) journal has indeed 
roots within the liberal tradition. 
initially sympathetic to the project, was persuaded by Bamberger and Oppenheim not to 
participate in the meeting (Hamburger 1968:290). 
In his response to Treitschke's attack on Kathedersozialismus, Schmoller quoted a 
formulation by Bamberger (made in 1868): 'The state asks the individual to give his blood 
because the state is in danger, and it should say another time round, go and starve for I do not 
know you? ... Folly, nonsense, contradiction!' (Sell 1953:261; Hamburger 1968:290). This 
formulation sums up succinctly the underlying logic: if the state wants to rely on the citizenry to 
let themselves be killed (in war, but also in the daily life of capitalist production) it has to give 
something in return - namely some relief from the social distress caused by the extraction of the 
surplus that is the basis of this state's existence. The fact that the leading proponent of 
Kathedersozialismus quotes a formulation from a former democrat turned Manchester liberal 
(and staunch enemy of Kathedersozialismus) indicates that the whole discourse, despite and 
through its antagonisms, constitutes one continent of ideas, not several: the continent of what 
Wallerstein calls 'lower case' liberalism. The differences that the different factions argue about 
are about how good the price should be for the citizens to give their surplus labour power, and, 
occasionally, also their lives. 
Neumann (1 942:90t) includes Friedrich List in the number of the Kathedersozialisten. 
Because of List's combining racialism, imperialism and state socialism, he calls him 'the first 
articulate National Socialist'. Adolf Wagner, the most influential of the Kathedersozialisten and 
co-founder of Stocker's Christlich Sociale Arbeiterpartei, followed List's conception. 
Marx and Engels had defined their position in an article from September 12, 1847 (Deutsche 
Briisse1er Zeitung No. 73). They argued that 'the rule of the bourgeoisie' is preferable to 'the 
present ... rule of bureaucracy' because it puts the proletariat in a better position to fight the 
bourgeoisie as a 'recognized party'. They referred to this article in 1865 when they refused to 
cooperate with the Lassalleans. They demanded that the Conservatives should be criticized at 
least as strongly as the Liberals which the Lassalleans failed to do (Massing 1949:251). 
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1.3.2 Nationalism and the modern nation 
Just as the modem state (l'Etat) overcame the pre-modem estates (les etats), 
the modem nation replaced the medieval nationes (Schenck 1965:702). The 
characteristic of the usage of the two terms in the modern context is their 
tendency to converge. This tendency is reflected in the concept of national 
sovereignty which combines two different, and arguably antagonistic, notions: 
the people (the totality oflegally equal individuals) are the supreme legislative 
instance, while the national state is the supreme instance of authority above any 
other power (ibid.:708). 
When dynastyl04 was not available anymore to articulate and illustrate the 
specific differences between particular states and societies, the gap was filled by 
the concept of the nation. The cultural-ethnic features of the nation flesh out the 
'contract' 105 between egotistic individuals (to form a society based on universally 
identical bourgeois values) in a fashion that would make the particular state and 
society look unique - i.e. worthy ofloyalty, potentially to die for - despite the 
universality of most of its features. 106 The ethnicity and culture of the nation are 
also crucial for the claim to nationhood being as well an invocation of the unity 
of the specific national society. 
Although the modem nation-state is in any case an ethnic-cultural and 
political entity at the same time, one of the dominant themes of nationalist 
discourse, and also of discussions about nationalism, is the effort to establish a 
dichotomy between 'ethnic' (or cultural, racial, German, 'Eastern') and 'civic' 
(or political, patriotic, French, 'Western') nationalisms, and an implicit claim that 
there are nations that are 'based on' the one or the other. Both are connected 
104 Of course, even dynasty was only to a limited extent able to express specificity, since the 
aristocracy of Europe was very much interconnected. 
105 Rousseau first detected, as Neumann puts it, the deficiency of social-contract theory's trust on 
self-interest to provide sufficient grounds to unify society into sustaining a (modem) state. He 
emphasized that additionally to being based on a mere 'contract' between egotistic individuals, 
the nation had to be 'a moral, collective body' (ibid.:87). 'The nation' refers thus to a new form 
of loyalty that became a decisive political force in the French Revolution (although, to a lesser 
degree, already earlier). It helped the bourgeoisie to impress 'its system of values on all of the 
people'. 
106 In an ironic sense, the extent to which a particular nation has embraced universal (bourgeois) 
values and modem institutional forms becomes in this process - particularly during inter-state 
conflict - in tum an element of this nation's cultural-ethnic particularity: after all, some nations 
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(within the liberal context in the widest possible sense of the word) with the 
notion that the 'civic' is normatively superior to the 'ethnic'. This specific 
discourse - the juxtaposition of the two alternative 'types' of nationalism -
seems to go back to the border dispute following the German conquest of Alsace-
Lorraine in 1871. 107 
On the German side, David Friedrich Strauss and Theodor Mommsen 
invoked language, culture, race and history when they argued that the Alsatians 
were German and that the Prussian military had only corrected the 'historical 
anomaly' of French tutelage that had resulted from French 1 i h century conquest 
(Finkielkraut 1988:31). The most notable respondent on the French side was 
Ernest Renan who had - until then - shared German historicism's concept of the 
nation, its scorn for Enlightenment anthropology as 'abstract', for 
contractarianism as 'pernicious' and who had agreed that it was a 'dangerous 
sophism' to assume that the individual was prior to the nation (ibid.).108 The 
experience that - after French military defeat - representatives of the (ethnically 
German) Alsatians expressed their wish to remain French converted him to a 
more contractarian concept of the nation: the case of the Alsatians proved that 
ethnicity did not determine political will. Renan avoided the dispute about the 
'real' ethnicity of the Alsatians but argued that ethnic-cultural-racial 
'abstractions carry much less weight than the right of flesh and blood Alsatians 
to submit only to an authority enjoying their consent' (ibid.). Renan managed to 
claim concreteness for the republican concept of the nation and to tar the ethnic 
are more universal than others, and within the nationalist discourse it is a good cause to defend-
and die for - one's higher degree of universality against less universal nations. 
107 Of course, civic nationalism was formulated in the context of the French Revolution in the 
consciousness that it constituted a conception that was more inclusive than any previous one. It 
was always closely intertwined with the discourse of 'popular sovereignty'. For example, in the 
debate on the future of A vignon in 1791 the 'wish of the inhabitants of the city of A vignon to 
become part of France was held to override international law, in this case the Pope's ownership 
of Avignon' (Hughes 1988: 12). In this context it was argued that the will of 'the nation' is 
superior to all other ('legitimist', traditional, historical) rights. Brubaker adds that the principle of 
self-determination was 'invoked to justify the territorial gains of 1791-1793' as well as the 
acquisition of Alsace in the I i h century (Brubaker 1992:7). The common element of all these 
discourses is the revolutionary consciousness that tradition can be undone and replaced by 
something new that is based in the willing and aspirations of people in the present (whatever that 
may mean in particular). 
108 Renan was a moderate republican, influenced by the historians Thierry and Michelet, and part 
of the intellectual establishment of the French Third Republic (Almog 1988:256). He saw his own 
book 'La vie de Jesus' (1863) as an extension and complement of the book 'Das Leben Jesu. 
Kritisch bearbeitet' (1835/6) by David Friedrich Strauss whom he admired until the Franco-
Prussian war changed his attitude to the German intellectual world. 
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concept with the brush of being based on (typically German) abstractions. The 
same Renan who had been 'the real scientific inspiration behind the Aryan myth 
in France', author of the words that 'the Semitic race, compared to the Indo-
European race, represents a truly inferior version of human nature' (ibid.:33) was 
converted by the circumstantial necessities of the patriotic cause to a textbook 
liberal. 
Renan's reaction to German triumphalism became emblematic for the 
subsequent canonization of a conception of the nation that implied a notion of 
'man' as able to 'lift himself out of his context, escape from his national 
heritage' (ibid.:34). It counted as the progressive alternative to what the 
apologists of German military might, Mommsen and Strauss, seemed to 
presuppose: man as 'a captive of history' .109 
109 Finkielkraut points out that the basic constellation of the dispute over Alsace repeated itself in 
the Dreyfus affair (ibid.:45f), when the anti-Dreyfussards argued - as it were - the 'German', 
ethnic way (some anti-anti-Dreyfusards actually found that anti-Semitism was an un-French, 
German attitude) while the defenders of Dreyfuss argued 'patriotically' like Renan. Also the 
Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute of 1879/80 shows the same constellation, but in this instance-
somewhat ironically - Mommsen played the role ofRenan, while Treitschke excelled in his 
performance of what had been Mommsen's part a decade earlier. 
The specific difference between German and French nationalisms is particularly interesting, 
but often misrepresented. In France, 'cultural nationhood has been conceived as an ingredient, not 
a competitor, of political nationhood' (Brubaker 1992:10). In Germany, by contrast, this 
integration did not happen at an early stage because nationalism appeared in two separate and for 
a long period hostile forms: as that of the (Prussian) 'reformers' who thought of nation-building 
in strictly political terms, and that of the 'romantics', who tended to think in cultural, moral and 
aesthetic terms (ibid.). The difference between French and German nationalism is not a 
distinction between political on the one side, cultural/ethnic nationalism on the other side, but 
that between a comparatively integrated political-cultural/ethnic nationalism as it emerged in 
France, and that of a tension-ridden dualism between political and cultural/ethnic nationalisms 
characteristic of 19th century Germany. However, in both countries the 'inner' nation-building 
through state-led unified educational and communication institutions happened only from the 
1870s onwards. 'In practice, in the midst of war against other states as well as against internal 
rebellions, the successive governments of France fused the idea of nation as the body of the 
citizens with the idea of the nation as the French' (Breuilly 1992:23). Gall asserts that the 
'reactive nationalisation' in Spain, Italy and Germany followed 'the same pattern as the 
nationalisation of France under the banner of the French Revolution'. The phenomenon can 
already be observed in the context of the French Revolution, and has subsequently been a 
'gateway for a gradual de-liberalization and de-democratization of the concept of the nation' 
(Gall 1996:212). If the articulations of nationalist thought in the context of the French Revolution 
emphasized universal and political values as defining the nation, it does not mean that other 
('objective', cultural, 'ethnic') features were not (at least silently) presupposed as existing. The 
latter had to move more into the focus of revolutionary, nationalist discourse when the nation 
found itself in conflict with other states, and especially after these subsequently also adopted the 
concept of the nation and its characteristics. Only as long as the conflict was between 'la nation' 
and other states most of which were dynastic, not national states, the 'universal', 'political', 
'subjective' 'civic' or 'constitutional' side of nationalism could dominate its articulations. The 
more, however, a situation emerged in which different states afthe same kind, namely nation 
states, confronted each other, the less this was sufficent ground for mobilization. 
As is universally acknowledged, in France and England 'the state' preceded and created 'the 
nation'. In Germany, the state also preceded and created the nation, but in the German case this 
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However, Renan's conception oversimplified the issue as Etienne Balibar 
argued in a comment on Finkielkraut. Racist nationalism does not 
straightforwardly lock human beings into their being-so. Rather, it does 
accommodate (no less than liberalism and socialism do) a vision of 
transcendence (Balibar 1991a:57): racism and nationalism defend the 
transcendence of the state of 'animality' that humanity has already achieved 
against elements that threaten it with a regression into animality (both from 
within the particular people that the racist-nationalist is concerned about, and 
from without). I 10 
Iflooked at more closely, the dichotomy of 'ethnic' versus 'civic' 
nationalism is less useful than it appears to be at first sight. If' ethnicity' is 
narrowly defined as a reference to 'descent', hardly any nationalism will fit into 
that category because hardly any nationalism actually makes 'descent' the main 
issue. If' ethnicity' is defined as a reference to 'culture', III then all nationalisms 
are 'ethnic' .112 The salient point is that in reality all nations have a national 
culture, and most theories of the nation, as well as most nationalisms 
acknowledge this fact - whether they might otherwise be filed under 'political' 
or 'ethnic' approaches (Brubaker 1999:61).113 The 'ethnic' and the 'civic' 
seems to be less universally acknowledged because a strong tendency amongst intellectuals of the 
time chose to believe, and made others believe, that 'the nation' created 'the state', and the 
administrators of the latter occasionally found it opportune to confirm this notion. When 
nationalist intellectuals claim that there 'is' a nation on behalf of which they speak and which is 
somehow prevented from 'having' its own state, they really mean that a state - if there was one-
would find in a specific territory favourable conditions for building a nation out of two main 
ingrediences, the 'ethnic'-cultural (but not yet national) raw-material and the historical 
experience of the founding of this state (usually including wars, often civil wars that might 
include intensified forms of class struggle or other social conflicts). The notion that 'common 
heritage' (i.e. culture or ethnicity) is at least one of the 'factors' or 'elements' that constitute a 
nation is based on circular reasoning: unless a concept of commonality or community is already 
presupposed, a concept of 'common heritage' is impossible. Of course, there have to be cultural 
traditions or artefacts that can be interpreted as 'common heritage', but they are never in and out 
of themselves 'common'. Commonality comes only from their being recognized and promoted as 
being common. The crucial point is: how and why are which cultural traditions or artefacts 
considered by whom to be constitutive of which commonality? 
lID Furthermore, many forms of racism and nationalism invoke a human ideal that they hope to 
realize in the future, although they might draw inspiration for this from the (imaginary) past. 
III This is how Smith (1983) uses these terms. 
112 After all, natio is just Latin for the Greek word ethnos. 
I J3 Renan's famous lecture that contains the formulation that the nation is a 'daily plebiscite' 
(prefaced by Renan with 'pardon the metaphor') also stresses (in many more words) 'possession 
in common of a rich legacy of memories' and 'a long past of endeavours, sacrifice and devotion' 
(quoted in Brubaker 1999:61). The point ofRenan's lecture was that 'the nation is "given" as 
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aspects of the nationalist discourse cannot be understood as the opposite endings 
of a scale of 'types' of nationalisms defined by the 'proportion' in which these 
two supposedly distinct ingredients are mixed. 114 
well as "chosen'" in the sense that one is supposed 'to choose' from amongst what is 'given'. 
(Cp. also Yack 1996: 198;208) 
When in the French Revolution Abbe Gregoire reported on 'the necessity and means of 
abolishing the patois and universalizing the use of the French language', he was addressing - in 
the name of civic equality - a crucial aspect of culture. 
114 For example Anthony Smith (1986) proposed such an approach. Furthermore, scales and 
classifications do not work if they presuppose that one can define one case of nationalism as 
more or less 'ethnic' than another: how can ethnicity be quantified? 
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1.3.3. The German Reich of 1871 
The German Reich of 1871 was a nation-state but not founded by 
nationalists, nor inspired by a broad nationalist movement. It was a bourgeois 
state but not governed by representatives of the bourgeoisie. During its first 
decade at least, it realised a consistent program of liberal-capitalist economic 
reforms most of which were formulated by liberal experts and politicians but 
implemented by an authoritarian state apparatus whose backbone consisted of an 
army and a bureaucracy that were predominantly staffed by the sons of the 
landed nobility. I IS 
The founding of the Reich under Bismarck was not primarily inspired by 
nationalism, although many nationalists might have claimed this (Brubaker 
1992:12). The National-Liberal Rochau stated as late as 1869 that a strong 
national consciousness did not exist in Germany, and that therefore a national 
state could only be created through strong external force, not through an internal 
development leading towards political agreements (Wehler 1995: 940). This is 
exactly what - surprising for all involved - happened in 1870171. A form of 
nationalism tailored to fit the Reich still had to emerge and grip the masses. 116 
The kleindeutsche unification of 1871 'was a radical departure from earlier 
trends in German history' (Hughes 1988: 131) and 'was carried out to solve 
Prussia's internal political difficulties not the German problem' .117 Unification 
115 To what extent these features are 'peculiarities' of the German case, or can also be found in 
other national contexts, cannot be discussed here (cp. Plessner 1974; Faulenbach 1980; Ruggiero 
1981; Eley 1983; 1984; 1986a; 1986b; 1996a; 1996b; Blackboum 1984; Breuilly 1994; Berger 
1997; Evans 1997). 
116 'German patriotism was marginal in the Napoleonic period .... For modem patriotism, in 
which state and nation are connected by ideas of culture and constitutionality, one has to tum to 
France and England at this time' (ibid.). As Hughes argues, the idea that nationalism caused, or at 
least was one of the causes behind the unification of Germany (Hughes 1988:2) is a myth: ' ... at 
least until the last quarter of the [19th] century, nationalism was a minority movement, deeply 
divided and with only a marginal impact on German political life' (ibid.). Breuilly suggests that 
the emergence of German patriotism was prevented earlier in the 19th century by 'loyalties to 
confession, region, narrow self-interest, and traditional rulers'. (Breuilly 1992:8). At the time of 
the foundation of the Reich, not even the middle classes were completely supportive of German 
nationalism: still in the 1870s it occurred that Bavarian deputies in the Reichstag would refer to 
Bavaria as their 'nation'; only in the 1890s, was the concept of Germany as 'the nation' 
completely hegemonic (Wehler 1995 :952). Strangely, the German Reich also lacked a national 
anthem and a national flag (ibid.:957). Furthermore, the concept of the Reich implied not so 
much national unity (Volksgemeinschafl) but that ofa federation of peoples (Volkergemeinschafl) 
(Buschmann 2001 :357). 
117 However, the domestic problems of Prussia were not solved but merely 'transferred into the 
Reich'. Hughes suggests that a continuation of the development of the Confederation would have 
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was a 'damage-limitation exercise' (ibid.: 135) aimed at containing modernizing 
trends and safeguarding the existence oftraditional structures. Universal male 
franchise was introduced with a comparably Janus-faced intention. Having 
studied the case of Napoleonic France, Bismarck understood that it 'could benefit 
the conservative interest in the countryside; the rural vote mobilised by 
landowners could, in the absence of a secret ballot, swamp urban liberals whose 
mistrust of the masses robbed them of a long-term political future' (Carr 
1992: 101). The 'supposed national unification' led - 'ironically' - first of all to a 
'serious polarization ofthe [alleged] nation' (Hughes 1988:3). 
Through the war of 1866, Prussia created a solid power base 'down to the 
river Main' for the project of a Great Prussian state (Carr 1992:84f). The actual 
foundation of the Imperial German state took place in a situation where 'anti-
Prussianism was growing stronger, not weaker' (ibid.:94). Carr suggests that 
'National Liberal reactions to deadlock over final unification combined with 
serious political umest in south Germany ... may well have played a part in the 
decision to go to war in 1870' (ibid.:96). The governments ofWuerttemberg, 
Baden and Bavaria were under much more serious pressure around 1869 than 
Prussia had been earlier in the 1860s. Popular Catholic movements, represented 
by parties that held a majority in the diet (Bavaria) or were part of a majority 
coalition (Wuerttemberg) opposed increased military spending, military service 
and the curtailment of church activities, and defended a grossdeutsche 
perspective against the prospect of Pruss ian hegemony (ibid.:94f). From their 
perspective, the Reich of 1871 was the 'product of a civil war' and meant 
division, not unification (ibid.:92). The Reichsgruendung made possible the 
stabilization of the situation in the south and domestication of Prussian liberalism 
while retaining political leadership in the hands of the Prussian establishment. I 18 
resulted in 'a giant Switzerland at the heart of Europe', which would have benefited and secured 
Germany's international position more than the Reich did. 
118 The divisions that Bismarck intended to send to Bavaria and Wiirttemberg in case of an 
uprising were already earmarked in March 1870. In reaction to the situation in the south, the 
National Liberals in Prussia urged Bismarck to speed up the creation of Kleindeutschland by 
allowing Baden to join the North German Federation, with the afterthought that this might have 
provoked a French declaration of war which in tum would have increased German-patriotic, pro-
Prussian popular sentiment. Bismarck, however, decided on an alternative route to the same 
outcome that made the war look like a Pruss ian reaction to French arrogance, not a French 
reaction to Prussian expansionism (making it more difficult for the other powers to support 
France) (ibid.: 102). 
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The Prussian bourgeoisie had several economic reasons for making national 
unification a priority. One was that as long as the antagonism between Prussia 
and Austria remained umesolved, it had to carry the main financial burden for 
Prussian 'protection' of the smaller German states from possible Austrian 
expansionism. The Prussian bourgeoisie saw itself as 'structurally discriminated 
against' by this situation (Winkler 1978:8). Similarly, the multiplicity of state 
structures meant unnecessary deductions from the revenue: a 'most irrational 
system of taxation' (the tolls raised on the river Elbe) allowed for example a 
minor prince to build 'in Schwerin a palace which surpasses Windsor and 
Versailles' as the author of an article in the 'Preussische Jahrbuecher' 
complained in 1859 (quoted in Hamerow 1969:163). In the liberal 'German 
Quarterly' from 1862 it was pointed out that investments in modern factories fail 
to be made because 'in view of our national weakness a war threatens us at any 
moment' (ibid.: 144). Furthermore, it was argued that a nation without a navy is 
disadvantaged in international trade because 'no fleet collects for German 
industrialists the unpaid claims they may happen to have in Mexico' (ibid.). 
German nation-building needed not only regime change, but territorial 
changes that a majority of liberals came to think could not be achieved other than 
by military means. This placed at the centre of the political scene an institution 
that was by definition unlikely to promote a liberal mindset. In this constellation, 
liberals were allowed to run the economy and be 'arbiters of what constituted 
good taste' (Breuilly 1994:289) but political-military power remained in the 
hands of the experts. The alternative approach that had hoped liberal regime 
change in the German states could be achieved by parallel liberal-democratic 
movements within these states died out only in the course of the 1860s. 119 The 
difficulty was that the co-operation between reactionary governments of a long-
established network of sovereign states would almost inevitably be more efficient 
than that between rather vulnerable grassroot movements - at least as long as the 
latter were not based on, and refused to invoke, popular mass support. 
119 Georg Gottfried Gervinus' 'Memorandum on peace' (1871) is an example ofa minority view 
within liberalism that did not welcome German unification in the form of the Reich (Kohn 1961 
[1946]: 109f). Gervinus argued that centralisation should be avoided and federalism strengthened 
- with not Berlin but 'a city which would symbolise a policy of peaceful civilisation' being the 
capital: an anticipation of Weimar and Bonn, as it were - in order to prevent a vicious circle of 
militarization of European politics. Gervinus held that Germany was by nature (geography etc.) a 
strong state that did not need to keep open military options. 
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The founding of the Reich - i.e. the fixing of its borders and institutions -
was followed by what in German is called 'innere Staatsbildung' (Hardtwig 
1993: 12): creating the conditions for a deeper penetration of the state into 
society, of centre into periphery, of state and society into the relations between 
individuals and the individuals themselves, destructing the relative autonomy of 
intermediary institutions. For this process a new and more effective 
legitimization was needed that would also trigger an atmosphere of dynamism, 
mobilization and enthusiasm for a cause shared by all who found themselves 
inside the borders of the new state - the nation (Wehler 1995:942).120 This 
became more difficult when during the industrial depression since 1873 and the 
agricultural crisis since 1876, the 'nationalist fever' caused by the wars of 1866 
and 1870171 gave way to the more sober mood of having to deal with pressing 
everyday problems (ibid.:946). After all, 'Reichsnationalismus' was primarily 
based on (apart from military success) increased economic unification and 
dynamism after 1871, supported by fast growing communication systems 
(railway and media) (ibid.:948).121 
The German Imperial state 'had to deal with strong particularisms in eastern 
Prussia, Bavaria and elsewhere, a potential liberal-democratic opposition, 
religious divisions and a rising labour movement, without the benefit of a 
centralized state apparatus (given the entrenched federalism of the constitution) 
or national cultural institutions' (Eley 1986c:79). Under such conditions, the 
Reich was not able to initiate easily a form of 'integral' or 'state-sponsored' 
nationalism. 122 Furthermore, nation-building in the Reich was hampered by the 
120 For some specific groups of the population 'Germany' became much earlier an 'experiential 
space' because they were travelling a lot across state borders: in the course of university 
education, scholarly contacts, as part of an administrative career, or through exile (Echtemkamp 
1998:504). This was the case for most 1848 deputies. Trade obviously needs to be added to the 
list. 
121 The fact that nation-building in Germany coincided with industrialization allowed for the 
claim that its benefits (like an increased general standard of life and economic dynamism) were 
achievements 'of the nation' and of nationalism. At the same time it could be claimed that the 
nation-state was needed to resolve the specific problems that industrialization created (Wehler 
1995:958). After 1878, the slogan 'protection of national labour' became common currency 
(ibid.:949). 
122 'Official nationalism ... may have helped temporarily to consolidate the alliance of the "ins", 
but it had the effect of alienating other groups' (Hughes 1988: 156). The relevance of 'official 
nationalism' is difficult to assess but should not be overrated. Nationalism is hardly ever a 
'strategy' arbitrarily adopted (or not) by 'the state', Rather, the social and historical dynamic of 
society in its totality gives birth to 'the state' and also, as an aspect and effect of specific changes 
in society, drives this state towards transforming itself into a 'national state', 
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problem that 'the foundation of the national state did not lead to a creative 
unfolding of national culture' because its fixation on the new state meant it lost 
its reference to the German linguistic realm (Deuerlein 1970:255).123 
The boom period of the 'Gruenderzeit' 124 began in 1867, massively 
intensified after the Franco-Prussian war. From 1867, Prussia and the North 
German Federation, after 1871 the Reich, also saw a encompassing series of 
economic reforms, chiefly the work of Rudolf Delbrueck and Otto von 
Camphausen ('confirmed "Manchester men"', as Pulzer notes) (Pulzer 1988: 18). 
Freedom of trade was introduced in the Gewerbeordnung of 1869, the 
Aktiennovelle of 1870 abolished restrictions on the development of joint stock 
companies; the Reichsmuenzgesetz of 1871 and 1873 introduced the gold 
standard which helped 'encourage German business to go after a larger share of 
the world market' (Massing 1949:5).125 Duties on pig iron, scrap and 
shipbuilding materials were abolished in 1873, those on half-finished iron 
products and machinery were halved and subsequently abolished in 1877. 
Due to rapid industrialization prices for grain and for cultivated land rose 
sharply which encouraged agrarian capitalists in the early seventies to borrow 
money to be invested in land and in industrial methods to increase yield 
(Massing 1949:32).126 When grain prices collapsed due to the industrial 
depression from 1873 -78, worsened by the influx of cheap wheat from the USA 
and Russia, an agrarian crisis broke out that made conservatives (from the mid 
The defeat of democrats who opted for social reform in 1848 meant that class conflict 
became so obvious a reality - in the second half of the 1860s Germany saw an unprecedented 
series of strikes - that the emergence of independent labour organizations that stood in opposition 
to liberalism and bourgeois democracy was inevitable (Hardtwig 1993 :27). 
123 Further, the new conception of culture as the supposed 'expression' of the specific national 
character of the 'Reichsnation' had the effect that the concept of culture was extended to any 
aspect of human existence which led - especially during the years immediately following the 
foundation of the Reich - to the disaffection ofa large section of the cultural elite (Nietzsche 
would be an example) who turned against the Imperial 'nation-state' in the name of the values of 
classical, humanist German culture (ibid.). 
124 Pulzer translates Griinder, more commonly translated as 'founder' as 'promoter' which seems 
to be the correct technical term denoting a person who participates in the foundation of a 
company and for that purpose 'promotes' this company for fund-raising (Pulzer 1988: 19). 
125 Between 1850 and 1875, 'the value of bank notes in circulation in Prussia increased from 18 
million to 290 million Taler' (Blackboum 1984: 181). Before 1871 there were eight different 
silver based currencies in the German League. In the 1860s the relative values of silver and gold 
were quite unpredictable (one factor was the gold rush, another one the flow of silver to Asia); 
the transition to a unified gold currency seemed a way of handling this. Furthermore, the smaller 
German states endangered currency stability by being able to print paper money at will (Weber 
1978). 
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1870s) call for protective tariffs on wheat. Because from the 1860s, the public 
image of liberalism had increasingly been identified with free trade policy 
(Langewiesche 2000: 190), many blamed political liberalism for the crisis of 
1873-5 (the 'Gruenderkrach ,).127 
The crisis forced industrial and agrarian capital to corne to concerted action, 
negotiating their contradictory interests in low food prices (that meant low value 
of industrial labour power) on the one side, cheap industrial products and 
machines on the other side. 128 Bismarck managed to translate the changed 
constellation into the political sphere. Using the occasion of the two attempts on 
the life of the Kaiser (May 11, 1878; June 2, 1878) he intensified the fight 
against Social Democracy with the Sozialistengesetz and used the process of 
introducing this law to paralize the liberals. 
On the same day that the Reichstag passed the Sozialistengesetz (October 19, 
1878), a 'Volkswirtschaftliche Vereinigung' consisting of deputies from 
Conservatives, National Liberals and Center issued a declaration cautiously 
calling for protective tariffs. 129 This was 'of the highest momentum for social 
126 By 1880, two thirds of East Prussian Rittergijter were in bourgeois hands (Blackboum 
1984: 182). 
127 There has been a long scholarly controversy whether there was a 'Great Depression' from 
1873 - 1896 (Rosenberg 1967, Wehler 1995) or whether this is a myth (Saul according to 
Mommsen 1995: I 05; cpo also Eley 1986b). Mommsen in his summary assessment states that 
most scholars tend to reject the notion. He emphasizes that there have been repeated ups and 
downs in the period, and the development of different sections of production was extremely 
uneven due to the growing integration of the German economy into the world market. Even 
within the most dynamic areas, such as metal industry, only ever a small number of companies 
would do extremely well while many either catch up or go bust. Even if aggregate data suggest an 
economic boom during most of any given period, this does not at all mean that most companies, 
let alone most people did (or thought they did). 
It seems safe to say that there was a period of stagnation between 1873 and 1878. 1879 - the 
year of the Streit - was the year of a weak economic recovery. 
The agricultural crisis began in the 1870s (Mommsen 1995: 107) but peaked only in 1894. 
Nevertheless, in the whole period agricultural productivity rose significantly, the absolute number 
of people employed in agriculture increased slightly. 'Generally speaking, the agricultural sector 
remained comparatively strong up to 1914' in Germany, contrasting sharply with the 
development in Britain for example (ibid.: 108). 'Until 1914 the German Empire was both an 
agrarian and an industrial state'. 
128 The introduction of protective tariffs in July 1879 'represented the first modem piece of 
legislation in Germany to bear the stamp of a top-level business organization all over it' (Wehler 
1985:86). 
129 The social powers behind the tum towards protectionism were mining and textile industry and 
to a lesser degree industrial agrarians (Winkler 1978:14). The petition was based on a 
compromise: tariffs on foodstuff (that increase costs oflivelihood and thus wages) were meant to 
be balanced out by tariffs on finished products allowing industry to offset the increased wage 
costs. Two weeks later, a conference of the German Chambers of Commerce in Berlin also 
departed from free trade policies. In May 1879, 'the free traders' counterattack reached a high 
point' (Sheehan 1978: 187) when representatives of seventy-two German cities - the grass-roots 
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history' (Sell 1953:271) because it was the first case of political cooperation 
between large scale agrarians and heavy industry,130 and it made possible 
'Bismarck's emancipation from liberalism' (ibid.). 
Ludwig Bamberger suggested in his widely read manifesto 'The Secession' 
(1880) that 
among all the civilized nations (KulturHindern), Germany has experienced 
least the political power of its Buergertum. This means that feudal ideas 
have remained stronger here and that Socialist ideas have ... gained more 
and more power (quoted in Sheehan 1978:195). 
Bamberger used this observation in order to explain the double phenomenon of 
Bismarck's successful outmanoevering the National Liberal party, and the 
growth of Social Democracy that was also to the disadvantage of the liberal 
parties. 131 
The Prussian state (and that of the Reich that it dominated) was old-
fashioned in some respects, but modern in others (Hardtwig 1993: 11).132 The 
landed aristocracy in Prussia managed to emerge from the dissolution of feudal 
structures as an economically successful class in its own right that did not need 
the co-operation of the bourgeoisie (ibid.:22), so that aristocracy and bourgeoisie 
tended to maintain their separate cultural characteristics more than in England 
and France. 
The characteristic feature of the modernization process in Germany is the 
extent of 'separation and conflict between the institutions specialising in 
administration and warfare on the one hand, and those specialising in economic 
and cultural activity on the other hand' (Breuilly 1994:293). The bourgeoisie was 
of German liberalism - met in Berlin and 'voted overwhelmingly to oppose any tariff on 
foodstuffs'. When the National Liberal faction was not able to decide on how to vote, fifteen right 
wing members left the party in July 1879 (amongst them Treitschke). 
130 It is not our concern here whether or not protective tariffs were economically necessary or at 
all beneficial to German economy of the time (cp. Winkler 1978:16). The point is that a 
significant enough portion of both industrialists and agrarians thought it was necessary; apart 
from their specific (lack of) understanding of political economy, nationalism might have been one 
of the elements in their thinking that made them think so. 
131 Bamberger's observation has later been taken up by a variety of authors in order to explain 
various aspects of German history - the 'Deutscher Sonderweg' argument - but has often been 
overburdened with claims to explanatory power that went far beyond what Bamberger, for 
example, intended to say. 
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more self-consciously bourgeois, and the nobility equally self-consciously 
aristocratic, while both contributed in their ways to 'modernization' (ibid.; 
similar: Kocka 1993:27). 
However, in France and Britain as in Germany, the building of 'popular 
national identity', industrialization, capitalization and the creation of modem 
state structures - the main elements of 'modernization' - took place in the period 
1800-70 (Breuilly 1994:285). Cobden found 'the Prussian bureaucracy with its 
specialized administrative functions ... clearly more modem than the English 
system ... ' (ibid.:287), while Bismarck as 'a radical-conservative modernizer ... 
had clear contemporary parallels in other European countries, such as Disraeli in 
Britain or Cavour in Italy' (Evans 1997: 17). 
Neither the exclusivist, executive, nor aristocratic features of the German 
polity before 1914 - that is, the checks on popular participation, the 
relative weakness of parliamentary controls, and the privileges of the titular 
nobility - were at all unusual by the European standards of the time. 
Indeed, the Kaiserreich was more frequently regarded as an exemplary 
'modem' state - in the technocratic efficiency of its bureaucratic and 
military machines, in its more interventionist relationship to the economy 
and society, in the vaunted excellence of its municipal governments, in its 
system of social administration, and (from a different point of view) in the 
existence of universal suffrage and the extent of popular political 
mobilization (Eley 1996b:93). 
Eley asserts that 'the German experience' of the last decades of the 19th century 
was 'a successful but conflict-ridden (conflict-ridden because so successful) 
capitalist modernization' (Eley 1996c :44; italics in the original). The formation 
of the German nation-state 'did indeed represent an intensified version of 
structures and processes at work in Western and Central Europe as a whole' 
(Evans 1997: 18). The main 'particularities' according to Evans (ibid.: 18) are the 
particular timing - German nation-building happened when industrialization and 
capitalist class-formation were already in full swing - and the size and economic 
power of Germany. 133 
I32 'Prussia [at the time of German unification] was not associated only with the barracks and the 
spiked helmet; it was broadly identified with the cause of modernity in fields ranging from 
education and communications to the scientific management of forests' (Blackbourn 1991:19). 
!33 The fact that the nation state left 'millions of ethnic Germans outside its boundaries', 
providing extreme nationalists with an idealist sounding and superbly tempting excuse for 
conquest and expansion, was a further 'peculiarity'. 
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1.3.4. RELIGION 
1.3.4.1 The necessity of religion 
In the modem period 'religion was subsumed (eingegliedert), and not 
overcome (aufgehoben), as Adorno and Horkheimer wrote. 134 The German 
society of the second Reich might have been 'becoming increasingly 
secularized', but it was 'by no means secular' (Walser Smith 1995:85). Private 
and public, inner and outer, state and civil society needed a link of some sort, 
providing firm values, and this link was generally seen in 'culture'. 'Values' and 
'culture' were, however, impossible to think of without reference to religion. 
Enlightenment liberalism developed two approaches to religion, which Smith 
calls a 'soft', or pluralist, and a 'hard', or rationalist tendency (ibid.:4). The 
former saw theological differences as not reconcilable and suggested their 
frictions could best be neutralized by creating' a competitive market in religious 
sects' (ibid.:3) - the more there were the more peacefuU it would be, not unlike 
today's notion of the 'multicultural society'. The other line of thinking was the 
idea that old time theology ought to be transformed into a new, rational form of 
religion (that very often was understood to be a continuation and extension of the 
Reformation). The rational religion would be universal, cosmopolitan, pure 
morality stripped of all institutional, historical and popular incrustation. Both the 
'soft' and the 'hard' tendency are not, however, separate items: an emblematic 
thinker like Locke contributed to both at the same time. 
When Locke (echoed for example by John Stuart Mill) argued that politics 
should not concern itself with religion, this did not mean it was independent from 
it. The tension between a secular state and a religious civil society was not 
abolished by decree. The resurgence of forms of religious enthusiasm that would 
challenge this precarious separation has never been absent from modem 
societies. 
In this context, toleration was extended for the most part to the dissenting 
Protestant sects, not necessarily to Catholics, Jews and especially not to atheists. 
'The point [of toleration] was to validate not every way oflife and set of moral 
134 They argue that when religion became a 'cultural artefact' (Kulturgut)" only its 'reified forms' 
(verdinglichte Formen) survived while the 'element of truth' that they had carried and preserved 
(the Messianic promise of a better life) tended to be suppressed and made forgotten 
(Adorno/Horkheimer 1997/1971 [1944]: 176/158). 
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beliefs but only enough of them to avoid the dangers of civil war' (Smith 
1997:4). Within this logic, very small minorities (too insignificant to engage in a 
civil war) needed not be tolerated, and also if toleration of (Jewish and other) 
traditional religious practices seemed to jeopardize either the pluralist strategy, 
or the emergence of universalist 'rational religion', it could be rej ected. Moses 
Mendelssohn argued for the extension of toleration to Judaism and Islam on the 
grounds that church, mosque and synagogue (not necessarily, however, the 
atheist reading club) could 'assist the government in inculcating moral reasons 
for obeying the law' (ibid.: 172). Also in Mendelssohn's argument the toleration 
of diversity will best ensure that moderate, not too unreasonable religion will 
complement and support the purposes of the modem liberal state. The state 
should therefore grant the space for this to happen, while at the same time 
critically observe that toleration is actually being put to good use (ibid.: 175).135 
Hegel rejects the notion that the spheres of politics and religion are 'mutually 
indifferent' (ibid.: 195). He argues for religious toleration because the recognition 
of religious freedom asserts a crucial Protestant principle, the centrality of 
individual subjectivity that thereby interpenetrates the secular sphere. 'Hegel 
argues that to exclude Jews from civil rights would only confirm the separatism 
for which they have been reproached'. As it were, the modem state and society, 
united in the spirit of Protestantism, assert their world historical triumph by 
tolerating the remnants of religions that have had their glory days in the past. The 
case for toleration is here an expression of optimistic belief in the actuality of 
liberal progress. 136 
I35 Mendelssohn also makes the case for pluralism and diversity which are 'evidently the plan and 
purpose of Providence' (quoted ibid.: 177). Apparently reflecting on the North American 
experience, he writes that the demand for religious uniformity was at odds with human nature. 
136 In the famous fragment from 1795, The earliest program for a system of German Idealism (at 
least co-written by Hegel) it is argued that religion and politics both teach 'contempt for 
humanity and the incapacity of man to realize the good and to achieve something through his 
own efforts' (ibid.: 187). While this text seems to condemn positive religion as such, Hegel 
exempts Christianity from such condemnation in his The spirit of Christianity and its fate (1798-
99): here he presents Judaism as the paradigmatic religion of despotism. Hegel quotes in this 
essay Tacitus' formulation 'odium generis humani' (allegedly the 'soul of Judaism'). 
Furthermore, he identifies Kant's ethics with Judaism's view of the law originating from a source 
wholly outside mankind. When Kant thought he had replaced the despotism of external law with 
the obedience to an inner law, Hegel now argued that Kant had not eliminated but merely 
internalized the formerly external despot (ibid.: 189). In this essay Hegel attacks any form of 
legalism as so many denials of 'individuality' and 'life as it is' of particular persons; he suggests 
Christianity's doctrine oflove constituted a crucial departure from the (Jewish) spirit of legalism. 
It seems plausible that many subsequent articulations of anti-Judaism in the 19th century took for 
example the reference to Tacitus from Hegel's essay. Even in his later writings in which Hegel 
56 
It is crucial to the discussion that the fate of Enlightenment, liberalism and 
emancipation is bound up with that of the modem state, the nation and the 
necessities they represent. Altogether, these form moments of the larger socio-
historical framework of modem bourgeois society. 137 While Spinoza, Locke, 
Kant and others call for a civil and reasonable religion that would provide the 
necessary bridging of the gaps between private and public, civil society and the 
state, leaving the door open for various religions to join into a general neo-
reformation movement, Hegel and then Treitschke - together with cohorts of 
others - claim straightforwardly what had previously at best been implied 
between the lines: this modem and reasonable religion already exists - more or 
less - in the form of Protestant Christianity. In this situation, the Jews and others 
have to double their effort to join the Protestant bandwagon of reasonable 
religion, or might find themselves being left behind. 
1.3.4.2 The form of religion 
Religious conflict in the 19th century was neither anachronistic nor parochial 
but the meanings of 'religion' and 'confession' differed from earlier periods. At 
least three related tendencies that characterize religion in the modem period can 
be distinguished: 
~ Clericalization: the church hierarchy takes over, centralizes and standardizes 
the forms of religious life that had previously been much more local and 
village-centred. 
recognizes the Jewish contribution to the evolution of humanity's consciousness of freedom, 
Judaism is presented as a form of consciousness that has had its time: the Protestant articulation 
of the idea of 'inner freedom' has rendered all other religions so many stepping stones from the 
past to the present. 
137 The 'modem era' is the period in which 'modernization' of society took place, i.e. a historical 
period in which a specific set of structural changes occurred that resulted in the creation of 
'bourgeois society'. The difficulty and complexity of the concept lies in the fact that beyond its 
historical-structural meaning, the concept 'modernity' also carries normative connotations, a set 
of promises - emancipation, humanity, human reconciliation in universal liberation - that 
'modernization' has only begun to fulfil. The unfulfilled promises of 'the modem', the difference 
between 'modernity' and 'modernization', need to be salvaged against the reality of modern 
society as it currently exists. It is for this reason that 'modem bourgeois society' is not the 
pleonasm that it seems to be. Although it is less than clear what it would be, the notion of another 
modernity is not less relevant now than it was at any point in time before (cp. Salecker 1999:73f). 
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~ Politicization: with the emergence of the modem state and of 'politics' as a 
separate sphere of activity, religion becomes one of their most effective 
toolS.138 
~ Individualization: parallel to clericalization (Verkirchlichung) there is a 
growing tendency to Ent-kirchlichung, i.e. the emergence of a sphere of 
'religiosity' different from, but not indifferent to formal, institutional and 
positive religion. 
The interaction of these three tendencies produced the immense multiplicity of 
religious phenomena in the modem period. In the following section I wi11look at 
religion in the pre-nationalist formation of modem states, the transformation of 
religion into mere 'sets of beliefs' from the late 18th century on, the revival of 
piety in the 19th century and the ambiguous role of religion for nationalism. 
From the late fifteenth century 'the evangelization of the populace coincided 
with the development of what can loosely be called nation states' (Lamer quoted 
in Sayer 1991: 128). 'Post-Reformation Christianity' (including both 
Protestantism and counter-reformation Catholicism) was 'the world's first 
political ideology'. As reflected in early modem formulas such as un joi, un roi, 
une loi or cuius regio eius religio, modem religion was constituted in a 
contradictory development, as a private affair and a political affair at the same 
time. This contradiction reflects that 'the political' and 'the private' have never 
been located in separate or even independent 'spheres' to the extent that the 
accompanying (liberal) theory might have suggested. 
In Germany, religious confessionalisation was bound with the emergence of 
territorial states (Schilling 1991 :237). Religion provided rulers of early modem 
states with a powerful legitimation to challenge traditional and corporate 
(stiindische) social and legal relations within their territory and also to 
consolidate its borders (ibid.:240) - in many ways not unlike nationalism would 
be used later. 139 Religion in the confessional age was also instrumental in 
138 Religion as a 'tool' of politics needs to be distinguished from the 'moral-religious' view of 
social and economic processes that is characteristic of 'traditional' society where 'the economy' 
as a separate sphere in its own right, following its own 'a-moral' rules and laws, does not exist. 
The complex of processes usually summed up as 'modernization' includes the constitution of the 
sphere of 'the economy' (next to that of 'the political') and tends to provoke a 'moral-religious' 
reaction, too. 
139 'Religio vinculum societatis' was not a medieval idea but 'the axiom of early modem 
Vergesellschaftung' (ibid.: 197). Cp also Hegel in a text of 1802: religion 'expresses the 
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imposing social discipline as well as first modem standards of moral and sexual 
behaviour: it was only in this context that the church (in either denominational 
form) took over the regulation of crucial social functions such as engagement and 
marriage ceremonies from local family and village structures (ibid.:24l). In the 
same breath it fought also the heathen elements of popular piety. 
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) had aimed to create territories in the 
German area that were confessionally homogeneous to an extent comparable to 
that of most other early modem European states. However, this effort was 
undermined by both the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities in 
countries of different confession, 140 and by enlargement of states by annexing 
areas populated by people of different confession (especially Prussia and 
Bavaria) (Hoelscher 2001:42). The 'map-makers at Vienna boldly joined what 
those at Augsburg and Westphalia had so carefully kept asunder' (Anderson 
2001 :320), and the enormous increase in spatial mobility and urbanization 
throughout the nineteenth century intensified this mixing process. 141 Not 
surprisingly, German nationalism in the period after Napoleon and before 1848 
searched for a singular, national religion that could bridge the confessional 
breach. Ernst Moritz Arndt for example claimed that 'Germany is the land of 
Protestantism' (Arndt in 1814, quoted in Altgeld 2001:52), while others searched 
for a synthetic form of Christianity beyond the Christian confessions (such as the 
late Fichte and Jacob Fries, one of the protagonists of the Wartburg festival in 
innermost being of all people, so that all external and diffuse matters aside, they can find a 
common focus and, despite inequality and transformations in other spheres and conditions, are 
still able to trust and rely on each other' (quoted in Altgeld 2001:54). 
140 Dutch, Belgian, French, Bohemian and Swiss Protestant refugees were welcomed by German 
governments because they came 'from culturally advanced regions' (Hoelscher 2001 :43). Jews 
who were in a position of becoming instrumental to advancing modernization were also welcome 
although their relevance was actually much less central than has often been assumed. Hoelscher 
suggests that generally in (early) modem Europe, religious minorities that faced difficulties 'to 
maintain their religious integrity in an alien environment' (ibid.) tended 'to strive for economic 
and cultural success' . 
141 'The demographic shifts that brought Catholics and Protestants into common space prefigured, 
far more than Bismarck's policy, the recrudescence of confessional conflicts in the Kaiserreich' 
(Walser Smith 1995:234). 
The confessional mixing process through intra-state migration or changing state borders had 
different effects in the cities and on the countryside: amongst the more mobile and urban parts of 
the population (first of all, from the mid 18th century, the educated bourgeoisie), confessional 
distinctions appeared bridgeable the more personal belief gained in importance. Less mobile and 
more traditional groups reacted by re-affirming local church traditions. In Prussia after 1815 for 
example, Catholics reacted against the Prussian reform policy as much as did Lutherans and 
Calvinists against the state-led unification process of Pruss ian Protestantism (Hoelscher 
2001 :44f). 
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1817), or thought about pre-Christian religiosity rooted in the ethnic Germanic 
past (such as Jacob Grimm) (Altgeld 2001 :55). In this context, anti-Jewish 
hostility was instrumental to the building of the synthetic, national religion: the 
Jews formed 'a negative point of reference for an ideology of national-religious 
integration' (ibid.:59).142 
Modem society transformed traditional religions into 'systems of belief and 
'confessions' that one does or does not 'have' .143 'From around 1770 the 
theology of the Protestant Enlightenment distinguishes between a "public" and a 
"private", an "outer" and an "inner" religion' (Hoelscher 2001 :36). Confession 
and belief144 were conceived of as separate (although not independent) from each 
other145 while religious orthodoxy (Jewish as well as Christian) tried to defend 
whatever had survived from pre-modem religion as a (formal-objective as well 
as spiritual-subjective) aspect of everyday practice. 146 
In either Christian confession, the twin trends of clericalization! 
confessionalization and personalization! individualization worked together - like 
a campaign on two fronts - against on the one hand, local, non-clerical traditions 
142 Hoelscher suggests that more than in England, France, Italy or Spain, nineteenth century piety 
created in Germany a plethora of sects and religious groupings that constituted a 'vast religious 
spectrum' characterized by 'social and regional breaches' (Hoelscher 2001 :45f) that 'rendered a 
weltanschauliche integration of society' difficult. Society was not simply divided into an 
Enlightened, anti-clerical and a pro-clerical, conservative camp, but pious and dissenting groups 
could often oppose both 'the established Church and its political allies in governments and 
bureaucracies' . 
143 The liberal notion of 'having' a religion presupposes social conditions in which one likewise 
'has' a social position, a job (or, in German, a 'Beruf [vocation]), political beliefs, ideologies, 
world views etc., all of which exist separate from each other (tentatively in real life, more strictly 
in discursive reflection). Although the modem world-view would admit that they 'influence' or 
'construct' each other, it still postulates their existence as separate entities. The specific quality of 
'orthodox' religious positions is their refusal to accept (some of) the categories and separations of 
modem bourgeois society. 
144 For the latter also 'religiosity' and 'piety' (in German, Frommigkeit, which initially had the 
meaning of 'hardworking goodness and honesty'; Hoelscher 2001 :36) 
145 The centrality of individuality, personality, dignity and the urge to find individual expressions 
ofbelief(ibid.:36f) was in itself rather typical of the Protestant confession. It was in this context 
that family and educational institutions gained more influence on an individual's religiosity, 
while the relevance of the church as such correspondingly decreased (ibid.:39f). 
146 Their understanding ofreligion as 'entkirchlichte' religiosity meant for example that 
Protestants did not always see decline in church attendance as something negative (Altgeld 
2001 :49). Walkenhorst argues that 'religion's evaporation into religiosity (Verfliichtigung der 
Religion ins Religiose)' (Walkenhorst 1996:524) was instrumental to the sacralization of the 
nation since it blurred the distinction between a 'sacred' and a 'profane' sphere. This was 
anticipated in 18th century and earlier theology by the notion of history as the arena in which 
God's will reveals itself (Walkenhorst 1996:517). In this context, nationalism was not at all an 
Ersatzreligion, but nation could be an Ersatz for church and milieu as these had been discharged 
from 'religiosity' (ibid.:527): the nation seemed to give people back what had been lost when 
religion became religiosity. 
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of piety that was indifferent or even illoyal towards the church as an institution, 
and on the other hand the trend towards secularization (Blaschke 1997b:31 ft). 
Catholic clerical reaction in the form of ultra-mont an ism was accompanied by a 
campaign of spiritual - quasi evangelist - (Jesuit led) popular missions. On the 
Protestant side, there was the spiritual movement of pietism while clericalization 
(in Prussia, the main Protestant power) took the form of the Pruss ian Unionist 
Church l47 • In either case, the clerical and the spiritual movements overlapped but 
were not identical. 
By the early nineteenth century, 'Catholic popular piety and the Catholic 
Church had been in ruins' (Altgeld 200 1: 49t), but both 'neo-traditional forms of 
mass-religiosity' and the institution of the Church itself (as the 'ultra-montane' 
church) went through 'a stupendous renewal' (ibid.:50) in the course of the 
nineteenth century. The 'new forms of integration, demarcation, and identity' 
that emerged in the nineteenth century in all confessions might have been 
misunderstood by some contemporaries and commentators as anachronistic 
leftovers of a religious past, but they were 'aspects of the modernization process' 
itself. 148 
'Ultra-montanism' introduced and reinforced an effective hierarchical 
institutional structure and reglementation and homogenization of piety and 
superstition, including that of anti-Semitism: the church partly opposed Jew-
hatred, partly redefined and standardised it (Blaschke 1997b:31); 149 anti-Jewish 
riots should not break out 'spontaneously' but 'in ways defined by the clerics'. 150 
The twin phenomena of a popular pious movement coinciding with attempts 
by Rome to reinforce Papal authority within the church (largely connected with 
the name of Pope Pius IX)151 were intensified in the fall of 1848 when the 
147 A crucial difference was that the latter was - in a Lutheran way - allied to the Prussian state. 
148 'Severe and lasting intra-religious divisions occurred in the 1 840s, especially in the cities' 
among Jews, Catholics and Protestants to similar degrees and as part of the same historical 
process (Smith/Clark 2001: 13). 'Religious division, which Kant once believed would disappear 
with the passage of time, deepened in nineteenth-century Germany because of, not despite, social 
and demographic, cultural and political forces pushing for integration' (Walser Smith 1995:238). 
Walser Smith stresses that confessional conflict was part of the 'general processes of 
modernization' (ibid.:235), and those who took part in them could consider themselves forward-
looking and modern, such as Protestant bourgeois or Catholic workers. 
149 It defined for example what a 'proper' ritual murder was supposed to look like. 
150 As an effect, riots that saw stones being thrown at the Jews as well as at the parish priest 
became a thing of the past (ibid.:40). 
151 The landmarks of ultra-mont an ism were the endorsement of the doctrine of 'Immaculate 
Conception' (1854), the anti-liberal 'Syllabus Errorum' (1864) and the declaration of Papal 
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Catholic bishops of Germany agreed to commit the Church to a 'full-fledged 
campaign of popular missions (Volksmissionen) to restore faith, obedience and 
order among Catholics all across Germany' (Gross 2001:245). These missions 
were organized on behalf of the Church by religious orders, foremost the 
Jesuits. 152 Before the Kufturkampfbegan in 1871 in Prussia and on the level of 
the Reich, 153 it had already been fought - avant fa fettre - in Bavaria and Baden 
in the wake of liberal economic reforms from 1863 on. The' liberal Protestant 
educated middle classes' felt they had to defend modem culture against medieval 
barbarism. 154 
However, much more than that, 'for liberals the Kulturkampfmeant ... a 
struggle to unlock the potential for social progress, freeing the dynamism of 
German society from the dead hand of archaic institutions' (Eley 1986 c:69). 
Central to this was defeating 'clerical control of charities, poorhouses and 
schools' (ibid.). The newly introduced freedom of enterprise and movement as 
well as attempts to put the riches of foundations (that had previously e.g. 
provided poor relief) to productive use underpinned the popular anti-liberal 
movement especially amongst the rural population. 'The fact that this anti-liberal 
popular movement was also a Catholic movement, increased the liberal readiness 
to pursue the Kulturkampf as a domestic preventative war against "Ultramontane 
anti-modernity" ... ' (Langewiesche 2000:202). As if echoing Hobbes' warning 
that religion other than in the service of the (modem) state ('superstition') could 
infallibility (1870). The ideological struggle between liberalism and anti-liberal Catholicism 
constituted a 'pan-European' phenomenon (Langewiesche 2000:200). The death of Pope Pius IX 
in February 1878 gave Bismarck a good opportunity to phase out the Kulturkampf(Langewiesche 
2000:195). 
152 They benefited from the Prussian constitution of 1850 that ended state intervention in 
ecclesiastical affairs. 
The Gennan Reich that ended in 1806 was inhabited by 60 per cent Catholics; the German 
Bund of 1815 by roughly 50 per cent, and the Reich of 1871 by one third (Altgeld 2001 :51). 
However, they constituted much less than a third of the Bildungsbiirgertum (Becker 2001 :391). 
153 Virchow, one of the founders of the Progress party, is said to have coined the term 
'Kulturkampf (Massing 1949:214). 
154 Treitschke for example wrote that Rome's policy made him appreciate the value of 
Protestantism, and reminded him that 'the Pope is the Anti-Christ' (ibid.). Many (Lutheran) 
Conservatives, however, understood (correctly) that the Kulturkampfwas not so much a 
denominational religious conflict but a struggle of secular authority against clerical authority and 
thus felt themselves under attack (Massing 1949: 16). 
While for many liberals Catholicism seemed a dangerous anachronism, for some the same 
was true for Judaism, while others saw anti-Semitism as part of a 'relapse' from modernity into 
'the Middle Ages'. Whether any modem (in the widest sense, liberal) individual saw 
Catholicism, Judaism or anti-Semitism as tasteless and reactionary medieval anchronism, 
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become dangerous, the Kulturkampf was (also) the de-legitimization of an 
ideological resource for popular resistance to (capitalist) progress. Although 
conservative and 'anti-modem' (in the normative sense or the word), this 
resistance was, however, also part of the process of 'modernity' (in the sense of 
'modernization'). 
Protestantism, too, especially in Berlin, went (after 1815) through a neo-
pietist movement of religious revival (Clark 2001:72). This was paralleled by the 
state-led effort to unite Lutherans and Calvinists in the 'Church of the Prussian 
Union' (ibid.:74)155 that included the standardazation of rites, vestments and 
buildings 'down to the most minute details' (ibid.). Those who resisted the 
unification process (like the 'Old Lutherans') were depicted as troublemakers 
and subversives (ibid.:75). The Prussian Union 'was a church-state organism of a 
new type', an exercise in both 'disciplining the Church and sacralizing the state' 
(ibid.).156 
While the war of 1866 had met substantial Catholic opposition, Protestants 
and Catholics hardly differed in their attitudes to the Franco-Prussian war 
(Becker 2001:394;395). Correspondingly, the Versailles proclamation of the 
Reich was strictly military and avoided a confessionally straightforward religious 
depended on what exactly that particular individual understood 'modernity' to be. This category 
is of course conveniently flexible to accommodate an array of different positions. 
155 This constituted an 'unprecedented confessional interventionism' on the part of the Prussian 
King, as Clark writes (ibid.). 
156 While Frederick William III maintained generally an Enlightened point of view, seeing 
religion as functional and subordinate to raison d'etat and being only tangentially influenced by 
Pietist revivalism, Frederick William IV (from 1840) embraced the concept of the 'Christian 
state' and made conversion of the Jews an issue of state policy (ibid.:77). Friedrich Julius Stahl, a 
convert from Judaism and a director of a Berlin based society for the conversion of Jews, 
developed the concept in his The Christian State (1847). Stahl argued that the state was 'a 
revelation of the ethical spirit of a nation', and since ethics in tum were grounded in religion, the 
state had to express, propagate and realize in practice the values of the nation's religion (i.e. 
Christianity). Stahl rejected in particular the traditional (especially Lutheran) view that the earthly 
realm ought to be kept separate from the 'Kingdom of God', and argued that the state was an 
instrument for remodelling the former on the image of the latter (ibid.:79). Church and state were 
to be separate but not 'apart'. He applauded the Emancipation edict of 1812 for exemplifying the 
generosity of the Protestant spirit but still safeguarding the Christian character of the state. 
Although Stahl's concept of the 'Christian state' never unequivocally became the basis of 
government policy, it was reflected for example in article 14 of the Pruss ian constitution of 1850 
(that also remained valid after 1871) which stated: 'The Christian religion is taken to be the basis 
of those institutions of the state that are connected with the practice of religion, regardless of the 
freedom of religion guaranteed in article 12' (ibid.:83). In contrast to the rhetoric of the 'Christian 
state' of the 1880s and 1890s, Stahl's concept was, though, grounded in a notion of Christianity 
as a spiritual aim of humanity that needed to be served by the state, not in Christianity as a 
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ceremony (ibid.:396). Even the concept of the 'Reich' itself could be understood 
as an 'offer of integration' to Catholics. The majority of educated Catholics 
welcomed the Reich of 1871,157 although they might have understood it as a first 
instalment to later grossdeutsche unification (ibid.:402).158 
Of course, members of differing faiths 'constructed their national identity 
differently, appealing to different traditions, separate memories, another history' 
(Walser Smith 1995:238). While Protestant nationalists saw Luther as a founder 
of the German nation, Catholics tended to see him as a traitor who had invited 
foreign powers to intervene in Germany and caused its disintegration (Becker 
2001 :404). As Walser Smith writes, the problem of 'national unity in a polity 
with a divided memory' is a 'peculiarly modem' one (Walser Smith 1995:235)-
after all, 'national unity' is a 'peculiarly modem' phenomenon anyway. The 
salient question is, why does 'divided memory' constitute a problem: why did 
Protestants imagine the Catholics, or the Jews, as disloyal when they actually 
were not? 159 
The integration of a Catholic into the nation cannot happen in exactly the 
same way as that of a Protestant: for the one, Bonifatius must be a national hero, 
for the other Luther (for a Jewish German nationalist probably Mendelssohn or 
Borne). One might expect that the promotors of nation-building should always 
and everywhere have appreciated that different groups of the population 
accommodate themselves in differing ways to the nation, and should have 
recognized that allowing this to happen is in the nationalist interest. After all, the 
actual day to day mechanics of modem society make sure that the ultra-
montanist, the Pietist and the Social Democrat will work the same shifts, pay the 
same taxes and die in the same trench (unless, of course, these 'group identities' 
happen to coincide with specific class positions). However, the advantages of a 
'multicultural' capitalist development are so obvious only in the perspective after 
the event, and the actual builders of modem nations more often than not have 
been blind to the blessings of 'celebrating diversity'. 
particular positive characteristic of a particular Valk (the German people) that needed to be 
reflected in the character of the state that was inhabited by that Valko 
157 'Catholics in Imperial Germany rarely questioned the legitimacy of the national state as it was 
founded in 1871' (Walser Smith 237f). 
158 This perspective seemed to be confirmed by the 'Dual Alliance' with Austria (1879). 
159 Mutatis mutandis, the same is true for the socialists. When it came to the crunch, a huge 
majority was as loyal and patriotic as liberals or conservatives were. 
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The point seems to be that religion is more than just an integrating ideology 
instrumental to nation-building. The more religion demands the believer to take 
serious its specific national-religious narrative, the more it reproduces difference 
and antagonism to the extent that it can become an obstacle to, more than an 
instrument of, nation-building. It is in this sense that nationalism's reliance on 
and subsumption of religion is a double-edged sword. 160 Religion is a unifying as 
well as divisive element. However, this dialectic takes many forms as Walser 
Smith shows: in the last decades of the Kaiserreich, Catholics and Protestants 
learned to create a common national culture based on 'shared antagon isms' 
(Walser Smith 1995:239): it was agreed between them to maintain confessionally 
exclusive schools, high grain tariffs, the protection of 'public morality' against 
(what they thought were) 'the evils of modernity', and antipathy towards Jews, 
ethnic minorities and Social Democracy. As it were, they marched separately but 
fought together. 
160 Again, the same is true - mutatis mutandis - for socialism, too. On the one hand, nationalists 
could hardly do anything better than putting socialism into the service of creating an 'imagined' 
unity of 'the people' that obscures the divisions and antagonisms that characterize modem 
society. On the other hand, they will always have to struggle within that construction to contain 
or destroy any challenges to the subsumption and obfuscation of these antagonisms. Wherever 
theory sees 'function', historical practice shows struggle. In the same vein, nationalists could not 
do better than - after some hesitation - allowing women to be nationalist in a 'female', or even in 
a feminist way. To the extent that nation-building was presented as the highway to emancipation 
of women (or workers or Jews or ... ), the actual leaders of 'the nation' (who tended not to be 
women, workers, Jews themselves) had to make good on some of the promises involved. This 
could not but create frictions and contradictions. 
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1.3.5. EMANCIPATION 
1.3.5.1 The concept of' emancipation' 
The word 'emancipation' stems from Roman law where it denotes a legal act 
in which a paterfamilias could release a child from the authority of the father, 
which gave the child - not anymore a member of the family but a persona sui 
iuris - the right to own and accumulate property (Raber 1979:255). To grant 
emancipation or not was completely up to the father - under no circumstances 
was there a 'right' of the child to be emancipated (Grass/Koselleck 1975:154). 
The word entered the European vernaculars between the 14th (Italian, French) 
and 1 i h centuries (English, German) where it assumed extra - legal meanings. In 
this process, it was linked to the concept of 'coming of age' (from customary 
law) and assumed thus a connotation of self-empowerment based on the natural 
process of' growing up'. Under ancien regime conditions, and outside the 
specific legal context,161 to 'emancipate oneself or to act in an 'emancipated' 
way tended to carry a negative connotation in the sense of 'taking (too many) 
liberties' (ibid.: 158f). It was only in the context of the French Revolution that the 
word (in its casual, not its legal meaning) was transferred from denoting (unruly, 
disrespectful) moral-ethical behaviour to the political realm where it was used 
with either strong positive or negative evaluation. When those using the word 
with positive evaluation exploited the powerful analogy with the human being's 
'coming of age', their opponents would point out that society, or social groups, 
do not 'grow up' in the same way a child 'naturally' does, and therefore ought 
not to 'emancipate themselves' in the same way. They would see the claim to 
(self-) emancipation and release from fatherly/princely authority as expression of 
insubordination leading to anarchy (ibid.: 162f; cpo also: Rurup 1987: 162). 
A crucial moment of the debate was Kant's use of the concept of 'man's 
release from his self-incurred tutelage' 162 in his essay 'What is Enlightenment' 
(1784) (Kant 1969). Kant argued that human beings were already 'released into 
majority' by nature (,naturaliter maiorennes') but still had to 'come of age' also 
161 The word as the name ofa legal act (with slightly varying meanings) never wholly 
disappeared from European legal codes and played a more central role again in the Napoleonic 
Code Civil (ibid.: 156). 
162 'Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmiindigkeit' 
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intellectually and politically. For that they had to 'dare' to challenge whatever 
held them back in their state of unfreedom and 'tutelage'. 
Although Kant avoided using the word,163 it was possible for contemporaries 
to synthesize the concept of (auto-)emancipation with Kant's call for 
Muendigwerdung (Grass/Koselleck 1975: 163f). As a result the proposition that 
the' growing up' of adolescents is a 'natural' process of human being's ethical 
and intellectual maturing could be invoked to support liberal political demands 
which were thereby given the appearance of 'natural' demands (obscuring that 
the latter are in fact social-historical processes). 
One of the strengths of the concept of 'emancipation' was its double 
meaning as denoting a singular legal act as well as a prolonged social-historical 
process, allowing the implication that the demand for the legislative act of 
emancipation obviously and inevitably followed from the fact of the progressing 
'maturity' of society. In the process, (after the French Revolution) the concept of 
'emancipation' also extended its applicability: not only individual persons as in 
the legal context, but estates, classes, social groups in general, women, peoples 
or nations and finally, humanity, were supposed to be in the process of 
'emancipating themselves' (ibid.: 166). The process of concept-formation was 
completed in the German-speaking countries around 1830 when 'emancipation' 
became general currency as a key political concept. 164 
The first use of the concept of 'emancipation' with reference to the Jews 
seems to have been made by the Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Traugott Krug in 
1828 165 who advocated (in the vein of Humboldt, who was also a Kantian) a 
single legal act of Gleichstellung (Grass/Koselleck 1972: 166). The word was 
immediately generally adopted. Krug explicitly referred to the debate in the 
English parliament of the same year on 'Catholic emancipation' and the fact that 
also in England it was for the first time used for the Jewish case (Katz 1972:37). 
It was enthusiastically adopted (and no less enthusiastically rejected by critics) 
because the term 'emancipation' implied 'that natural rights had been withheld 
163 Kant did not use the word because for him the decisive act was not a natural, but an 
intellectual-moral process of maturing. 
164 However, as a legal concept, 'emancipation' continued to be used exclusively in its traditional 
meaning; none of the laws that concern what commonly came to be called 'lewish emancipation' 
actually used the word. 
165 Wilhelm Traugott Krug: 'Ober das Verhaltnis veschiedener Religionsparteien zum Staate und 
tiber die Emanzipation der Juden', lena 1828 
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till then from those concerned, and that these must be restored to them 
unconditionally' .166 In this implication, the concept went far beyond what had 
previously been discussed under one of the equivalents of 'Verbessemng', let 
alone 'naturalization' .167 
In the years preceding 1848, the concept 'emancipation' became 'something 
like the lowest common denominator of all groups that urged social change' and 
were 'excluded from immediate political and social power positions' 
(Grass/Koselleck 1972: 164f). The demand for emancipation became more self-
evident as an issue in its own right, less dependent on specific arguments, and 
was thus increasingly disconnected from a discourse of 'betterment' and 
'civilization', which receded into the background (Rump 1969:79f). The rhetoric 
of 'freedom' and' equality' tended to replace reference to the 'mechanics of the 
state' and societal progress. 168 
1.3.5.2 The discourse on the 'Jewish problem' before the French Revolution 
The starting point for the early emancipation debate was 'the mass of the 
poor Jews' who engaged in the 'destitute trades' (,Nothandel') (Rump 1969:70) 
(peddling, pawnbroking, second hand clothes trading)169 and constituted an 
166 The promise of emancipation meant - or seemed to mean - the prospect that Jews could 
'secure civic integration without the quid pro pro of religious conversion or the provision of 
specific utilitarian services to the state and its rulers, as had been the case for the several hundred 
Court Jews ... ' (Birnbaum! Katznelson 1995:3) 
167 Katz points out that for example in the writings of Gabriel Riesser, the word 'emancipation' is 
used when a more emotional and evocative word is needed, and the equivalent 'burgerliche 
Gleichstellung' is used when a more sober and technical term is needed (Katz 1972:44). Rurup 
adds that the term 'emancipation' had occasionally been used with reference to the Jews in 
German petitions already since 1817 (Rurup 1987: 160ft). 
168 Rotteck argued in 1833 that legal restrictions existed not only for Jews but also for women, 
servants and proletarians, and if one wanted to abolish all these distinctions one should rather 
'wear the red cap of the Jacobins' (Rurup 1987: 198). It would be worth looking at in more detail 
the 'striking congruence' of the discussions on the 'Arbeiterfrage' and 'Judenfrage' (Biefang 
1999:53). In both 'questions', admission to bourgeois society was made conditional on material 
as well as cultural adaptation to bourgeois standards. In the case of workers, the road to 
citizenship led through 'learning and saving'. The concept of 'emancipation' is or course also 
central to the 'woman's question'. For the quid pro quo character of emancipation, cpo the 
following quotation from a speech by the National Liberal politician, Johannes Miquel addressing 
an assembly of workers in 1867: 'My dear Sirs! You are from the workers' estate, and you have 
won a precious right without doing anything at all to get it. Every man in the population is equal. 
... But these great rights are associated with great duties. No one receives a right without a duty. 
The duty consists in the workers' estate enlightening itself, so that it no longer just lives, but so 
that it develops its own conviction as to what is needed for its estate, for itself and above all for 
the Fatherland' (Langewiesche 2000:108). The 'congruence' could not be more striking. 
169 Since the 1 i h century, very small numbers of central European Ashkenasim demonstrated 
their ability to join the wealthy and educated bourgeoisie in a way that had seemed an exclusive 
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'unbearable' condition for Christian society.l70 This problem was meant to be 
tackled by (what only decades later would be called) 'emancipation'. 'The 
remedy of past centuries, the expulsion of the Jews across state borders, was no 
longer acceptable in the age of the enlightenment, nor did it promise a lasting 
solution' (ibid.:71). Modernizing state-officials like Dohm suggested 'liberation 
from the traditional legal disabilities' (ibid.), i.e. inclusion of the Jews into the 
modernizing state policy.!7! The enlightenment insight that 'the Jew' was a 
product of past policies went together with the confidence that what had been 
made could also be un-made and re-made. 172 
For a long time - before 'emancipation' became the keyword - the legal term 
central to debates on the position of the Jews was 'naturalization', which 'was 
the term for allowing aliens to acquire the rights due by nature to those born in 
the country' (Katz 1972:25). The argument for Jewish 'naturalization' was that 
Jews should no less than Protestants be allowed to settle in England if 
economically desirable, and be granted the freedoms of making their living and 
of 'making laws amongst themselves' (ibid.:26). 'No political or social 
integration into the surrounding society was envisaged.' !73 
prerogative of the Sephardim of for example Bordeaux, Amsterdam or London. This also threw a 
new light on the destitute and uneducated Jews of Europe (Rump 1987:96). 
170 At the beginning of the 19th century in Germany, three groups of Jews can be distinguished: 
the few hundred Court Jews; the limited group of licensed Jews who had permission to settle and 
trade; and the much larger group of illegitimate Jews (,unvergleitete ') who tried to find niches to 
survive. The latter constituted a precarious group not unlike today's illegal immigrants (Jersch-
Wenzel 1974:368). It was official state policy to take maximum advantage from the smallest 
possible number of Jews (not unlike today's immigration policies). 
171 The catalogue of economic restrictions that Dohm suggested be imposed on the Jews is 
discussed in Salecker (1999: 103). 
172 Locke in his 'Letter concerning toleration' (1689) (in which Jews are only mentioned twice) 
argues that 'neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded [on religious grounds] 
from the civil Rights of the Commonwealth, ... which embraces indifferently all Men that are 
honest, peaceable and industrious' (Locke 1983:54). Katz argues that Locke's brief remarks 
anticipated some of the developments that occurred in the century preceding the French 
Revolution, in particular the growing conviction that the position of the Jews should be discussed 
in terms of their 'economic merits or demerits rather than in terms of their religious divergence' 
(Katz 1972:24). 
173 This is still the case with John Toland's pamphlet, 'Reasons for Naturalising the Jews in Great 
Britain and Ireland on the Same foot with all nations' (1714). Toland defends here a Whig law 
(that had just been suspended by a Tory government) that allowed Protestants of any confession 
to immigrate and acquire citizenship. Toland argued this should be extended to Jews so that Jews 
would be allowed to immigrate and then be treated like all other Jews - which did not mean 
'emancipated' (Katz 1972:27). However, opponents of the bill, and some commentators in 
Germany, suggested it meant an actual enlargement of the rights of the Jewish popUlation 
(ibid.: 31). Only indirectly did the text help prepare the discourse on emancipation since Toland 
rejected the notion of an inherent and unchangeable Jewish nature and for the first time 'applied a 
central principle of European rationalism - the essential oneness of all human nature - to the case 
of the Jews' (ibid.:29). The cause advocated by Toland in 1714 was defeated by public discussion 
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The text that most clearly signalled a change was Dohm's 'On the civic 
improvement of the Jews' (1781). Dohm put the question of emancipation in the 
larger framework of re-defining the tasks of (modem) government with respect 
to society. 174 Dohm describes the transformation of the Gesellschaften and 
Verbindungen - corporations, estates and so on - of traditional bourgeois society 
into the layers, classes and groupings of modern bourgeois society. He points to a 
characteristic dialectic of continuity and change: social groupings continue to 
exist, and they still 'indulge' in prejudices and 'exclusive principles', but rather 
than existing statically next to each other, they engage in dynamic competition 
and form a harmonious whole, the modem 'state'. 175 The task of' government' is 
to help 'harmony' to emerge by 'attenuating' social separations: the 'great 
harmony of the state' is not based on the abolition of separation and prejudices 
but their transformation. Dohm's notion of harmony is a dynamic rather than a 
static harmony: the state's members 'love' and recognize each other individually 
as 'citizens' but are in competition with each other as members of social strata, 
groups and classes. 176 
in England in 1753, after which time 'the Jewish question as a matter of public concern in 
England was laid to rest for some eighty years' (ibid.:30). From the 1750s onwards, new 
impulses to the issue came first of all from the context of the German Enlightenment. 
174 'It is the great and noble business of government so to attenuate the exclusive principles 
(ausschliessenden Grundsatze) of all those various societies (Gesellschaften) that they do not 
damage (nicht nachteilig werden) the large common link (der grossen Verbindung) that embraces 
all of them; that each of these divisions (Trennungen) shall stimulate only competitiveness 
(Wetteifer) and activity rather than dislike and distance; and that all of them are resolved (sich 
aIle auf1osen) in the great harmony of the state. The government ought to allow each of those 
special groupings (besonderen Verbindungen) to indulge in its pride, even in its not damaging 
prejudices; but it also ought to strive to instil yet more love in every single one of their members, 
and it will have achieved its great task when the nobleman, the peasant, the scholar, the artisan, 
the Christian and the Jew are, beyond and above all that, citizens' (Dohm 1781, quoted in Ri.irup 
1969:72; translation amended). 
175 'State' means here what in today's parlance would rather be called 'society', while we tend to 
use 'state' and 'government' as near synonyms. 
176 One of the themes ofDohm's argument for Jewish emancipation was the static character of 
('standische') corporate society. Dohm suggested that Jewish emancipation, if possible combined 
with the abolition of the guilds, would lead to increased competition, dynamism and productivity 
(Moller 1980: 134). Dohm commented (in a text from 1815) on Joseph II's edict of toleration 
arguing that it had remained ineffective because it was not accompanied by a program of 
reforming 'inclinations, mentalities and habits of the nation' which could only be the result of a 
long term process (ibid.: 142). 
Mendelssohn (1782) rejected Dohm's suggestion to leave Jewish communal jurisdiction 
intact. Mendelssohn argued the rabbis should not have the power to exclude dissidents from the 
community (Moller 1980: 146) - Mendelssohn might have had the fate of Spinoza on his mind. 
The thinking of the philosopher was here more radical than that of the state official. 
'While in England' - where only a minute number of Jews had been admitted by and since 
Cromwell- 'the question still revolved around the admission offoreign Jews, in Germany it 
turned into the question of granting equal rights' not least because most German territories had 
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Amongst the concerns of Pruss ian absolutism were raising productivity, 
abolishing traditional intermediate structures and creating an unmediated 
relationship between state and individual. However, there is also evidence of a 
policy of preventing Jewish assimilation and preserving the Jewish community as 
a segregated, semi-autonomous unity - obviously contradicting the general 
policy of mobilizing as much productive potential in all sectors of society as 
possible. This puzzling contradiction can be explained in terms of the absolutist 
state's dependence on state credit: only Jewish bankers were prepared to engage 
in this (at the time, and on its enlarged scale) new and risky business (Arendt 
1973: 15). The latter were in tum, however, only in a position to accumulate 
money capital by appropriating it from the Jewish community, which constituted 
a monopoly clientele for Jewish bankers. Jewish emancipation depended on the 
growth of a new type of state - independent from the existing groups and 
structures of civil society - which, however, in tum depended on the continued 
existence of the Jews as a group distinct from all other social groups. Therefore, 
emancipation took first of all the form of the extension of privileges to gradually 
ever larger groups of Jews. l77 
admitted the (re-)settlement of Jews (Katz 1972:31). Strangely, the German discussion used for 
what subsequently would be called 'emancipation' initially the word 'naturalization', adopted 
from the English context but with its meaning changed. Dohm' s book of 1781, that used the 
formulation 'biirgerliche Verbesserung' in its title, ended this use of the word 'naturalization'. 
What half a century later would be called 'emancipation' was then referred to as Verbesserung, 
Veredelung, Rejormezirung or Regeneration (ibid.:32). Mendelssohn, interestingly, replaced 
'V erbesserung' in his discussion of Dohm' s text with 'biirgerliche Aufnahme', 'civil acceptance' 
(ibid.:35). Mirabeau's French translation ofDohm's text used the words 'De la reforme politique 
des Juifs' (ibid.:36). The novelty in Dohm's work, and others that subsequently embraced the 
option of 'emancipation' was the assumption that the Jews could - sooner or later - be citizens of 
the state. 
Dohm's and others' argument for emancipation was based on the theoretical assumption of 
the separation of state and church as had been first propounded by Locke (Katz 1972:94). 
However, during the period, separation of Church and State was rarely the case. This implied that 
wherever Jewish Gleichstellung was achieved, it was achieved on the basis of a state that was not 
consistently separated from religion. In this context, emancipation implied not the complete 
secularization of the state, but state recognition also for the Jewish religion. Katz points out that 
the liberal Gabriel Riesser for example had appreciated the notion that rabbis would receive a 
state salary like priests did (ibid.:95). 
177 The last remains of the special relationship between state and privileged Jews ended in the 
context of the last third of the 19th century when also 'Jewish wealth had become insignificant' 
(Arendt 1973:15). 
Another aspect of the process for which 'emancipation' is a kind of shorthand, was that the 
'networks Jews could join multiplied, as their isolation diminished. As a result, the capacity of 
organized Jewish communities to control deviant behavior became more tenuous' (Birnbaum! 
Katznelson 1995: 11). This would have been a worrying perspective for the conservative and 
clerical elements within the community. 
However, there is also an important element of modernization that was in the interest of the 
Jewish elite. The traditional corporate status of the Jews implied that every member of the group 
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1.3.5.3. The discourse on emancipation of the Jews since the French Revolution 
In the debate on Dohm's text, opinions differed as to how much government 
guidance was needed to create 'great harmony' out of the 'various societies' that 
were in the process of transforming themselves into a dynamic and competitive 
modem society. While Dohm's was a middle position, some argued that the 
social process could sort out itself without state guidance at all since 'betterment' 
or 'polish' was the product only of freedom. Others held against this that the 
sudden decreeing of freedom would rather worsen the Jews' situation because 
decrees would not change the prejudices of the population and would fail to 
protect the Jews against hostilities (Rurup 1969:73). The theoretical discussion 
amongst the enlightened reformers - in Germany as well as in France where the 
German debate was closely followed - was, however, resolved not by more or 
less persuasive reasoning but by the different courses of events: the French 
Revolution and the processes that were triggered or intensified by it. 178 
was held responsible for every other - which must have been quite unappealing for the educated 
members of the community who culturally tended to share more characteristics with their 
Christian class peers than with the poor Jews. They were likely to embrace the idea of educating 
the Jews towards productive activities (their 'Produktivierung') for three reasons: the more 
productive the Jews became the less unproductive surplus eaters had to be fed; the group as a 
whole would be less objected to by the Christian elites; and the appreciation of artisanal work 
was also in accordance with the artisanal tradition of rabbinical ethics (Bermann 1973:47). 
Support by the Jewish elites for dissolving the extra-societal status of the Jewish poor had to 
increase in particular after the special role of Jewish bankers (the only good reason for them to 
maintain the ancient conditions) lost its relevance in the course of the 19th century. 
There is a strong tradition of calls for forcing the Jews into agriculture and productive work 
starting from the Constance Concile (1414-1418), through Martin Luther (who qualified however 
that if the productivization of the Jews would mean competition for Christian peasants or artisans 
they should rather be driven out) into Enlightenment conceptions including Dohm, Abbe 
Gregoire and Humboldt (ibid.:48). In 1780s Prussia and afterwards, in a number of instances 
there was co-operation between the Jewish elite and the reform administration in the effort to 
change the professional structure of the Jews (ibid.:49ff). However, in the longer term these 
efforts could not overcome the resistance of 'ziinjiige' industry, and many newly trained Jewish 
artisans emigrated to America where they found work instantly without economic discrimination 
(ibid.:51). 
'As early as the 1730s, the Pietist missionaries of the Institutum ludaicum in Halle had 
begun to redefine "conversion" from Judaism to Christianity in occupational and sociological 
terms that prefigured the debates of the later Enlightenment' (Clark 2001:85). 
For Hegel, the path to emancipation leads through 'labour and education'. The 'Verein flir 
Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden' was founded on this platform (Claussen 1994a: 133), and in 
this context the word 'Produktivierung' seems to have been coined. In the Kaiserreich, there 
were renewed attempts at establishing artisanal training for Jews, this time however rather in 
opposition to the general economic trend and more clearly as an attempt to 'prove wrong' anti-
Semitic propaganda (Bermann 1973 :60), without much effect. 
178 'Whereas in France action had been confined to one single act of emancipation leaving social 
integration to the unfettered interplay of social forces, opinion in Germany continued to look 
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The most emblematic formulation of the position taken by the 
revolutionaries is that of Clermont-Tonnere in the National Assembly 25 
December 1789: 
Everything should be denied to the Jews as a nation; everything should be 
granted to them as individuals. They are obliged to become citizens. Some 
argue they do not want to be. Let them say this themselves, and let them 
then be expelled. It is impossible for them to be a nation within a nation 
(quoted in Katz 1972:67). 
'Nation' is in this context a near synonym for 'estate' - it does not mean 'nation' 
in the modem sense (as in 'nation-state'). 179 
upon the state as an educational as well as legal institution, which accordingly was obligated to 
discharge its responsibility towards society also in respect of the Jews' (ibid.:73). 
While before 1791, either line of thinking had been present in the German and the French 
discussion on the 'betterment of the Jews' alike, subsequently they would often be dubbed the 
French 'liberal-revolutionary' and the German 'enlightened-etatist' model of emancipation 
(ibid.). These shorthand concepts are, however, rather simplistic: one could just as well talk about 
an enlightened-revolutionary and liberal-etatist tradition. The 'German view' of the necessity of 
educationally motivated state restrictions of economic and social liberties was invoked by 
Napoleon in 1808, which was seen by German contemporaries as a confirmation of their view. 
Napoleon's decree remained valid for ten years (Rurup 1987: 173). 
179 'Nation within a nation' is a variation on a then common phrase, 'state within the state' (Katz 
1972:67) which is a formula that was meant to assert state sovereignty against intermediate 
corporations. In the period beginning with the French Revolution, the phrase's meaning changed: 
it 'now served as the justification for denying the Jews the right to remain a separate social group, 
engaging in distinguishable economic activities and evincing religious principles and a spiritual 
outlook inconsonant with that of the Christian majority' (ibid.:68). In this meaning, the slogan 
never disappeared from the anti-Jewish literature of the nineteenth century. 
However, Clermont-Tonnerre's assertion that the Jews deserved nothing 'as a nation' did 
not mean, incidentally, that they 'were expected to disavow their heritage in order to enjoy the 
benefits of citizenship' as is often anachronistically assumed (Feldman 1998: 176). The discussion 
in the National Assembly was about replacing mediation by corporate bodies by a new, direct 
relation between state and individual and did not imply - at that time - that Jewish 'cultural 
identity' had to be given up. 'Before 1880 the state in Britain, France and Germany was less 
demanding and less effective in securing its demands than has been presented in many accounts' 
(ibid.: 177). 'It is clear that the ambitions of modem states to purge themselves of ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and cultural diversity have been grossly overestimated.' 
The liberal understanding of society that underpinned Clermont-Tonnere' s statement has 
been expressed by Robespierre: Tentends par peuple la genera lite des individus qui compose la 
Societe' (quoted in Bermann 1973:43). 
Ironically, the accusation of forming a 'state within the state' began being directed at the 
Jews only when their institutional autonomy actually was in the process of dissolution. At the 
same time, the kind of social group that the Jews formed - different from what had previously 
been estates and corporations - was not at all an anomaly in modem bourgeois society. 'Social 
groups organized on the basis of class origin and against the background of religion and 
profession continued to exist' as Katz observes (Katz 1972:76). 
The phrase, 'a state within a state', writes Katz, 'expresses negatively what the term 
"sovereignty" denotes positively' (ibid.:49). The first and only source where the formula is 
expressly defined is a text from 1760 in which it is argued that a sovereign ruler must not allow 
'status in statu', citing as an example the Spanish Inquisition (ibid.:50). However, the phrase has 
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Katz argues that during the ancien regime the Jews were not considered 'a 
state within the state' because they were seen as strangers anyway. The abolition 
of their corporate status did not in itself make the Jews citizens (as was the case 
with non-Jews) (ibid.:60). The call for abolishing mediating social institutions 
was in the case of Gentiles a call to make all members of such corporations 
immediate citizens of the state. The dissolution of the Jewish corporations, 
however, threw up the alternative either to drive the Jews out, or to create new 
legal grounds for their presence, i.e. individual citizenship. This is the logical 
starting point of the 'Jewish Question' that for a prolonged period of time 
remained undecided. 180 
In the German context after the French Revolution the most important 
statement on the issue was Wilhelm von Humboldt's comment on the draft of the 
Pruss ian Edict of Emancipation (1809). Humboldt suggests there are three 
means for resolving 'the Jewish condition,181, 'amalgamation' (Verschmelzung), 
'destruction of their ecclesiastical organization' (Zertruemmerung ihrer 
kirchlichen Form) and 're-colonisation' (Ansiedelung) (Humboldt 1964:96). At 
the same time he famously advocates 'immediate emancipation' (plotzliche 
Gleichstellung) because this is the only just and politically efficient measure 
(ibid.). 182 Civil rights can not be made dependent on what the actual character of 
a group of persons is. Should the Jews fail to fulfill their civic duties they should 
be expelled rather than being granted civil rights conditionally only (ibid.: 1 00). 
always been 'a political slogan' rather than an analytical category (ibid.:51). In France the term 
often referred to the Huguenots, then to the Jesuits. Diderot's Encyc!opMie which began to 
appear in 1751, emphatically promoted the idea of undivided sovereignty of the state, criticized 
intermediate bodies, corporations and orders (ibid.:52) and supported their abolition such as 
through the expulsion of the Jesuits from France in 1764 (ibid.:53). From the 1760s onwards, also 
the Freemasons were accused of forming a state within the state (ibid.:53f). The phrase was first 
used against Jews in 1779 in Alsace (ibid.:56). A second example quoted by Katz is by a writer 
who refuted Mendelssohn's suggestion that atheists (rather than Jews) should be excluded from 
citizenship with the argument that atheists who fulfilled their social obligations according to 
'natural morality and reason' should be citizens, while the Jews willingly sought 'to constitute a 
state with a state' and on these grounds should not have citizenship (ibid.:57). Also in the tract by 
Pere Gregoire, Essay sur rligimeration physique et politique des juijs (1789) the phrase can be 
found. This author argues that only the current situation made the Jews 'a state within a state' 
(ibid.:58). 
180 In the 19th century, the phrase 'a state with the state' was predominantly used against the Jews 
(and also still against the Freemasons) (ibid.:65). 
181 He defines this as their 'disproportionate visibility' (unverhaltnissmassige Wichtigkeit). 
182 He repeatedly asserts that partial Gleichstellung would increase rather than supersede 
separation. He even rejects the making of statistics and registers because it would hold up the 
disintegration of Judaism (ibid.: 105). 
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Humboldt rejects as circular reasoning the fear the Jews might after 
emancipation (Gleichstellung) push out (verdrangen) the Christians: 
emancipation means that it is politically irrelevant whether somebody who holds 
an office and does the job well is Jewish or not (ibid.: 102). Humboldt puts great 
emphasis on the necessity to overcome popular prejudice. But since the state is 
'not an educational but a legal institution', it merely has to create the conditions 
for the citizens to 'educate themselves' (ibid.:98) towards the overcoming of 
prejudice. The state ought to promote toleration amongst the different strands of 
Judaism to the effect that the majority of Jews would soon realize that they 
adhere not to a religion but to a ceremonial law only, and will tum towards the 
higher, Christian belief (ibid.: 104).183 
The Prussian emancipation decree of 1812 was a product of the short period 
of radical reform triggered by Prussia's defeat by Napoleon in 1807. For this 
specific historical moment, Prussian state officials unequivocally declared that 
the preservation of the Jewish group was not necessary or advantageous for the 
state (Arendt 1973:30;60).184 
At the congress of Vienna, Austria, Prussia and Hanover failed to impose on 
the German Federation the comparatively liberal legislation that had been 
adopted in Austria in 1782, in Prussia in 1812 and in Hanover when it was part 
of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia (Hamburger 1969:7). The year 1815 
meant for this reason, as Hamburger asserts, the reversal of a general trend 
towards Jewish emancipation (ibid.:8). In Wuerttemberg and in Baden the diets 
opposed government proposals towards improvements of the legal situation of 
the Jews, in the former case without, in the latter (under the leadership of the 
liberal Karl von Rotteck) with, success (ibid.:9). 
Despite the general lack of development in their legal status, Jews made 
remarkable progress socially and economically. In Prussia in particular, they 
benefited from compulsory education to the effect that between the traditionally 
wealthy minute Jewish elite and the numerous Jewish poor, a middle class 
183 Humboldt argued here in a tradition shared also by Kant, on whose philosophy Humboldt 
builds. Kant argued in Conflict of the Faculties (1798) that emancipation will necessitate prior 
evidence of moral and religious reform (Smith 1997: 185), the 'purification' ofbelieffor which he 
uses the very unfortunate metaphor, the 'euthanasia of Judaism'. 
184 Furthermore, at that time Prussia had lost its eastern provinces (i.e. most of the Jewish poor) 
so that emancipation in practice meant 'not much more than a general legal affirmation of the 
status quo' of privileged Jewry (ibid.). 
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developed that 'entered trade and crafts in growing numbers' (ibid.: 10). This 
development created 'a definite contradiction between the social and economic 
status of a growing number of Jews and their legal situation' in the course of the 
first half of the nineteenth century (ibid.: 11 ).185 It was reflected by the fact that 
after 1848, the Liberals 'systematically espoused the cause of Jewish 
emancipation' (ibid.: 14), in spite of 'the stubborn resistance of the German 
middle class to the emancipation of the Jews' in the less economically advanced 
regIOns. 
After the Congress of Vienna, not only the spirit of reform lost its thrust, but 
also the eastern provinces were given back to Prussia, where the Jewish poor 
lived, and 'nobody but a few intellectuals who dreamed of the French Revolution 
and the Rights of Man ever thought of giving them the same status as their 
wealthy brethren - who certainly were the last to clamour for an equality by 
which they could only lose' (Arendt 1973:33). While the Prussian reformers had 
discarded the traditional insistence ofthe state on the preservation of the Jews as 
a distinct social group, the Prussian state after 1815 reasserted the traditional 
position, as when in 1823 Frederick William III prohibited 'the slightest 
renovations' of Jewish customs and rituals and ruled out anything 'which could 
further an amalgamation between the Jews and the other inhabitants' (quoted 
ibid.:32).186 
In this period, most German liberals' attitude towards the 'Jewish question' 
was determined by three elements: they generally shared 'the enlightened-etatist 
view which held that the Jews must first pass through a "preparatory school" on 
the way to freedom' (Rurup 1969:79), as well as 'a specific enlightened-liberal 
aversion to Judaism' as an anachronistic manifestation of 'ignorance, fanaticism 
and poor taste' and of a refusal to develop and progress. Thirdly, liberals-
including for example Karl von Rotteck - tended from this time to postulate 'a 
certain uniformity of thought and action for the new society' (ibid.:79f) in a way 
that had previously not been customary. While in the context of the 
185 In Prussia except Poznan, the Jewish population managed from 1812 (despite regressive 
tendencies in state policy) to fonn a higher bourgeoise, a strong middle class and a broad lower 
middle class (not, though, a numerous proletariat). 
186 In post-I8I5 Prussia the conversion of Jews to Christian faith should be rewarded with civil 
rights, while in reverse, Christians converting to Judaism were threatened with the loss of civil 
rights. The latter was perhaps the more important aspect (Clark 2001 :70t). In addition, 'the 
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Enlightenment, de-Judaization had meant religious reform, participation in the 
general trend of making society 'industrious' and the commitment to 'universal 
reason', under the new conditions of advanced nation-state formation in the 
period after the French Revolution these concerns were complemented, and 
partly replaced, with a much more encompassing concern for culture. The urge 
towards cultural-national assimilation was an element of nationalism rather than 
of Enlightenment universalism .187 
The 'state-cultural' element became quite central during the first half of the 
19th century. Karl von Rotteck wrote in 1828 that 'the Jew had to be de-
Jewified,188 (Leuschen-SeppelI978:26). He argued in 1833 that the 'temporary 
restriction of the rights of the Israelites' was necessary 'because the state as an 
intimate association (inniger Verein) necessitates a certain homogeneity or 
amalgamation of attitudes and preferences (eine gewisse Gleichformigkeit oder 
Verschrnelzung der Gesinnungen und Neigungen), and the Jews can not have this 
actually social attitude towards us' unless they 'stop being Jews in the strong 
sense of the word'. Rotteck held that 'hostility (Feindseligkeit) or at least 
adversity (Scheu) against all other peoples' was intrinsic to Judaism (Rump 
1987:77). While Enlightenment liberalism was primarily concerned with civic-
political assimilation (and also with reform towards universal 'reasonable 
religion'), nationalist liberalism shifted the emphasis on assimilation towards 
national culture. 189 
emergence of a secular third option' was legally prevented: Jews were not allowed to leave their 
community without converting to the Christian faith (ibid.:71). 
187 Birnbaum and Katznelson assert against a 'nationalist current in Jewish historiography' which 
tends to equate emancipation with the 'end of the Jewish people' that 'there was no near-
complete eradication of Jewish culture in the societies in which the Enlightenment and 
emancipation left their most striking marks', namely North America and France. 'Modernization' 
as such changed the meaning of, but did not extinguish Jewishness (BirnbaumlKatznelson 
1995: 18). 
188 Rotteck rejected Jewish emancipation with the argument their religion was 'v6Ikerfeindlich' 
(apparently a blend of anti-social and anti-national) (quoted in Sterling 1969: 81). The Jews 
lacked 'the freedom and true Sittlichkeit' to 'subject themselves voluntarily to the majority 
principle' (ibid.:85). 
189 Most Jews were ready to take part in the bourgeoisie's struggle for emancipation from 
aristocratic domination and in this process, to assimilate into the emerging bourgeois society, or 
rather the class that saw itself as the core of that society. However, the non-Jewish bourgeoisie 
was not unconditionally ready to welcome the support by a even less privileged group and to 
fight for their specific interests as well (Jersch-Wenzel 1974:365). An example is the statement 
by Friedrich Dahlmann (formulated in 1831): the 'faults of our civil society (die Gebrechen 
unserer biirgerlichen Gesellschaft) would not allow an act as 'politically daring' as the 
emancipation of the Jews (quoted in Sterling 1969:88). He feared emancipation could trigger 
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The 'insistence that the emancipated Jew should cease to be a Jew in any but 
a purely private capacity remained the liberal orthodoxy' throughout the 19th 
century (Pulzer 1997:5). About the time-scale of how to get there, however, two 
positions continued to compete with each other. Rotteck -like most pre-48 
liberals - argued for a postponement of emancipation until sufficient reform of 
Judaism and the Jews was completed, but also the Humboldtian position - then 
the minority position - was present, as formulated for example by another Baden 
deputy (also in 1833): the Israelites should 'be thrown into the masses of the 
Christian population so that they would be carried away by the torrent and, like a 
pebble wandering along a river bed, be rounded and made to fit into the existing 
order (dem Bestehenden sich einfuegen)' (quoted in Rurup 1987:80). 
From around 1846, majority liberal thought shifted towards support for 
emancipation without conditions (Rurup 1987:89).190 From the 1860s, finally, 
there was a liberal consensus that state legislation should not be concerned with 
the actual process of the social integration of the Jews, but merely abolish any 
obstacles that restricted the individual, and to allow society to take care of the 
rest. 
riots that could get out of hand. During the anti-Jewish riots leading up to 1848, liberal bourgeois 
tolerated or even encouraged violence against Jews. 
Jewish liberals tended to endorse the emancipation-assimilation deal. In 1830, Gabriel 
Riesser expressed the old Enlightenment position thus: 'The state has the undeniable right to 
demand the fulfillment of general civic duties as a condition for granting civil rights; but there is 
no state in Germany in which the Jews would not be ready to accept these duties and burdens' 
(quoted in Pulzer 1997:7). Emil Lehmann, one of the founders of the Deutsch-Israelitischer 
Gemeindebund, went beyond Enlightenment-liberal demands when he spoke (in 1869) of 
assimilation as the 'reciprocal obligation' (Gegenleistung) due for emancipation, including for 
example the abandonment of Sabbath observance (ibid.). 
190 This was generally not based, however, on the acknowledgment of any 'civic betterment' that 
the Jews might have undergone in the meantime; typically it was claimed that 'the time' (not 'the 
Jews') was ripe now, and that liberty was the hallmark of the Zeitgeist. 
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1.3.6 ANTI-SEMITISM 
The Viennese rabbi Adolf Jellinek predicted in 1866 that the antithesis 
'Christians against Jews' was going to be replaced by that of 'Aryans against 
Semites', the 'new Jewish question' (Cahnmann 1965:677). The emergence ofa 
movement that chose to refer to itself with the neologism 'anti-Semitic' around 
1880 proved him right. The social and intellectual process that found expression 
in the new concept, however, reached back much farther. 
The word 'Semitic' had been established as a collective word for the 
languages Hebrew, Phoenician, Arabic, Aramaic and Ethiopian by 18th century 
scholars (Bernal 1991 :344).191 The concept of a 'Semitic race' has been 
introduced by historians, philologists, and political commentators (in Germany) 
in the 1840s (Sterling 1969: 126). An important proponent of the concept of a 
'Semitic race' (modelled on the linguistic account) was Ernest Renan. Renan 
supported Jewish emancipation and was not 'consciously antisemitic' (Almog 
1988:257). Nevertheless he gave academic credibility to notions typically held 
by anti-Semites such as that 'the Jewish nation' (although not the individual Jew) 
was responsible collectively for the death of Jesus (ibid.:263), or that Jesus might 
not have been Jewish after all given that Galilee was a 'racially mixed' province 
(ibid.:270). He asserted that language is founded in insurmountable racial 
difference and hierarchy (ibid.:266). However, he was prepared to allow some 
leeway for cultural dynamics and historical change: the Israelite 'who has 
become French, or even better, European' has thereby culturally transcended his 
lowly racial background (ibid.:267).I92 
The exact origin of the term 'anti-Semitic' is not known. The earliest known 
reference is an article in the Allgemeine Zeitung des deutschen ludentums 
(September 2, 1879) reporting the announcement of an 'Anti-Semitic journal' by 
191 The term was of course taken from the catalogue of peoples in Genesis J: 10 whose author 
seems to divide all peoples known (or relevant) to him into three groups named after the three 
sons of Noah, one of whom is called Shem (Nipperdey/Riirup 1972: \30). For the historical 
linguists of the 18th century taking up this reference must have been an obvious choice because in 
this text language is one of the main determinants of 'a people'. The speakers oflanguages that 
modern scholarship refers to as 'Semitic' are however not identical with the peoples listed in 
Genesis J: J 0 as the descendants of Shem. 
192 In his celebrated speech on the concept of the nation (1882) Renan emphasized that politics 
ought not to be based on racial categories. Almog suggests that Renan's professing of 
individualist-liberal values were part of his public-political agenda but did not 'penetrate into 
79 
Wilhelm Marr. 193 At the end of the same month there were advertisements for the 
foundation of an 'Anti-Semitic League' which did however little more than 
propagate the word. The breakthrough of the term as a new political keyword 
occured in the course of the year 1880. The new term was 'conveniently 
inaccurate' as it implied more than 'just' hatred of the Jews, but still left no 
doubts about the target (Volkov 1978:39). It also 'tended to load on the Jews .. , 
the whole weight of "Asiatic barbarism'" (Halevi 1987: 132). The proponents of 
'anti-Semitism' claimed that 'Semites' (in particular, Jews as the most prominent 
and exemplary group) had 'always' been hated, although the new term was 
chosen to signal, and in the consciousness of, its modernity. 194 Those who coined 
the new word (and many contemporaries) seem to have felt that they 'invented' 
something radically new; however, the explicit reference to the notion of a 
'Semitic race' was at most a shift in emphasis within a discourse significant parts 
of which had presupposed that notion for much longer (see below). 
1.3.6.1 Anti-Semitism, pro- and anti-modem 
One of the most perplexing aspects of 19th century anti-Semitism is that 
hatred of Jews could express opposition to modem liberal society, nationalism 
and 'bourgeois revolution' as well as (nationalist, bourgeois, liberal) opposition 
to reaction and counter-revolution. Anti-Semitism originated historically from 
[the] deeper levels' of his scholarly thinking (ibid.:268), nor did it keep him from sharing anti-
Semitic notions of the (modem) Jewish character (ibid.:271f). 
193 However, Marr had announced an 'Anti-Jewish journal' and started himself using the word 
'anti-Semitic' in publications only from spring 1880. The journalist of the Allgemeine Zeifung 
seems to have learned the word from another source and adopted it for his reporting on Marr's 
publication (Nipperdey/Riirup 1972: 138). 
194 This double character is clearly a 'modernist' feature of 'anti-Semitism'. The 'Janus-face' also 
resembles the case of the concept of the (modem) nation. 
I follow Blaschke's (1997b:269) suggestion that the term 'anti-Judaism' should be reserved 
exclusively to that (early) medieval attitude that treats the Jews as objects of (princely or 
patrician) patronage and Christian mission, not in any way as 'an active factor in politics, 
economy and culture'. I use 'anti-Semitism' and 'Jew-hatred' - as far as the 'modem period' in 
the widest sense is concerned - more or less as synonyms because I find an overemphasis on a 
rupture around 1880 (when the word was coined) misleading. It gives undue credit to the anti-
Semitic claim that the movement that referred to itself with that name was something new and 
different from e.g. the Jew-hatred of 1819 or 1848. In particular I reject the widespread idea that 
Jew-hatred that is articulated within the rhetoric of 'race' is substantially different from Jew-
hatred that does not use that rhetoric, and, conversely, that Jew-hatred that makes references to 
(Christian) theology constitutes a discrete object in its own right. The overlap between both is so 
strong that such a conceptual distinction obscures rather than helps. 
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two antagonistic sources at the same time, and both sides of its twofold origin 
left their traces in all subsequent forms and manifestations of anti-Semitism. 195 
The short period of anti-feudal reform in Prussia between 1807 and 1815 
gave birth to a form of anti-Semitism that expressed conservative aristocratic 
opposition to modernization. The Prussian conservative landlord Ludwig von der 
Marwitz argued in 1811 that the legal introduction of the free alienability of real 
estate made Prussia 'a modem Jew-state (ein neumodischer Judenstaat), (Rogalla 
von Bieberstein 1992:113; Arendt 1973:31). The anti-Semitic German-nationalist 
radicals from the period of the anti-Napoleonic wars (Arndt, Fries) were anti-
reform and anti-French. 196 The anti-Jewish and anti-French agitation ofthe 
'Wartburgfest' (1817) included celebrating Luther as well as burning copies of 
the Code Napoleon. The anti-modernist anti-Semites adopted herewith an idea 
that had been first developed by the French Catholic reaction to the French 
Revolution claiming the Jews were 'useful instruments' for Illuminati and 
Jacobins who were carrying out a conspiracy against religion, monarchy, civil 
society and property197 (Rogalla von Bieberstein 1992:107).198 
Anti-modernist anti-Semitism evolved suddenly in Prussia and destroyed the 
generally friendly relations that had existed between aristocracy and Jews 
(especially the Berlin salon scene) but it decreased when the reform period ended 
with the Vienna Congress. Conservative anti-Semitism (mostly reduced to forms 
of 'mild discrimination') continued to exist next to liberal, anti-aristocratic, pro-
modernization anti-Semitism. In a Prussian anti-feudal pamphlet from 1807 the 
195 The validity of any interpretation of modem anti-Semitism must be measured against how it 
manages to take account of this peculiar phenomenon. It is crucial in this context not to reduce 
the historiography of 19th century anti-Semitism to a succession of distinct phenomena but to 
appreciate the branching out of an increasing number of differential and contradictory, even 
antagonistic, appearances. 
196 Additionally, they were also anti-Hegelian: they considered Hegel's philosophy an instance of 
'French-Jewish foreign domination' (Claussen 1994a:127). 
197 From a counter-revolutionary publication from 1795 
198 Those who accepted this theory could point to Napoleon's efforts to instrumentalize Masonic 
infrastructure for his own purposes, while at the same time promoting Jewish emancipation in the 
occupied territories. In German anti-French literature of the same period the coincidence of both 
- despite the fact that most Lodges did not admit Jews - was transformed into the notion that 
Masons and Jews together were instances of the French occupation (ibid.: I 08). (Not unlike 'Jew', 
the concepts 'Free-mason' and 'Illuminati' were often used at the time in a loose and 
metaphorical sense [ibid.: liS).) Christian clerics interpreted Napoleon's initiative for a 'Big 
Sanhedrin' in 1806 as further evidence of this conspiracy, identifying the Napoleonic Sanhedrin 
with the Jewish institution of the same name in Jerusalem that allegedly had been responsible for 
the crucifixion of Jesus. 
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Jews were claimed to form a symbiosis with the nobility (Rogalla von 
Bieberstein 1992: 110).199 
Populist anti-Semitism in the period before 1848 was rooted in the anti-
capitalist moral sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie that tended to be anti-
modernist and 'related in many ways to the conservative world-view' (Sterling 
1969:115). Nevertheless, they were articulated as a petty bourgeois form of 
liberalism. From the perspective of artisans and other traditional 'middle class' 
groups, the ascendancy of the Jews from the very lowest to fairly comfortable 
positions contrasted with their own fears of decline. It produced a rhetoric that 
could see 'the puffing locomotive' as a work of demonic Jews (ibid.: 117).200 
A good example of this 'liberal' form of anti-Semitism is a pamphlet 
distributed in Bavaria in May 1819 by a lawyer, Thomas August Scheuring, who 
argued that Jews considered themselves only temporarily to be living in diaspora 
until 'their great Messiah' would lead them to Palestine. Therefore, 
the Jews [could] never fully amalgamate with the indigenous, national 
people and become a part of that harmonious whole that we call a 
bourgeois society (Rohrbacher 1999:38).201 
This pamphlet was debated in the local press and village pubs immediately 
before the 'Hep Hep riots' in Wuerzburg in August 1819. Local debates and 
'Hep Hep' riots coincided with the Bavarian diet's discussing the emancipation 
of the Jews (ibid.:39). The riots were a political protest against emancipation and 
invoked - amongst other arguments - the notion that the Jews were unable to be 
part of bourgeois society?02 Another example for liberal opposition to Jewish 
199 This line of anti-feudal, pro-bourgeois (and in this sense, quasi liberal) anti-Semitism 
exploited similarities of some aristocratic and Jewish values (social conservatism, the emphasis 
on the importance of family links, the a-national, inter-European orientation). Arendt asserts that 
the view held by early liberals in Prussia and France that aristocracy and (privileged) Jews 
constituted an interested alliance against the rising bourgeoisie was not totally implausible at the 
time (Arendt 1973:20). Furthermore, there have been specific periods in history (for example in 
Poland before 1795) when such an alliance actually existed; cpo Halevi 1987). 
200 There seems to be some congruence, and possibly historical relationship, between this 
ambivalence ofpre-1848 German liberalism (mostly a small-town phenomenon anyway) and 
traditional petty bourgeois resistance to modernizing changes (such as the introduction of new 
working practices) that in tum seems to have been implicated as early as in the heretical 
movements of the 12th and 13 th centuries that were predominantly supported by artisans (Kofler 
1979). 
201 ' ... die Juden mit den eingebornen, nationalen Menschen nie innigst verschmelzen, und ein 
Theil jenes harmonischen Ganzen werden [k6nnen], den wir einen buergerlichen Verein nennen'. 
202 The expression 'Hep Hep' might refer to the slogan 'Hierosolyma est perdita' (Jerusalem is 
doomed) from the Crusades against the Jews in the Rhineland in 1097. Claussen (l994a: 159) 
82 
emancipation as imposed by the Enlightened-absolutist state is a motion that the 
liberal politician Karl von Rotteck brought into the Baden diet. In Baden Jews 
enjoyed equal state citizenship (Staatsbuergerrechte) since 1807 but not 
communal citizenship (Gemeindebuergerrecht). When the reform government 
abolished the distinction between 'citizen of a town' (Ortsbuerger) and 'protected 
citizen' (Schutzbuerger) in 1831, the Jews were exempted from this due to 
Rotteck's motion. After that, Jews were the only group who could be 
Schutzbuerger in Baden towns - their relative discrimination had actually 
increased (ibid.). 203 
Anti-Semitism changed to the extent that people got used to 'demons' such 
as locomotives, liberalism and the capitalist mode of production. The period 
between 1848 and 1871 saw the majority of the landed aristocracy as well as the 
more wealthy petty bourgeoisie join the dynamic, capitalist sections of society 
and increasingly adopt the capitalist methods that they had previously 
condemned as 'Jewish'. This condemnation was transformed in the process if not 
given up (Sterling 1969: 135): capitalism and liberalism were in their eyes - so to 
speak - 'baptized' to the effect that only their destructive, radical, incompatible 
or unpleasant sides continued to be referred to as 'Jewish' (ibid.: 136). 
Modern anti-Semitism in the more narrow sense of the word - the 'anti-
Semitism of the industrial age' (Rosenberg 1967: 91) - was an even less 
suggests that the perpetrators of the pogroms more likely thought of the sounds with which 
people call animals. In a more general sense the socio-economic background of the situation was 
that the ending of the Napoleonic 'Continental System' resulted in cheap English commodities 
(especially textiles) entering the continental European market. In particular in South Germany 
this had severely damaging effects on local production and distribution. The imported products 
seem to have been sold mainly by Jewish traders, which must have added to the anti-Jewish riots 
in 1819. The so called 'Hep Hep riots' that began in Wurzburg (Bavaria) paralleled discussions 
on Jewish emancipation in the Bavarian diet while at the same time Christian traders tried to 
enforce restrictions on Jewish competition (Claussen 1987:73). These issues were fiercely 
discussed also at the universities and within the fraternities. 
Nevertheless, Wurzburg (like other places where anti-Jewish riots occurred) was then not a 
place of particularly extreme poverty (Rohrbacher 1999:35). While it is evident that the 
Uournalistic and state-official) discourse about the riots consistently claimed that the urban and 
rural poor suffered from and took revenge for Jewish usury (ibid.:43), it seems not clear that the 
rioters themselves were actually debtors and the victims their creditors (ibid.:36). 
203 In other words, a social divide between full citizens and protected subjects had turned into a 
divide between Christian citizens and Jewish non-citizens (Rurup 1987:90). 
Rohrbacher writes that the anti-Jewish riots in 1848/9 happened in places that were not main 
places of the revolution (Rohrbacher 1999:31). James Harris demonstrated the existence ofa 
'broad-based, popular and remarkably well-organized' political movement that prevented Jewish 
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homogeneous phenomenon than that of the reform and reaction periods 
following the French Revolution: next to the (now smaller) number of those who 
still hated the Jews for standing in the way of progress and the (still large) 
number of those (mainly conservative and clerical forces) who hated them for 
ushering in progress at all204 there were those anti-Semites 'who were, in effect, a 
disappointed second generation of the National Liberal bourgeoisie' (Pulzer 
1988:xxi), a 'bourgeois movement against the principles of bourgeois society' 
(Jochmann 1988:52). Although they also inherited some of the petty-bourgeois, 
pre-1848 (artisanal) liberalism, their rejection of capitalist modernity was much 
more selective. Only rather marginal figures amongst the National-Liberal 
Bildungsbuerger would completely reject industrial society; but still, many saw 
themselves disappointed when they realized that the result of the process they 
had supported was quite different from what they had expected it to be: a modem 
state based on and a promoter of capitalist economic development. They tended 
to blame what they would see as the 'exaggerations' of its modem capitalist 
elements on the influence of the 'Jewish spirit', rather than on the specific 
historical dynamic of which their own involvement had been a part. 
Many other anti-Semites came from 'the disappointed democratic camp' 
such as Richard Wagner, Wilhelm Marr and Bruno Bauer (Claussen 1994a:144). 
Their anti-Semitism results from disappointment with either the failure, or the 
unwanted effects of the partial successes of the left-liberal, democratic 
movement, combined with their refusal to join the only credible inheritor of 1848 
radicalism, Social Democracy. 
A further differentiation has to be made between those who despised liberal 
capitalism when it worked well and those who - after the economic crisis of 
1873 - despised it only as long as it did not (Pulzer 1988:33). Respectively, there 
is a sliding scale of anti-Semites who would (with similar rhetoric) intend to go 
back to whatever they think things had been like in pre-capitalist society -
reaction - and those who would intend to make the existing system work better -
reform. 
emancipation in Bavaria in 1849 and that was not directly related to any form of economic crisis 
(quoted in van Rahden 1996:17f). 
204 An example: Smith and Clark describe an influential populist writer in Baden in the 1890s 
who presented rural Jews as 'exemplary for their devotion, for their work, and for their 
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Perhaps the only element that constitutes a real novelty in the second half of 
the 1870s was the emergence of anti-Semitism as a 'world-view' (Rurup 
1987: 115). This aspect of anti-Semitism was more than an anti-Jewish program 
but offered 'the travesty of a theory of society', more specifically of 'bourgeois 
society in crisis' (ibid.). As a 'world-view', anti-Semitism promised that the 
destruction of the 'evil' principle of Judentum would mean the victory of a 
'good' principle, while all earlier forms of anti-Semitism also knew of other evils 
that were not supposed to be automatically resolved together with the 'Jewish 
question' .205 However, this particular form of anti-Semitism only gained some 
currency during and since the 1890s206 and falls therefore outside the 
demarcations of the present discussion. 
The Jew-hatred of peasants for example was probably far from 
'weltanschaulich'. The peasants might have hated 'their' Jewish middlemen but 
still had an awareness that they belonged to the same rural world within which 
they depended on each other: 'resentment or no resentment', business had to be 
done (Massing 1949:75). The urban middle classes were very differently 
positioned. 'Insecurity and instability were the dominant notes of their 
existence', or at least of their consciousness. The lower middle class youth of 
Christian and Jewish background were directly competing for social 
advancement; peasants and village Jews were objectively bound up together and 
on the decline together.207 
abstinence from drink' while his 'anti-Semitic diatribes' were directed against city-Jews as well 
as 'other city people: Old Catholics, Freemasons, Protestant professors' (Smith/Clark 2001: 12). 
205 Rurup writes that anti-Semitism as a world-view had the function 'to allow for a criticism of 
the existing conditions without questioning their real foundations; for attacking the "spirit" of 
capitalism, banking and stock-jobbing, but not the mode of production itself; for threatening 
persons but not institutions; for being radically critical of the defects of the system without 
suggesting revolutionary consequences' (ibid.:116). This is not, however, an exclusive 
characteristic of what I would call 'weltanschaulicher' anti-Semitism. 
'Post-liberal mass-based' anti-Semitism rejected using anti-Semitism for merely tactical 
purposes and made it 'the goal and content of its struggle' (ibid.), having accepted 'the positivist 
attitudes to law and religion and the notion of mass participation in politics' and also being 'more 
violent, more prophetic, more apocalyptic', no more respectful of Junkers and cardinals than it is 
of Jews and Liberals', being 'atheist without being rationalist' (Pulzer 1988:55). 
206 Much more, of course, after that rupture of ruptures, WWI. 
207 'The interests of petty bourgeois high school and university graduates, who coveted jobs and 
positions as teachers, judges, lawyers, journalists, physicians, engineers, administrators and 
politicians, were at variance with the old-fashioned notion that religious conversion and political 
reliability, honesty, and public-mindedness established civil equality' (ibid.:76). The specific 
form of anti-Semitism of the 'small people' that was based in 'material interest, social envy and 
the craving for social status' and the belief in 'the identity and moral inferiority ofJewry, usury 
and the rule of capital' became 'something much more encompassing', namely the world-view of 
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The main tendency of anti-Semitism after 1848 reflects the partial 
convergence of the main ideological positions, liberalism and conservatism. 
Within this framework, elements of the (reactionary) discourse that finds the 
Jews too modern can be found in combination with elements of the 
(modernization and emancipation) discourse that finds the Jews too un-modern. 
The majority of anti-Semitic pamphlet literature (that seems mostly to have been 
written by people from petty bourgeois background) in the nineteenth century 
can be located somewhere between the anti-modem tendency and that of those 
who were disappointed by failed or insufficient modernization. It remains to be 
seen how the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit (a manifestation of the 
bildungsbuergerliche discourse) can be located on this scale. 
1.3.6.2 The 'racial' element of anti-Semitism 
Blaschke (1997b) argues that the familiar typological distinction between 
(racial) 'anti-Semitism' and (not racial) 'Jew-hatred', 'anti-Judaism' or 
'traditional anti-Semitism' tends to obscure and play down the latter. 208 The 
suspicion that even a converted Jew 'always remains a Jew' - not a pervasive but 
neither an unusual element of 'traditional anti-Judaism' - has always been 
implicitly racial whether or not the word 'race' is actually used (ibid.:76).209 The 
notion of an unchangeable Jewish character was for example already present in 
some of Luther's writings: they were 'racist' avant fa fettre. 210 
Sartre shows that at the basis of race-thinking, long before any reference to 
alleged 'biology' comes into play, is the notion that social groups relate to each 
other the same way individuals in society do. The notion that every social group 
modern anti-Semitism, 'only indirectly' when 'politicians, agitators and ideological fanatics' 
mirrored back to them their sentiments in systematic form seizing the opportunity given by 
circumstance (Rosenberg 1967:97). 
208 He suggests in its place distinguishing between 'openly confessing' racial anti-Semitism 
('Bekenntnisantisemitismus') and consensual, habitual anti-Semitism (,gebundener 
Antisemitismus'). The latter does not typically adopt the rhetoric of 'race' but is ever more 
fundamental: it is the 'deep structure' (,Tiefenschicht') of anti-Semitism (ibid.:71) and insofar 
deserves not less, but rather more attention than the former. 
209 Whenever the concept was available at all, there has been a range of views within the 
framework of Christian theology on whether religious difference is a symptom of racial 
difference, or race a product of religion (or of a divine master plan) (ibid.). Either way, both 
religion and race mattered and were seen as interrelated. 
210 Caricatures of Jews that constructed 'typical' physical characteristics of Jews, i.e. a 'racial 
type', became common as early as in the second half of the seventeenth century (Hilberg 
1985:17). 
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has a 'collective will' accommodates the idealistic view that social processes are 
caused by 'wills' (intrigues, cabals, perfidy, courage and virtue) with the 
contradictory experience that one's individual will does not always, and not even 
typically, get its way. If a social group is supposed to 'have a will', it must be 
thought of as a quasi- personality, modelled on the bourgeois individual. For the 
anti-Semite, the Jewishness that makes the Jews Jews is a substance or essence 
'analogous to phlogiston' (Sartre 1965:37), the 'substance' that in the nineteenth 
century was thought to constitute the 'matter' of electricity.211 The developed, 
allegedly 'biological' concept of 'race' is only a secondary 'slender scientific 
coating' of this much older and more fundamental- namely societal- conviction 
(ibid.:38)?12 
The word 'Jews', and also the phrase 'the Jewish people' referred until the 
end of the 18th century to a group constituted by its religion as well as its status 
outside (although not independent from) stiindische society (Nipperdey/ Rump 
1972: 131). To the extent that within the context of that society social position 
was static and quasi-inherited anyway, a specific notion of inherited, quasi-racial 
characteristics was unnecessary and hardly existed.213 From the 18th century 
onwards, this changed. In the context of 'Protestant theology of the 
Enlightenment, idealism and liberalism' (ibid.) those elements of Christianity 
that the former aimed to challenge tended to be identified as the anachronistic 
manifestations of a 'spirit of Judaism', a spiritual force that needed to be 
restricted to its proper realm, the Jewish sub-culture. The same 'spirit of 
211 This was before it was discovered that electricity is not matter but merely difference of charge, 
or a relation between antagonistic poles - the analogy is striking. Sartre alludes here to Marx's 
concept of 'commodity fetishism'; he writes that the bourgeois 'behave toward social facts' like 
followers of fetishistic religions 'who endow the wind and the sun with little souls. Intrigues, 
cabals, the perfidy of one man, the courage and virtue of another - that is what determines the 
course of their business, that is what determines [in their thinking] the course of the world.' 
(ibid.). As Sartre implies, intrigues, cabals, etc. might indeed to some extent determine the 
immediate course of affairs within the bourgeoisie, but the extrapolation of this experience to the 
course of society as a whole is a fetishistic delusion. 
212 The etymology of 'race' is unclear; on the various theories see Sommer (1984: 137t). Apart 
from occasional use of the word 'razza' etc. from the 13th century (in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese 
and French), 'race' is increasingly used only from the 16th century (from then also in English) in 
the meaning of (royal or aristocratic) family or lineage (ibid.). The aspect of superior quality is 
central to the concept: it could also refer to groups of the same (high) social status that were not 
related by kinship. The use of the word for human beings and for animals (especially horses) 
seems to have developed in parallel (ibid.: 141). It has not, however, been used in an 
anthropological sense before the end of the 18th century. 
213 The probably only exception is Spain where a specific historical constellation created the 
conditions for a specific and, as it were, more modem, i.e. more explicitly racial discourse. 
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Judaism' that allegedly corrupted and falsified Christian religion subsequently 
could in a similar vein also be held responsible for the wrongs of Christian 
society. In this process, Judaism was transformed from a theological to a secular, 
anthropological-historical category.214 While in the pre-modem context, religion 
could be thought of as constituting a social-cultural-ethnic group (a 'nation' in 
the rather vague, pre-modem meaning of the term21 \ for the historical-
anthropological thinking predominant in the nineteenth century, religion could 
not be more than the epi-phenomenon of an underlying national, 
cultural/historical substance. This substance is what finally is called - by some, 
not by everybody in the first place - 'race,?16 
As is the case in the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, the anti-Semitic discourse 
often reflects on the notion that there must be a reason why the Jews have been 
objects of hate in so many instances and over such a long time. Anti-Semites are 
very keen to demonstrate the antiquity of Jew-hatred: ifnot only Goethe and 
Napoleon but even 'the Romans' hated the Jews, it cannot be completely wrong. 
Anti-Semitism tends to suggest a specific construction of a history of animosities 
against Jews. The wider the temporal framework for such a construction, i.e. the 
more trans-historical Jew-hatred is claimed to be, the more trans-historical must 
be the supposedly self-identical object of that 'eternal' hate, the Jews?l? This 
process produces inevitably a 'racial' concept.218 Those who argue in such a 
mode identify, or at least ally, themselves with the long line of perpetrators of 
what they understand are anti-Semitic acts. Their racism is 'the attempt of the 
persecutors and discriminators to explain their own practice of persecution to 
themselves' in a way that necessarily obscures the actual history of those 
214 Schwarzschild writes that there has been a series of endeavors to 'aryanize' Christianity, 
including Hegel's essay from 1795, 'Athens and Judea - Should Judea be the Teuton's 
Fatherland?', his later identification of Jesus with Socrates, and comments by Goethe, Diihring 
and Chamberlain (Schwarzschild 1986:77). 
215 In the pre-modem context, a statement such as that the Jews are a nation constituted by their 
religion, is a meaningful statement, in the modem context it is not. 
216 For example, Gutzkow wrote in a novel from 1835: 'character' is based on 'tribal psychology 
(Stammespsychologie) and probably has a corporeal basis'. Gutzkow also argued for 'racial 
purity (Racenreinheit), (Sterling 1969: IOOf). 
217 For an account of Jewish history that consistently avoids the notion of a Jewish 'sameness' 
over thousands of years and several continents see Halevi (1987). 
218 Again: whether the word 'race' is used or not, is of only secondary importance. 
88 
practices (Reemtsma 1992:303; cpo also Graetz 1965: 47; Bamberger 
1965:161f)?19 
Modem 'race-thinking' - gradually evolving into the 'world-view' of 
'racism' as it can be found in the late nineteenth century - has most prominently 
been shaped by three different historical developments and the discourses that 
accompanied them, reinforcing and influencing each other in various ways: the 
Spanish reconquista and Catholic reaction, European colonialism and the 
struggle between old and new nobility (feeding into that between nobility and 
'third estate') in 18th century France. 
In the context a/the Spanish Inquisition, the (formerly Jewish) conversos220 
were suspected of not sincerely having adopted Christian belief because those 
who forced them to convert knew that the conversion had been by force 
(Reemtsma 1992:305). The process that led to the formulation of probably the 
earliest form of racial theory (the Spanish notion of the' limpieza de sangre' i2l 
in this context was as follows: 
1. it was believed that the presence of Jews was 'a problem'; 
2. this problem was chosen to be solved by enforced expulsion of most Jews 
and enforced conversion of a smaller number; 
3. there was a feeling that 'the problem' was not really solved, so that 
persecution and discrimination continued. Furthermore, there was a form of 
awareness that the brutality of the trial to resolve 'the problem' must have 
reinforced the (alleged) hostility of the Jews; 
4. the continued existence of 'the problem' and of persecution needed an 
explanation that would legitimize the continued practice of persecution and 
suspicion without questioning the adequacy of the initial trial to resolve the 
219 The concept of race is also implicit in the uneven logic of the emancipation bargain: if 
toleration led to the Jews becoming assimilated and civilized, this was evidence of the validity of 
the idea that emancipation leads to assimilation. Ifit did not, this was evidence of the un-
assimilable nature, or at least the (tendentially eternal) 'immaturity' of the Jews. The concept of 
an inferior 'race' (whether the word is actually used or not) functions here, too, as a way of 
explaining the failure of the emancipation doctrine. Rather than admitting that the doctrine does 
not work, it is argued that the stubborn Jews are beings outside the doctrine's range of validity: 
they are not human, assimilable beings, capable of fitting, or being fitted, into bourgeois society. 
220 The same seems to be true of the (formerly Muslim) moriscos. 
221 'Limpieza de sangre', purity of blood, seems to have been first demanded in 1414 by the 
University of Salamanca from its students; the concept developed in the context of and in 
interrelation with those of the purity of religious doctrine - a specific understanding of 'pure' 
Catholicism - and the identification of the Spanish nation as its defender (Schilling 1991 :212). 
Post-reconquista Spanish theologians did not challenge the Catholic doctrine that all human 
beings descended from Adam but argued that having fallen from the belief in Christ has 
irredeemably corrupted the blood of those who only recently (re-)converted to Christianity 
(Poliakov 1974:12f). 
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'problem' and without admitting the feeling that the 'resolution' actually 
reinfored, ifnot created, 'the problem'. This explanation was the concept of 
'race'.222 
At the time of the formulation of the racial theory the initial motivation of the 
practice of persecution might have become either irrelevant, or insufficient for 
legitimizing its continuation: 'the mental traces of a centuries long practice live 
longer than the considerations which led to that practice in the first place' 
(ibid.:315).223 
In the colonial context,224 an older tradition of European Christian 
'ethnocentrism' and the Renaissance ethnographic discourse on various 'exotic' 
peoples that European explorers met was transformed into the modem concept of 
'race' when the conditions of slavery of 'blacks' (that became more exclusively 
harsh in the course of the second half of the 1 i h century) needed explanation and 
legitimization (Smaje 2000: 140ff). The concept of 'race ,225 referred in the 
colonial context to the lower level of productivity prevalent in the SUbjected 
colonial (or imported slave-) population, a socio-economic characteristic that was 
222 Ibid.: 314; Reemtsma points to Poliakov who argued that the Inquisition consciously referred 
to the hate that persecution must have created as the reason for continued and preventative 
persecution. 
It is in this context that for the first time the notion of a 'Jewish race' emerged. It is 
important to note that the exclusion and persecution of conversos and moriscos was in the first 
place a struggle about the composition of the ruling elite. Although 'Jewish race' clearly implied 
inferiority (at least that of holding the wrong belief), this 'race' was still construed as a faction 
within the elite, i.e. was connected to the sense that the word was used before the late 18th century 
(see above). 
223 The history of persecution and murder, and their multifarious reasons and motivations, is 
obscured and petrified not only by the notion of 'races' (some obnoxious and persecuted, others 
superior and persecutors) but also by the concept of 'racism' and the attempts at 'fighting 
racism': 'racism' can only be fought by 'making impossible the practices of discrimination and 
persecution' and breaking up their continuities. 'Racism', however, is not one of the reasons of 
'racist practices' but merely an aspect of the specific/orms they take. 'Fighting racism' is 
therefore at best a very imprecise word for what needs to be done: taken literally, it means 
'fighting the ways the perpetrators explain their own practices to themselves'. Reemtsma argues 
that the examination of specific histories of persecution is relevant, not, however, 'lyrical 
thoughts about "the problem of the other'" (Reemtsma 1992:320). He suggests that the concept of 
'racism' may better be given up since it leads to lumping together very different histories of 
persecution. Langmuir argues similarly: 'The Aryan myth was their (false) rationalization of their 
hostility, but since we do not believe that biological differences were the cause of their hostility, 
"racism" cannot be our explanation of the myth of their hostility' (Langmuir 1987:88). 
224 Different demographic and socio-economic relations in different colonies produced of course 
also different concepts of 'race' that cannot be mapped out here. In this section I refer only to the 
case of the Anglo-American colonies. 
225 On the connections between the emergence of the concept of 'race', early colonialism and the 
transformations in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe - particularly Spain and England - see 
Wood (1995); Lewis (1995); Goldner (1997,1999); Smaje (2000). 
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hypostatized into a physical one (Scheit 1999:559).226 The most momentous 
development was in this context the 'invention of the white race' (Allen 1994) in 
the late 17th century. Clear concepts of 'a white race' and 'a black race' need to 
be distinguished from the more diffuse elements of racialization and race-
thinking that can be found in the colonial context from its beginnings (to the 
extent that 'race' was a regular part of the vocabulary of the most 'advanced' 
European elites since the 16th century). The status of African-American laborers 
was until 1660 'essentially the same as that of European-American bond-
laborers, namely limited-term bond-servitude' (Allen 1994:3).227 In the 
framework of the triangular trade, however, African slaves turned out to be much 
cheaper than European servants,228 and their servitude could (for practical-
material as well as cultural-ideological reasons) more easily be extended to life 
long, and then hereditary, slavery (Tompsett 2000:28)?29 This outcome set them 
226 In the beginnings of this specific discourse in the 16th century, the different 'races' of slaves 
were shorthands for different price: the main racial characteristics that Europeans bothered to 
record were related to a prospective slave's use value for specific labours. Although being of 
'black' (or otherwise 'coloured') 'race' implied primarily being 'predetermined' to be a slave, the 
concept is not implied in the institution of slavery as such: no slave economy before the 
American plantation system seems to have developed a 'racialized' concept of the people who 
would be slaves simply because there was de facto no such predetermination: whoever would 
become a slave depended onfortune de guerre (Scheit 1999:562f). 
Skin colour and similar (otherwise irrelevant) features were in the first place mere 
(,arbitrary' in the linguistic sense) signifiers (ibid.:566). The speculative reversal that made skin 
colour from a signifier to the supposed cause of someone's 'racial make-up' came later. On the 
shift from the 'legal' to a 'biological' concept of race see especially Guillaumin (1995:37-49). 
227 The system of indentured servitude in the colonies 'was taken from the cities of Europe, where 
apprentices agreed to work for their master for seven years before being admitted to the master's 
trade' (Tompsett 2000:32). The system 'deteriorated' in the colonial setting where 'none of the 
social forces which kept abuse of the system in check' existed and 'paved the way for slavery'. In 
the 1620s, about 50 000 indentured servants were shipped to the American colonies (ibid.:38). 
228 Skin colour came to be significant as a mark denoting firstly, 'a slave from Africa' as opposed 
to a slave from Europe, then, when slaves stopped being recruited in Europe, just 'slave' 
(Guillaumin 1995: 138). Subsequently, what had been simply a mark of a social relation - slavery 
- now came to be seen as the origin and legitimization, or even the cause of that social relation 
(ibid.: 142). 
Allen (looking at the different development ofracialization in the English colonies on the 
Caribbean islands and on the American continent) argues that in both cases, the slaveholders 
were far outnumbered by their slaves and needed a middle-stratum to keep the considerable 
potential for resistance in check. In the case of the islands, this function was taken by a 'mulatto'-
stratum, on the mainland by what came to be construed as a 'white' propertyless class. 
The 'socio-economic' argument that the concept of the 'black race' originated from 
plantation slavery (Williams 1944) does not rule out that there has been some kind of 'anti-black 
prejudice' beforehand that went into the making of the modem concept of 'race'. However, the 
former needs to be distinguished from the latter. 
229 First all non-Christians were turned into life long slaves, then all servants who were not born 
as Christians (ibid.:39). After the slave trade (and then also slavery) had been abolished, the 
concept of the 'white race' in the American context became more complex especially due to large 
scale immigration of Europeans in the 19th century. 
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so fundamentally apart from everybody else that 'race' became a plausible 
denotation of this group of the workforce. 
In the early 18th centwy, members of the high aristocracy in France 
developed a theory of history - most famously formulated by Boulainvilliers 
(1727) - that tried to explain and legitimize the current class structure of France 
with reference to the concept of 'race': the privileges of the high aristocracy were 
said to be the result of the conquest of a Gaulish race by a Frankish race (Conze 
1984:157; Poliakov 1974). Not unlike in the Spanish case two centuries earlier, a 
ruling elite of old lineage defended itself against successful boundary-crossers 
from less noble lineage with reference to the concept of 'race,.230 In the period 
preceding the French Revolution, this notion was increasingly invoked against 
the claims of the 'Third Estate' but back-fired devastatingly in the revolution 
when it became an argument against the high nobility (Arendt 1973: 162f). 231 The 
idea of a superior Germanic race was then used with an anti-nationalist, 
reactionary intention and in the hope to rally aristocratic solidarity on a European 
level. 
Although the political use of the concept had been a French aristocratic 
invention, the 'Germanic race' was subsequently more successfully invoked in 
Prussia in the context ofthe anti-French wars of 'liberation'. Here, the concept 
functioned in two overlapping but distinct ways: as a means to unite a not (yet) 
national population against French domination, and to create a national society in 
which the aristocracy (some of whom had been suspiciously fond of French 
language and culture) would cease to be the exclusively ruling class. In Prussia, 
thus, race-thinking first developed not against but within the discourse of 
nationalism (such as in Arndt), independent from a nobility that was closely 
involved with the state (ibid.: 166).232 It is in this specific historical context only 
that 'racial' ethnic-cultural nationalism stood in opposition to more traditional 
230 The Spanish high aristocracy held a similar myth: they considered themselves descendants of 
the Visigoths who conquered Spain in the fifth century (Poliakov 1974: 13). 
231 Cpo Sieyes in 'What is the Third Estate': 'Why should [the Third Estate] not relegate to the 
forests of Franconia all those families which persist in the foolhardy pretence of being descended 
from the race of the conquerors and of having succeeded to the rights of conquest?' (quoted in 
Poliakov 1974:28). 
232 Arendt suggests that nationalism reinforced by race-thinking developed due to the protracted 
period within which the formation of a unified German nation-state failed to occur: it is a form of 
'frustrated nationalism' (ibid.). 
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forms of state-nationalism, the 'patriotism' that translates as loyalty to a 
Vater/and and a Landesvater. 
Most forms of 'race-thinking' assume the existence of a multiplicity of races 
that usually, but not necessarily, are ranked in a strict hierarchy oftheir value. In 
such contexts, 'the Jews' are one race amongst others and often rank somewhere 
in the middle ground between 'Aryans' (top) and 'the Africans' or 'the Chinese' 
(bottom).233 It is important therefore to distinguish from a more general notion of 
'racist anti-Semitism' a more specific one that Sokel (1991) suggested calling 
'ontological antisemitism': the 'Jewish essence' is unchangeable and 
transhistorical like in the concept of race, but based on a Manichaean, dualistic 
idea of good and evil, light and darkness, with Judaism/Jewry/the Jews being the 
evil element. This concept operates with moral, universal, sometimes 
cosmological claims and in a metaphysical rather than (or in combination with) a 
'biological inheritance' rhetoric and seems to be indebted to the older theological 
tradition of anti-Semitism. Sokel quotes Richard Wagner, Gustav Raabe, Arthur 
Schopenhauer and Eugen Diihring as representatives of 'ontological anti-
Semitism'. The 'ontological-dualistic' element of modem anti-Semitism can be 
articulated with or without use ofthe rhetoric of 'race', while in tum 'race' does 
not necessarily imply ontological dualism. The more systematically violent forms 
of anti-Semitism tend to be those that show the element of 'ontological dualism'. 
The Manichaean 'good vs. evil' principle seems to imply an imperative for 
particularly extreme action (such as extermination), while the concept of 'race' 
as such does not. 234 
1.3.6.3 The economic discourse on the Jews 
Clerical reaction and conservatism in the aftermath of the French Revolution 
opposed a cluster of historically related phenomena that are usually summed up 
under umbrella terms such as 'modernity', 'modernisation' or 'modem society' 
including liberalism, individualism and the capitalist mode of production. They 
also opposed most forms of socialism - except, however, when socialist notions 
233 Ernest Renan would be an example. 
234 The argument that 'race' as such does not in itself imply an imperative for action has been 
developed by Hage (1998). 
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of collectivism or 'community' seemed to offer themselves as an ally against 
liberalism and individualism and were themselves articulated in backward-
looking terms and imagery.235 
To a significant extent, clerical reaction and conservatism were anti-
Semitic236 , in the sense that they held 'the Jews' responsible for the modem 
phenomena that they opposed (Blaschke 1997a: 116).237 In particular Catholic 
economic thought as it was cultivated in the nineteenth century in the context of 
clerical-populist Catholic reaction238 painted egotism, greed and materialism as 
Jewish and established the distinction between a 'good' and a 'bad' economy: 
Jewish economy means exploitation that is not based on productive labour, its 
wealth stems from gambling and speculation; Christian economy is based on 
honest labour and the just use of Uustly acquired or inherited) property 
(ibid.: 122). Non-bourgeois Catholics tended to maintain a 'theological' work 
ethic that saw labour as just punishment for 'the Fall' that nobody should be 
allowed to escape (ibid.: 124).239 The gist of the idea is epitomized in a 
formulation from a text from 1880: 'The factories must become monasteries 
again' (ibid.: 142)?40 
235 The idea of communism as articulated by Marx - pivoted as it is on the dialectical notion of 
the 'social individual' - is of course a modem (as it were, 'post-liberal', and more specifically, 
'post-Hegelian') phenomenon while 'primitive' notions of communism - that since the 19th 
century tend to be absorbed by anti-individualist, anti-liberal reaction - have existed throughout 
the history of Christianity on the fringes of, or outside the Church as an organization, but within 
the framework of Christian theology (cp. Kofler 1979); their points of reference are the Christian 
notions of (cosmological and metaphysical) 'natural right' and universal 'human' equality (that 
are contradicted by the fetishism and obscurantism characteristic of any religion, as well as the 
more or less authoritarian character of their specific organizational forms). 
236 To my knowledge it has never been established by any historian whether conservatives on the 
whole have been (or are) more prone to endorsing anti-Semitism (on grounds of reinforcing 
Christian theology), or opposing it (on grounds of defending religion). I would assume that most 
conservatives have been (or are) so much ambivalent about this that this question is 
unanswerable. 
237 This idea had two elements that would typically, but not necessarily appear together: the Jews 
are historically responsible for having caused, and they are of the same essence (wesensgleich) 
with liberalism, individualism and capitalism. 
m This was not the case, incidentally, within the (comparatively marginal) bourgeois strand of 
19th century Catholicism. As the parallel existence of bourgeois Catholicism proves, 19th century 
Catholicism did not have to be anti-capitalist as far as the theology as such is concerned. The 
economic elements of anti-Semitism also existed in the Protestant context, although less 
pervasively. 
239 In 1891 Leo XIII tried to square the circle of the Catholic concept of labour with economic 
reality by maintaining that 'capitalism' meant 'degeneration (Verwilderung und Entartung), 
unless that, ifit was 'spiritualized' by the 'right spirit', it could be reformed into a civilizing 
(kulturbejahend) economy. 
240 The time-discipline that is characteristic of a monastery is fundamentally different from the 
discipline characteristic of a capitalist factory: while in the latter time functions as measurement 
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Two phenomena are most important and also most perplexing: first, Catholic 
populist reaction was extremely successful during most of the 19th century; 
secondly, its anti-Semitic anti-capitalism was not only shared but further 
developed by an array of non-Catholic, and even non-reactionary groups and 
individuals including liberals, democrats and socialists. The notion of the Jews as 
harbingers or incorporation of capitalism seems to have been the most influential 
element that mediated between anti-modernist and pro-modernist anti-Semitisms 
as described in the previous section. How is it possible that a concept that stems 
from medieval Catholic social-ethical-economical thinking (based on contrasting 
feudal property as legitimate to bourgeois-mercantile property as not, or at least 
less, legitimate) could be translated into a conception that became immensely 
effective in the totally different context of industrial capitalism?241 
Non-Catholics could appropriate ideas that had first come in a Catholic guise 
because Catholic anti-capitalist and anti-modernist ideology not only antedated 
capitalism and modernity but also Catholicism itself. Its historical sources (Attic 
and Hellenistic Enlightenment, classical bourgeois society)242 allowed it to 
bridge other, historically younger intellectual divisions (such as between 
liberalism, conservatism and socialism) in situations when these seemed to 
become temporarily less significant - first of all, of course, in situations of 
intensified nation-building, and again in the various forms of crisis that capitalist 
society produces. 
of quantities, or lengths of time, in the former it signals beginning and ending of time periods (cp. 
Postone 1996:207-16). 
Blaschke emphasizes that this Catholic version of anti-capitalist anti-Semitism was not so 
much due to tradition but rather to 'Traditionalisierung', i.e. the 'inventing' of tradition, a 
conscious 19th century tendency to re-appropriate elements of medieval thinking (also as part of a 
revival of scholastic and Thomasian philosophy) (ibid.: 135). 
241 For a number of reasons, the same process of developing industrial capitalism in the 19th 
century did not lead to significant anti-Semitism in the Netherlands, where the Jews constituted 
up to 3 per cent of the popUlation (three times the ratio of Germany, and a multiple of the French 
figure), with Jews constituting up to 13 per cent of Amsterdam's popUlation (and continuing to 
speak Spanish and Portuguese apart from Jiddish) (von der Dunk 1999:86t). Amongst the various 
reasons for this might have been a centuries long non-agrarian and non-aristocratic history that 
did not stigmatize money and money making (helped by the bourgeois-calvinist ethos that went 
with it). 
242 The Catholic doctrine itself has roots in classical Greek thinking, in particular Platonic 
conservatism that expressed hostility to certain forms of (classical, i.e. not capitalist) commodity 
production. 19th century Catholicism could mobilise such elements from the legacy of the 
thinking of classical Mediterranean civilisation (that it inherited via Aristotle via late medieval 
Islam and Judaism) that had been preserved within the body of Christian thought (cp for a similar 
argument Blaschke 1997b:84-91). However, such ideas could only become actually relevant 
95 
Anti-Semitic anti-capitalism was channelled from its place of origin in 
Catholic economic thought through German Romanticism and French 
Proudhonism into the liberal and socialist traditions (Massing 1949:213)?43 In a 
polemical remark about the commercially minded bourgeoisie of the wealthy 
trading place, Hamburg, Heimich Heine (in a letter from 1816) adopted the 
traditional imagery in a playful and sarcastic way that can stand for countless 
similar (although less witty) remarks by others: 'I call all Hamburgers Jews, and 
those whom I call baptized Jews - in order to distinguish them from the 
circumcised ones - are vulgo called Christians' (quoted in Aschheim 1996:48). 
Still in the Kaiserreich, it was not uncommon that liberals who defended Jewish 
emancipation would maintain the notion that 'mammonization' is crucial to 'the 
Jewish spirit', and also that the Jews themselves are the clearest (although not the 
only) carriers of this 'spirit' (ibid.:56). In popular liberal publications 'Jews were 
granted a virtual monopoly in caricatures concerned with moneymaking and 
commerce in its dishonest and vulgar forms' (ibid.). Blaming the nasty sides of 
moneymaking on 'the Jewish spirit' helped liberals bridge the gap between 
embracing industrial capitalism but at the same time being 'locked into an older, 
competing system of values' that stemmed from petty bourgeois, small-scale 
commodity production. The distinction between financial and industrial-agrarian 
capital 'provided [the middle classes] with a social critique that did not touch ... 
private property' (Massing 1949:13).244 Arendt states that more generally in the 
period, the 'leftist movement of the lower middle class and the entire propaganda 
against banking capital turned more or less antisemitic, a development of little 
importance in industrial Germany but of great significance in France and, to a 
lesser extent, in Austria' (Arendt 1973:37).245 
because of a specific receptivity to them in the mind-set characteristic of members of modern 
bourgeois society. 
243 Massing points out that a large part ofthe Communist Manifesto is devoted to deriding 
reactionary, romantic and artisanal forms of socialism. The polemic against Proudhonism runs 
through Marx's whole life work. 
244 For example the anti-Semite Otto Glagau who attacked 'predatory capital' presented himself 
as a spokesman of the petty bourgeoisie (Mittelstand) (ibid.: 12). 
245 Totally different from Germany, a large portion of the (very few) French Jews were members 
ofthe upper bourgeoisie. An explosive social development during and after Napoleon's 
'continental system' of blockading trade with Britain (from 1806) accompanied by huge demand 
for money capital guaranteed their success, and due to census-vote they were a privileged group. 
This is the background for 19th century France 'becoming the breeding ground of new anti-
Jewish moods, tendencies and ideologies' (Schenck 1965:710). Similarly, von der Dunk points 
out that France, where modern, 'ideological' anti-Semitism originated (with Proudhon, Fourrier, 
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The concept of 'predatory capital' was common property to all populist anti-
Semites of the 1870s onwards. It allowed conservatives, reactionaries and the last 
representatives of old-fashioned petty bourgeois liberalism to appropriate some 
of the more traditional elements of the socialist movement. At the same time, 
however, it sharply distanced them from the modem liberalism that was then 
predominant amongst the upper bourgeoisie (,Manchester' liberalism), and also 
from Marxist Social Democracy.246 
Blanqui, Toussenel, Tridon and others), was the only place where consistently realized 
emancipation actually created the conditions for the full integration of wealthy Jews into the 
upper bourgeoisie (von der Dunk 1999:81 f). In Germany by comparison, similar arguments 
anticipated the effects of Jewish emancipation before it had a chance of becoming a reality. 
Arendt writes that only the necessity to take sides against clerical, reactionary, anti-republican 
anti-Semitism in the context of the Dreyfus affair ended the long tradition of anti-Semitic 
republican-socialist thought in France (Arendt 1973:47). 
246 Populist anti-Semitism appropriated socialism but fought Marxism. Anti-Semites have no use 
for the paradoxical realities of capitalism as understood by Marxist dialectics: they reduce all 
historical phenomena to unchanging essences and hope one day to be able to build the racial 
community 'on timeless, indestructible qualities', the highest expression of which is the 'Aryan 
blood', in order to reconstruct Germany 'in the immortal spirit of honor, beauty, friendship, and 
the regulation of profit' (Massing 1949: 103), prevailing against 'the Jewish forces of 
Mammonism and Marxism'. The racist myth was a static ideology that 'culminated in the dream 
of a noncompetitive society based on private enterprise' (Massing 1949: I 02). In analogy to their 
imagining capitalism without competition, the racists dreamed of history without history: they 
attempted to 'de-historicize history' by transposing all social categories into biological ones. (For 
two more theoretical approaches, cp Postone [1986] and Bonefeld [1997]). 'Indeed it was a 
constant complaint among anti-Semites that the Marxists refused to regard stock exchanges or 
banks as more wicked than other capitalist institutions' (Pulzer 1988:43) since they 'welcomed 
the dynamism of the capitalist system as irrevocably insuring its historical demise'. Adolf 
Stocker emphasised that he warred only against 'mobile capital', 'stock-exchange capital' while 
'Marx and Lassalle ... looked for the roots of the [social] problem not in the direction ofthe 
stock-exchange, but of industrial production; they made the industrialists responsible for all 
social ills and directed the workers' wrath upon them. Our movement corrects this. We show the 
people that the roots of their plight are in the power of money, in the mercenary spirit of the 
stock-exchange' (Stocker quoted in Massing 1949:12). Here lies the immediate political 
background for the notorious paradox that subsequent generations of anti-Semites held Jews 
responsible for both the capitalist mode of production and the forces that aimed to overcome it 
(such as in the anti-Semitic slogan of an alleged alliance of 'the Golden and the Red 
International'). For understanding this phenomenon it seems crucial to consider the social 
experience of the contemporaries. Liberalism and socialism could indeed be understood as 
reflections and aspects of the same socio-historical process. The anti-Semites understood 
instinctively the dialectical dependency of socialism on capitalism: emancipation of the working 
class - implying that of humanity - was not a rejection but rather an extension of the liberal 
project that relied on the dynamism of the capitalist mode of production. In an ironic sense, the 
'real movement' that is communism (Manifesto) is the dynamism of capital- i.e. of the 
antagonistic relation of capital and labour. 
Talmon paraphrased similarly the anti-Semitic logic: 'Modem Jewish universalism in the 
form of international capitalism or international Marxism, was the same thing using two differing 
disguises, for both aimed at weakening the organic unity of the race and national solidarity' 
(Talmon 1965: 154). The fact that the contemporary reader is baffled by the anti-Semitic notion 
that capitalism and socialism are both forms of appearance of a common essence, 'the Jew', is 
due to the circumstance that we take it for granted that 'capitalism' is a reality - and so firmly 
established a reality that it is quasi 'second nature' - and that Marxist 'socialism' (rather than 
Catholic conservatism) is its enemy. However, in Europe in the nineteenth century industrial 
capitalism and socialism could indeed appear as two newly arrived, competing but related 
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entities. The modernity of both, socialism and capitalism, was still fresh. Whether or not one 
believes that socialism and capitalism are of the same 'essence' (which might be called 'the Jew' 
or something else) depends on one's wider world-view. If the notion of the racial-ethnic 
Volksgemeinschaft is the central value around which one's world-view is organized, then it 
makes sense to perceive different attacks on this central value as of the same essence. Pulzer 
remarks (writing about Constantin Frantz): 'To the more old-fashioned kind of Conservative anti-
Semitism, the fundamental similarities shared by Liberals and Socialists in any case loomed large 
- their humanism, positivism, internationalism, and the revolutionary origins of their theories all 
seemed to come out of the same stable' (Pulzer 1988:256). 
'Anti-Semitic socialism' (the tradition from Proudhon to Diihring) was forced to re-
articulate itself by the ascendancy of the Social Democratic Party (beginning in 1875 with the 
unification of the two workers' parties in Gotha, but gaining momentum especially in the I 890s): 
the growing hegemony of the Marxist rejection ofProudhonism and related ideologies meant that 
anti-Semitic socialism needed to confront (what it understood to be) capitalism and Marxist 
Social Democracy at the same time. This is an important element in Stocker's rhetoric (as quoted 
above) and was subsequently developed into a more consistent ideology of Judaism being the 
'common essence' of 'capitalism and Marxism'. This conception is not without its irony because 
the socialism that the anti-Semites themselves tend to endorse is indeed (in the perspective of the 
Marxist critique) of the same essence with capitalism: it fails to challenge the basic elements of 
the capitalist mode of production (the value form, commodity production, labour power as a 
commodity, wage labour). The 'anti-Semitic socialists' attack the Marxist challenge to the 
capitalist mode of production for being of the same essence with capitalism, while they 
themselves endorse those elements of the socialist tradition that fail to challenge the capitalist 
mode of production. The anti-Semitic notion that emancipation of 'unproductive people' (like the 
Jews) is only welcome ifit means that they become productive links anti-Semitism to bourgeois 
ideology while Marx's critique of political economy offers a critique of the bourgeois concept of 
productivity (namely productivity of value). However, the workers' movement and its institutions 
did certainly not in their entirety manage to leave behind all these elementary forms of bourgeois 
theory and praxis, which weakened in turn their members' immunity to anti-Semitism. 
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1.3.6.4. The historical background of the perception of the socio-economic role 
of European Jewry in the 19th century 
As Hannah Arendt wrote, anti-Semitism 'must be seen in the more general 
framework of the development of the nation-state, and at the same time its source 
must be found in certain aspects of Jewish history and specifically Jewish 
functions during the last centuries' (Arendt 1973:9). 
Until the 8th century AD, most Jews at any given place in the world were 
peasants and artisans, not traders or money-lenders (Bermann 1973: 19). The 
rabbinical ethics of 'classical Judaism' (Halevi 1987) can best be understood as 
the 'corporate ideology (Standesideologie) of artisans' (Bermann 1973:19); it 
emphasizes more than most other religious traditions the value of work247 , and 
there are many rabbinical injunctions against the money trade (ibid.: 18). 
However, long before the dissolution of the Jewish state in Palestine by the 
Romans, a large number of Jews all over the Mediterranean basin had been 
engaged in trade, parallel to the Jewish peasant society in Palestine. As Leon 
(1993) suggests, Judaism did not share the fate of most other classical 
Mediterranean civilisations - to vanish at the latest with the decline of the 
Roman Empire - because a stable diaspora was already in place that was not 
negatively affected by the events in Palestine, and whose wealthy members 
warranted the continued existence of Judaism as part of what made their specific 
network distinct.248 When after the disintegration of the Roman Empire 
commodity production shrunk to a minimum in Europe, Jewish traders 
'continued to be the sole commercial intermediaries between the East and the 
West' (Leon 1993:123). But it is not before the high Middle Ages that the Jews 
of Central Europe were driven out of agriculture and shifted towards whatever 
economic niche was most open to foreigners and newcomers, first into trade, 
then, out oftrade249 into money lending (Bermann 1973:23).250 In Carolingian 
247 Differing from the Christian interpretation, the rabbinical tradition asserts that Adam was 
working even in Paradise (Gen.2: 15). Maimonides in the lih century praised physical labour 
(ibid.:20) even, and perhaps especially, for intellectuals and the wealthy. 
248 The Jewish urban poor seem to have embraced Christianity at an early stage, while the Jewish 
rural poor assimilated and 'disappeared' slowly like many other ethnic groups within 
Mediterranean civilisation. 
249 With the last Crusade at the latest, Christian traders took over foreign, and subsequently also 
domestic trade. 
250 In the Mediterranean, Jews continued being artisans (and also for example, like most famously 
in Salonica, dock workers). In the Arab and Muslim realms, where the huge majority of Jews 
lived, they continued being peasants and artisans (Halevi 1987). 
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times,judaeus and mercator seem to have been used as synonyms; there are 
documents from the 10th century using the phrase 'Jews and other traders' 
(ibid.:25; also Leon 1993: 123). For this period, there is no evidence that Jews 
have been accused of usury. With the emergence of the guilds and the 
proclamation of the canonical ban on interest,251 the Jews of Central Europe were 
increasingly restricted to usury, and at the same time accused for it. However, 
usury, at least in its German version ('Wucher', literally: increment) did only 
successively adopt the moral meaning of 'excessive' interest.252 
The crisis of Jewry begins with the general crisis at the tum of the 
millennium, consisting of the disintegration of a precarious balance between 
local social relations and the imperial-sacral order (Schenck 1965:690f). It brings 
the European Jews discrimination, ridicule, demonization, separation, expulsion 
and extermination. Three factors lead to pogroms against Jews: a desperate need 
of money capital; the general psychopathic-religious state of a large part of the 
1 · h'fi' hI' f 253 popu atlOn; SItS In t e re atlOns 0 power. 
251 As expressed for example by Thomas Aquinas who mediated scholastic dogma (in this 
context, taken from Augustinus) with Aristotelian philosophy, Catholic doctrine sees interest as 
the appropriation of the labour of others (Blaschke 1997a: 127). Initially the church had only 
banned clerics from taking interest. The ban was generalized since the 8th century (Cahnmann 
1965:640). For the late middle ages the rule was: 'When the Christian took interest it was a sin 
and could be repented. When the Jew did the same it seemed natural; from him nothing good was 
expected' (ibid.:643). However, the ban on interest was sidestepped in many ways whenever 
money lending was an attractive option. Cahnmann writes that the 'relation between creditor and 
debtor is the central conflict situation of an agrarian and small-scale commodity exchanging 
society' (ibid.:639). 
252 To say that only Jews tended to be 'usurers' in certain rural areas is to say nothing other than 
that only Jews were giving credit when others saw no creditworthiness. Precarious small scale 
credit always carries a higher interest rate than more secure forms of credit. Sterling mentions 
that in 1836, large scale landowners in the Prussian Rhineland managed to persuade the state to 
ban Jewish 'usury', referring to the misery it allegedly brought on the peasants, to the effects that 
the latter had to sell off their land to the same landowners because of a lack of cash flow (Sterling 
1969:33). 
253 The lowest echelons of the population are destitute and owe money, and are also most 
receptive to religious fanaticism. The towns strive for greater autonomy and fight the territorial 
princes. The princes try to gain greater autonomy with respect to the Imperial order. The Jews (as 
'Kammerknechte') tended to be protected by the Imperial power (in return for cash payment) 
against princes, towns and the people, and came thus to be seen as representatives of the alien, 
distant power of the Empire. Furthermore, a confident higher bourgeoisie arose next to the 
artisanal petty bourgeoisie that ventured into money economy and became successful competitors 
to the Jews (ibid.:694t). 
Drawing on 16th century cases, Po-Chia Hsia asserts that the agitation against Jewish usury 
did not primarily come from the lower clases that were directly engaged in this way with Jews 
but from parts of the clergy and the guilds who feared the Jewish competition in selling small 
consumer goods cheap (Po-Chi a Hsia 1995: 165). Many of the 16th century texts quoted by Po-
Chia Hsia have a tendency of jumping without much mediation from a religious anti-Jewish to an 
anti-usury discussion that is explicitly directed at Christian as welI as Jewish usurers, both calIed 
'Jews'. 
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In the 15th and 16th centuries the guilds managed to have the Jews driven out 
of most German towns onto the countryside. This is the beginning of the twin 
phenomenon of a large number of empoverished peddlers and Bette1juden and 
the minute number of wealthy 'Court Jews' (Bermann 1973:30). 
The history of anti-Semitism begins at the time when the Jews become 
dispensable and therefore vulnerable.254 Ironically, the modern anti-Jewish 
discourse preserves the equation of Jew with 'merchant' although it had been 
meaningful only in the context of medieval economy when Jews did to a certain 
extent represent money economy as a foreign, external element within an 
'underdeveloped', de-commodified economic order. To the extent that Europe 
resumed commodity-production on a wider scale, let alone when it developed the 
capitalist mode of production, this equation became less and less meaningful -
but it did not come out of use. 
The expulsions of the Jews in the 13th , 14th and 15th centuries were from the 
more advanced (England, France, Spain) towards the more backward countries, 
with the largest number ending up at the bottom of that ladder, Poland, while 
some survived in the less developed pockets of Germany and Italy (Leon 
1993: 153). Everywhere except in Poland255 begins the time of petty usury, 
ghettos, persecutions, special taxes and second hand goods dealing. 
Germany after the religious wars was a destroyed and impoverished area 
'inhabited by a petty people sticking to standische and ziinjtlerische privileges' 
(Cahnmann 1965:657), not conducive to the formation of a national bourgeoisie 
Medieval law, following Roman law and in contrast to modem political economy, refused to 
understand money as a (special) commodity and 'considered gold and silver as tokens possessing 
imaginary value, varying at the will of the king' (Lazare 1995 :60). In the absence of a concept of 
(commodity) value and any adequate theory of money, the 'price of money' was subjected to 
ethical-political-theological considerations. The more society was monetarised, the less viable an 
'ethical approach' to determining interest was. In modem society, any interference with the law 
of value comes at a price that a ruling group can only afford in exceptional circumstances (such 
as intense pressure from the value-producing classes combined with conditions of a high rate of 
profit). 
254 For the larger part of the Middle Ages, very little was produced in Europe that potential 
trading partners in the Orient would have been interested in buying. The few places where goods 
for exchange (such as textiles) were produced (some cities in Flanders and Italy that were both 
industrial and commercial places) soon began developing a Christian class of merchants who 
subsequently began the process of pushing the Jewish merchants out of business (Leon 
1993: 137). Leon writes that the relevance of legal restrictions for this process has been 
exaggerated: barriers for medieval subjects to change profession were a generic phenomenon. In 
feudal society, everyone 'should remain in his place' (Leon 1993: 142). 
255 The most economically 'backward', i.e. non-bourgeois place was also the only one where 
religious toleration was a principle of governance. 
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and a modern state. 256 In this situation - in the German context more than in 
others - Jews became the allies of modernising absolutist monarchs operating 
towards what would later turn out to be 'bourgeois society', but against the 
opposition of the urban bourgeoisies. After the Thirty Years War, money capital 
was rare and desperately sought after by the territorial princes, and for the 
temporary lack of a strong enough Christian bourgeoisie to provide the necessary 
monies, a small number of rich Jews became Hofjuden. 257 
Hannah Arendt suggests that in the modern period, state credit remained the 
only actual financial service that Jews had a quasi monopoly on. Even this, 
though, was temporary: Christian banks began to handle state credit in increasing 
measure since around 1830 (Arendt 1973: 19). 'The last war financed by a Jew 
was the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866' (ibid.:20).258 
256 State fonnation obviously means to the individual merchant or manufacturer a deduction from 
the revenue. No state can be fonned unless a group of people is prepared, or can be forced, to pay 
the bills. 
257 In England, France and Spain the consolidation of large territorial states - that would 
subsequently be re-interpreted as nation states - happened after or coincided with the expulsion 
of the Jews (in 1290, 1394, 1492). The empoverished population (that was inclined to seeing 
devils and witches at work anywhere) could easily jump to conclusions when it saw a small 
number of people rising from the most destitute to considerably well off positions in a time of 
general destitution while the bourgeoisie kept in mind the memory of the Jews as allies of the 
princes (Schenck 1965:702). 
Since even after readmission their numbers were small in these countries, the mythic and 
demonic Jews of Christian mythology were not necessarily matched to empirical, actual Jews. 
People participating in the Christian folklore must have been less likely to assume that 'the Jews' 
are actually existing people rather than characters of mythology. In Germany, however, the Jews 
were numerous, visible and lived under the precarious condition that the lack of a uniform legal 
and political system prevented their effective expulsion as well as their integration or permanent 
establishment (Schenck 1965:698f; also Cahnmann 1965:649). The failure of a 'bourgeois 
revolution' (from the 15th to the 19th centuries) to occur was, first of all, responsible for the fact 
that a considerable number of Jews survived in Germany. 
25K Together with the traditional concern for the 'European balance of power', the tendency of 
governments (irrespective of their specific character) to make use of the inter-national 
connections of the Jews also eclipsed in the Imperialist period (ibid.:22). 
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1.3.7 The anti-Semitic discourse in Germany before and around 1879 
Massing observed that the periods in which anti-Semitism blossomed during 
the Second Reich were the periods in which the Conservatives were hostile 
towards the government (Massing 1949: 104): the last phase of Bismarck's liberal 
era (1875-78) stimulated anti-Semitism's ascendancy for the first time, while 
during the reactionary period (1886-90) the anti-Semitic movement virtually 
disappeared. It enjoyed a revival during the liberal era under chancellor Caprivi 
(1890-94). This observation allows an important conclusion on the relative 
impact of the different strands of anti-Semitism at the time: only established 
Conservatism was able to mobilise efficiently, while all other tendencies of anti-
Semitism - the 'radicals' of all shapes and forms - remained marginal then and 
were basically fellow-travellers of the Conservatives?59 A good illustration of 
this is the case of the' Antisemitenpetition', an anti-Semitic petition that was 
circulated in fall 1880 and seems to have constituted the high water mark of anti-
Semitic pUblicity when it fetched a quarter of a million signatures all over the 
Reich.26o Although initiated by an assemblage of radical anti-Semites of diverse 
backgrounds, it 'merely demanded the legalization of what was the predominant 
administrative practice anyway' (Hamburger 1968:37).261 
The presentation in this chapter moves from the more mainstream towards 
the more fringe phenomena. 
259 The fact that the latter received much more attention in the scholarly literature than their 
importance in their own day alone would warrant has obviously to do with the larger impact they 
later had on Nazism. 
260 The petition was debated in the Prussian diet in November 1880 (after the 'Freisinnige' party 
demanded the government make a public statement on the petition). On New Year's Eve night 
1880/81 'organized gangs of hooligans provoked anti-Semitic incidents outside coffee-houses in 
Berlin Friedrichstadt' after a mass rally organized by the group behind the Antisemitenpetitiol1 
(Belke 1978:61 f). 
261 In practical terms and despite legal emancipation, only converted Jews tended to be admitted 
to state office in the German Reich. Conversion (far from being about religion in a spiritual 
sense) functioned in this context as proof of an individual's readyness to function as a loyal and 
disinterested bureaucrat (Hamburger 1968:98) - for the Jews, of course, an additional test of 
commitment. 
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1.3.7.1 Conservative and mainstream anti-Semitism 
Until the mid-1870s, anti-Semitic pamphlets were generally seen as 
expressions of 'private opinions' of individuals (Massing 1949: 14)?62 'The tum 
came in 1875' when anti-Semitism was 'taken up by two politically defined 
newspapers', 'Kreuzzeitung', the voice of orthodox Prussian Protestantism,263 
and 'Germania', the organ of the Catholic Centre Party. 264 
In January 1874 - at a time when the anti-Catholic Kulturkampfhad been 
• .C' h 265 d . '.C' h gomg on lor tree years an economIC recesslOn lor one year - t e 
Conservatives suffered a massive election defeat by the National Liberals and the 
Catholic Centre. The anti-Semitic articles of the Kreuzzeitung that were 
answered - in a more violent and hateful tone by those in the Germania seem 
to have been a deliberate offer of co-operation to a new potential ally (Massing 
1949: 17).266 The initial tone was set by Franz Perrot who called 'our fellow 
citizens of Semitic race and Mosaic belief ... the actual leaders of the National-
Liberal majority in the Reichstag' (Kreuzzeitung 148 [1875], quoted in 
Bernhardt 1994:36). The articles in the Kreuzzeitung attacked in particular the 
economic aspects of Bismarck's policy which was tarred as 'a banker's policy 
made for and by Jews'. 
The articles in the Germania claimed that hatred and persecution of Jews 
'were never caused by religious fanaticism, but were, rather, a protest of the 
Germanic race against the intrusion of an alien tribe'. They supported this claim 
262 The most interesting strictly conservative anti-Semite was Konstantin Frantz (born 1817, the 
son of a Lutheran pastor) who had been an admirer of Bismarck until Bismarck's exclusion of 
Austria from the German League (Pulzer 1988:72). He published his first anti-Jewish pamphlet in 
1844 but is best known for his 'The Religion of National Liberalism' (1872) and 'National 
Liberalism and Jewish Domination' (1874). He advocated 'social monarchy' (Pulzer 1988:74) 
but - differing from state socialist Kathedersozialisten - he refused to accept the reality of 
industrial civilization. 
263 The actual name of this publication was 'Neue Preussische Zeitung', founded in 1848. The 
articles are in nos. 148-152 (29.6. - 3.7 1875). One of the editors of the Kreuzzeitung was 
Hermann Goedsche who had published the novel 'Biarritz' (1868) that was later used as one of 
the sources of the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' (Mosse 1966: 128). On 'Biarritz' see Mosse 
1978:116ff. 
264 In the nos. 174,185, 189, 190,201,203,228. 
265 On the Kulturkampfsee Wehler 1995:892-902 
266 In the elections to the Prussian diet (1873) and those to the Reichstag (1874) Conservative 
seats were slashed by roughly two thirds (Wehler 1995:918). There were then two Conservative 
parties, the 'Free Conservatives ' (officially called 'Deutsche Reichspartei' since 1871) 
(ibid.:920), the 'Partei Bismarck sans phrase' (ibid.:92I ) who co-operated with the National 
Liberals, and the 'Old Conservatives' (officially called 'Deutschkonservative Partei' since 1876) 
who were anti-liberal, anti-state, anti-modem and defended for example clerical control of 
education. Their organ was the Kreuzzeitung (ibid. :918). 
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with anti-Jewish quotes from (non-Catholic!) authors such as Goethe, Herder, 
Kant, Fichte and Bismarck.267 The Germania pointed out that there were few 
Jews in the 'productive strata' and interpreted the Kulturkampfas a Jewish war 
of revenge. It called for 'emancipation of the Christians from the Jews' and for 
Christian economic solidarity: 'Don't buy from Jews!' (Massing 1949: 14f). In 
the aftermath of both series of articles, a group of Conservatives and Catholics 
came together as the' Anti-Chancellor League' and continued publishing on the 
same tracks. 
1877 saw the pUblication of the book 'Political Promoters (Grunder) and 
corruption in Germany,268 by Rudolf Meyer who played a central role in the 
'Anti-Chancellor League' (Pulzer 1988:76). Meyer was 'the most extreme anti-
Bismarckian, anti-Semitic State Socialist' who perhaps most convincingly 
represented the Conservative idea the monarchy be responsible for the welfare of 
the working class.269 Meyer's target was Bismarck who he argued was 'owned 
by the Jews and the Griinder' (Pulzer 1988:78).270 
Another leading anti-Semite close to the extremely conservative part ofthe 
Lutheran Prussian establishment was the priest Adolf Stocker. He came from a 
lower middle class background and via a career through university and army 
became a court chaplain in 1874. He had close relations to the Kreuzzeitung and 
was a life-long friend of Adolf Wagner, a Berlin University economist and the 
leading Kathedersozialist of the 1880s (Massing 1949:22). Stocker's 
fundamental attitude - rooted in Christian economic doctrine - is summed up in 
a formulation from 1874 when he described socialism as 'an offspring of 
materialism, created in the palaces of atheist wealth' (ibid.:23; cpo chapter 
1.3.6.3). 
267 The 'Germania' quoted a speech by Bismarck from 1847. 
268 Mehring, Engels and Bebel thought highly of this book when it first came out (Pulzer 
1988:76). 
269 He had previously published a pioneering and sympathetic work on the labour movement in 
Europe and the USA ('The fourth estate's struggle for emancipation') (1874-5) (ibid.:75). After 
the publication of his book on the Griinder-period he was forced into exile. 
270 Pulzer writes that Meyer was not 'haunted ... with the paranoiac's hallucination of the Jewish 
demon lurking behind every misfortune' (ibid.). Meyer was a disciple of Rodbertus and became 
in the 1890s a contributor to the Social Democratic 'Neue Zeit'. Mehring reported that it was 
Meyer who initially interested Stocker in social reform but that he did not support Stocker's 
movement (Massing 1949:215). 
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In 1878 Stocker founded the 'Christian Social Workers' Party,271 (Wistrich 
1982:90) which attempted to promote a clerical version of Pruss ian state socialist 
reformism, timed to parallel the anti-Socialist laws of the same year. The party 
made some headway only after Stocker increased the use of anti-Semitic rhetoric 
from September 1879. From then on, he managed successfully to translate 
traditional Conservative anti-Semitism into an urban populist movement. Still, 
Stocker 'made no secret of the fact that Social Democracy was his chief enemy' 
(ibid.:93).272 
His 'first full-dress anti-Semitic attack', a speech on 'What we demand of 
Modem Jewry' was held on September 19, 1879 (Massing 1949:29f). Already 
the emphasis on modern Jewry in the title points to Stocker's claim that he 
'respected' or even 'loved' Jews as long as they remained religious, i.e. were not 
'modem' Jews. 273 
The argument of Stocker's first explicitly anti-Semitic speech274 took the 
following form: 
~ 'Jewish papers assail our faith' (in Massing 1949:279). 
~ 'I do indeed consider modem Jewry a great danger to German national life' 
(ibid.). 
~ 'Please, be a little more modest!' (ibid.:281) 
~ 'Modem Jewry is most certainly a power against religion' (ibid.:283). 
~ 'They persist in remaining Jews' (ibid.:284). 
~ 'Please, be a little more tolerant!' (ibid.) 
~ 'The worst Berlin papers are in the hands of Jews and ... the Jewish element 
completely dominates the editorial staffs' (ibid. :284 f). 
271 The 'Workers' was dropped in 1881 after workers failed to turn up. 
272 Stocker was a pioneer in a new form of politics: the 'enemies of democratic rule now had to 
make use of the democratic process to maintain the old structure of power' (Massing 1949:27). 
However, although anti-Semitism was 'inherent in the orthodox Protestant concept of the 
Christian state', it was not in the foreground of his rhetoric as long as he tried to target workers. 
To the extent that the workers' organizations were influenced by Marxism (rather than by non-
Marxist traditions of socialist thought), they stressed explicitly that it did not matter whether their 
exploiters were Christian or Jewish. Only when Stocker redirected his efforts at the middle 
classes, did anti-Semitism become central. 
273 In a letter written in September 1880 (but published only in 1895), Stocker wrote that he 
wanted to attack 'only frivolous, godless, usurious, fraudulent Jewry which, indeed, is the 
misfortune of our people' (ibid.:30). (Stocker seems to allude here to Treitschke's famous 
fOlmulation.) Stocker later claimed that Bismarck's social welfare policy was his political victory 
(ibid.:44); the apogee of Stocker's movement was in 1881, it was already in marked decline by 
1884. 
274 A translation is contained in Massing 1949:278-87. 
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~ 'Our sacred institutions are constantly dragged into the dust' (ibid.:285). 
~ 'Unless these wells of poison are cleaned out, the situation cannot improve' 
(ibid.). 
~ 'Germany's splendour will arise with new life after this period of decline' 
(ibid.). 
~ 'The Jews are and remain a people within a people, a state within a state, a 
separate tribe within a foreign race. All immigrants are eventually absorbed 
by the people among whom the live - all save the Jews' (ibid.:285f). 
~ 'They control the arteries of money, banking, and trade; they dominate the 
press and they are flooding the institutions of higher learning' (ibid.:286). 
~ 'And this is where we make our third request. Modem Jewry must take part 
in productive work: a little more equality, please!' (ibid.) 
~ 'They do not enjoy work and ... they do not believe in the German concept 
of dignity oflabor' (ibid.). 
~ 'Hatred of the Jews is already flaring up here and there, and this is repugnant 
to the Gospels. Ifmodern Jewry continues to use the power of capital and the 
power of the press to bring misfortune to the nation, a final catastrophe is 
unavoidable. Israel must renounce its ambition to become the master of 
Germany' (ibid.:287). 
~ 'Either we succeed in this ... or. .. German spirit will become Judaized' 
(ibid.). 
Treitschke's first article in the Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute - written only weeks 
later - takes its cues from Stocker's speech to an extent that borders on 
plagiarism, despite the verbal contempt that Treitschke had for Stocker. 
Another mainstream source of anti-Semitism in the period were the writings 
by the journalist Otto Glagau, which, however, were far removed from the 
reactionary establishment that provided the background for the previously 
mentioned writers and agitators. 
From December 1874, G1agau published a series of articles (,The Stock 
exchange and speculation fraud in Berlin') in the moderate liberal Gartenlaube275 
(Massing 1949: 1 0) which seems to have had a readership of two million 
(Claussen 1987: 105). The Gartenlaube stood for a 'fusion of political liberalism, 
Kitsch and mass following', it was anti-aristocratic and generally supported 
'equal opportunities' (Wassermann 1978:48). It usually presented the German 
middle classes a schmalz Judaism (ibid.:52) as quaint, gemiitlich and 
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unthreatening as their own 'Christian culture,.276 Glagau's articles provided a 
form of moralistic indictment of dishonest business practices that included 
references to anti-Jewish stereotypes as a rhetorical element of their populist 
journalistic style (Katz 1988:285). Glagau presented himself as a defender of 
petty bourgeois economic interest against big industry and (allegedly Jewish) 
finance capital (Wistrich 1982:53).277 In 1878, Glagau's articles were published 
as a widely read book (Massing 1949:212).278 
Glagau's target was National Liberalism. He claimed that before 1866, it had 
campaigned abstractly for 'freedom' and 'unity' while since 1866 it set out 
establishing 'Manchester freedoms' that enabled the Griinder to rob the people 
of their money. In this context, Glagau claims that 90 per cent of the Griinder 
were Jewish (quoted in Claussen 1987:94) 279. In another text also published in 
1878, G1agau blamed Jewish liberals - Lasker and Bamberger - for the 
liberalisation of trade and stock exchange and criticized liberal hypocrisy in the 
face of the uprooting of handicraft by industry, the disappearance of the 
peasantry and the emergence of a 'destitute proletariat' (Massing 1949: 11). 
Manchesterism 'wants to transform everything into money', it 'rejects all sense 
of solidarity, humanity and all ethical principles' and 'preaches crass 
materialism'. The freedom of trade and movement that it has brought to the 
worker is actually just 'the freedom to choose the occupation and the place where 
he may starve to death': 
Jewry is applied Manchesterism in the extreme. It knows nothing any more 
but trade, and of that merely haggling and usury. It does not work but 
makes others work for it, it haggles and speculates with the manual and 
mental products of others. Its centre is the stock exchange ... As an alien 
275 The word means 'summer house' or 'bower' and implies that this publication is meant to be 
read in leisurely and recreational surroundings. 
276 It presupposed that its readers were used to an undemanding, light version of religion that was 
more or less indifferent to any specific religious content - a petty bourgeois clientele who would 
not have the stomach for either actually believing, or not believing in a religion. Like the 
Grenzboten in the same period, it shifted from liberal to conservative in the course of the 1880s 
(ibid.:55). 
277 In the form that Glagau's articles appeared in the Gartenlaube (edited by its liberal editor), 
they were not anti-liberal and not aggressively anti-Semitic (Katz 1988:285; also Wassermann 
1978:60). Katz writes that Glagau developed a straightforwardly anti-Semitic discourse only 
when he experienced that the public seemed to respond particularly positive to the anti-Jewish 
formulations that he occasionally used. 
278 As Katz writes, Glagau's often quoted formulation, 'the social question is nothing but the 
Jewish question' was made not in the Gartenlaube but in the book only (Katz 1988:285). 
279 Claussen seems to be quoting from the book version ofGlagau's articles. 
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tribe it fastens itself on the German people and sucks their marrow. The 
social question is essentially the Jewish question; everything else is 
swindle (ibid.). 
On an optimistic tone, Glagau claims that the number of 'decent and honest folk' 
was slowly rising (from 'The Stock exchange ... ', quoted in Claussen 1987:97) 
and concludes: 
I do not want to murder or slaughter the Jews, nor drive them out of the 
country; I do not want to take away any of their possessions, but I want to 
change them thoroughll80 (ibid.:103t). 
Although being 'a physically as well as psychically decidedly degenerate race', 
they 'are ruling the whole world,.281 From the Jews 'we can learn' how to 
function as 'a single chain, closely knit'.282 
Of somewhat similar background to the case of the Gartenlaube is the case 
of the periodical 'Grenzboten '. Founded in the 1840s, it was a liberal 
publication283 that 'swung over to supporting Bismarck ... without qualification' 
- due to Bismarck's co-operation with National Liberalism - by the end of the 
1870s (Sheehan 1978: 195). In 1880 it published articles that were written by 
Moritz Busch284 - press officer in the Foreign Office and Bismarck's 'journalistic 
handy man' - in which the foundation of a cross-party and cross-denomination 
umbrella organisation solely dedicated to anti-Semitism was suggested (Massing 
1949:84). 
280 ' .•. aber ich wi II sie revidiren, und zwar funditus revidiren' . 
281 This example shows how the anti-Semitic discourse connects the notion of Jewish inferiority 
with that of Jewish superiority: the Jews are (effectively) superior through being (morally) 
inferior. This stands against the often repeated suggestion that the concept of anti-Semitism ought 
to be strictly demarcated from that of racism because racists see their objects as inferior, anti-
Semites see their objects as superior. 
282 From 1880-89, Glagau edited an anti-liberal and anti-Semitic middle class magazine called 
'Der Kulturkiimpfer' (Massing 1949:212). 
283 Since 1848 the Grenzboten was edited by Gustav Freytag and Julian Schmidt and targeted a 
bourgeois readership that the editors aimed to educate towards national self-consciousness and 
the trust in Prussian liberalism (Wehler 1995:242). The name ofthe publication means 
'messenger from the border'. 
284 They were first published anonymously, in subsequent book publications under Busch's name 
(Pulzer 1988:96). 
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1.3.7.2 The anti-Semitic fringe 
In 1879, for the first time an explicitly racial, populist and anti-Christian 
anti-Semitic publication reached mass circulation, Wilhelm Marr's 'The victory 
of Judaism (des Judentums) over Germandom (das Germanentum), regarded 
from the nondenominational point of view' (Pulzer 1988:47).285 In this text, 'Jew 
was contrasted not with Christian, but with German, along a line of division 
which was not accidental and remediable but eternal and indelible' (ibid.). This 
was a far from original idea,286 but Marr's publication marked the point when 
this kind of argument found a ready readership.287 Marr also founded in 1879 the 
short-lived Antisemitenliga. 
Marr argued that it was 'idiotic' to blame the Jews for Christ's crucifixion, 'a 
performance staged, as we know, by the Roman authorities which yielded in a 
cowardly fashion to the howling mob of Jerusalem'. He declared himself for 'the 
unconditional defence of the Jews against all "religious" persecution' (Massing 
1949:7; note the inverted commas around 'religious'). Because the Jews were an 
oppressed group it was only natural that they greeted the revolutions of 1789 and 
1848 they cannot be blamed for that. However, the fact that they are the 
dominant power in the West (Jewish monopoly of the press is a major theme for 
Marr) is due to their racial qualities, and only a general pogrom can save the 
Germanic peoples from' Judaization'. Marr sees 'passionate popular indignation' 
on the rise. 
Marr presents himself as a disillusioned democrat and atheist who turns his 
back on liberalism (which he finds is 'Judaized' and materialist) but neither 
wants to embrace socialism. 'Like Voltaire, Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, 
Wilhelm Marr saw the root of all tyranny and evil in monotheistic religion' 
285 Pulzer and Massing, as well as most other scholars seem to quote from a I t h edition of 1879. 
Pulzer and Massing suggest that there was a first edition in 1873. Most others suggest that all 
twelve editions are from 1879 (NipperdeylRiirup 1972:138; Zimmermann 1978:91; Katz 
1988:281; Bernhardt 1994:37). A facsimile of the eighth edition (1879) is downloadable from 
www.gehove.de/antisemi. 
286 Marr had himself published an earlier version of the same argument in his ./udenspiegel 
(1862) (Massing 1949:6). 
287 Whether or not there was an edition of 1873, the more important fact is that the text went 
through a large number of editions in 1879. 
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(Wistrich 1982:53). The economic behaviour that he considered 
characteristically Jewish was for him a manifestation of the former. 288 
Marr was also the first editor of 'The German Guard, Monthly for national 
cultural interests, published by the anti-Jewish Association,289 whose first issue 
appeared in November 1879.290 Already the following year, Marr was replaced 
as editor by H. Naudh,291 the author of another emblematic text of racial, anti-
Christian anti-Semitism, 'The Jews and the German state' which was then in its 
tenth edition.292 Naudh discusses the 'Jewish Question' strictly as a problem of 
the state and its underlying morality (Sittlichkeit), claiming that Sittlichkeit is 
determined by race. 
Naudh and Marr are the two anti-Semites who are most unequivocally not 
anti-modem but re-articulate the pro-modernisation anti-Semitism from the first 
decades of the 19th century. The thrust oftheir argument is to show that Jews 
cannot be part of modem liberal society and that their presence endangers its 
288 'Marr's extreme hatred of Catholicism was no less virulent than his attacks on Judaism'. In his 
youth he had been 'preaching a confused atheistic utopia to German artisans in Switzerland' 
(ibid.). 
289 'Die Deutsche Wacht, Monatsschrift fUr nationale Kulturinteressen - Organ der antijiidischen 
Vereinigung'. I quote from the bound edition of the first year's issues (Berlin 1880). 
290 The leader article in the first issue of the journal has the form of an appeal to the two chambers 
of the Reich (The title is: 'An die Adresse des hohen Bundesrathes und des deutschen 
Reichstages'.) It starts with a list of all the liberties that had been fought for in 1848 and that have 
subsequently been revised and restricted, or have never been implemented fully in the first place. 
The article suggests that only one of the 'achievements' ('Errungenschaften' - in inverted 
commas in the original) has not been reversed: Jewish emancipation. Marr (the article is not 
signed, but most probably written by the editor) points out that he had himself been amongst the 
'cloud-cuckoo-Ianders (Wolkenwandler), of the 'people's springtime' a mistake of which he says 
he is not ashamed. The author goes on to tell the 'unvarnished truth' of the 'democratic' (again in 
inverted commas in the original) birth of Jewish emancipation. He claims that Jewish 
emancipation has actually never been supported by the majority of any assembly, but it had to be 
'fabricated and smuggled in' in a package together with other demands including general suffrage 
and freedom of the press (Deutsche Wacht 1880:3): 'Jewish emancipation has been a contraband 
of the revolution of 1848'. The 'sufferings' that stem from Jewish emancipation are worse than 
any other endured by the German nation: 'All of society sighs under the spirit of Jewification 
(Verjudung) that has become flesh and blood ... and grows like cancer' (ibid.:4). Emancipation 
should not remain the only 'achievement' of 1848 that escaped revision. 
'Verjudung' seems to have been coined as a neologism by Richard Wagner in 1850 
(Aschheim 1996:56). However, it became common currency only after emancipation (ibid.:46). 
There is an element of disappointed expectations of the effects of emancipation in this notion. 
The concept - although with a different meaning - had been part of the discourse of Christianity 
since its very beginnings: the followers of St. Paul called that the followers of St. Peter who 
urged conformity to Jewish ritual law (ibid.). The fear that Judaism might somehow be able to 
'reclaim' the church was never completely absent from Christian theology. 
291 synonym for H.G. Nordmann 
292 It appeared first anonymously, the fifth edition is from 1862. Naudh claims its authorship in 
his 'Israel im Heere' (1879). In a pamphlet from August 1879, an opponent of anti-Semitism 
(Scholl 1879) claims that Marr's text merely emulates Naudh's publications. Naudh's argument 
is indeed richer and better supported than Marr's. 
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successful realisation. They combine anti-Jewish ideas with various references to 
modem bourgeois political thought. From their autobiographical remarks it is 
clear that the failure of 1848 is pivotal to their thinking: anti-Semitism seems for 
them a way of rationalizing the experience that the 'democratic' revolution they 
had been hoping for did not realize?93 
Many ofthe lesser known pamphlets seem to be predominantly focussed on 
economic arguments. One of the most straightforwardly economical pamphlets is 
by Egan Waldegg which is a pseudonym for Alexander Pinkert, the leader of the 
small 'German Reform Party' and organiser of the first 'International Anti-
Jewish congress' in Dresden in 1882 (Zimmermann 1978:93). His pamphlet 'The 
Jewish question in relation to German trade and industry, A Manifesto directed 
to the German nation' was first published in September 1879.294 One 'Junius' 
argues in 'Jewry and the daily press, A warning in difficult times' (1879) that 
'Jewry/Judaism (das Judenthum) is the illness of the 19th century' (Junius 
1879:7), it 'represents the power (Grossmacht) of capital against that of purely 
spiritual (geistige) interests' (ibid.:3). 'The state is in danger of material ruin' and 
the press - instead of delivering enlightenment (Aufklarung) - merely 'serves 
economic interests' (ibid.:4f). 
Eugen Diihring, who had by that time developed a 'sort of "national" 
Socialism' based on national self-sufficiency in a controlled economy (Pulzer 
1988:50) but differed from the Kathedersozialisten through a stronger 
affirmation of populism took up Marr's discourse and developed it into what was 
then 'the ne plus ultra of anti-Semitic extremism' (ibid.) in his atheist work, 'The 
293 The same is true about Richard Wagner. Wagner had published in 1850 (under a pseudonym) 
the essay 'Judaism (Judentum) in Music' (in the specialist publication, Neue Zeitschrifijiir 
Musik) which had a small circulation and provoked few responses. It was a (mostly aesthetic) 
polemic against 'Hebrew taste' and attacked the works of Mendelssohn-Barth oldy, Giacomo 
Meyerbeer, Heine and Borne. In 1869, Wagner published (under his real name) a largely re-
written and longer version of the text as a pamphlet that received many more - mostly negative-
responses. This version of Wagner's text was much more straightforwardly racist and became a 
point of reference for the emerging anti-Semitic movement. The edition by Fischer (2000) 
documents and annotates the differences between the two versions of the text. 
294 Waldegg appeals to members of the middle classes to join a 'Reform Party' that should 
support the monarchy and playa crucial role in the development ofa 'people's parliament'. This 
is supported by an extended economical argument. In the anti-Semitic material that was 
published immediately before and around the time of the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit economic 
arguments seem to figure much more strongly than in the exchange between Treitschke and his 
critics. The precise argumentative structure of the anti-Jewish campaign of that time, how it 
differs from the Streit and which discourse had what kind of impact on readers or participants is 
something I hope to be able to analyze in detail on some later occasion. 
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Jewish question as a question of race, morality and culture'. 295 He stressed that it 
is 'precisely the baptized Jews who infiltrate furthest'. This was why he saw need 
for a strictly racial form of anti-Semitism (quoted from Mendes-Flohr/Reinharz 
1980:273). Diihring also argued that 'Semite' was 'a euphemism' when referring 
to the Jews because 'the Jews are a particular small tribe (Volksstammchen) 
within the Semitic race' and its 'most evil manifestation' (quoted in Claussen 
1994b:46). He differed from Treitschke and also Naudh when he stated that the 
'Jewish question' is 'more ofa concern for society than for the state' 
(ibid.:49).296 Against conservatives, and also against Treitschke whom he did not 
regard as a serious fellow anti-Semite, Diihring insisted anti-Semitism should be 
more than a tactical instrument of anti-liberalism.297 
295 'Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Kulturfrage' (1881). Cpo Claussen (1994b:64). 
296 He also seemed to differ from Marr when he stated one should not exaggerate the Jews' 
power: they do not create all evil in the world, they merely manage to instrumentalise existing 
corruption for their egotistic purposes (Pulzer 1988:50). 'Unfortunately', so Diihring, they also 
manage to exploit 'human rights' and 'modem social freedom' in this way (ibid.:51) to the effect 
that equality as introduced by the French Revolution has been perverted into inequality (ibid.:52). 
297 Two other important activists of the time were Ernst Henrici, who was involved in the 
founding of the 'Sociale Reichs Partei' in 1880. His agitation lasted only from 1880-82. He 
claimed to speak for 'all truly liberal citizens' (Massing 1949:85). Max Liebermann von 
Sonnenberg was also a racist anti-Semite, but from the ultra-conservative camp (ibid.:86). 
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1.4 Trei tschke 's liberalism 
If the most crucial characteristic of a liberal is a commitment to bourgeois, 
rather than feudal-aristocratic society, then Treitschke was undoubtedly a liberal 
at any point of his career. What place, if any, there should be for the aristocracy 
and for aristocratic values once bourgeois society is established, is a different 
question. Treitschke's view that they did have an important role to play was 
clearly not shared by every liberal, but neither was it an illiberal view. The same 
can be said about how Treitschke related the state to the concept of individual 
liberty, and what these three elements of the liberal world-view - according to 
Treitschke - meant for political practice. 
1.4.1 Bourgeois society 
Treitschke's aim has consistently been the 'expansion of the power of the 
bourgeoisie' for which the national state was central (Langer 1998:377). On 
many occasions Treitschke celebrated quintessential bourgeois values: in a 
speech given at a festival of 'gymnasts ' (Turner) in 1863 he praised the 
bourgeois sense of enterprise, the creation of wealth in the German towns and the 
bourgeois notion of the 'nobility oflabour (Adel der Arbeit)' that made 'our 
economy more moral and more joyful (sittlicher und freudiger), (quoted 
ibid.:101).298 In an essay on 'The Republic of the United Netherlands' (1869) 
Treitschke depicted the Dutch struggle of liberation from Habsburg rule with 
undivided sympathy (Langer 1998:205). He remarks that 'amongst this 
industrious little nation (bei diesem emsigen V6lkchen) trade and industry seem 
to have been more a passion that a business (Geschiift). Everybody was trading, 
and everybody traded with every commodity ... '. He saw in the revolutionary 
Dutch the avant garde of the modem bourgeoisie and its primary virtues, labour 
and thrift (ibid.:208)?99 
29R In the same speech Treitschke also argued that the dynamic of bourgeois economic success 
will finally lead to unification, and he admonished the 'gymnasts' not to forget that the Germans 
were 'one flesh and one blood' (ibid.: 1 02). 
299 Even Treitschke's notorious essay on the 'Teutonic Knights' (1862) (which provides a quasi-
mythical pre-history to the claim to leadership of the modern Prussian state) is written from a 
liberal-bourgeois perspective insofar as it emphasizes the role of German merchants in the 
colonization of the East - although these merchants depended on the protection by a heroic 
warrior aristocracy (Iggers 1971:71). 
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When Treitschke nevertheless invoked bourgeois reconciliation with the 
aristocracy, he did so not out of sympathy for feudal social relations, but in order 
to counterbalance the booming capitalist economy and the mind-set and the 
social dynamism it comes along with. Treitschke saw the aristocracy - within the 
context of an established bourgeois society, i.e. under the conditions of a society 
that was not aristocratic - as allies to his bildungsbiirgerliche liberalism. It has to 
be seen in this context that he attacked what he saw as the 'excesses' of 
capitalism, such as 'speculation' or 'usury'. Such occasional expressions of 'anti-
capitalist' (to be precise: anti finance-capital and anti-'speculation') sentiments 
were not untypical for German liberals of the time. 
Treitschke praised the Code Napoleon and the anti-feudal orientation of 
Napoleon I. (ibid. :211) while he described the ideas of the revolution of 1789 as 
'an obscure chaos of despotic and liberal thoughts that exclude each other,30o 
(ibid. :212f). Treitschke attacked egalitarianism and the notion of popular 
sovereignty together with the 'all-powerfulness (Allmacht) of the state' and the-
typically French - desire for 'unconditional unity and centralisation' (ibid.:213). 
He argued that under Louis Philippe (1830-1848) when for the first time in a 
European country the middle classes gained 'complete possession of ordered 
government' (quoted ibid.:223) they missed the chance to 'reconcile old and new 
propertied classes' and showed the same 'class egotism (standische Selbstsucht), 
that the aristocracy had previously shown. They turned France into 'a nation of 
careerists'. Treitschke acknowledged that Louis Napoleon recognised and tried to 
address the destitution of the working class. However, 'even this coldly 
calculating mind falls for the perennial delusion of all absolutists, as if the 
education to freedom was possible other than through freedom itself (quoted 
ibid.). The revolution of 1848, however, showed that 'nobody is less democratic 
than the masses' (quoted ibid.:227). He relates the extreme violence of modern 
French history to the expulsion of 'the Protestant faith' and the 'moderate 
freedom' that it offers (ibid.:232). He praises the efforts made by Napoleon III to 
raise the educational level of the workers and for their' civil improvement 
(biirgerliche Verbesserung), (ibid.:239). However, he asserts that 'not even the 
magic tricks of monarchic socialism managed to reconcile capital and labour' 
300 In his five-part essay on 'Bonapartism' (published between 1865 and 1868). 
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(ibid.:240). For Treitschke the conflict of capital and labour cannot be reconciled 
by social (state-socialist) policies. He supports only such carefully chosen 
measures that promise to weaken the class-consciousness of workers (such as 
turning them into house-owners). 
When in December 1871 Heimich Bernhard Oppenheim attacked criticisms 
of Manchester style liberalism from one of the bourgeois proponents of social 
reform301 - for whom Oppenheimer on this occasion coined the term 
Kathedersozialisten - Treitschke supported the social reform option rather than 
the Manchester position (ibid.:275).302 Treitschke also signed the invitation to a 
meeting in the summer of 1872 that resulted in the foundation of the 'Vereinfiir 
Sozialpolitik,.303 Nevertheless, Treitschke made a fiercely polemical statement 
against attempts at social reform in reaction to a speech by Schmoller from 
March 1874 ('Der Sozialismus und seine G6nner,)?04 
Treitschke agreed with Schmoller that social reform was unavoidable in 
order to prevent revolution, and that the state was 'the most magnificent moral 
(sittliche) institution for the education of humanity (Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts)' (a formulation Schmoller had used in 1872, quoted in 
Langer 1998:277). Treitschke's disagreement was with Schmoller's suggestion 
that 'the origin of social classes and, more generally, of history was force 
(Gewalt), . For Treitschke the existence of classes was an anthropological 
universal: 'The millions must plow, forge and plane for some thousands to be 
able to study, paint and govern' (ibid.:279).305 For Treitschke, 'marriage, 
property and the organic subdivision (Gliederung) of society' were the 
foundation of society sans phrase. The struggles between unequal social groups 
was what history was all about - but for Treitschke classes pre-existed, were not 
formed by struggle and violence. 
301 Gustav Schonberg 
302 Langer argues this with reference to a letter by Treitschke to Gustav von Schmoller. 
303 However, he did not take part in the meeting, apparently because of his deafness. 
304 Both Schmoller's speech and Treitschke's polemic were published in Preussische lahrbiicher. 
305 These famous words are 'often condemned. But moral indignation does not alter the facts of 
the history of civilizations' (Megay 1958:31 Of). Treitschke's words were (as so often) 
particularly catchy, but the idea was anything but new. Turgot for example also recognized that 
'inequality is necessary to the development of division of labor and commerce, and therefore to 
all the social benefits which modem Europe enjoyed through them' (ComnineI1987:69). 
Treitschke repeated a point that classical political economy had not have hesitations to make at a 
point in time when mass literacy made it advisable for bourgeois theorists to formulate more 
carefully. 
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Cultural 'Gleichmacherei' seemed to Treitschke particularly dangerous since 
universal suffrage opened the perspective of 'democracy' which spelt the 
'political de-moralization of the masses (politische Entsittlichung des Haufens),. 
Treitschke emphasised - against what he saw as the Kathedersozialisten's 
naivety - the danger that too much reform would dissolve bourgeois society into 
anarchy (i.e not-society, a not-human state of things). 
Treitschke was clearly aware of the difficulty of navigating liberal society 
between the Scylla of 'too little reform' and the Charybdis of 'too much reform'. 
He based his hopes on achieving this tightrope act on the particular nature of the 
German bourgeoisie, which he contrasted favourably to its French counterpart: 
while the latter is egotistic and greedy by nature, the German bourgeoisie has 
only occasionally succumbed to the 'temptations of an epoch of feverish 
speculation' (ibid.:283) - and even these rare cases cannot be blamed on the 
properly German bourgeoisie: 
Many new fortunes have been made, amassed by dirty hands using 
immoral means, and in some parts of the press the greed of these circles 
shows itself in its ugly triviality as the Shylock-character of the worse 
elements of our Jewry (ibid.). 
Because the German bourgeoisie is less capitalist-minded than the French 
bourgeoisie, there is hope that the former will be able to maintain bourgeois 
society with only a modest amount of reform - under the condition, however, 
that the Jews whose negative influence aggravates the social problem are being 
kept in check. This is how Treitschke's understanding of the precarious and 
contradictory nature of bourgeois capitalist society provides the framework that 
gives urgency to 'the Jewish question'. 
1.4.2 Staat, Freiheit, Sittlichkeit 
Treitschke advocated 'the liberty of man within the liberal state (die Freiheit 
des Menschen im freien Staate), (Langer 1998:183). 'Man' can act as a man only 
as a citizen, i.e. in the framework of the state. Decisive is not the morality of the 
individual (Moralitat) but the morality as mediated by the state (Sittlichkeit, the 
synthesis of subjective and objective morality) (Megay 1958:305). Full 
development of human personality is only possible in the state - following Hegel 
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- not against the state (as Treitschke felt that 'deformed' liberalism a la 
Humboldt and Mill suggested). 
The ways Treitschke conceived of the relation between state, nation, society 
and individual are less than coherent. His reasoning can best be described as a 
de-dialecticized reading of the Hegelian conception306 in which each single 
element stands next to all the others in its own right rather unmediated. 
Treitschke rejects the utilitarian concept of the state as a mere means for 
achieving the interests of individuals. He holds that the totality of society 
(,Gesammtdasein') is of higher value than the 'free movement' of the individuals 
(ibid.:I06). 307 However, he also argues for the 'mutuality of rights and duties' 
between citizens and the state whereby both the state and the citizens carry rights 
and duties. The state 'is its own purpose (sich selbst Zweck) like everything 
306 Treitschke saw the state simultaneously as the political form of the 'Yolk' (people/nation) and 
as the unified and structured bourgeois/civil (biirgerliche) society (the sphere of particular and 
conflicting interests). Treitschke vaguely reflected the mutual dependence of nation, state and 
society and held that the state's interventions into nation and society needed to be limited. 
Relying on Hegel's account, the forming of civil society is impossible unless straight away 
organized in the form of the state, which is defined as 'the people united under law', or else as 
'civil society homogeneously organized' (Megay 1958:308f). Civil society abstracted from the 
state is for Treitschke just that: an abstraction. However, Treitschke falls back behind Hegel when 
he employs a vulgar nominalism to civil society, and fetishizes, or reifies, the state. A crucial 
difference between Hegel's conception and the version presented by Treitschke is the latter's 
failure to think the concept of state and civil society dialectically. Treitschke on the one hand (in 
keeping with the teachings of the historical school oflaw and economics) 'explained political and 
legal institutions as a reflection of the power relations existing among the more important societal 
forces', but on the other hand introduced 'the state (the actualization of universality and concrete 
morality) from the outside as an agent with inherent power to bring order and justice into the 
chaos of civil society'. Treitschke 'was never able to eliminate this dichotomy between society 
and state' which 'also mars his view of man as an individual person and as a citizen' (ibid.:309). 
Megay holds that for Hegel, 'the essence of the modem state' was that 'the universal is united 
with the full freedom of particularity ... which must retain its right'. While the strength of the 
dialectical conception of state, civil society and individual would lie in its keeping open the 
tension - the 'force field' - between its contradicting terms, Treitschke maintained 'an uneasy 
symbiosis of the essentially antithetical concepts' (ibid.:31 0). 
Iggers adds that Treitschke's notion of the state as an 'ethical force that draws together the 
nation on a higher level' only superficially resembles Hegel's conception because it lacks the 
essential idea that the state 'in its development as well as structure is reasonable' (Iggers 
1971 :67). The idea that the state is an 'ethical personality' is for Treitschke just another way of 
saying that it is not subject to universal norms and values. Iggers emphasizes that this concept 
only appears idealist, while actually it is a form of positivism, irrationalism and value-relativism 
(ibid.:78). 
307 This quote is from 'Liberty (Die Freiheit)' (1861) which is partly a review of John Stuart 
Mill's 'On Liberty' (1859). Treitschke rejects Mill's utilitarianism but acknowledges Mill's 
indebtedness to German idealism and presents large parts of Mill's argument as support for his 
own. Langer writes that in the revised version of the text from 1864, the emphasis shifted more 
towards the state. In the first version Treitschke had written (in a Kantian vein) that 'the citizen 
must never be used by the state as a mere means to an end' and 'the personal well-being of the 
citizen is the touchstone for the dignity of the state', while both statements were not contained in 
the second version (ibid.). 
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living'; the state 'leads an actual life just like each citizen does' (quoted ibid.).308 
On another occasion, Treitschke rejected what he saw as Hegel's deification of 
the state and defended (as he believed, against Hegel) the independent force of 
conscience of the individual (introduced by Christianity into world history).309 In 
the context of the KulturkampfTreitschke wrote that the state was also 'a cultural 
force (Cultunnacht) which we expect to make constructive contributions to all 
spheres of national life' (ibid.:257). He maintained - against the US-American 
model in which churches are private associations totally separate from the state -
that churches should be publicly supported and, by the same token, publicly 
controlled. He also argued that the state as the creator of order is necessary for 
bridging the particular interests of the groups that make up society (ibid.:155).31o 
Treitschke argued that 'the ultimate legal basis of the state' is the 'ethical 
consciousness of the nation (sittliche Bewusstsein des Volkes), (ibid.:179), and 
that 'the state is not the enemy of the citizen' (ibid.: 107). At the same time, he 
feared egalitarianism and' dictatorship of mediocrity' and applauded Mill's 
demand the individual need be protected against 'the tyranny of the prevailing 
opinion and feeling' (Mill 1976:68).311 'The love of the Gennan for individual 
freedom' combined with a strong sense of toleration were for Treitschke the 
specific features that characterised the emerging German nation state (Langer 
1998: 181). One of its supreme tasks ought to be to fight off the threat by unifonn 
mass civilisation. 
30H The last quote is from the revised version of 1864. 
309 This is from a chapter on Hegel in the third volume of 'German History' (1885). Treitschke 
also wrote that Hegelianism presaged an intellectual iconoclasm and lack of modesty that he 
otherwise characterized as Jewish and French. 
310 This quote is from his 'Social Science, A critical essay' (Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft. Ein 
kritischer Versuch) of 1858. 
311 Treitschke accepted Mill's statement that 'mankind' is only 'warranted ... in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number' for the sole purpose of 'self-protection' (Mill 
I 976:72f) but found it too unspecific because Mill failed to provide the criteria by which to judge 
when a case for self-protection could be made. He concluded that 'there is no absolute limit to 
state power' but there are only relative, i.e. historically specific limits. The limit of state power 
was the acceptance on the side of the citizens that they felt their own agency to be respected by 
the state's and that they were not being used in a merely instrumental way. 
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1.4.3 National unification and liberal constitution 
For Treitschke, liberty remains a mere phrase 'as long as no nation exists', 
because the nation 'is the only basis of any development of the state', and liberty 
is possible only in the state (quoted from a text of 1854, in Krieger 1957:366).312 
Whichever path leads fastest to nation-building and state-formation is the best, 
'even despotism', because 'once national unity is achieved, any unnatural 
constitutional form will not last' (quoted from a letter from Treitschke's student 
days; Langer 1998:78). National unity automatically leads to (constitutional) 
freedom, while (constitutional) freedom not based on national unity is mere 
illusion. 
Treitschke embraced a pro-Prussian attitude because Prussia had 
(comparatively speaking) most liberties amongst all German states. He held that 
all other principalities 'can be called states only in a daringly metaphorical way 
of speaking' (quoted ibid.:84). Prussia - since the reform period - qualifies as an 
'ethical' state in the Hegelian sense.313 In a letter written in 1860, Treitschke 
outlined his view of what had to be done: 
... driving out the dynasties, annexation by Prussia ... Who believes this 
could be done peacefully? But is not German unification under Emperor 
Wilhelm I an idea worth a few hundred thousand lives? (ibid.:85). 314 
Treitschke had no sympathies for defenders of the dynastic rights of the princely 
rulers of any semi-feudal, absolutist realm such as Schleswig-Holstein. If the 
power that had constituted those rights in the first place had ceised to exist, or 
stood in the way of progress, those rights were void. Treitschke rejected scruples 
in destroying the old principalities because 'the ball is rolling, not even a God 
could stop its course now'. The 'train of history (Zug der Geschichte), 
necessitated the 'unification oflarge national masses' which Treitschke expected 
312 In a lecture on Fichte given in 1862 (published in 'Die Grenzboten'), Treitschke quotes 
approvingly Fichte's statement that 'in Germany there will arise a true Empire of Right (Reich 
des Rechts) and of personal freedom, based on the equality of all human beings' (Langer 1998:91 
313 Treitschke came from a patriotic Saxonian (and rather anti-Prussian) family, i.e. he acted not 
out of a received Prussian patriotism or chauvinism. 
314 National Liberals tended to be rather casual in relation to war (different for example from 
Kant). Treitschke applauded Fichte's and Hegel's understanding of the necessity and benefits of 
war: 'The concept of war is inherent in the concept of the state, because the essence of the state is 
power (Mit dem Begriffe des Staats ist der Begriff des Krieges schon gegeben, denn das Wesen 
des Staats liegt in der Macht) ... without weapons against those who disturb the inner order and 
against the foreign enemy no state can exist' (ibid.: 139). 
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would also replace provincial narrow-mindedness with the 'moral improvement' 
(ibid.: 123) that characterizes the citizens oflarge nation states. After the Prussian 
victory over Austria in July 1866, Treitschke commented that the smaller states 
were now 'more than ripe for the deserved destruction' (ibid.: 122). Now was the 
time to attach 'the soft mass of statelets (die weiche Masse der Kleinstaaten), to 
Prussia 'in its rough greatness, its strength and brusqueness as a hard core (mit 
all' seiner rauhen Grosse, seiner Harte und Schroffheit als einen festen Kern)' 
(ibid.: 120).315 
Only the nation state can guarantee true civilization and world peace 
(ibid.: 125), and political liberalism needed to 'have the courage' to support 
Prussia in destroying the widely hated Kleinstaaterei (ibid.: 124). Since at the 
same time, unification had to be achieved at the exclusion of what liberalism had 
always considered its main enemy, Habsburg Austria, it had to be carried out by 
a lesser enemy of liberalism - the Prussian state.316 
Treitschke welcomed that the liberal movement had managed after 1848 to 
free itself from its 'naIve' trust on the reformability of absolutism. Gotha 
liberalism (that had successfully integrated some democrats) differed clearly 
from the cautious and moderate old-fashioned Beamtenliberalismus. 317 
Nevertheless, Treitschke opposed the careful reformism of German 
monarchical thinking to Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty which in his 
315 This rhetoric anticipates the type of 'male fantasies' that Theweleit (1987, 1989) describes. 
316 From a liberal position, seeing the evolution of nation-states as an element of liberal progress, 
there is indeed no good reason to shed any tears about the destruction of Saxonian or Hanoverian 
princely semi-feudalism; Langer calls Treitschke's attitude correctly 'idealistic realism' (ibid.). 
When some critics of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein argued it should be up to the 
population whether they wanted to be a Prussian province, Treitschke stated that the right to self-
determination should not be over-emphasized: asking the population for its opinion leads to 
'anarchy', and liberals who abhor universal suffrage as an 'instrument of Caesar ism' (ibid.:112) 
should not at the same time call for referendums. 
The National-Liberal pattern of thought is strikingly contemporary: we don't like war, and 
we don't even doubt that the motives of the states that are starting it (against existing inter-state 
law) are egotistic and narrow self-interest, but we still support it because we - due to our superior 
insight - understand that the weltgeist (liberal progress) merely uses the egotism of the 
warmongers for the higher purpose of advancing liberal democracy (in the same way that it uses 
the egotism of the baker to provide society with the finest quality bread). Therefore we have to 
allow the superpower of the day to destroy all those petty evil dictators (formerly known as 
dynastic absolutist semi-feudal princes) in the name oflong-term progress. Once sweet (free 
market) commerce is restored to its naturally rightful might (by any means necessary, even if they 
look ugly) the political small print (national self-determination, democracy, human rights) will 
follow inevitably and of their own accord. 
317 Occasionally Treitschke would - at that time - criticise more cautious fellow liberals (such as 
Haym, then editor of the Preussische lahrbiicher) for not opposing a censorship law such as the 
one imposed by the Prussian King in 1863 (ibid.:98). 
121 
view led necessarily to anarchy and despotism (ibid.: 136).318 One element of 
'Altliberalismus' that Treitschke never abandoned was the rejection of universal 
suffrage and the view of the Beamtentum as the truly 'governing (regierende) 
class' (Langer:338). National monarchy was necessary to counterbalance the 
tendency of parliamentarians to represent the interests of the propertied classes 
(ibid.: 140), as well as preventing a tyranny of the majority and the possibility of 
'socialisme autoritaire' (ibid.: 141). 
Like the majority of liberals319 - and, in the course of the war of 1870171, the 
general public320 - Treitschke advocated (already before the war) the annexation 
of Alsace-Lorraine (ibid.: 146). Treitschke wrote in 1870 that the Alsatians could 
not possibly know 'what is good for them' because they had to live under 
despotic French cultural influence; the German state should 'return to them their 
own self against their own will' (ibid.: 147). Their German features would soon 
be re-animated by 'nature itself, the voice of the blood'. He did not fail to 
mention, however, also the economic benefits of annexation (ibid.: 148). 
When Treitschke left the National-Liberal party (July 1879), he argued that 
the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative' had lost their meaning. They were indeed 
318 Treitschke argued that English parliamentarian ism was viable only thanks to the existence of a 
strong, talented and self-governed aristocracy that enjoyed popular trust. It did not provide a 
'model' that could be transferred to other countries with different social and historical conditions: 
'Because our society is more democratic that English society, our government needs to be truly 
monarchic'. Treitschke rejected those elements of the liberal tradition that he understands to be 
French (representative democracy and centralized state government) and admired English 
'aristocratic' institutions of 'self-government' (lggers 1971 :69). Treitschke argued that 
Germany's ruling class was not the aristocracy but the Beamtentum. Nevertheless, Treitschke 
holds that the English and the Germans share the concept of liberty as 'the unlimited right of the 
personality' (Mill according to Treitschke) that differed from the French (democratic) idea of 
liberty. 
Treitschke considered natural-law liberalism (as prevalent in the south German states) to be 
an effect of the 'French deformation of liberalism' and 'the smug old Enlightenment' that filtered 
across the border into Germany (Langer 1998:369) and was popularized by 'international Jewry'. 
England provided hypocrisy and trade-mindedness and is labelled by Treitschke (in the fifth 
volume of 'German History' [1894]) the 'new Carthage' (ibid.:3 71). For the anti-Semitic 
overtones of this notion cpo Bernal (1991 :341f): Phoenician is a Semitic language. An affinity 
between Carthage and England was seen by many in the 19th century on both sides of the 
Channel. 'Many Victorians had a positive feeling towards the Phoenicians as sober cloth 
merchants who did a little bit of slaving on the side and spread civilization while making a tidy 
profit' (ibid.:350). 
Treitschke had adopted methodical 'realism' (Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann) that claimed 
the principles of politics be deduced from an historical account of the political and social 
circumstances of any given country already in the first half of the 1850s (Langer 1998:71). 
319 Ludwig Bamberger was also a supporter, for example, while Bismarck seems to have been 
rather reserved about the idea. 
320 Respect for the 'popular sovereignty' of the Alsatians had not even in the democratic press 
been unanimously demanded. 
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becoming increasingly blurred in the course of the 1880s (Dorpalen 1957 :251). 
Supra-party organizations such as students associations or pressure groups 
realized precisely the kind of conservative-liberal rapprochement ('on the model 
of the Victorian Compromise') that Treitschke began to advocate for party 
politics. Furthermore, there was 'the solid foundation of parallel economic 
interests' of agrarians and industrialists. Treitschke sensed correctly the winds of 
change. By any means, the remaining forces of classical liberalism were wiped 
out of German politics not by anti-Semitism or cultural illiberalism but because 
the liberals' opposition to Bismarck's social security scheme and their 
'identification with the free-trading interests of the numerically small 
commercial and handicraft groups' left them without a chance in parliamentary 
politics (ibid.). As Treitschke formulated, 'the living forces of history had passed 
them by' (ibid.). The widely held notion that Treitschke first was, and then from 
some point (e.g. 1866) stopped being a liberal has to be treated with caution. In 
many respects there has not been a significant break in Treitschke' s intellectual 
development, although a radicalisation of Treitschke's nationalism and an 
increase in straightforwardly racial motives can be discerned (Langer 1998:377). 
Langer concludes that Treitschke was probably a 'typical German liberal of the 
1860s', while the Treitschke of the 1870s was less clearly middle of the road but 
neither a complete outsider (380; 382; 384). Hans Herzfeld (1923) - drawing on 
Friedrich Meinecke (1922) - saw Treitschke as a representative of 'classic 
liberalism' aiming at 'a synthesis of previous German idealism and historical-
political experience' (quoted in Langer 1998:5). Herzfeld characterised 
Treitschke after his tum towards admiring Bismarck as a 'liberal Tory'. The anti-
democratic features of Treitschke' s individualism are rooted in his conscious 
opposition to what he saw (and abhorred) as the 'atomism' inherent in natural-
law liberalism. Ruggiero concludes in a similar vein: 
Treitschke's political conception ... represents a form of Liberalism 
doubtless in many respects at variance with Western Liberalism, but at 
bottom inspired by the same motives, and equally tending to find in the 
autonomous personality the source of a rich and varied political life 
(Ruggiero 1981:264).321 
321 For brief characterizations of the other contributors to the Streit see Appendix 4.2. 
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2. The 'Berliner Antisernitisrnusstreit' 
2.1 Outline of Treitschke's first article 
The starting point of the Streit was the concluding section of a review of 
current political affairs in the Preussische JahrbiJcher (November 1879) which 
Treitschke edited. This text - actually quite short and rather casually formulated 
- set the topics that would subsequently be unfolded into the much more detailed 
and sophisticated arguments that constitute the Streit. 322 
The succession of arguments in Treitschke's first contribution (Treitschke 
1896a) is as follows: 
1. Treitschke observes the current anti-liberal mood of the public - described as 
frightening - and argues that the noisy phenomena on the surface have to be 
explained in terms of what goes on 'in the depths' of 'the nation's life'. 
Treitschke claims that the liberal press is out of touch with society. The 
current social process is in its essence an adverse reflection on 'humanity and 
Enlightenment', implying a return from skepticism to 'moral groundedness' 
and 'religious earnestness'. Treitschke welcomes this trend but also stresses 
that religion ought not to interfere with 'the positive right of the secular 
state'. The awakening of the national consciousness is directed against 
'effeminate philanthropy' and aims at restoring the 'majesty of the law' as 
well as its execution (Treitschke 1896a: 19-21). 
2. The new anti-Jewish movement is appreciated as one of the 'symptoms' of 
this overall, anti-liberal current. It represents an ugly but welcome liberation 
from the liberal anti-anti-Judaism of the preceding decade; it is seen as 
coming from 'the people' and being directed against the 'authoritative' 
discourse of the liberal-intellectual-J ewish establishment. The Jews, the press 
and, more generally, liberalism are to be blamed for having caused the 
popular irritation, which it is implied could dangerously get out of hand. 
While earlier forms of' Jew-baiting' had been 'hollow and irrational', 
however, at the bottom of the current 'noisy activity' lies 'long suppressed 
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anger' that is genuine and legitimate. It reflects the emergence of 'a German 
Jewish question' ('eine deutsche Judenfrage') (ibid.:21t). 
3. Treitschke argues that the German situation is essentially different from that 
in 'Western' countries such as England and France. At this step of the 
argument, Treitschke names mass immigration of Polish Jews as the decisive 
difference. While the 'Spanish Jews' who carne to the Western countries 
tended to assimilate easier, the 'Polish Jews' who are immigrating into 
Germany are unable to assimilate (ibid.:22t). 
4. Treitschke's central demand in this text is for assimilation: the Jews shall 
'become Germans' which means in the first instance to 'regard themselves' 
as Germans, irrespective of their religion. However, he makes this demand on 
the grounds that 'Germanic civilization' must remain unmixed. The conflict 
between the concern for an 'unspoiled' Germanic civilization and the demand 
for political assimilation irrespective of religion remains umesolved 
throughout the text, although the concept of a 'German spirit' that the Jews 
are asked to adopt seems to be an attempt to bridge the self-contradictory 
conception. Treitschke expresses doubts about whether many Jews actually 
want to become Germans. Treitschke reverses the Enlightenment expectation 
that legal emancipation will inevitably lead to assimilation and suggests that 
'Jewish arrogance' is a recent i.e. post-emancipation phenomenon. As 
evidence he points to Jewish academic and business involvement which he 
argues is changing the traditional character of German economy and also of 
'German spirit'. He develops at length the theme of' Jewish domination of 
the press'. He accuses Borne in particular of mocking Germany 'as if he was 
not a member ofthe nation - implying that he actually is and ought to act 
accordingly. This seems to reflect Treitschke's overriding concern with every 
citizen's unequivocal identification with nation and state. He then goes on to 
characterize the German nation as a Christian nation, leaving unclear how or 
to what extent the Jewish citizens ought to identify themselves with the 
Christian German nation (ibid.:23-26). 
5. Treitschke urges the reader to take seriously the anti-Jewish movement and 
warns against underestimating it as a transitory mood of the mob and a few 
322 For the contents of the whole article 'Our prospects', see chapter 2.2.5.1. For a complete 
translation of the section presented here see appendix, 4.1. 
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fanatics. He emphasizes that some of the 'best educated' men share the anti-
Jewish feeling, suggesting only indirectly that this may include himself. He 
points out that the current anti-Jewish movement is grounded neither in mere 
'Christian fanaticism' nor in 'national arrogance' (ibid.:26f). 
6. In the concluding paragraphs Treitschke rejects the idea of revoking legal 
emancipation which he argues would mean a betrayal of the 'fine traditions' 
of the (liberal, secular) state. However, he argues that the weakness of the 
German nation (as compared to France and England) necessitates a 
specifically German unequivocal stance on the Jews. Pointing to France and 
England as examples, he suggests that stronger German national 
consciousness will create a context in which Jews will be 'harmless' or 'even 
beneficial'. The main thrust of his argument includes two demands: the 
Germans shall become more conscious and proud of their nationality, and the 
Jews shall become more German. To the extent that assimilation can never be 
complete, Treitschke argues that the minority should accept the dominating 
role of the majority without criticism of or intervention in 'their' business and 
show 'tact' and 'tolerance' (ibid.:27f). 
The impression of a first reading of the text is that of a basically liberal 
argument shot through with anti-liberal undercurrents. However, this is a 
notoriously difficult and evasive document. The illiberal and even 'racist' 
elements in a text that seems predominantly a call to accelerated assimilation 
begs explanation. In the following chapters the unfolding of the debate along its 
thematic strands aims to bring out the contradictions both within Treitschke's 
'illiberal' liberalism and what others have responded to it, as well as how both 
relate to each other. This process of working through the text material will lead 
to a set of questions about the nature of the relation of liberal state, bourgeois 
society and anti-Semitism, and processes of exclusion and domination more 
generally. These will be discussed in Part Three. 
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2.2 A structured presentation of the main strands of the 
argument 
2.2.1 Origin, extent and meaning of the current anti-Jewish campaign 
2.2.1.1 TREITSCHKE'S REFORMULATION OF JEW-HATRED 
Two thirds of Treitschke's article 'Our prospects' are a comment on foreign 
affairs (see 2.2.5.1) which ends with Treitschke's thoughts on the relationship 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Treitschke asserts his kleindeutsche 
position that the integrative and internationally stabilizing function of the 'Dual 
Monarchy' is more in the interest of the German Reich than the grossdeutsche 
perspective (that would include a policy of destabilizing Austria-Hungary and 
aiming to annexe its German speaking parts). Treitschke argues that the prospect 
of Austrian-Hungarian disintegration is threatening and creates a general 'feeling 
of insecurity' (Treitschke 1896a: 18). This diagnosis of the international context 
leads Treitschke to his discourse on domestic affairs, starting with an analysis of 
the recent elections to the Prussian Diet: 
In such a situation we need most of all strong government, loyal harmony 
(treue Eintracht) between crown and people. The Prussian electorate has 
understood this necessity. We want peace with the government - this was 
the message ofthe recent polls. The ranks of the conservative parties in the 
[Pruss ian] diet have been reinforced not by artificial pressure from above 
but through the voters' free will. The conservative current in the people is 
even stronger than the election results make it appear to be: some liberal 
deputies had their mandate confirmed only due to personal respect or old 
habit or as well because of the difficulties that a new party or grouping 
faces in the constituency. The nation is disgusted and fed up with the 
quarrelling of her parliaments; even the majority of the opponents of the 
new economic policy seem determined to wait for the effects of the 
reforms and to judge the facts. The Fortschrittspartei finds itself limited to 
some big cities and a few dispersed boroughs. The voters have mercilessly 
cleared out (raumten auf) the National-Liberal faction .... The people does 
not want anymore to be spoon-fed by coteries (das Yolk will sich nicht 
mehr von Coterien gangeln lassen) (ibid.: 18f). 
Treitschke concludes that the Prussian elections have 'strengthened the central 
power (Reichsgewalt), over against the particular states. Treitschke's argument is 
that because of the looming insecurities of the international context, the German 
state needs unity and a powerful, centralised government, and for this purpose it 
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is necessary to end the 'quarrelling' in the parliaments caused by the dated 
doctrines of 'old school' liberals and radical progressives. Because 'the people' 
seem to understand this necessity, the formula for the future lies in a 'loyal 
harmony' between 'crown and people' . 
Here follow the notorious nine pages that begin with 'meanwhile 
(unterdessen),. Treitschke draws a general picture of the mood prevalent in 
Germany at the time - apparently he had just returned from a six week long trip 
to Italy:323 
Meanwhile a miraculous and powerful excitement labors in the depths of 
our national life. It is as if the nation reflected on itself, as if it judged itself 
harshly (Treitschke 1896:19).324 
The returning Treitschke 'is almost frightened' by the 'awakening of the national 
conscience' (Erwachen des Volksgewissens), manifested in a thousand voices 
'that defend or indict each other' (die sich unter einander entschuldigen oder 
verklagen). Treitschke attributes to this process additional importance and 
authenticity by claiming that this happens 'almost entirely independently from 
the press'. He suggests that 'the press' is, as in the 1860s, 'still' dominated by 
'liberal wish lists' and the 'na'ive belief in the unfailing moral force of 
"education" ("Bildung")'. Different from 'the majority of the German press', 
'public opinion' manifests an anti-liberal popular mood coming from 'the depths 
of our folk-life'. 
Economic hardship, the recollection of so many disappointed hopes and of 
the sins of the 'Griinderzeiten', the sight of the increasing degeneration 
(Verwilderung) of the masses, which keeps pace with the spreading of the 
secret arts of reading and writing, and last but not least, the recollection of 
those days of horror in spring 1878325 - all this forced thousands to reflect 
on the value of our humanity and Enlightenment. Thousands feel that due 
323 There he had found confirmed his view of the 'deep necessity of Christianity', and had also 
been able to make anthropological observations such as that Romance and Slavonic people do not 
have hip bones 'which remain the privilege of the Germanic peoples' (Boehlich 1965b:240, 
quoting a letter Treitschke's to his wife). Having spent 'the last couple of months abroad' 
Treitschke implicitly claims to be in a position to observe 'the stormy German world' more 
objectively. Treitschke reinforces the authority-enhancing effect by referring to himself in the 
third person: ' ... he who, like the writer of these lines, has spent the last couple of months abroad 
and now suddenly .... '. 
324 'Unterdessen arbeitet in den Tiefen unseres Volkslebens eine wunderbare, machtige Erregung. 
Es ist als ob die Nation sich auf sich seIber besanne, unbarmherzig mit sich in's Gericht ginge.' 
325 Treitschke alludes here to the attempts on the life of the Kaiser. 
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to educational conceit we risk forgetting completely the moral ground of 
human life326 (ibid.:20). 
After the attacks on liberalism and 'the press' Treitschke evokes a popular 
sentiment against 'Bildung', slandered as 'Bildungsdiinkel' (educational conceit) 
that is bound to give up on Enlightenment and 'humanity' and returns to 
questions of 'moral ground (sittlichen Halt)' - implying that Enlightenment and 
talk about 'humanity' do not provide, but rather erode 'sittlichen Halt'. 
Treitschke argues not against 'Bildung' as such but against the generalization of 
'Bildung' which he links to social 'degeneration'. 
Treitschke paints a picture of a society divided in two groups: one group of 
those who 'fall for arid scepticism' (verfallen einem wUsten Unglauben), 
opposed to another group in whom 'religious earnestness, the ecclesiastical sense 
(der kirchliche Sinn)' have' gained strength again'. This generic suggestion leads 
Treitschke to comment on a specific event, the Protestant General Synod. He 
introduces on this occasion his thoughts on a theme that will remain central to his 
argument: the interrelation of religion and the state. Treitschke gives an 
ambivalent assessment of the synod. He applauds the way it has shown 'even to 
the opponents' 'that this church still lives, that it is still an effective force 
(wirksame Macht), firmly rooted in the people (Volk), full of moral gravity 
(sittliche Ernst) and not at all lacking in spiritual powers (geistigen Kdiften),. On 
the other hand, he criticizes 'some unpleasant resolutions' including the 
'hopefully unfeasible attempt to subject the theological faculties [of the 
universities] to ecclesiastical rule (kirchliche Parteiherrschaft)'. These resolutions 
were accompanied by 'some ugly zealous words' and betrayed 'the old 
theologians' sin, the indifference towards the positive right of the secular state' 
(das positive Recht des weltlichen Staates). Two of Treitschke's key concepts, 
the 'positive right of the state' and the 'moral gravity' of (Protestant) religiosity, 
are introduced standing in a relation of tension to each other. It is significant that 
in the introduction of that section of the text that is mainly about the position of 
Jewry in the national state and society, Treitschke reflects on the relationship 
between the secular state and the (Protestant) church. The state depends on the 
church to provide vital ethical underpinnings that complement the secular state, 
326 ' .•. ueber unserem Bildungsduenkel den sittlichen Halt des Menschenlebens ganz zu 
vergessen' . 
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while the state also finds its authority challenged in the field of education - a 
field that is crucial to the process of nation-building. Treitschke applauds the 
'religious gravity' of the Protestant synod, but rejects its challenge to the 
authority of the state. 
Treitschke then returns to his observations on the popular mood that were the 
starting point of the essay, paraphrased here as 'the awakened conscience of the 
people' (das erwachte Gewissen des Volkes) that is directed 'mainly against the 
effeminate philanthropy (weichliche Philanthropie) of our age', a remark that 
takes up again his attacks on liberalism and humanism. This is followed by the 
discussion of the recent publication of Otto Mittelstaedt's text 'Against prison 
sentences' (1879),327 which Treitschke describes as 'a powerful protest against 
that pampering and mollycoddling (Verhatschelung and Verzartelung) of 
criminals which has overcrowded our prisons and has become a cruel insult 
(Grausamkeit) to the decent people (rechtschaffene Leute), (ibid.:20f). 
Treitschke asserts that 'this strictly objective publication' has been answered by 
'incensed meetings and harsh resolutions of contempt from the radical parties' 
because 
the heroes of the philanthropic phrase silently feel that the brave author-
although his particular statements can often be criticized - essentially 
pronounces only what hundreds of thousands are thinking .... The whole 
spirit of the age urges that the most severe majesty of right be fully restored 
in our laws and their execution.328 
Treitschke does not give any evidence for his claim that Mittelstaedt's anti-
liberalism reflects a popular, anti-liberal mood. 
327 Mittelstaedt rejects in his pamphlet 'Gegen die Freiheitsstrafen. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des 
heutigen Strafensystems, Pro Li bertate! ' (apparently based on his practical experience as a judge 
in Hamburg) the ideas that underlie 19th century reforms of the justice system. He asserts that 
punishment ought not to be misrepresented as an educational act that is aimed to better the 
delinquent. In the absence of general religious consciousness (which he does not deplore) only 
strict assertion of an ethical 'categorical imperative' (Mittelstaedt 1879:26;29) can warrant social 
order: punishment ought to be understood as 'Straftibel' that creates justice, deters and neutralizes 
(Unschiidlichmachung), not as 'forced education (Zwangserziehung), (ibid.:27 ;71). The justice 
system 'cannot and ought not to be educational' (ibid.:61). He rejects the idea that forced labour 
in prison was 'educational' as a liberal delusion and asserts that it is merely meant to intensify the 
punishment (ibid.:39). He also argues the state should not exclude the use of death penalty 
(ibid.:75), deportation (ibid.:77) and corporeal punishment (ibid.:81). He argues that prison 
confinement is also an infliction of corporeal suffering that can be worse than corporeal 
punishment which to deny he denounces as liberal bigotry (ibid.). 
328 'Der ganze Zug der Zeit drangt dahin, dass die unerbittlich strenge Majestat des Rechts in 
unseren Gesetzen wie in ihrer Handhabung wieder zur vollen Anerkennung gelangen muss.' 
Treitschke had already in 1870 argued for death penalty (Langer 1998:144). 
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Treitschke's concerns with the resurgence of religious sentiment and with 
law and its enforcement provide the context for the discussion of anti-Semitism, 
which is referred to for the first time in the following paragraph: 
Among the symptoms of the deep change of mood that goes through our 
people (Volk) none appears as disconcerting (befremdend) as the 
passionate movement against Jewry (gegen das Judentum)329 (ibid.:21). 
The anti-Semitic movement is introduced by Treitschke as only one out of a 
number of 'symptoms', which relativizes its importance, but amongst this 
number it is introduced as the most 'disconcerting' one. The cautiously critical 
tone of this formulation is overruled, however, by the subsequent sentence, 
which contrasts anti-Semitic agitation with what Treitschke alleges the situation 
previously had been like: 
Until a few months ago, the authoritative 'inverted Rep-Rep-call' was still 
dominant in Germany. 
'Rep-Rep' is the notorious derogatory rallying cry against Jews especially 
associated with the anti-Jewish events of 1819. In the 1870s and 1880s it was 
quite common to liken any anti-Jewish tendencies to revivals of the earlier 'Rep-
Rep'-riots. Treitschke reverses this common (liberal) topos and uses the tabooed 
term to stigmatize the (liberal) critique of anti-Semitism. By qualifying the 
liberal discourse as 'authoritative' (berufene) he reinforces his point that the 
change of mood in the 'Volk' represents an anti-authoritative, authentically 
popular movement. Treitschke's attack on the liberal discourse delegitimates in 
advance liberal reproaches and allows Treitschke to express sympathies for the 
current 'movement' without appearing to be continuing the 'medieval barbarism' 
of Jew-baiting.33o 
Treitschke describes the established liberal discourse as follows: 
About the national wrongs of the Germans, the French and all other 
nations, everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody 
dared to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness 
329 German words ending on -tum (or -thum) are ambivalent as to whether they refer to an 
abstract, spiritual or a concrete object: 'Judentum' can be 'the Jews' just as weB as 'Judaism' or 
even a 'Jewish principle' of whatever sort. Anti-Jewish rhetoric seems to play on this semantic 
ambiguity. (Holz [2001: 177-180] states that' Judenthum' only refers to an abstraction as opposed 
to 'the Jews'. Judging from Treitschke's use of the terminology, I do not find this convincing.) 
330 This point has been made by Hoffmann (1997:227) and Holz (2001: 185). 
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of the Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and 
religious persecutor by nearly all newspapers. 
Treitschke invokes here an anonymous (German) collective of independent 
minds who wish to debate the weaknesses of all peoples, including their own and 
that of the Jews, but are kept in check by 'the press',33l which allegedly 
suppressed any criticism of the Jews. 
In the remainder of the same paragraph Treitschke enumerates recent events 
that outline the current anti-Semitic movement: 
Today we have already come to the point where the majority of Breslau 
voters - apparently not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation -
conspired not to elect a Jew to the Diet under any circumstances. Anti-
Semitic societies are formed, the 'Jewish question' is discussed in noisy 
meetings, a flood of anti-Semitic pamphlets inundates the market 
(ibid. :22). 
Treitschke reverts to the tone he already adopted earlier. 'We have come to the 
point' seems to suggest that a basically legitimate reactive development is 
tending to go too far. Voters 'conspire', meetings are 'noisy', 'floods' of 
pamphlets 'inundate' the market. Treitschke uses negative terminology to 
express some distance from the events. At the same time, though, he stresses that 
the voters at least (perhaps in contrast to the 'passionate' movement) acted 'not 
in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation'. Taking into account that his main 
concern is with the 'positivity' of state and law (as expressed earlier), 
Treitschke's ambivalence about the processes seems to be more than just tactical: 
he perceives and articulates the risks for the 'positivity' of the authoritative state 
that lie in popular movements and the 'noise' and the 'floods' they cause. 
However, he implies that liberalism and the Jews are to blame for the fact that 
'we have come to this point'. In tum, the social process is at least partly rational 
and legitimate. 
Treitschke further elaborates on the twofold character of anti-Semitism: 
331 The number of Jews involved in the publishing business was certainly higher than the Jewish 
share of the overall population (in Germany less than 1%), but the idea of its 'Jewish domination' 
is without grounding in reality. It might have seemed self-evident to Treitschke and his readers 
that if 'the press' - presented here as the arbiter of social discourse - defended 'the Jews' against 
anti-Semitism, this could have only been because of their statistical 'over-representation'. Anti-
Semitism could thus in tum be implied to be an act ofliberation from 'Jewish domination' - a 
perfectly circular argument. 
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There is only too much of dirt and brutality (Roheit) in these activities (in 
diesem Treiben), and it is impossible to suppress one's disgust when one 
notices that some of these incendiary pamphlets (Brandschriften) seem to 
come from Jewish pens. It is well known that since Pfefferkorn and 
Eisenmenger,332 there were always many born Jews (geborenen Juden) 
among the fanatic Jew-haters (Judenfressern). 
'Dirt and brutality', 'Treiben' and 'Brandschriften' add to the dissociating tone 
ofthe previous statement.333 However, the (unsupported) claim that 'born Jews' 
(i.e. Jews converted to Christianity) are amongst the Jew-haters suggests that the 
Jews not only contributed indirectly to Jew-hatred by giving it a cause, but that 
some are even directly involved.334 The Jews are the force behind liberalism as 
well as behind the (self-)destruction ofliberalism, or, in other words, the self-
destructive element ofliberalism is identical with its Jewish element. This 
construction allows Treitschke to separate and 'save' the non-Jewish and non-
destructive elements of liberalism from rejection. The same pattern works with 
reference to the anti-Jewish movement: the Jews are responsible for the 
movement's dangerous and destructive features, which allows Treitschke to 
salvage also this movement's true and respectable side. Furthermore, the notion 
of Jews hating (or rather: eating [Judenfresser]) Jews (inducing disgust [Ekel] in 
the observer) implies that being destructive of the group they belong to is an 
essential characteristic of the Jews. Under this perspective, the 'disgust' with this 
- as it were - 'carnivore' behaviour seems to point - in reverse - to the 
fundamental belief that decent human beings are always loyal to 'their group'. If 
a group consists of people whose main characteristic it is to be disloyal to their 
own as to any other group, this group is thus different from and inferior to all 
other groups of human beings?35 Treitschke concludes: 
But is there really nothing but mob brutality and business envy at the 
bottom of this noisy activity? Are these outbreaks of a deep, long 
332 Johannes Pfefferkorn (1469-1523) converted to Christianity and is the author ofa number of 
anti-Jewish writings. Johann Andreas Eisenmenger (1654-1704) is the author of 'Entdecktes 
Judenthum' (1700) and was wrongly assumed to have been a converted Jew (Holz 2001: 190n). 
333 Holz (200 I: 188) notes though that dirt can be wiped off and 'Roheit' (rawness) can be 
polished and civilized. 
334 Paulus Cassel interpreted this statement as proof of Treitschke's particular dislike of converted 
Jews. Cassel insinuates that the base of this dislike is envy of the person who deliberately adopts 
a particular belief, suggesting that this belief might be stronger or 'truer' than merely received 
belief (Cassel 1880: 17). Joel (1965) also rejects the allegation that many ofthe anti-Jewish 
pamphlets have been written by Jews. 
335 This point has been emphasized by Holz (200 I: 189-192). 
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-
suppressed anger really only a momentary outburst, as hollow and 
unfounded as once the Teutonic jew-baiting of 1819? No, - the instinct of 
the masses has in fact correctly recognized a grave danger, a serious sore 
spot of the new German life; it is more than an empty phrase when people 
today talk about a German Jewish question (eine deutsche Judenfrage). 
Treitschke refers again to the 'Hep-Hep' -riots of 1819, which he dismisses as 
'hollow and unfounded' and contrasts it with the recent anti-Semitic movement 
which he argues has 'correctly recognized a great danger'. Treitschke asserts the 
different character of the recent anti-Semitic movement (although it is also rooted 
in a 'deep, long suppressed anger'). While most liberal critics tended to ignore 
the historical specificity of the anti-Semitism that emerged in the late 1870s, 
dismissing it as an anachronistic reincarnation of the 'Hep-Hep' -riots, Treitschke 
grounds his sympathies for the anti-Semitic movement on the fact that it is not 
like the earlier 'hollow and irrational' riots - or at least, this is what he wants the 
reader to believe. The argument implies that the recent anti-Semitism is rational 
and well founded. 336 
Treitschke's formulations in this paragraph imply further that the specific 
(modern) character of the anti-Semitic movement in Germany is related to 
specificities of the German historical development. The 'grave danger' that has 
been recognized by the anti-Semites is, according to Treitschke, 'a serious sore 
spot of the new German life'; the problem is thus as much 'new' as it is 
specifically German. Treitschke concludes that there is a specifically German 
, Jewish question' . 
In the concluding section of his first article, Treitschke states that 
the noisy agitation of the moment appears only as a brutal and spiteful but 
natural reaction of the Germanic national feeling (des germanischen 
Volksgefiihls) against an alien element which has usurped too much space 
in our life (ibid.:26). 
Treitschke suggests that the removal of the taboo on discussing 'this evil' is in 
itself an achievement. 
336 Note that above Treitschke has already pointed out that the anti-Semitic voters in Breslau 
acted 'not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation'. Treitschke's argument seems to imply 
both the later scholarly distinction between 'modem anti-Semitism' and 'pre-modem anti-
Judaism' and an anticipation of Hitler's notion of 'anti-Semitism of reason' (a phrase used by 
Hitler in a letter to Adolf Gemlich from September 1919, quoted in Claussen 1987:190-3). 
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Let us not deceive ourselves: the movement is very deep and strong. A few 
jokes about the cheap words of wisdom from the mouths of Christian-
Socialist soap-box orators will not be sufficient to suppress it. Even in the 
best-educated circles, among men who would reject with horror any 
thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance, we hear today the 
cry, as from one mouth: the Jews are our misfortune! 
Treitschke formulates here a powerful anti-Semitic slogan,337 but he puts it into 
the mouths of an anonymous multitude that is said even to include 'educated 
men'. Apart from constituting a precaution against criticism, the image of the 
'cry, as from one mouth' is a very strong rhetorical means. 338 Treitschke invokes 
a unified voice that - even metaphorically - did not exist at the time. 
Treitschke's claim that even educated men held the anti-Semitic persuasion 
qualifies his earlier description of the anti-Semitic movement as an anti-
establishment movement: it is further evidence of the rational elements of the 
movement that it is being joined by 'educated men' as well; the rationality of 
anti-Semitism transcends class. 339 
The key to the formulation's ambivalence - starting from a perspective 
apparently critical of anti-Semitism and gradually turning to supporting it - is the 
'us' at its exhortative beginning. We, the imaginary community of reasonable 
people of all walks of life who do not like noisy people (Treitschke alludes to 
Stocker and other populist demagogues) should not 'deceive ourselves' and 
underestimate the current movement. However, the line between reevaluation 
and appreciation is thin. In pointing out the modem character of the anti-Semitic 
movement lies part of the strength of Treitschke's pamphlet. His understanding is 
here superior to that of those of his contemporaries who merely turned up their 
noses to the vulgar noises of the anti-Semites. Treitschke makes clear that anti-
Semitism grew' even in the best educated circles'. He locates the paranoid 
projection that identifies 'misfortune' straight and simple with 'the Jews' in the 
imagined common mouth of men (silently including himself) 'who would reject 
with horror any thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance'. With this 
337 Treitschke might be alluding to Luther who had referred to the Jews as a 'misfortune' in his 
'Von den Jueden' (Hilberg 1985:17). 
338 Holz argues that the word 'Unglueck' adds a fatalist element because 'against misfortune one 
is helpless' (Holz 200 1:231). 
339 Treitschke had used a similar formulation in a letter from August, 25, 1879: 'The hate against 
this alien being (Wesen) that has usurped (an sich gerissen) the domination (Vormundschaft) over 
our press and public opinion erupts from one hundred thousand Germanic hearts like a sound of 
nature (Naturlaut), (Rosenberg 1967: 107). 
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statement Treitschke pointed to the existence of a modem type of anti-Jewish 
attitude that was neither based on religious fanaticism, nor simply on 'national 
arrogance' . 
In the course of the 'Streit', Treitschke did not move away from most aspects 
of his position, although he did concretize and qualify a lot. In his very detailed 
third contribution (Treitschke 1896c; predominantly a response to Bresslau, 
Lazarus and Cassel) Treitschke claims to express 'the opinion of hundreds of 
thousands'. He rejects the claim that anti-Jewish agitation has been initiated by 
ultra-conservatives and ultra-montanists. He claims that 'respectable circles' (die 
gute Gesellschaft) (Treitschke 1896c:49) 'irrespective of party allegiance' 
discussed for more than a decade 'how to protect our old German ways against 
the growing power and arrogance (Dbermuth) of the Jews'. It was only a fear of 
being identified with the particularist interests of ultra-mont an ism, clericalism 
and deep conservatism that made 'many decent men' still hesitate to join in the 
'movement' . 
On the contrary, I found it more desirable that for a change a man who 
cannot be silenced with the popular slogans 'intolerant priest' or 'the Jew 
has to bum' speaks out openly about the current movement (ibid.). 
In other words, if anti-Semitism has so far been articulated mostly by 
reactionaries, this merely shows that non-reactionary anti-Semites are still 
waiting for a mouthpiece from a non-clerical background - namely Treitschke. 
Treitschke offers here an account of the social meaning and function of his own 
intervention: he helped to shift (one is tempted to say, to emancipate) anti-
Semitism from being a domain of clerical conservatism to a truly national 
ideology. In other words, Treitschke made anti-Semitism respectable not so 
much for 'respectable society' as such (as opposed to 'the street') but for the 
liberal, non-clerical mainstream of 'respectable society' as it had become 
predominant at the time. In that sense, Treitschke understands himself (correctly) 
as a modernizer of anti-Jewish sentiment - as someone who not so much makes it 
'respectable' but rather helps it to remain respectable with a new kind of 
'respectable society' . 
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2.2.1.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEW-HATRED, THE MASSES AND THE 
'EDUCATED MEN' 
Views of the social foundation of the anti-Jewish campaign fall roughly into 
two models: Treitschke claims to see a massive change of mood in the deep 
structure of 'the people' and its 'soul' that is also embraced and articulated by 
'educated men'. He also appears to believe that some 'educated men' had 
anticipated it all in the preceding years. Either way, the 'educated men' are 
secondary to the larger entity of 'the people': they are the latter's mouthpieces. 
The alternative model, variations of which are adopted by most others, 
supposes that the masses of ordinary people are in principle unimpressed and that 
the anti-Semitism formulated by (some) intellectuals is either dangerous or-
more typically - futile demagoguery motivated by enmity to the Imperial state, to 
liberalism or both. Heinrich Graetz for example argued that the anti-Semitic 
campaign is 'isolated and little relevant' (Graetz 1965a:26); Seligman Meyer 
(Meyer 1880a) wrote that the anti-Jewish agitation in Berlin did not have much 
effect on most people. 
Harry Bress/au (1965a) rejected the claim that the anti-Semitic agitation 
'arose' from the 'instincts of the masses'. He traced its beginnings back to the 
series offive articles that appeared in the 'Kreuzzeitung' in 1875 in which he 
claims the more general anti-liberal theme was first combined with anti-Jewish 
rhetoric and subsequently developed into a campaign against the 
'Judenwirthschaft' (Jew-economy) in Prussia and the German Reich. These 
articles were mainly directed against the financial and economic politics of the 
Prussian and Imperial governments, which were claimed to be under the 
influence of Jews. Soon, the 'agrarian party', the 'ultra-montanist' tendency 
within Catholicism, and also particularist (i.e. 'anti-Imperial') newspapers in the 
provinces took up the theme (ibid.:56f).34o By locating the origins of anti-
Semitism in the conservative camp, i.e. in a background hostile to National-
Liberalism, he seems to be trying to 'win back' Treitschke. Bresslau claims that 
340 The Catholic 'Germania' argued that the anti-Catholic 'Kulturkampf had been a device 
deployed by the Jews 'to distract the attention of the German people in order to be able to exploit 
it properly at the same time' (ibid.:56). Bresslau suggests that the Catholic press obviously hoped 
to improve its positioning in the anti-Catholic Kulturkampfby joining Protestant conservatism for 
an anti-Jewish campaign. Bresslau argues that 'since that time the so-called Jewish question has 
not disappeared from the agenda' (ibid.:57). 
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apart from the foundation of the 'Antisemiten-Liga' (which he dismisses as 
irrelevant) the only news in recent months is that the agitation has been extended 
'from the press into parliament' and, addressing Treitschke, 'the unfortunate 
phenomenon that you also joined the anti-Jewish movement' (ibid.:57). He 
suggests that until the end of 1875, only 'certain political parties' - identical to 
those who used to be called 'Reichsfeinde', enemies of the Empire (and in 
particular of Bismarck's politics) - have driven the public towards anti-Semitism 
'for certain political purposes' and 'making use of old prejudices'. Bresslau 
concludes sarcastically that the political and social background of the initiators of 
the Jew-baiting is actually 'powerful evidence to prove the Jews' patriotism and 
national-mindedness (nationale Gesinnung) - in the meaning you and I 
understand this concept' (ibid.: 58).341 
In a subsequent comment, Bresslau singles out the character and origin of 
'today's movement' as the main point of disagreement between himself and 
Treitschke (Bresslau 1965b:92). He argues that it is the context of the current 
anti-Jewish agitation which makes Treitschke's aphorism, 'The Jews are our 
misfortune', particularly harmful, but disputes that the discussions that 
Treitschke claims to have observed amongst 'respectable circles' are a general 
phenomenon (ibid.:92). 
Manuel Joel points out a contradiction fundamental to Treitschke' s 
argument: his claim that the anti-Jewish agitation is 'deeply rooted' in the 'spirit' 
of the German people is populist, while his denunciation of 'noisy anti-Semitic 
rabble' is elitist. Joel finds that Treitschke's distanciation from the anti-Semitic 
demagoguery is merely tactical. He asserts that the common people are innocent 
in the first place and deliberately 'seduced' for political reasons. 342 In a similar 
341 In his response, Treitschke (Treitschke 1896c:48) exploited the extent of agreement that 
Bresslau conceded and the rather defensive tone of his text. Endner applauded Treitschke's 
defiant response but stated that Bresslau 'deserved a more gruff reprimand (derbere 
Zurechtweisung)' (Endner 1965: 123). 
Meyer (1880b:5) reproached Bresslau for having published a brochure on the Judenfi'age-
because there is no such thing. He declares that Bresslau's 'recognition by the enemy is for a 
reason (ist erkliirlich),. Naudh sarcastically 'acknowledge[d] the reconciliatory tone' used by 
Bresslau (Naudh 1965:180). However, he writes that 'practical problems' should not be left in the 
hands of professors (such as Treitschke and Bresslau) because professors tend to find 'a 
convenient formula' that would merely cover up and perpetuate 'the evil'. 
342 He writes that 'the people working with loyal industriousness (das in treuem Fleisse 
arbeitende Yolk) ... are innocent of the anti-Jewish campaign .... Hatred of Jews has always been 
a poison that has been injected purposefully by fanatics either of religion or of a doctrine or by 
those who served those for opportunistic reasons. ( ... ) Unless the masses are being seduced, they 
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vein, Seligmann Meyer (Meyer 1880b) argued (in his response to Treitschke's 
third article) that - judging from the overall sum of the responses to Treitschke's 
first article - the 'attempt at resuscitating embalmed medieval cadavers343 has 
failed' (Meyer 1880b:3). The 'Jew-baiters' (Judenhetzer) (ibid.:4) have not 
managed 'to rob the German people of its culture and enlightenment'. 
While Meyer, Bresslau and Joel try to re-claim the soul, instinct and culture 
of the German people from Treitschke, Naudh emphasizes like Treitschke the 
popular roots of anti-Semitism but attacks what he understands is the liberal 
conceptual framework of Treitschke' s position. 
Naudh claims that anti-Semitism started not in 1875 but as early as the 
escape of Moses and 'his bunch oflazy and dirty thieves' from Egypt (Naudh 
1965: 181). Anti-Jewish attitudes have never been absent during the last three 
thousand years, although they changed forms of appearance between persecution, 
'passive hate' and 'disgust', 'depending on whether the behaviour of the Jews 
provoked the one or the other'. In Germany, it existed 'as disgust' until 1848 and 
'turned into hate only since liberalism allowed itself to be hijacked by the Jews in 
order to afford them domination of economy and state' (ibid.). Naudh scorns 
Treitschke for his support for Bismarck's alliance with liberalism and connects 
this with a criticism of his historiographical method: he implies that Treitschke's 
historiography is unscientific and ideologically informed by his (liberal) 
understanding of the present. 344 N audh defends Stocker against Treitschke' s 
condescension and claims for Stocker what Treitschke claimed for the anti-
Jewish movement in general: Stocker only expressed 'what was seething 
amongst the people'. However - reversing, as it were, Joel's and Bresslau's 
indictment of manipulation - he reproaches Stocker for 'soothing the passions of 
have the instinct that the Jews do not differ in humanity from their Christian fellow citizens' 
(ibid.:21f). 
343 'Wiederbelebungsexperiment, das mit einbalsamirten mittelalterlichen Cadavern 
vorgenommen wurde' 
344 'If history was not a/able convenue [a story/narration agreed upon because it is convenient] 
but really the science of what has actually happened, then its students would be able to 
understand or at least to sense what is happening in the present from what has happened in the 
past, and Herr von Treitschke would not have had to continue spinning yarns (fabuliren) for so 
long, and he would not only now discover to his great surprise that liberalism was fatally 
disgraced by the Jews (dass der Liberalismus an den Juden zu Schanden geworden sei).' Naudh 
does not, though, indicate how this methodological criticism (betraying a positivist understanding 
of the concept of 'science') relates to his (unsupported) claim that 'the Jews' disgraced 
liberalism. 
140 
the masses': his obligation to Christian love makes him undermine patriotic 
love.345 
Naudh supports his version of a populist, anti-Semitic nationalism with a 
long discussion ofthe concept of' education', reflecting on Treitschke' s use of 
the term. He points out that Treitschke noted with surprise, and Bresslau rejected, 
the claim that the 'Jewish question' has even penetrated 'into the circles of the 
highest education'. Naudh argues that 'these circles' are unlikely to take up the 
issue (ibid.: 183) because they entertained a concept of 'Bildung' that abstracts 
from the character of the nation. He claims that 'every "Bildung" is essentially 
(im eigentlichen Sinne) something false - because 'educating' (bilden) does not 
mean to bring forth the thing itself but an image (Bild), an appearance (Schein) 
of it' ?46 In Naudh's demotic discourse, the educated - including National 
Liberals like Treitschke - are suspect because they are simultaneously also a 
cosmopolitan, universal class. 
345 Naudh expresses similar reservations about the organizers of the 'Antisemitenpetition'. He 
claims that the petition is also an expression of a popular sentiment but its immediate purpose of 
merely changing legislation is rather too 'moderate' (ibid.: 183). 
346 Naudh believes Bildung refers to development through external influence while he argues that 
people should develop 'from inside' only ('von Innen heraus '). He insinuates to Treitschke a 
mechanical concept of Bildung which he attacks by recourse to the concept of Bildung as it was 
developed in the German classical tradition. His argument opposes the notion of an authentic, 
inalienable essence of the individual human being to attempts to 'form' this individual according 
to external, i.e. inauthentic educational standards. In Naudh's critique of the concept of Bildung 
two elements oflate 18th century German thought seem to reverberate: resentment of the elitism 
of official culture and the anti-French and anti-hoejische discourse of German proto-nationalism. 
Both anticipated elements of the concept of the nation. Naudh mocks the lack of nationalism on 
the side of the 'educated' elites: they 'attempt to suppress nationality, which is - in Hegel's 
words the ground of all living life, and want to be men in general who live in a nowhere land 
(Menschen schlechthin, die nirgends leben) instead of being Germans, which only they can 
become and be' (ibid.:184). 
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2.2.1.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEW-HATRED, LIBERALISM AND PROGRESS 
The question of what motivates the anti-Jewish demagoguery is central in 
particular to the contributions by Ludwig Bamberger and Heinrich Bernhardt 
Oppenheim. Bamberger347 argues that 'the attack on the Jews is only one aspect 
of to day's great campaign against liberalism,348 and that 'without doubt' it was 
the attack on liberalism that led Treitschke towards anti-Semitism (ibid.: 157)?49 
Bamberger states that a 'good portion of the anger against the Jews comes from 
the fact of their liberal conviction' (ibid.: 157), quoting Lasker as an example. 
Since the Jews have predominantly been seated 'on the benches of the left wing', 
he continues, they 'have to put up with that' [the anti-Jewish campaign].35o 
Bamberger suggests that 'educated men' do not in their entirety hold anti-
Jewish opinions (ibid.: 175), and, pointing to election results, that 'the people by 
and large think in a much more unprejudiced way than some scholars do' 
(ibid.: 176). Nevertheless, while anti-Jewish sentiment is least widespread in the 
countryside, where Christian and Jewish poor share the same fate, and rare 
amongst the uneducated, it is all in all more widespread than the Jews, 
'especially the educated Jews', are ready to admit (ibid.: 177). 
Heinrich Bernhardt Oppenheim (1880) also argued that whatever is new in 
the current anti-Jewish movement is of 'agrarian-socialist origin'. He suggests -
like Bresslau - that it had been initiated five years earlier as a campaign against 
Bismarck in which the Jews were merely a pretext. The campaigners had then 
347 Bamberger and Oppenheim are the only contributors who referred to the argument of 'Our 
prospects' as a whole; cpo 2.2.5.1. 
348 Bamberger's choice of the formulation 'eine Diversion im heutigen grossen Feldzuge gegen 
den Liberalismus' is slightly unclear (possibly a misprint, although Hamburger quotes from the 
original publication also 'Diversion' [Hamburger 1968:295]). Bamberger probably does not mean 
'a diversion from ... ' but rather 'one variant within the whole diverse set of strategic options that 
together constitute ... ' (perhaps like in [ military] division). 'Deutschtum und Judentum' first 
appeared in the monthly 'Unsere Zeit'. 
349 To support his view he points out that 'the essay in whose concluding section the Jewish 
question is being addressed is directed against liberalism' (Bamberger 1965: 156) as weB as 
against phi lanthropy and education (ibid.: 158). For example, Treitschke expressed approval of 
Mittelstaedt's agitation for corporal punishment. 
350 He adds that only two Jewish deputies of previous Reichstage sat on the right, the 'financial 
aristocrats' (Fiirstlichkeiten der Finanz) Strousberg and von Rothschild. It could be held against 
Bamberger's argument that these two - notably Rothschild - are regularly quoted as particularly 
despicable Jews by anti-Semites. Bamberger's reduction of the anti-Jewish campaign to nothing 
but an element of a campaign against liberalism fails to explain why it also directs itself against 
Jews that are not Liberals. 
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'phantasized about a conspiracy between Bismarck, Lasker and Bleichroder'. 351 
Oppenheim sees the current campaign as an expression of 'a systematic 
promoting of political, clerical and in particular, economic reaction' for which 
'Herr von Treitschke seems to be working ( ... ) - probably unknowingly,.352 For 
Oppenheim, 'the Jewish question is but a pretext' as 'totally different things are 
at stake': 
To challenge Jewish emancipation would mean challenging the 
constitutional (staatsrechtlichen) and the economic foundations of the 
constitutional state (Rechtsstaat). Whoever would try this, would have 
against himself not only the Jews. 
Therefore, 'not the Jewish question, but the question of Jew-hatred' needs to be 
discussed. Oppenheim ridicules the pompous and pretentious rhetoric of 
Treitschke's article353 and refutes Treitschke's claims about what the current 
manifestations of the Zeitgeist or the Volksgeist are, in particular Treitschke's 
'phantasmagoric presentation' that there has been a sudden change of mood in 
society. There has neither been any particularly pro-Jewish mood before, nor is 
there a deep anti-Jewish movement now amongst the people (Volk). Oppenheim 
rejects Treitschke's claims as fictionae54 and points out that Treitschke fails to 
give any reasons for the sudden change he allegedly has observed. Oppenheim 
points out that the only firm evidence of a change in mood is in some parts of the 
(party-political) press, contrary to Treitschke's claim that this change occurred 
outside the press.355 
351 Oppenheim points to his own article on this in Die Gegenwart from October 2, 1875. 
352 Oppenheim adds that he had taken part in the struggle for emancipation already in the 30s and 
40s when identical 'complaints' were held against the Jews, 'only sharper and more honest'. This 
had then been 'an honest struggle' about 'actual prejudices' and 'real convictions'. The 
opponents were 'more grim, more convinced and more clever', but some of them also could be 
'converted' after an 'objective (sachliche) debate' fought with 'real arguments'. 
353 'You believe you hear the Zeitgeist's pulse beating, but it is merely the noise made by the 
scene-shifter (Kulissenschieber), (Oppenheim ibid.:3). 
354 Oppenheim implies that Treitschke's text is like a piece of badly written fiction: 'The lowest 
ranking novelist would be obliged to motivate such a psychological turn in his characters'. 
355 Oppenheim concludes that Treitschke's intention is to demonstrate 'the existence of a "Jewish 
question'" and to lend an 'ideal foundation' to crude Jew-hatred, mob brutality and economic 
envy (Poebelroheit und Geschiiftsneid) (ibid.:4). 'If the people was as lowly as Herr von 
Treitschke writes, then today's jew-baiting would inevitably lead to atrocities no less than in 
1819' (in the second part of the article that was published January, 10, Die Gegenwart No. 17:2, 
page 17). However, then as now it was merely a small part of the 'mob (Poebel), which was 
'incited by half-educated men enraptured by phraseology (phrasenberauschten Halbgelehrten)'. 
Philippson argued similarly against the notion that there has been a fundamental change in 
the public mood (AZ 9. 12. 1879, No 50:785). He suggests that a number of writers from the 
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Oppenheim's observations are interspersed with reflections of a more 
philosophical character. At the beginning of his contribution Oppenheim quoted 
a reflection on the concepts of 'progress' and 'civilization' by the French 
Romantic writer and critic, Charles-Augustin Saint-Beuve. The quotation implies 
that the continued existence of 'civilization' cannot be taken for granted or as if it 
was natural, but has to be (re-)invented and confirmed ever again. It can also be 
lost: centuries of progress can be reversed 'in just a matter of weeks': 'Savagery 
is always but two steps away, and it recommences as soon as one falls back' .356 It 
is implied that for Oppenheim the anti-Jewish campaign represents such a 'fall-
back' into 'savagery' and signifies the precariousness and reversibility of 
'progress and civilization'. 
His principal target is the decline of idealism and the triumph of Realpolitik: 
Those who used to believe in the victory of the idea now - with a mocking 
smile - merely believe in the victory of the cannon, the right of the 
mightier (ibid. :2).357 
Together with the worship of Bismarck, this has created a general climate 
beneficial for reaction. As a further example of this he refers to the argument 
(also quoted by Treitschke in his first article) that the reintroduction of corporal 
punishment would mean the 'salvation of society'. Oppenheim opposes the talk 
about the 'brutalization (Verwilderung) of the masses' .358 He argues that the call 
for cruel methods of punishment (as advocated by Mittelstaedt and Treitschke) 
rather suggests there is 'a certain brutalization (Verwilderung) of the so called 
educated classes'. He compares the calls for reintroduction of corporal 
punishment, as well as the current anti-Jewish movement, to clerical 
ultramontane, reactionary and radical camps have increased their clamour while the apparent 
weakness of the liberals has encouraged all enemies of the Jews (J udenfeinde) to join in. The 
current anti-Jewish agitation in the press also proves wrong all claims about Jewish domination of 
the press: there is nothing that would explain why Jewish domination would suddenly have given 
way to an anti-Semitic campaign. (Philippson was the editor of the AZ and - as I presume - wrote 
in this function the leader articles, which are, however, unsigned. Most of what I attribute in the 
following to Philippson is actually from unsigned (leader) acticles and commentaries.) 
356 'La sauvagerie est toujours la a deux pas, et, des qu'on lache pied, elle recommence'; quoted 
in French by Oppenheim. 
357 'Die frueher an den Sieg der Idee geglaubt, glauben nun hohnliichelnd nur noch an den Sieg 
der Kanone, an das Recht des Stiirkeren.' 
358 He suggests that simply the judiciary might have become more effective, rather than that the 
people have become more vicious. 
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reactionaries who continued to oppose the heliocentric model of the universe 
long after it was clearly established. 
This comparison points to an important tension in Oppenheim's argument: 
the reference to the debate about the heliocentric model works as ridicule of anti-
liberalism because attacks on heliocentrism were then obviously futile. 
Oppenheim, like many others, could not imagine that attacks on liberalism and 
Jewish emancipation could be successful. The centrality of liberal values in 
society seemed as certain as the centrality of the sun in the galaxy. Nevertheless, 
his choice of the aphorism by Saint-Beuve (quoted above) shows that 
Oppenheim also felt ambivalent about his own trust in the irreversibility of 
progress. While the quote stands for scepticism about progress, the likening of 
anti-liberalism to anti-heliocentrism stands for optimism. However, Oppenheim 
does not take up the theme of the quote in the body of the text at all: the text is 
ruled by liberal optimism, while the darker sceptical tone is exiled into the pre-
text, couched between inverted commas and at a secure distance from the 
argument. 
A different perspective can be found in some remarks by the priest, Paulus 
Cassel who comments on the weaknesses of liberalism from the perspective of a 
Christian missionary. He writes that one of the roots of the anti-Jewish 
movement is the fact that the emancipation of the Jews in 1848 happened not for 
reasons of 'love of the Jews or actualliberal-mindedness (Freisinnigkeit)' 
(Cassel 1880:8) but 'for the sake of being in opposition: emancipation was part 
of the liberal platform'. Correspondingly the Jews are now attacked with the 
intention of hurting the Fortschrittspartei (ibid.:9). People 'begrudged them the 
liberty (man gonnte ihnen die Freiheit nicht)' because 'they were not liberated 
themselves (man war selber nicht frei)' (ibid.: 11). In this situation of failed, or 
incomplete liberation, 'self-righteous envy exploits the old prejudice' (Cassel 
ibid.: 12).359 
359 'Pharisiiischer Neid gebraucht das alte Vorurtheil.' 
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2.2.1.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEW-HATRED AND NATIONALISM 
More than the two questions of the social background of the anti-Jewish 
agitation and how it relates to liberalism, the question of the link between the 
anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic tendencies and nationalism was a main theme in the 
Streit. Paulus Cassel might have been the first contributor who emphasized this 
connection when he called the anti-Jewish movement the 'exuberance of national 
stimulation (Reizung) over the true cosmopolitanism of the Gospel' (Cassel 
1880:7). At the end of the same year, Treitschke published a statement that took 
up and reversed this argument: he stated that 'the newly reemerging Jew-debate 
(Judenstreit), is merely 'the sad inheritance of a long epoch of weakened national 
pride and insecure religious sentiment' (Treitschke 1965a:225). In this sense, 
Treitschke holds that 
it is our fault that the Jews (das Judenthum) in Germany show off their 
tribal consciousness (Stammesbewusstsein) as provocatively as in no other 
large state (ibid.). 
While for Cassel and others anti-Semitism seems to signify an overdose of 
nationalism, for Treitschke it points to a lack of nationalism. 
The extent to which the Streit is part of, and shaped by, a wider discourse on 
the nation, is illustrated by the suggestion by Philippson (AZ 1879:785)360 that 
Treitschke's article might have been triggered by an article in the French 
'Journal des de bats 'by J. Bourdeau (November 5, 1879) on the anti-Jewish 
campaign in Germany. In his own review of this article (AZ 1879:737),361 
Philippson had expressed his 'truly patriotic pain' about the author ridiculing the 
German anxiety about Jewish domination as umeal, and 'gloatingly' interpreting 
the fact that the Germans perceive themselves as captives, 'the booty of a 
conquering race', thus showing their own weakness.362 One can imagine that if 
Philippson felt 'patriotic pain' about this kind of comment from a French 
journalist, Treitschke must have been furious. 
360 AZ, 9.12.1879, No 50. 
361 AZ 18.11.1879, No 47 
362 Bourdeau points out that after emancipation, the French Jews did not dissolve into 'our purely 
French community (Gemeinschaft)' but still developed into useful and loyal citizens. He asserts 
that emancipation turned the Jews of France into the most 'ameliorated' of all Jewish groups. 
Bourdeau suggests that the Germans should not resent the high level of involvement of Jews in 
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The most important evidence for the view that the Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit was essentially a debate about differing concepts of the 
nation is the much quoted and celebrated 'Declaration of the Notables' that was 
published in November 1880.363 Significantly its text is foremost an appeal to 
patriotic unity and the defence of central liberal tenets in the name of the German 
idealist tradition. The Declaration begins with a statement on the evolution of 
German national history ('Declaration' 1965:202): 
Fierce struggles have united our fatherland (Vaterland) to a powerfully 
rising Empire. Unity has been achieved because the feeling of necessary 
belonging (nothwendigen Zusammengehorigkeit) carried the victory over 
the tribal and religious divisions that had fragmented our nation like no 
other. Making individual members [of the nation] pay for these divisions is 
unfair and vulgar (unedel) and mostly punishes those who honestly and 
seriously strive to overcome [their] peculiarity and to achieve true 
amalgamation with the nation (in treuem Zusammengehen mit der Nation 
die Sonderart abzuwerfen). They experience it [this discrimination] as a 
breach of loyalty from those with whom they feel they are striving for the 
same goals. It prevents what is and remains the common goal: the 
eradication (Ausgleichung) of all past divisions that still continue to exist 
within the German nation. 
The Declaration takes the standpoint of those who are committed to eliminating 
(abzuwerfen) all religious and 'tribal' divisions within the German nation. It 
claims that this group is most affected by the current anti-Jewish campaign, 
while social groups not committed to complete assimilation (let alone the 
existence of social divisions other than religion and 'tribe') are not mentioned. It 
is implied that such groups were less affected by the anti-Semitic campaign, and 
the life of the nation but appreciate its usefulness: the Jews 'unite the religious and the practical 
spirit, the taste for metaphysical and for financial speculation' (ibid.:739). 
363 The AZ (23.11.1880, No. 47:741f) documented the complete text of the Declaration o/the 
Notables including all 75 signatures, introduced with the comment: 'Finally there seems to be 
light on the horizon! Finally the nightmare that weighed on the minds is being shaken off!'. The 
following week (November 30, No. 48), Philippson comments that the Declaration 'is written in 
the most noble style and despite its briefness it touches upon all relevant moments with satisfying 
determination' (ibid.: 753f). The week after (No. 49, December 7), Philippson adds that the 
Declaration 'already is a momentous fact like Lessing's "Nathan", the Pruss ian constitution or 
the German Imperial law ... ' (ibid.:778). In No. 50, December 14 he writes: 'Every sincere patriot 
is deeply hurt to observe the confusion and divisiveness (Zerfahrenheit und Zerrissenheit) in the 
German fatherland that has grown so hugely through the latest agitations against the Jews, and 
the humiliation of the German spirit which this perpetration constitutes. On top of this now comes 
the regret that these weaknesses and the weakening of the German nation is being watched and 
condemned abroad; Germany's prestige, honor and her civilizational influence suffer so much 
from this' (ibid.:785). This comment is followed by several quotes from the English press (ibid.: 
786). 
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they seem to be excluded from the patriotic defence.364 National unification and 
the elimination of particularity are presented as historical necessities, counter-
tendencies to which are stigmatized as anachronistic: 
In various places, in particular the larger towns of the Reich, the racial 
hatred (Racenhass) and fanaticism of the middle ages are currently revived 
and directed against our Jewish fellow citizens in an unexpected and deeply 
embarrassing (beschamender) fashion. 
The current campaign is referred to as 'racial' as well as 'medieval', 365 adding up 
to an effective stigmatization: the characterization as 'racial' removes the anti-
Jewish discourse from the realm of idealism and liberalism, the characterization 
as 'medieval' puts it into contrast with the historical teleology that leads from 
pre-modem dividedness to national unity. 
It is being forgotten that many of them [the Jewish fellow citizens] have 
brought benefit and honour (Nutzen und Ehre) to the fatherland in the 
areas of business and trade, art and science. 
Those who anachronistically hate the Jews have to be reminded that integrative 
national policy is beneficial to the nation. The formulation 'it is being forgotten' 
presupposes that also the anti-Semites can be expected to acknowledge that the 
nation is an overriding value - they seem only momentarily forgetful of the 
benefits the Jews bring. Their motives can only be of a lesser order: the 
'reanimation of an old delusion (Wahn)' in the name of 'envy' threatens to 
poison social relations based on toleration. However, the 'resistance oflevel-
headed men (Widerstand besonnener Manner)' can still oppose the 'confusion' 
and the 'artificially fanned passion of the multitude'. The Declaration appeals to 
'the Christians of all parties' and 'all Germans who cherish the ideal heritage of 
their great princes, thinkers and poets' to defend 'the ground of our common 
life': 
Respect for every denomination (Bekenntnis); equal right; equal sun in 
competition (gleiche Sonne im Wettkamp±); equal recognition of merit and 
achievement (gleiche Anerkennung tuechtigen Strebens) for Christians and 
Jews. 
364 The use of the formulation 'Jewish fellow citizens' also seems implicitly to exclude from the 
defence Jewish immigrants who are not (yet) citizens. 
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While the first half of the Declaration focuses on national history and the 
necessity of unification, the second half shifts the argument towards central 
liberal tenets and also refers to their wider socio-economic framework: the 
demands with which the Declaration culminates include two cultural-political 
liberal demands - religious freedom and legal equality - and a socio-economic 
demand (in two complementary formulations): only merit won in unrestricted 
competition should determine an individual's positioning in society.366 The 
Declaration thus links Jewish emancipation to a wider conception of a liberal-
bourgeois socio-economic order, and on the other hand links the anti-Jewish 
'confusion' to 'the passions of the multitude' driven by 'envy'. 'Racial hatred' as 
well as its rejection are linked to economic interest and class positioning. At the 
same time, the Declaration emphasizes the struggle for German national 
unification and the elimination of all particularities as the political and historical 
framework of the conflict and comes to the defence of Jewish citizens who are 
assimilated or in the process of becoming such. In addition, the explicit reference 
to the merits of Jews 'in the areas of business and trade, art and science' leaves 
lower class Jews (such as most of the Eastern immigrants) unmentioned. 
Although this is not openly articulated, the intertwining of a political-cultural and 
a socio-economical argument also implies that the process of nation-building is 
supposed to eliminate particular class interests, namely the 'envy' and the 
'confusions' of 'the multitude', along with the elimination of ethnic-cultural 
particularities. 
Theodor Mommsen's answer to Treitschke follows similar lines. He 
explicitly names only a small group of friends as the intended addressees of his 
statement367 and explains that this group is defined by a particular historical 
experience - national unification: 
365 Both attributes, though, contradict each other: the Middle Ages surely knew 'fanaticism' but 
not 'racial hatred'. 
366 The image that everybody should enjoy 'the same sun in competition' seems to underline the 
liberal claim that a social order based on merit and competition is a natural order - under the sun 
(i.e. out there, in the open field, in the real world), after all, every human being has the same 
opportunity. This is of course an ideological mystification not only of society but also of nature. 
367 Mommsen writes that he does not want to contribute to the more public debate on the Jews to 
which he refers as a 'hullabaloo' (Charivari) 'to whose dissonances the rabble (Poebel) on either 
side contribute to the best of their capacities' (Mommsen 1965b:210) and a 'machination' against 
which 'a single voice' can hardly hope to be heard. His concern is exclusively with the debate 
amongst former (National-Liberal) allies and friends, i.e. the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit in a 
more narrow sense: '1 will be happy when the few words that I want to make will explain my 
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To our generation it was granted ... that our nation has reached the great 
goals that we found ahead of us when we were growing up to be thinking 
people (Mommsen 1965b:210). 
We, 'our nation' has reached the goals that we, 'our generation', 'found ahead of 
us'. Whoever grew up in those days - i.e. before 1871 - 'will consider no price 
too high for our Reichstag and the Imperial flag come what may - and many a 
thing may still come'. 
This nationalist confession is followed by a big but: 
But one has to be very steadfast and far-sighted in order actually to enjoy 
this fortunate fate. The immediate consequences recall the saying that fate 
punishes men by fulfilling their wishes. While Germany was still in the 
making, nobody - as befits those who are fighting for a common goal -
asked about confessional or tribal differences, about conflicting interests of 
rural and urban population, of merchants and industrialists. In the realized 
Germany war is being waged by all against all, and we will soon reach a 
stage when only he is considered a full citizen who can trace back his 
descent to one of the three sons of Mannus, 368 who confesses the gospel the 
way the pastor collocutus369 does and who gives evidence of his skills in 
ploughing and sowing. The confessional war, the so called 'Culturkampf 
and the recently waged civil war of the wallet is being joined now by the 
deformed child (Missgeburt) of national feeling, the anti-Semitic campaign 
(ibid.:211). 
Mommsen reasons that '(we) older men, all of whose willing and hoping had 
been invested in the national idea', feel ambivalent about this state of affairs. On 
the one hand, the anti-Semitic campaign recalls 'Saturn once more eating his 
offspring' (ibid.),37o on the other hand this 'backlash' appears futile and merely a 
'retarding moment' that will not actually change the course of things. 
Nevertheless, this 'suicidal acting of the national feeling' does 'grave damage to 
persons and interests'. 
Mommsen links anti-Semitism to the process of nation-building, describing 
it as its 'Missgeburt' in one instance, in the next one as 'Saturn eating his 
attitude to this affair to those who want to know it. It separates many, who have otherwise been 
close and long time allies, and separation hurts. Although the word of conciliation 
(Verstiindigung) will fade away in general, it will perhaps find its destination here or there on a 
personal level.' (ibid.) 
368 The three sons of the god Mannus are the founders of the Germanic tribes in Germanic 
mythology. 
369 This is a technical term meaning the priest as representing church authority. 
370 This seems to have been a widely used image in contemporary comments on the 'Terror' of 
the French Revolution. 
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offspring', then as 'that suicidal acting of the national sentiment' (ibid.). Anti-
Semitism appears here as a product of nationalism that is at the same time 
destroying the national process. The overall historical process cannot be halted 
by some anti-Semitic noisy rabble but it still does 'grave damage'. He states that 
the social coherence that was generated in the process of struggling for national 
unification is lost in the moment that this struggle is successful; once the nation 
state is established it develops a dynamic of social conflicts, the anti-Catholic 
'Culturkampf, economic struggles and anti-Semitism. The national movement 
aims at a form of social coherence - the national community - but actually seems 
to be able to guarantee this cohesion only as long as it is not (yet) successful. 
This awareness gives Mommsen's nationalism an unhappy, melancholy touch. 
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2.2.2 The specifically German character of the 'German Jewish 
question' 
2.2.2.1 TREITSCHKE'S FORMULATION OF A GERMAN 'JEWISH QUESTION' 
One strand of the Streit was about Treitschke's claim that there is a German 
'J ewish question' , or else that the' Jewish question' had a specifically German 
character in Germany: 
If the English and the French talk with some disdain of the prejudice of the 
Germans against the Jews we must reply to them: you do not know us; you 
live in happier circumstances, which make the rise of such 'prejudices' 
impossible (Treitschke 1896a:22). 
Treitschke defends here the anti-Jewish 'prejudice' against criticism from 
English and French observers. He claims [a)] that Jewish immigration from 'the 
East' reinforces what he claims to be [b)] the non-Western character - arrogance, 
unassimilability - of the German Jews. The pivot of this argument is that Jewish 
immigration is harmful in particular because of a continuity of 'Easternness' 
between immigrating (Polish) and resident (citizen) German Jews. Both are 
'Orientals' in the last instance. 
Furthermore, Treitschke argues that the harmful effect of Jewish influence is 
aggravated by a lack of national-minded ness on the side of the Germans. 
Treitschke opposes 'our country' to 'Western Europe': 
The number of Jews in Western Europe is so small that they cannot have 
any noticeable influence upon the morality of the nation. But our country is 
invaded year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths 
from the inexhaustible cradle of Poland, whose children and grand-children 
are to be the future rulers of Germany's stock exchanges and Germany's 
press (ibid.:23). 
Treitschke invokes an 'invasion' of foreigners from the East who first engage in 
petty trade and will then rise into powerful positions in civil society, presenting 
this as a quasi-automatic process. He implies that petty trade, trading on the stock 
market and journalism are essentially similar activities that not only attract the 
152 
same sort of people but allow individuals to rise easily from trouser-seller to 
editor or stock-jobber.371 
Treitschke claims that massive Jewish immigration throws up the question 
how 'this alien nation' can be assimilated (wie wir dies fremde Volksthum mit 
dem unseren verschmelzen konnen).372 Significantly Treitschke emphasizes as 
the most threatening aspect of the immigration the fact that the immigrants have 
successful careers. The crucial problem is therefore not whether they can 
assimilate but what exactly the immigrants assimilate to. Treitschke asserts that 
they assimilate not to the' German people' but to the' German Jews'. By 
contrast, 'the Jews of the West and the South' (of Europe) in their great majority 
'have become good Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, as far as can be reasonably 
expected from a people of such pure blood and such distinct peculiarity' . 
Treitschke gives two different reasons for the alleged difference: their number 
and their alleged descent. Those in the West and the South 'belong mostly to the 
Spanish branch (Stamm) 373 which looks back on a comparatively proud history 
and which always adjusted comparatively easily to the Western way of life'. He 
contrasts these Jews favorably to the alleged mass of Jewish immigrants into 
Germany: 
We Germans, however, have to deal with Jews of the Polish branch (mit 
jenem polnischen Judenstamme), which bears the deep scars of many 
centuries of Christian tyranny.374 According to experience it is 
incomparably more alien to the European and especially to the Germanic 
character (dem germanischen Wesen). 
Treitschke refers to those Jews who do not belong to the 'Spanish branch' with 
the concept of the 'Polish branch' instead of calling them 'Germanic'. As 
Treitschke must have been aware, the Jewish culture of Poland was a product of 
371 As Holz (200 I: 199) argues, the commonality of trade and journalism is that both are activities 
of mediation. 
372 'Volksthum' was coined as a neologism around 1800 and became commonplace through 
Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's book 'Deutsches Volksthum' from 1810 (Holz 2001 :200). The term 
refers to the 'Wesen' ofa 'Volk' as well as the (everyday life, cultural) appearances of the 
'Wesen'. 
373 I translate 'Stamm' usually as 'tribe'. However, when it refers to the distinction between 
Ashkenazim and Sephardim, I translate 'branch' (which sounds weaker than Stamm). Since 
Mommsen for example also refers to the German Stiimme (in contemporary academic parlance, 
one would probably write 'ethnic groups') the word 'Stamm' seems to be mostly descriptive and 
value-free, though from a National-Liberal perspective with a connotation of being anachronistic. 
374 The use of the term 'Christian tyranny' reinforces Treitschke's dissociation from pre-modem 
anti-Judaism (see above). 
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immigration by German Jews to Eastern Europe. Logically speaking, the 
equivalent of the concept 'Spanish' (more precisely, Iberian) Jews would have 
been 'Germanic' or 'Eastern European' Jews. Given the low esteem, in which 
Poles were generally held in the German capital at the time, the concept of a 
'Polish branch' seems to be tarring the immigrants with additional stigma. 
Treitschke also avoids the implication that the Jewish immigrants could 
historically claim some form of Germanness. Under the headings of 'East' and 
'West', 'Polish' and 'Spanish', Treitschke's argument invokes a notion of bad 
and good Jews. As Holz (2001:204) states: 'The Western Jews are "good Jews" 
because they appear as "good Frenchmen" (etc.) whereas "bad Jews" bring to 
bear their "alien Volksthum".' This implies that the best that can be expected 
from any Jew is not to make the Jewish Wesen to appear. 
I think, however, some of my Jewish friends will admit, with deep regret, 
that recently a dangerous spirit of arrogance has arisen in Jewish circles 
and that the influence of Jewry upon our national life, which in former 
times was often beneficial, has recently often been harmful (Treitschke 
1896a:24).375 
Whether or not Treitschke actually expected that 'Jewish friends' would come 
forward and defend him in a debate that he seems to anticipate, one cannot know. 
Criticism of old-fashioned, idiosyncratic Jewish particularity and the effort to get 
rid of a large part of traditional Jewish habits and attitudes (or what was held to 
be such) was indeed pivotal to the Enlightenment discourse on Jewish 
emancipation on the Jewish no less than on the Gentile side. The novelty in 
Treitschke's variation on this theme is, though, that he suggests a development 
from 'former times' (when Jews apparently have been modest and 'often 
beneficial') to modem times ('recently', i.e. since legal emancipation) when (a 
significant portion of) the Jews became arrogant and harmful. This inverts the 
older liberal argument that emancipation would tum unproductive, conservative 
and parochial Jews into good and productive citizens of modem society. 
In Treitschke's discourse, the peculiarity of the German (i.e. not 'Western') 
Jews is mirrored and aggravated in its harmful effects by the peculiarity of the 
German historical situation. The Jews of England or France are 'harmless or 
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even beneficial' because of the higher' energy of the national pride and the 
finnly rooted national way of life (nationale Sitte) of these two nations which 
look back on centuries of national culture (dieser beiden alten Culturvolker)' 
(ibid.:27).376 This implies that a strong national culture does not allow a 
problematic 'Jewish question' to emerge in the first place. In Gennany, the 
situation is different: 
Our national way oflife (Gesittung) is young. Our country still essentially 
lacks national style, instinctive pride, a finnly developed individuality; that 
is the reason why we were defenceless against alien manners for so long. 
But we are in the process of acquiring these qualities, and we can only wish 
that our Jews recognize in time the change which is now occurring in 
Gennany as a necessary consequence of the foundation of the Gennan 
state. 
Treitschke's fonnulation implies here the notion of Gennany as a backward 
country that has to catch up with her delayed nation-building - an anticipation of 
the 'verspiitete Nation' and 'Deutscher Sonderweg' arguments. 
2.2.2.2 THE 'EASTERN IMMIGRATION' ISSUE 
Treitschke's invocation of a flood-like immigration of 'trouser-selling 
youths' was perhaps the most commented on passage of his text. Both the 
immigration-issue and the debate on how to conceptualize the 'two Jewish 
branches' received plenty of attention. 
Only one of numerous responses reacted to the ridiculousness of the claim by 
ridiculing Treitschke's imagery: Dr. Ruelffrom Memel (in the AZ)377 wrote in a 
dry tone that Treitschke might have been inspired by his visit to the town of 
Memel - on the Gennan-Polish border - the previous year. There he must have 
noticed the substantial number of Jewish owned second hand clothes shops. 
375 Treitschke gives two key examples for this alleged recent tendency: the example for Jewish 
arrogance is his colleague, the historian Heinrich Graetz; the example for harmfulness is the 
current Jewish involvement in the economy. Cp chapters 2.2.4 and 2.2.7. 
376 The Vossische Zeitung from December 24th published an open letter by Ad. Neubauer, 
assistant librarian at Bodleian in Oxford. In the name of the English Jews he rejects Treitschke's 
compliments (quoted inAZ, 13.1.1880, No 2). 
377 AZ, 17.2.1880, No 7:108 
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However, the shopkeepers there are not 'youths (Juenglinge)'. 378 Ruelf makes -
in passing - two important points: first, the Eastern Jews are recognized to be 
German patriots; second, the migrant youths leave the province simply for the 
reason that they cannot find a living, and not in order to subvert the German 
Volksgeist. 379 Ruelfpresents the fact of migration from the province to the capital 
as an umemarkable, legitimate thing to happen. Perhaps surprisingly, there was 
only one other contributor to the Streit who made the same point, Paulus Cassel: 
'It is natural and a right for any human being to press towards the light' (Cassel 
1880:16).380 
Ludwig Bamberger points to the lack of conclusive statistical evidence and 
rejects Treitschke's language that evokes the image of an 'incoming flood like 
that of the Chinese in California'. Further, the people referred to by Treitschke as 
'Poles' might actually come not from the Russian but from the Pruss ian part of 
Poland?81 
In the latter case, with what right does the bitter opponent of Polish 
national resistance treat the inhabitants of the province of Poznan as 
foreigners (Auslander)? (ibid.: 163) 
Bamberger points to the contradiction that Treitschke on the one hand demands 
state-loyalty from ethnic minority groups, but on the other hand excludes such 
groups - even when they are loyal- on grounds of their ethnicity. However, as 
Bamberger suggests, the Jews of Poznan have traditionally been understood to be 
not only a German-speaking, but a Germanizing element of the population. 
Moritz Lazarus (Lazarus 1880:57-60)382 writes that a proper examination of 
the question of Jewish immigration has not been done recently and refers to a 
378 One of these Jewish trouser-sellers had just been awarded by the state a Hebrew bible with the 
picture of the Kaiser and also an amount of money on the occasion of his diamond wedding; this 
old Jew had given over half a dozen of brave soldiers to the German fatherland. 
379 Ruelfpoints out that the young men who migrate West to find themselves a living typically 
are not trouser-sellers but they are themselves short of decent trousers. Local people donate 
therefore trousers to Dr. Ruelf in order to hand them on to the emigrating young men. Ruelf 
offers to send some of the young men to Treitschke for him to have a look at their trousers and 
perhaps if appropriate to donate a pair of his own. 
380 'Ein Driingen zum Licht ist jedem Menschen natuerlich und sein Recht.' For Cassel 'the light' 
might mean not only the better living standard but also the Christian mission of Berlin. 
381 Graetz pointed out that Jews enjoyed unlimited equality in Galicia and are therefore 'little 
inclined to emigration' (Graetz 1965a:28). 
382 The section quoted here is from the 'Appendix: Statistical data on Jewish immigration and 
emigration in Prussia' that was added to the printed version of Lazarus' speech from December 
1879. 
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debate on the same issue in the 1850s. Over the period from 1834 to 1855, 
Jewish emigration from Prussia regularly exceeded immigration by a large 
margin. For the time after 1855 Lazarus holds that most probably any increase in 
the number of Jews in Germany would stem from the Jews' relatively higher rate 
of births rather than from an excess of immigration over emigration. Lazarus 
suggests that the rate of emigration still in 1880 is most likely to exceed that of 
immigration.383 This argument is followed by a more general consideration: 
But even if ... a handful more Jews were actually coming to Germany 
every year, what danger would it be? And I am not invoking here the 
concept of humanity against strangers, which certain circles seem not to 
appreciate anymore at all. What I mean is that an Englishman would laugh 
at us openly if we suggested that he control the immigration of some group 
of foreigners into the British Isles. He might consider it an insult to his 
nation to suggest that a handful of foreigners could corrupt the ideals, 
morality and character of his people (ibid.).384 
Similarly, Graetz remarked sarcastically that it is less than flattering for the 
'genius of the German people' and its 'heroism,385 when Treitschke suggests that 
'a handful of Jews' would present a 'misfortune' for 40 million Germans (Graetz 
1965a:26).386 Lazarus quotes Treitschke's claim that it is 'impossible to make the 
383 For several decades the Prussian statistical office had paid little interest to the 'confessional or 
racial make-up of immigrants and emigrants' (Hacking 1990: 195). However, there was evidence 
that Jews emigrated in larger numbers than their share in the population would warrant, which 
given that overall immigration numbers were known - allowed the conclusion that emigration 
most probably exceeded immigration. An increase in the number of Jews could therefore only be 
explained with higher birth-rates and lower mortality rates than with immigration. Nevertheless, 
the Prussian statistical office had published in 1877 a ('not too consistent', as Hacking writes) 
essay arguing the case of Jewish mass immigration. However, the statistical office of the city of 
Berlin strongly rejected the immigration theory in its yearbook of 1880, and subsequently 
supported Neumann (see below) against the Prussian office (ibid.: 197). 
384 Whether British society has always been so completely relaxed about (Jewish) immigration 
cannot be discussed here; Lazarus' reference to the laughing Englishman must have been 
rhetorically powerful particularly in an ideological context that considered the political culture of 
England to be paradigmatic. 
385 Similarly (Meyer 1880a:29) writes, addressing Treitschke directly: 'And if we have to read in 
foreign papers that the Germans are dim (beschriinkt), driven by racial hatred and trapped in 
prejUdices, then this is your responsibility!' Philippson also argues that the anti-Jewish campaign 
dishonors 'the great German nation' depicting it as being overpowered by only a handful of Jews 
(in AZ 9.12.1879, No 50:787). Again (in AZ 23.3.1880, No 12: 178) he writes that German Jew-
hatred must be mere pretence because the Germans cannot seriously believe that a nation of 43 
million could be endangered by half a million of Jews. 
386 Furthermore, Graetz (1965b) states that Treitschke relies on questionable source material, that 
the increase of the Jewish popUlation in Prussia is actually in keeping with that of the population 
in general, that there is virtually no immigration from Poland into the Prussian provinces 
bordering on Poland, and that the history of the Jews in Poland actually was less bleak than 
Treitschke implied. Graetz quotes a historical source from the 16th century suggesting that the 
Jews in Poland were engaged in agriculture as well as in trade and the sciences. 
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hard German heads Jewish,387 and asks: 'What's the noise about then? Why the 
fear?' .388 Lazarus implies here that the problem was not whether Treitschke's 
readings of immigration statistics (or else his understanding of the ethnic 
divisions within European Jewry) were correct or not. A large part of the Streit 
subsequently branched out, though, into discussions of just these particulars -
which tended to obscure the point and also the actual danger of Treitschke's 
argument. 
Treitschke himself also writes (in his answer to Graetz: Treitschke 1896b) 
that there are no statistical data available that break down immigration numbers 
according to religious affiliation, which means that such data have to be 
reconstructed indirectly from other statistics. Against Graetz's doubts Treitschke 
defends his reading of these data (Treitschke 1896b:31 f). 389 However - echoing 
Lazarus, although obviously with inverse intention - Treitschke also points to the 
merely secondary importance of the statistical issue: for him, the 'social power' 
(sociale Machtstellung) of the Jews is not reflected by their numerical share in 
the population. He states that the migration from the provinces into the cities 
increases Jewish influence on the commercial and social development of the 
nation (ibid.:33). On average greater wealth ensures better education of the Jews 
which in tum ensures greater influence in the press and the financial institutions. 
Treitschke concludes that, irrespective of population statistics, 'the Jews in 
Germany are more powerful than in any other country in Western Europe' 
(ibid.:34). 
The repeated claim that there are no Prussian statistics that would break 
down immigration according to religious affiliation, was refuted by Salomon 
Neumann in his pamphlet 'The fairy-tale of Jewish mass immigration', published 
later in 1880. Neumann argues that the Prussian statistics give detailed 
information on religious affiliation, in particular Jewish (Neumann 1880:3).390 
387 This formulation from the last section of the same text by Treitschke is quoted in chapter 
2.2.10.1. 
388 Cassel remarks that many of 'the German heads' have been 'seduced' and have adopted 
'French frivolity' which proves that they are 'actually not very hard at all' (Cassel 1880:23). 
389 Treitschke added in the fourth edition of the booklet version of the text ('Ein Wort ueber unser 
Judenthum') at this place a footnote on Salomon Neumann's text; for Treitschke's attitude 
towards Neumann see below. 
390 Neumann writes that every year between 1822 and 1840, three hundred more Jews immigrated 
than emigrated, which is roughly equivalent to the corresponding ratio among the general 
population (ibid.:6). The numerical extent of net immigration is thus relatively small in this 
period. From 1840 - 1871 emigration clearly exceeds immigration for all groups of the Prussian 
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In his review of Neumann's brochure in Preussische Jahrbuecher (from 
January 1881; Treitschke 1965c), Treitschke acknowledges the validity of 
Neumann's observation that Jewish emigration exceeded Jewish immigration 
from Eastern Europe to the effect that the overall growth of the Jewish 
population in Prussia was lower than its birth rate. However, he argues that this 
does not affect the validity of his own claims, 
for the social impact of strong foreign immigration is not neutralised by the 
subsequent emigration of the immigrants. Rather, it is obvious that those 
elements of Jewry (Judenthum) that will leave Germany after a few years 
will be least inclined to assimilate (sich zu germanisieren) (Treitschke 
1965c:234f). 
On the one hand, Treitschke certainly has a point here: the possible existence of 
an immigrant population that is merely 'stopping over' on its way to the West (in 
particular America) constitutes a social fact in its own right that is obscured by 
the statistics. On the other hand, Treitschke glosses over that this constellation is 
fundamentally different from the one that he had presupposed in his argument. 
Such a group of 'temporary immigrants' - if they existed - cannot at all be 
argued to pose the kind of problem for the nation-building process that 
Treitschke claims the Jews, and in particular Jewish immigrants from the East, 
pose to Germany. However, instead of conceding defeat on this question, 
Treitschke concludes that 'further substantial statistical evidence has to be 
produced before the issue can be evaluated conclusively' (ibid.).391 
Treitschke returned to the issue in a contribution to Preussische Jahrbuecher 
from November 15, 1883.392 Here he re-asserts his initial position with reference 
to statistical material that has - he writes - been published in the meantime, and 
he took back the one concession he had been forced to make due to Neumann's 
better command of the statistical data. 
population, while the excess is much higher for the Jews than for the overall popUlation (ibid.: 7-
9). Neumann argues that large scale immigration is generally unlikely during times of significant 
emigration (ibid.:15). Immigration into Prussia was generally very low in the period, and there is 
no evidence that would suggest that Jewish immigration was above average. Also, the statistics 
about residents who are born abroad confirm that there was no significant Jewish immigration 
from the East (ibid.: 18). 
391 Adolf Wagner in his review of Neumann's brochure (1880) wrote that for 'cultural reasons', 
internal migration could also be counted as 'immigration' (Regneri 1998: 147). 
392 'Jewish Immigration to Prussia' (1896h:295-302) 
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The thrust of Neumann's argument was that Treitschke had mistaken 
migration from the Eastern Prussian provinces into (first of all) Berlin (in the 
context of a general migration from the countryside to the urban centres) for 
immigration. The people Treitschke called 'Polish Jews' were actually 'Prussian 
Jews'. 
The fact that this particular issue gained (relatively) much attention within 
the debate is further evidence for how much it was bound up in a discourse on 
nationality: from the point of view of a straightforwardly racialist or ethnic-
culturalist anti-Semitism, it is irrelevant which state's territory the undesirable 
Jews come from. The fact that Treitschke too did not care much about the precise 
place of origin of the unwelcome strangers indicates that he already had one foot 
in the racialist discourse that became predominant only in the 1890s.393 
2.2.2.3 THE 'TWO BRANCHES' ISSUE 
The other ground on which Treitschke based his claim of a specifically 
German 'Jewish Question' was his notion of the 'two branches' of Jewry. Three 
issues were under discussion: 
~ Treitschke's use of the term 'Polish' (instead of 'Germanic') branch; 
~ Treitschke's notion that the Jews of the 'Western' countries consisted 
predominantly of 'Spanish Jews' and that these tended to be more assimilated 
than the 'Polish (German) Jews'; 
~ Treitschke's understanding of how the 'character' and degree of assimilation 
of either branch was formed by their differing experience of persecution. 
Joe! (1965:18f) rejects the concept ofa 'Polish branch' and argues that the 
Jews of Poland are actually the descendants of German Jews (ibid.: 18/94 who 
never stopped sticking to their 'Germanness (Deutschthum),. 
393 Another irony of the debate is that Eastern immigration increased significantly only in the 
course of the 1880s. To the extent that the defence against Treitschke focussed on proving that 
there was no Jewish immigration, it was eclipsed by later developments. While Treitschke 'lost' 
the 'Berliner Antisemitismusstreit' on the terrain of migration statistics, in the long run it proved 
fatal that the defenders of the Jews won their battle on this ground and not on the grounds of 
principle. The debate's focus on some of the facts and figures aspects of the anti-Jewish discourse 
contributed to avoiding the more fundamental issues at stake. 
394 'The Polish Jew is the German Jew who once had been driven to Poland' (ibid.: 19; italics in 
the original). 
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Graetz (Graetz 1965a) argued that the majority of French Jews are 'of 
German descent'. Philippson also wrote that during the two centuries that 
Alsace-Lorraine was a part of France more than 120000 mostly German Jews 
lived in France; furthermore, most Parisian Jews are of German background.395 
Oppenheim argues, referring to his own experience, that in France, England and 
Holland nine out often Jews involved in public affairs are 'German Jews', while 
the much smaller number ofIberian Jews live more secluded than the former. 396 
Bress/au held that only Italian Jewry consisted in its majority of Spanish and 
Portuguese immigrants, while in France and England (similar to the case in 
Germany), relatively few Jews are from the 'Spanish branch' (Bresslau 
1965a:58). Furthermore, he points out that there is no evident correspondence at 
all between ethnic ( 'Stammes '-) background and the measure of assimilation or 
emancipation (ibid.:59f). Differences in the extent of anti-Jewish prejudice in 
different countries must have other reasons. In England, Bresslau adds, anti-
Jewish prejudice 'exists to almost the same degree, only it never took as 
disgusting forms as currently in Germany' (ibid.:60). In France and Italy it is less 
strong, firstly because in the Romance countries there is no big difference in 
physical appearance between Jews and non-Jews, and secondly because 'one 
does not have to indicate one's confession at any conceivable [official] 
occasion'. Due to the confessional divide stemming from the 16th century, 
religious divisions in general are also experienced more strongly in Germany 
than anywhere else. 
Graetz writes that while Jews in Spain and Portugal suffered much more 
brutal persecution from the 14th to the 18th centuries, the Jews who come to 
Germany from Poland bring with them 'no scars' since they have been 
persecuted there only since the 1 i h century.397 Graetz concludes that the 
'Spanish Jews' integrated themselves despite their scars from centuries of 
persecution, while the 'German Jews' assimilated even more (in the absence of 
such scars) - and actually are 'incomparably more patriotic than for example the 
Poles (Wasserpolaken) in Upper Silesia and other Slavonic tribes in Germany' 
(ibid.:28). 
395 AZ9. 12. 1879, No. 50:786 
396 (in Die Gegenwart, 10.1. 1880, No. 17,2:17 
397 Nadyr (1879: 15) also points out that the Jews in Poland were not persecuted until 1648. 
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Treitschke (1896b:35) responded to Graetz's objections by re-stating his 
argument in an idiosyncratic way. He writes that the Spanish Jews' downfall 
under the Christian monarchs (after their enjoyment of cultural and economic 
high status under the Omayyad dynasty) brought them not only misery but also 
'the sublime and enthusiastic power ofmartyrdom',398 while the Jews in Poland 
had suffered a 'formally more moderate but essentially more pernicious tyranny' 
(ibid.:35). Treitschke explains 
... that an enslavement over hundreds of years accompanied by modest 
economic well-being necessarily does greater damage to the character of a 
people than a history full of great sufferings and struggles. Since our 
occidental history is essentially (im Wesentlichen) a history of freedom, 
aberrations and setbacks notwithstanding, the Marrannos of the West must 
be closer to our nature (unserem Wesen) than the Polish branch of the Jews 
(ibid.). 
Treitschke plays here on a Hegelian theme in his distinction between the proud 
and freedom-loving Spanish Jews and the 'Polish Jews' whose history is not a 
'history of freedom' (i.e. of the unfolding of freedom) and whose less brutal fate 
corrupted their Volksgeist. Different from the survivors of the Spanish Catholic 
reaction, the Jews in Germany carry deep 'scars' not so much from persecution 
but from the unheroic character of their own history.399 As a result of this, 
contemporary German Jews are less patriotic400 and assimilated than the 
descendants of the Marranos of France or England and are also rather arrogant 
and unpleasant fellow citizens.401 
Treitschke concludes: 
398 'Die erhebende und begeisternde Macht des Martyriums' 
399 This argument is reminiscent of the Hegelian concept of 'historyless peoples'. 
400 Treitschke is particularly unimpressed when Graetz defends the lack of patriotic loyalty on the 
side of the Jews of the Eastern Prussian provinces in the war of 180617 (ibid.:42). While Graetz 
suggests that they had no incentive to be loyal to Prussia, Treitschke argues they should have 
been loyal irrespective of their specific positioning and interests. Graetz in his reply (1965b) 
defends his approval of the disloyality of the Jews of Eastern Prussia in the Napoleonic wars that 
had particularly aroused Treitschke's anger: 'Suspicions about my [lack of] patriotism I have to 
reject' (Graetz 1965b:50). He points out that he had referred to the Duchy of Warsaw only, not, 
as Treitschke insinuated, to the whole of Poznan and Western Prussia: Warsaw had only briefly 
been a province of Prussia which - so Graetz - helps to explain that both Poles and Jews 
welcomed Napoleon as a liberator. The Jews had as well the obvious reason that France had 
generally taken a more positive attitude towards emancipation than Prussia at the time. 
401 It is possible that Treitschke's notion of the unheroic character of the German Jews is a 
proj ection of German nationalism's shame about the lack of a continuous German national (pre-
)history. 
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However, our public opinion finally is beginning to be watchful. In only a 
few years to come, it will be strengthened enough so that derogatory 
speeches about the 'ancient Germanic rabble (germanischen Vr-mob), as 
can be found now in the Jewish press will be as inconceivable in Germany 
as they already are in England (ibid.:46). 
Again, Treitschke points to the Jews of 'the West', in this case, of England, as 
showing the way the Jews of Germany ought to go.402 Except for Graetz, 
Treitschke does not give any evidence for his claim that the German Jews are 
less loyal to the German state than British Jews are towards their state.403 
Treitschke further supports his position with a reference to the history of the 
French Revolution. While the 'Jews ofthe South', i.e. those descending from 
Jews from Portugal, Spain and Avignon, gained legal equality in 1790, the 
Alsatian, i.e. 'German' Jews did not for another year and a half. Treitschke draws 
the conclusion that this must be because the 'Spanish Jews' fitted better into 
Occidental civilization (ibid. :51 f). 
Bress/au in his second reply commented that the differences in the pace of 
the emancipation of the Jews in France do not warrant conclusions about their 
'tribal' character but can be explained much more easily. Bresslau relates that 
'the Spanish and Portuguese Jews' of south em France had immigrated as 
(outwardly) converted Jews (Scheinchristen) and therefore had gained civil rights 
in France as early as 1550. Because they followed all Catholic customs they were 
not persecuted (as for example the Huguenots were) but managed in some cases 
even to attain nobility. Only from the 18th century on did their descendants begin 
to re-emphasize their Jewishness. Bresslau concludes on this issue: 
That a difference was made between those who had been French for two 
hundred years on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Jews from Alsace, 
who had been excluded until 1790 from purchasing land and from almost 
every decent trade and were generally hated for this reason; that there was 
hesitation to lead the latter without mediation (uebergangslos) from a 
complete absence of rights into complete equality - this is easily 
402 Meyer points out that on another ocassion Treitschke had quoted Disraeli's boastful remarks 
on the superiority of the Jews which contradicts his claim that boastful remarks by Jews were 
only imaginable in Germany (Meyer 1880a: 36). 
403 Treitschke states that Bresslau's response was the only one that he 'read with a sincere feeling 
of regret' (Treitschke 1896c:47). He claims that he had hoped his text would be welcomed by 
'those Jews who unconditionally feel themselves to be Germans'. Treitschke turns the fact that 'a 
man as totally German-minded (deutsch gesinnter) as Bresslau' feels offended by remarks that 
'he cannot possibly understand as referring to himself into another 'proof of that exaggerated 
sensitivity that distinguishes the German Jews from the French or English Jews' (ibid.:48). 
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understandable and does not need to be explained through the assumption of 
a difference in the ability for assimilation between the two groups of 
European Jewry (Bresslau 1965b:93f). 
Bresslau, in his refutation of Treitschke's attempt to 'racialize' or essentialize the 
different fates of the two groups, develops a historical explanation of the 
discrimination of the Alsatian Jews by the French National Assembly in 1790 
that comes close to a justification. 
Bamberger points out that there would have been much less outrage about 
'trouser-selling youths', had their descendants also become sellers of trousers. 
Anti-Jewish animosities are a reaction to 'an unusual drive towards learning' 
(Bamberger 1965: 168) and to social advance in the areas of 'honorable 
(ehrbaren) commerce, industry, art and ( ... ) science (Wissenschaft),. 
Treitschke's principal worries, however, are shared by Mommsen, although 
the latter draws a different conclusion: 
With the war of the Jews, we - the nation that has just been unified - enter 
upon a dangerous path. Our tribes (SHimme) are very unequal among 
themselves. None of them lacks their specific defects, and our mutual love 
is not so old that it would not possibly die (rosten), (Mommsen 
1965b:215). 
Mommsen adds that German unity is particularly precarious because it has been 
granted more 'by hatred of our enemies than by our own merit'. Mommsen 
warns that what has been granted by war can be taken away by disunity in peace 
(ibid.:216). 
164 
2.2.3 German culture, Jewish culture, and the concept ora 'mixed 
culture' 
2.2.3.1 TREITSCHKE'S DEMAND THAT THE JEWS BECOME GERMANS 
Along with 'the Jews are our misfortune' and the remark about the 'trouser-
selling youths', the third of the most frequently quoted sequences of Treitschke' s 
text is the one that contains what he 'has to demand' from the German Jews: 
What we have to demand from our Jewish fellow-citizens is simple: that 
they become Germans, feel themselves simply and justly to be Germans 
(sich schlicht und recht als Deutsche fiihlen), regardless (unbeschadet) of 
their faith and their old sacred memories, which all of us hold in reverence; 
for we do not want thousands of years of Germanic civilization (Gesittung) 
to be followed by an era of German-Jewish mixed culture (Mischcultur) 
(Treitschke 1896a:23). 
The logical structure of this statement is as follows: 
~ We demand: become Germans 
i.e., feel German 
regardless of faith and memories 
~ for we do not want ... mixed culture. 
The demand that the Jews 'become Germans' regardless404 of their (Jewish) 
religiosity seems to imply that religion is irrelevant for Germanness. However, 
Treitschke's restatement of Germanness as 'feeling' oneself to be German 
determines 'becoming German' as a process in which a choice that is political as 
well as cultural, although not (explicitly) religious, is intemalized.405 
In the subsequent sentence, introduced by 'for' (denn), Treitschke gives his 
reason for demanding the Jews to become Germans: 'we' do not want 'Germanic 
civilization (Gesittung)' to be replaced by a 'mixed culture'. The 'demand' for 
the Jews to become Germans appears to be a statement about state citizenship 
and -loyalty only. The 'want', however, that is articulated in the half-sentence 
that follows is a statement about' civilization' (Gesittung) and 'culture'. The 
statement about 'Gesittung' and culture provides the reason for the statement 
404 'Unbeschadet' plus genitive means 'regardless of although in the 19th century the etymology 
might stiII have reverberated as 'undamaged by'. 
405 Holz (2001 :211) reads the 'feeling' differently. While I argue that for Treitschke 'becoming 
German' always includes the dimension of 'feeling' - i.e. a dimension of consciousness or 'spirit' 
- Holz argues that Treitschke wants to say that the Jews can in the best of cases be expected to 
feel German because they cannot really become Germans. 
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about Germanness: because we do not want mixed culture, we demand the Jews 
become Germans. If the issue of Germanness is linked to a concern about culture 
(its purity and preservation), it is not a purely state-political issue, and it is 
doubtful how religion could be bracketed out of the equation. 
Treitschke's argument here is about his fear that a significant portion of the 
German Jews might refuse to 'become Germans' and destroy the 'purity' of 
'German culture'. His fear is based on his observation that the Jews are mediocre 
in the arts and sciences and harmful in literature and journalism. That they do not 
contribute anything positive shows that they do not want to become Germans. 
Whether they are unwilling or actually unable to perform up to German 
standards, is left open by Treitschke - here are two directions into which the 
debate will subsequently develop: the problem might be seen in Jewish lack of 
patriotism (a lack of political will; boycott; treason) or in an essential (racial) 
defect. The majority of the contributions to the Streit discussed the validity of 
Treitschke's evidence: what is the Jewish contribution to German culture, is there 
such a thing as 'cultural purity', and ifthere is, is it something worth aspiring to? 
Treitschke names the composer Felix Mendelssohn and two liberal 
politicians, Veit and Riesser (noting that contemporary examples could be added) 
as positive exceptions: 
it would be a sin to forget that a great number of Jews, baptized and 
unbaptized, ( ... ) were Germans in the best sense of the word, men in whom 
we revere the noble and fine traits of the German spirit (Geist) (ibid.). 
Treitschke confirms his indifference about religion ('baptized and unbaptized') 
and amplifies his notion of 'feeling' oneself German in terms of' spirit'. The 
actual display of 'German spirit' appears now as the decisive quality expected 
from a full member of German society. The category of 'spirit' traverses the 
conceptual divide between state and (underlying) culture. 
At the same time it cannot be denied, however, that there are numerous and 
powerful groups among our Jewry who definitely do not seriously intend 
(den guten Willen haben) to become simply Germans [italics added]. 
While there were Jewish individuals - Treitschke gives their names - who 
became Germans, i.e. developed and displayed 'German spirit', there are 
'numerous and powerful' groups (Jveise) who 'definitely' do not have this 'good 
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will,.406 As evidence he points to the Jewish 'arrogance' displayed by Heinrich 
Graetz (see chapter 2.2.7), a discussion of the Jewish economic spirit (see chapter 
2.2.4) and the role of Jews in the cultural realm: 
Among the leading names of art and science there are not many Jews. Far 
larger is the busy horde of Semitic third-rate talents (ibid.:25). 
Treitschke seems to have in mind two groups of Jewish intellectuals in particular, 
writers (he uses the derogatory term 'Poetaster') and journalists. Both together 
form a 'swarm of literati' (Literatenschwarm) bonded together by a mutual 
'insurance company for immortality' (Unsterblichkeits-Versicherungsanstalt) 
which hands out 'one-day fame' instantly and 'in cash'. Treitschke here 
describes cultural life in a language that is borrowed from the sphere of money 
circulation, linking together both spheres: while dealings in money express 
'J ewish spirit' , Jewish cultural production reflects the patterns of the former. 
The illegitimate Jewish domination of the daily press, however, has the 
most dangerous implications - a fateful consequence of our old narrow-
minded (engherzigen) laws, which denied the Israelites access to most 
learned professions. For ten years public opinion in many German cities 
was 'made' mostly by Jewish pens; it was a misfortune for the liberal 
party, and one of the reasons of its decline, that its papers gave much too 
much scope to Jewry (dem Judenthum). 
While the complaint about alleged Jewish domination of the press was then a 
staple topos of anti-Jewish agitation, Treitschke gives this an unusual twist 
claiming that Jewish involvement was one of the reasons of the decline of 'the 
liberal party' .407 
But, according to Treitschke, the Jews not only did a disservice to liberalism 
and its press but to the press in general. He claims that 'the little man cannot be 
talked out of believing that the Jews write the newspapers and therefore he will 
not believe anything they say any longer' (ibid.:25). Treitschke assumes here the 
406 Treitschke seems to hesitate before he goes into more detail about what he has to say about 
these 'Kreise' and finds it necessary to warn preemptively: 'Even conciliatory words are easily 
misunderstood here'. 
407 Given that liberalism in Germany owed a lot to a number of Jewish intellectuals and 
politicians, this is a distortion and slander, turning the victims into perpetrators. What brought the 
National-Liberal party into crisis was the ending of its cooperation with Bismarck and the 
Imperial state. The Jewishness of some liberal functionaries was of no relevance to Bismarck's 
ending this alignment. Treitschke had left the National-Liberal party only a few months before. 
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air of one, who would like to talk 'the little man' out of his anti-Semitic false 
belief, but unfortunately the Jews have driven things too far already. 
Jews: 
Treitschke continues with another nod towards the good qualities of the 
Our press owes much to Jewish talents. The acuteness and nimble 
quickness (schlagfertige Gewandheit und Scharfe) of the Jewish mind 
always found the arena of the press a rewarding field (ibid.). 
However, this compliment also turns into an indictment in the same breath: 
But here too the effect was two-edged. Borne was the first to introduce into 
our journalism the peculiarly shameless tone which talks about the 
fatherland as if from an external position (so von aussen her) and without 
any reverence, as if one did not belong to it (als gehore man seIber gar 
nicht mit dazu), as if mockery of Germany did not cut deeply into the heart 
of every individual German (ibid.). 
While in the preceding formulation, Jewish journalism is being accused of 
general trivialization and commercialization of intellectual life, the accusation 
that is directed against Borne is more specific: Borne talks 'as if from outside' 
(so von aussen her) and as ifhe did not belong. Significantly, the charge is not 
that Borne is an outsider and actually does not belong - the charge is that despite 
a/belonging, he still 'mocks'. 
This formulation brings the argument back to Treitschke's 'demand' made 
above: the Jews, just like everybody else, should 'become Germans' 
unconditionally and at the same time stop being 'other'. While Treitschke on the 
one hand asserted the freedom of religion, on the other hand he demands 
unequivocal identification and identity, not identity and difference interlocked. 
Many responses to Treitschke's article argued against Treitschke's claims 
about what the Jews actually contributed to German culture, but there was also 
an elaborate discussion of the concepts of 'purity of culture' and 'mixed 
culture' .408 At the same time, there was a widespread notion of a specific affinity 
between German and Jewish 'spirit': it was argued on the one hand that Jewish 
difference was not a bad thing at all, and on the other hand that the difference 
was much smaller than Treitschke had claimed. 
408 In a comment on Bresslau's and Treitschke's argument about 'mixed culture', Wilhelm 
Endner formulated more explicitly: 'Amongst the Gruender and usurers, pawnbrokers and 
repurchase traders, amongst all the bloodsuckers who understand just how to avoid prison, there 
are also many of German descent. Those are called "Jews" by the people - not by me -, they are 
representatives and the first offspring of German-Jewish mixed culture' (Endner 1965:110). 
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2.2.3.2 ON THE VALUE OF THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO GERMAN CULTURE; THE 
JEWISH ROLE IN JOURNALISM 
Most comments on these issues emphasize that the Jewish contribution to 
German culture and science is very high given that the Jews were institutionally 
excluded until only one generation before (Lazarus 1880:28-31). Bress/au states 
that the 70 or so Jewish professors at German universities - more than three 
times of what could be expected from their share in the population - cannot all 
be 'third rank' (as Treitschke had claimed) and argues that the massive 
involvement of Jews in this sphere is actually an indication of their patriotic 
commitment: 'All these men honestly work for the greater honour of the German 
name and to the advancement of the greatest fame of our nation, German 
scholarship (Wissenschaft), (Bresslau 1965a:68). The employment of Jews in 
academia demonstrates not only Jewish commitment to the progress of the 
nation, but also the state's recognition of this commitment.409 
Bresslau accuses Treitschke of uncritically replicating the strategy of the 
ultramontane press to denounce the liberal press as Jewish while hugely 
exaggerating the role of Jews in the liberal press (ibid.:68f). He reports that 
although there might indeed be a great number of Jewish correspondents and 
reporters, their representation on editorial boards and thus their influence on 
editorial policy is actually minute (ibid.:69). He adds that even if their number 
was larger 'I could not really concede that this in itself constituted a misfortune' 
since amongst the Jews there are undoubtedly many 'knowledgeable and decent 
409 Oppenheim writes similarly: 'How many Humboldt, Ritter, Helmholtz, Ranke does even the 
ingenious (geistesgrosse) German nation produce in a century! Since the Jews in Germany 
constitute just a bit more than one percent of the population ... it is highly honourable for them to 
be represented at all' (Oppenheim: 1880: 19). Oppenheim sarcastically comments that the claim 
that there is a Jewish 'insurance company for self-congratulation' (Lobassekuranz) (similar to 
Treitschke's 'Unsterblichkeits-Versicherungsanstalt') has been made before and ought not to be 
leveled at the Jews only. After all, the Jews are not very good at professional cliquishness 
because they tend to spend their evenings in the family not the pub (Kneipe) where cliques are 
constructed. Cassel (1880: 14) adds that the humour in the formulation is not new: the orientalist 
Max Mueller had before used the term 'intemationale Lobesversicherungs-Gesellschaft' in a 
polemic exchange, and also another writer (Martin Haug) had used 'Lob-
Assekuranzgesellschaft' . 
Oppenheim writes further that due to the modem division of labour between critics and producers 
of art and literature, the critics usually do not have anything to gain from doing favours. Rather it 
is the daily amount of mediocrity that 'is blunting' (Oppenheim 1880:19) and makes one's 
judgement more mild. On the other hand, most publications are partisan or party-related, as are 
most notably Treitschke's own 'Preussische Jahrbuecher'. Oppenheim also sarcastically admires 
Treitschke's ability to sense the religious background of writers of articles in the press since these 
tended to be anonymous at the time. 
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men' (ibid.:70). If there are incompetent and characterless, 'Catilinarian 
existences' amongst journalists, this is not a specifically Jewish problem. He 
adds that not the Jews but the Catholic reaction is actually unpatriotic: 
Never in the time that I lived through myself has any Jewish publication 
equalled the polemical perfidy of the Roman Jesuit paper, which carries to 
the shame of the German people the name 'Germania', nor the malignant 
slander of the 'Reichsglocke' by Herr Gehlsen nor the arrogant scorn of 
any national feeling in the 'Vaterland' edited by the ur-Germanic Herr Dr. 
Sigl! 
Bresslau underlines his own patriotism through the repeated attack on ultra-
montanism's orientation towards Rome. He points out that Treitschke focuses 
overly on alleged Jewish disloyalty for which there is sparse evidence while 
Jesuit reaction could much more obviously be charged. This disproportion 
illustrates the shift in Treitschke's position after the 'Culturkampf. 
Bresslau furthermore rejects Treitschke's comments on Borne and states that 
'acerbic self-criticism (schneidige Selbstkritik), has 'always been a trait of the 
German character - and not one of its worst traits' (ibid.:71f). He points as an 
example to Samuel von Pufendorf lO and argues that 'superior scorn (ueberlegene 
Hohn)' is not evidence of alienation but a mark of great writers. Bresslau stresses 
that Borne was very serious in his 'burning ardor of patriotism' (ibid.:72). 
Treitschke replied to Bresslau that Christian editors are dependent on 'their 
Jewish correspondents in Paris and London' (Treitschke 1896c:53) as well as the 
money coming from Jewish advertisers.411 In other words, the fact that non-
Jewish editors are also less anti-Jewish than Treitschke would have expected is in 
turn proof of the dictatorial influence of the Jews. Treitschke implies that Jewish 
reporters are able to dominate even those who employ them.412 
To illustrate the evil influence of 'neo-Judaism', Treitschke adds a discussion 
of Borne and Heine and 'the days of Young Germany' (ibid.:55). With hindsight, 
410 1632-1694, the legal theorist and defender of absolutism; like Treitschke from Saxony. 
411 In his second reply to Treitschke, Bresslau remarked dryly: 'I do not think that the Jews who 
are generally held to be good in business base their decisions about the placement of 
advertisements on other criteria than the highest possible circulation of their adverts; and as 
subscribers they can hardly have a significantly larger influence on the press than corresponds to 
their numerical strength in the German Reich' (Bresslau 1965b:94). Similarly, Philippson had 
written in the AZ , 17.2.1880, No 7: 'Herr Treitschke knows little about business' adding that 
adverts obviously go where ever they are most effective. 
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as Treitschke claims, these days can now be recognized as 'an era of moral and 
intellectual decline' (sittlichen und geistigen Verfalls): 
Alien (unheimische), radical, abstract ideas invaded our life at that time, 
and a slavish adoration of foreign ideas was preached in the name of 
liberty. Up to the present day, our best minds have been laboring to liberate 
the nation from the un-German ideals of that infertile epoch and to lead it 
back to itself (ibid.). 
While Bresslau had likened Borne to Pufendorf, Treitschke argues that Borne 
lacked what constituted Pufendorfs greatness, namely 'superiority' and 
'thorough industriousness' (Fleiss). Also Borne's patriotism lacked seriousness. 
He compares Heine favourably to Borne because of Heine's 'richer nature' 
(ibid.:56) and 'most of all, because Heine was far more German than Borne'. 
Treitschke distinguishes two dimensions of Heine's work, the 'international 
jokes' for which he earned a reputation as being 'vraiment Parisien' and those 
poems -like 'Loreley' - that display 'straightforwardly German sentiment' or 
even the 'smell of the soil' (Erdgeruch) from the Rhineland. Dismissing the 
former but applauding the latter, Treitschke posits Heine in a line of Jews who 
'recognized that they can achieve great works of art only on the tracks of the 
German spirit'. By way of making a half-hearted compliment, Treitschke turns 
Heine into a witness to his own argument. Borne, as opposed to Heine, used the 
'abstract journalistic language of education (abstracte journalistische 
Bildungssprache)', which is 'never truly German'. Treitschke concludes: 
Only arrogant mediocrity opposes itself with an air of imagined superiority 
to the knightly (ritterlichen) Germanic Esau .... When we oppose such bad 
habits (Unarten) of the evil elements of our Jewry (unseres Judenthums), 
men like Bresslau should support us. I cannot find a serious and deep 
disagreement between him and myself. 
Only a small number of contributors did not engage in a discussion of the facts 
and figures of Jewish achievement. Ludwig Bamberger turns Treitschke's claim 
that there are only few Jewish talents prominent in the arts and sciences against 
Treitschke: if that were true, Bamberger writes sarcastically, it should be a relief 
412 Treitschke wrote later in his response to Mommsen: 'Who fights today in the press the 
arrogance of the Jews (des Judenthums) does not misuse the power of the mightier but stands one 
against a hundred' (Treitschke 1965b:229). 
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to him because it would lessen the Jews' chances of polluting German culture. 413 
Even Bamberger, however, finds it necessary to add that there are many 'quiet, 
solemn and idealistic' (Bamberger 1965:173) Jewish scholars who do not get the 
attention that noisy 'third rank talents' of either denomination receive. 
The author who adopted the most assertive tone of all Jewish respondents, 
Nadyr, wrote, addressing Treitschke: 'you find the allegedly disproportionate 
influence of the Jews on the press unpleasant - the more pleasant it is to us' 
(Nadyr 1879:13).414 On the argument that the German Jews should become more 
German, Nadyr retorts: 'To be honest, we foreign Jews find that our German co-
religionists are already much too Germanized.' (ibid.: 14) He quotes Borne as 
saying that the German Jews should aspire to all the good qualities of the 
Germans without the bad ones and suggests that the German Jews are not 
selective enough in assimilating (ibid.: 15). They have no reason to be ashamed of 
their ancestry. Nadyr quotes the literal wording of Graetz's remark on Borne and 
Heine,415 suggesting that there is nothing wrong with it: 
Borne and Heine introduced into German literature (machten heimisch) wit 
and spirit, of which then - apart from Lessing - only a few in Germany had 
a proper understanding (ibid.: 19). 
Nadyr also argues that the German Jews had been right to participate in the 
debates of the Kulturkampf since this was not a debate about religious dogma but 
one about the character of the state: in participating, the Jews thus clearly acted 
as German nationals (ibid.:25). 
413 Bamberger misses here the kultUipessimistische point ofTreitschke's argument that in 
contemporary culture, the mediocre dominates the truly great. 
414 He adds that he is confident, nevertheless, that 'the sad and ignominious years of Hep Hep will 
not come back' because the German people has come of age (muendig) (ibid.). 
415 The reference is to Graetz 1870:369. 
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2.2.3.3 ON THE CONCEPT OF A 'MIXED CULTURE' 
For Bamberger, Treitschke's concept of the 'purity' of culture is mistaken 
and meaningless (Bamberger 1965: 171): 
If purity was a particularly distinguishing quality in connection with the 
concept of culture, then indeed one would have to be suspicious about 
German culture. ( ... ) If culture was something to be grown from the 
primeval soil (Urwaldboden), then the concept of a pure German culture 
that is thousands of years old would be an [enormously exaggerated] 
fiction ( ... ) Fortunately, though, culture is just the opposite of the linear 
propagation of a single national spirit (Volksgeist), and German culture 
stands so high because it managed to assimilate and digest so much (in sich 
aufzunehmen und zu verarbeiten vermochte) (ibid.:171±). 
Bamberger points out that Goethe had named Shakespeare and Spinoza as his 
main influences and quotes Herder's statement: 
(W)e Germans would still live in the forests peacefully like Americans, or 
rather brutally fighting and being heroes, had not the chain of foreign 
culture urged itself closely upon us and forced us, with the might of 
. . I d 416 centunes, to get lllVO ve . 
Since German culture is anything but pure in the first place, 'it is a mystery' how 
it should 'become a mixed culture' through the influence of the Jews 'who have 
settled in Germany almost from the very beginnings' (ibid.: 172). Bamberger 
points to the particular paradox that they are considered a threat to the purity of 
German culture because they 'push into the German universities and the German 
army', 'the two breasts of contemporary Germany's communal life': 
They sit in the lectures ofTreitschke, Duehring and Adolf Wagner, they 
even break their necks for the music of Richard Wagner, and in return - 0 
ingratitude - they are accused of shoving German culture into their bags as 
if they could run away with it like with a silver spoon (ibid.). 
Bamberger gives here a striking metaphor for the reification of culture into a set 
of static artefacts that underlies Treitschke's thinking. 
Bress/au rejects the concept of the unitary character of German culture in 
similar terms: 
416 Bamberger quotes from 'On the Origin of Language': ' ... wenn die Kette fremder Cultur nicht 
so nah an uns gedrangt und mit der Gewalt ganzer lahrhunderte uns genoethigt batte, mit 
einzugreifen' (translated from the quotation in Bamberger). 
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Our culture (Gesittung) is not at all, not even predominantly, a Germanic 
one, and in fact we have a mixed culture resting on three factors: 
Germanity, Christianity and classical antiquity (oo.). Nothing had a stronger 
impact on the culture ofthe German people than both the Old and the New 
Testament, both of which are undeniably a product of Judaism (Judenthum) 
(Bresslau 1965a:61). 
Bresslau stresses, however, that he 'subscribe(s) totally and completely' 
(ibid.:62) to Treitschke's demand for the 'Israelites' to 'become Germans,.417 He 
merely rejects Treitschke's claim that 'numerous and powerful circles' within 
Jewry did not intend 'to give up that quality that distinguishes the Jew from the 
Germanic person'. Bresslau argues that this was true of only' a small bunch of 
ultra-orthodox rabbis' (ibid.:63) who still considered 'Palestine the promised 
land' and the Jewish residence in Germany 'merely temporary' .418 
Holding the large majority of German Jews responsible for this bunch's 
attitude would be as unfair and inappropriate as if one would condemn the 
large majority of German Catholics because a few fanatical ultra-
montanists are prepared any moment to subordinate their German national 
feeling to Rome's claim to power. Anyway, the former's small and 
declining number is incomparably less dangerous to the German being 
(Wesen) than the activities (Treiben) of those minions of Rome (Romlinge) 
who dare to want to teach the Jews patriotism (ibid.). 
Bresslau claims that the 'ultra-montanists' constitute a much greater potential of 
disloyalty than the orthodox Jews do. 
The fact that there is a small number of un assimilated Jews, in particular in 
the countryside, is, however, not surprising: 
Just a century ago everything prevented the Jews from becoming German. 
The religious divide, the intolerance of Christian as well as Jewish clerics 
(Pfaffen), and most of all a legislation that made them pariahs, kept away 
every beam of German education from the dirty and despised quarters 
where princely favour (landesfiirstliche Gnade) had granted them a meagre 
existence (ibid.:64). 
417 Bresslau writes that had Treitschke not joined into the common, 'merely negative critique of 
Jewry (Judenthum)" he could have 'earned' for himself 'considerable merits about the 
development of the Jewish question'. For that purpose, he would have had to make an effort to 
'deepen the question positively', namely to point out what exactly distinguishes a Jew 'born and 
brought up in Germany' from a 'Germanic' person (Germanen) of similar background and by 
which means 'the transmutation of a Jewish into a Germanic person could be accelerated'. 
Treitschke then would have 'obliged every impartial and unprejudiced Jew to be grateful'. 
418 The possibility of secular Jewish nationalism does not seem to occur to Bresslau. 
174 
Given that emancipation had only been under way for such a short time, it is 
rather surprising that the 'process of amalgamation' has already succeeded so far 
(ibid.:65). The urging of so many Jews into education is, to Bresslau, a sign of 
their determination to assimilate to German culture. Jewish scholars like Bresslau 
himself are making an effort to accelerate the process by leading the way with a 
good example - but, directly addressing Treitschke again: 
... You join the men who make the divide more grave - that we chose as 
our lives' aim to make disappear as far as we can! - and thus you make our 
effort more difficult. I do not doubt, my most respected colleague, that you 
intend the good, but allow me to say that you are achieving the evil! (ibid.) 
The central argument of Moritz Lazarus' contribution is that 'true culture ... 
consists in diversity', and that 'the permanent vocation of the Jews' is to be 
promo tors of difference.419 Lazarus sees at the root of the problem a conception 
of history that is teleological and linear. He rejects the notion that the earlier 
'stage' of a development has a right to exist only insofar as it 'gives birth' to the 
subsequent 'stage' or form of existence (ibid. :41 ).420 He argues that 'the generic' 
or 'humanity' is not the result of an evolutionary process but the whole of all the 
forms or individuals that evolve along the way during the process. Rather than 
believing that history is evolving towards an 'end' - such as 'the individual' or 
'the nation' - it ought to be understood that 'the whole great diversity 
(Mannigfaltigkeit) of spiritual life and creation' is 'valuable (wertvoll) in itself. 
Here [in the linear and teleological conception of history] lies the deepest 
root of all intolerance. This is why for the Catholic, Protestantism is 
nothing but rubbish and heresy, while for the Protestant, Catholicism is but 
a preparatory stage. ( ... ) It has been held as an ideal that the whole world 
should adopt the culture of one people: all should become Roman or 
French. True culture, though, consists in diversity (Mannigfaltigkeit) 
(ibid.). 
Both Catholicism and Protestantism are wrong. In a Herderian tone, Lazarus 
condemns the cultural imperialism of Roman as well as French culture and adds: 
419 This is something, he adds without elaborating on it, that the Jews have in common with the 
Germans (Lazarus 1880:44). 
420 Lazarus introduces this idea with the analogy that although 'one might argue that being a 
mother is a woman's essential destination (wesentliche Bestimmung)', 'a woman is also a human 
being in her own right' (ibid.). 
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Mores, customs, strivings, life-styles (Sitten, Gebrauche, Bestrebungen, 
Lebensformen) can, may and should be diverse (mannigfaltig); they will 
have to be objectively different because they are meant to be the ultimate, 
the most pure, the most certain for everyone [subjectively] (weil sie fur 
Jeden das ihm H6chste, Reinste, Gewisseste seyn sollen). ( ... ) How will 
truth grow ifnot through spiritual struggle, ( ... ) through the competition of 
forces? ( ibid.:42). 
Lazarus does not reject the notions of development and progress in general. The 
'ultimate' though consists for him not in 'unity (Einheit), but in 'totality 
(Gesammtheit)' and 'diversity (Mannigfaltigkeit)' 'which cannot nor should be 
destroyed (vertilgt)'. 
At this point Lazarus attributes a particular role to the Jews: the 'permanent 
vocation (Aufgabe) of the Jews' is to be universal promoters of difference: 'By 
participating in various national spirits' they become themselves more and more 
diverse. The Jews differ from all other peoples because they gain 'heightening 
and deepening of their own (Erhohung und Vertiefung des Eignen)' by way of 
'totally immersing themselves (ganz eingehen)' into the particular (national) 
cultures of the societies they live in, whereas all other peoples 'learn from each 
other' while 'always remaining separate'. The Jews 'find, relate to and reinforce' 
in every people or culture those elements that correspond to their own identity 
(Eignes). The Jews thus represent a generic element (Allgemeines) which they 
find and reinforce in every particular people. Doing this feeds and enhances 
within themselves 'the generic' as their own particular characteristic. In this 
sense, Lazarus' argument implies that the Jews constitute a common 
denominator of all other peoples and cultures that they immerse themselves in. 
Lazarus defines this generic element as 'an ethical-religious content that 
overshadows in power and dignity any individual deed'. This specific content has 
come to replace what previously had been the Jews' nationality. Lazarus suggests 
that 'the Jews do not have a nationality anymore' (ibid.:43). They are 
'individualized according to where they live'. This allows Lazarus - in an 
attempt to square the circle of (German) identity and (Jewish) difference - to 
define the Jews as 'not an alien but an individually shaped distinct element 
inherent to each nation, reciprocally and specifically appropriated by them' 
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(ibid.:44). This constitutes their 'specific capacity (specifische 
Leistungsfahigkeit)' . 
In a key passage of his speech Lazarus discusses Treitschke's 'demand' that 
the Jews become Germans, developing his concept of the specific role of the 
Jews within the German nation. Lazarus asserts that the 'concept' and the 'ideal' 
of the nation have to undergo 'permanent deepening (fortwahrende Vertiefung) 
or heightening (Erh6hung), in a permanent struggle for national unity: 
All of us who care for the ideal and its fulfillment should struggle together 
against all those who fail to participate truly and energetically in the 
national idea, against all those who hinder and damage the ideality through 
their base attitudes (niedere Gesinnung) and their mean ways of living and 
acting (ibid.:36). 
Any separation through confession and descent will damage the struggle for 
national 'ideality'. Lazarus' understanding of the 'national ideality' includes a 
cosmopolitan dimension: 
Let the highest development of the idea of German nationality be the 
standard around which we flock. But we aim at a Germanity that is free of 
any felony against received (angestammte) traditions as well as against 
universal human principles (allgemeine menschheitliche Prinzipien). True 
Germanity '" must be high minded and generous (ibid.:36f). 
Lazarus argues that 'the idea of humanity stands higher than any Volksthum'. 
However, Lazarus seems to find the appreciation of the superiority of humanity 
over nationality a typically German notion: 
Never, though, had the particular spirit (Gemuehtsart) of anyone people a 
more direct relationship to this idea of Humanity than the particular spirit 
of the Germans has (ibid.). 
Other nations might have served humanity unintentionally, the 'particular course 
of our history (der besondere Gang unserer Geschichte)', however, has led the 
Germans to choosing consciously the idea of humanity as their (national) 
trademark. Lazarus develops the notion of the particularly unselfish character of 
German nationalism emphatically: 
We have often been reprimanded for not estimating our own but instead 
admiring the alien. It has never been possible to vaccinate us with a decent 
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dosage of national pride ( ... ). With all the will in the world we do not 
manage to despise the alien, to answer the hate of the enemy with equal 
hate; we cannot help searching for and acknowledging the good wherever it 
may be (ibid.:38). 
As a witness to his argument, Lazarus quotes Schiller: 
Germans, you hope in vain 
Ever to form a nation. Strive instead, as you can, 
To a state of greater freedom 
Than that: strive to be humans.421 
At this point in the argument, Lazarus introduces the concept of 'mixed culture'. 
Lazarus argues that 'it has been long established' that the most diversely mixed 
peoples tum out to be the culturally and historically strongest ones. Therefore the 
German Jews 'have the duty ... to remain Jews' and to put their Judaism 'to the 
service of German national spirit as a part of its strength'. This is not, however, 
an issue of the 'mixing of blood' but of 'spiritual abilities, moral drives', and the 
'longing (Sehnsucht) to shape (gestalten) the world'. These 'spiritual abilities' 
are incorporated individually in the tribes that come together to form the nation: 
only in the nation they are harmonized and transcend the individual and the tribal 
towards the generically human. 
As if, in a peculiar way, echoing Lazarus, Naudh too attacks the (liberal) 
trajectory of 'progress' and pleads for the particular and for diversity against the 
generic and the unified, but with diametrically opposed conclusions for the status 
of the Jews. Naudh accuses liberalism of 'ignorance of the particularity of men 
(Menschen) by declaring all men to be equal'. Naudh finds 'strange' that both 
Treitschke and Bresslau 'more or less subscribe to liberalism, although all history 
only originated from the diversity of people' (Naudh 1965:184). 
421 'Zur Nation euch zu bilden, ihr hofft es Deutsche vergebens; Ibildet, ihr koennt es, dafUr freier 
zu Menschen euch aus' (my translation). This epigram (entitled 'Deutscher Nationa1charakter') is 
number 96 of a set of 414 mostly polemical distichons and other short poems called 'Xenien' that 
Goethe and Schiller wrote in close co-operation and published in the 'Musen-Almanach fUr das 
Jahr 1797 '(a literary almanac) in 1796. The title is an allusion to the title of book 13 of the 
'Epigrammata' (85 AD) by the Roman poet Valerius Martialis; a xenion is a gift to be given to a 
guest, which is here ironical due to the polemical character of the 'Xenien'. The preceding 
epigram 95 is called 'Das deutsche Reich': 'Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es? lch weiss das Land 
nicht zu finden; IWo das gelehrte beginnt, hoert das politische auf. (Germany? Where does it lie? 
I don't know where to look for that place; where the scholarly starts, the political ends.)' 
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Naudh defines historiography as the study of the particularity of people and 
claims that it is not compatible with the egalitarian ideas intrinsic to liberalism 
('the scholasticism of politics'). The 'science of politics' will only be able to 
progress 'when it liberates itself from scholastic dogmatism (Formelwesen) and 
transforms itself into an empirical science (Beobachtungs- und Erfahrungs-
Wissenschaft)'.422 Liberals try to deflect from the 'Jewish question' with 
'unscientific' formulas: 
According to the liberal textbook, all men (Menschen) are equal and thus it 
is a mere matter of tactlessness (Unhoflichkeit) of the Jews that they are 
Jews (ibid.). 
The sarcastic use of the word 'tactlessness' seems to imply that the liberal 
conception falsely suggests that the ways one acts in society can be arbitrarily 
chosen as well as changed. For Naudh, there is more to the issue than 'tactful' or 
not so tactful visible behaviour, for behind the visible stands the invisible, the 
racial essence. Naudh exploits the fact that for liberalism - as for himself-
'Jewishness' is not a positive value: he does not reproach liberalism for being 
pro-Jewish but for being nai've about the Jews. According to Naudh, liberalism 
underestimates the danger when it mistakes Jewishness for a mere surface 
phenomenon - for just an accidental matter of bad manners. 
Naudh argues that Treitschke and Bresslau share the 'liberal formula'. When 
Treitschke demands that the Jews become Germans, Bresslau responds that they 
already are Germans (and also that the Germans were 'half Jews' due to the 
Jewish origin of Christianity) (ibid.: 185). Naudh rejects Bresslau's account of the 
concept of 'mixed culture'. The influence of classical antiquity on the formation 
of German culture has not produced a 'mixed culture': 
Greeks and Romans were people of our tribe (Starnmes), their spirit (Geist) 
was closely related to ours and just as alien to the Semitic spirit. Mornmsen 
has already pointed out that it was for this reason that the Punic wars 
became wars of extinction (V emichtungskriege), and the proverbial 'Punic 
loyalty' refers to a feature of the Semitic character in a way similar to how 
we use the term 'Jewish' when referring to a moral character type 
(ibid.:185). 
422 Cpo Naudh's comment on 'convenience' (ibid.: 181: 'fable convenu'). 
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Naudh suggests a three thousand year long Semitic-Gentile conflict (with the 
Phoenicians temporarily standing in for the Jews).423 Although Naudh does not 
use the word on this occasion, his notion of a conflict between two sets of 
peoples over a period of 3000 years logically presupposes the concept of 'race'. 
While, however, 'the old Jews' failed 'to impose a Jewish mixed culture' on 'us', 
'the living Jews' constitute an actual danger (ibid.: 186). This threat is not so 
much that of a mixed culture but rather one of 'Entsittlichung " i.e. a loss of 
culture, morality and civilization (ibid.: 187) because the Jews are not bearers of a 
civilization in the first place. 
The emphasis on the cultural-moral threat constituted by the Jews underpins 
the radicality ofNaudh's position. He is critical of the legalistic character of the 
'Antisemitenpetition' which he finds too 'moderate': the danger will not be 
averted 'even when we exclude the Jews again from the sphere of the state (aus 
unserem Staatsleben),. Naudh grounds his argument on the anthropological 
notion that 'in every individual all good and all bad characteristics can be found 
together' (ibid.). Actual individual behaviour is determined by predominance of 
the one or the other element. This predominance, however, in tum is determined 
by social 'consensus', i.e. in the interdependence with fellow members of 
society. This is why not so much Jewish positioning in the state, but rather the 
number of Jews living in society is at the root of the 'Jewish question'. Naudh 
mentions in particular the 'cunning' (die Listen) of the Jews. The necessity for 
Germans to compete with Jews will inevitably force them to adopt essentially 
'Jewish' strategies. 
The anthropological model presented by Naudh helps him explaining why it 
is due to Jewish influence and responsibility if non-Jewish Germans display 
behaviour that is stigmatized as Jewish. However, this line of argument still 
needs to take account of the obvious fact that the Jews - even ifthere was 
extraordinary immigration - would still constitute a tiny minority in Germany: 
why would not a morally superior German majority of more than 98 % simply 
annihilate Jewish misbehaviour (which had been the expectation underpinning 
the Enlightenment pro-emancipation position)? This is where Naudh brings in 
the concept of the Jews are an unproductive parasitic race. 
423 For this claim he could draw on the authority of 19th century historians as Bernal (1991: 341 f) 
and Burkert (1992 introduction) show. 
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Naudh suggests that 'we' should not wait and see when 'the Jews will have 
the kindness to become Germans which actually they do not want at all and, even 
ifthey wanted, could not do' (ibid.: 188). 'If historiography would be done in a 
more strictly scientific way (mehr in naturwissenschaftlicher Richtung), and if 
ethnography 'would be given the weight it deserves', Naudh argues, then 
historians would not come up with the 'adventurous idea' of turning Jews into 
Germans. 
[The Jew's] bones are crooked and askew and his muscles are weak, which 
is why he has a low fitness for work (Arbeitstuechtigkeit) coupled with an 
even lower enthusiasm for work (Arbeitslust) (ibid.). 
Naudh suggests that 'a whole people cannot do without working' which is why 
the Jews cannot form a people of their own but are forced to live as 'parasites' 
from other peoples' (productive) work. 'Their physical disposition' also 
determines 'their concept of God' and 'their spiritual (geistige) disposition' in 
general. While for the German, religion means 'communion with God through 
moral betterment (sittliche Uiuterung)', the Jews' dispute with their God (setzen 
sich mit ihrem Gotte auseinander) [italics in the original]'. They posit 
themselves 'as would-be competitors (als Contrahenten), against God and as 
negotiating partners 'enter into an immoral covenant (unsittlichen Vertrag), 
(ibid.: I88±). The subject of this covenant is the exchange of worship in return for 
the supply of peoples 'to eat': 'That is the promise that the people of parasites 
needed', Naudh concludes.424 'The difference in the understanding of one's 
relation to God and world' in the German/Aryan and the Jewish conception is 
'that the Aryan considers perfection his task, while the Jew considers enrichment 
his task'. A feeling of honour (Ehrgefiihl) and idealism spring from the Aryan 
conception, while they would contradict the nature of the Jewish covenant and be 
inconvenient for anyone living as a parasite. On the other hand, a lack of feeling 
of honour might result in ruthlessness and thus economic success. The effects of 
the covenant cannot be avoided by conversion: 'Those who deny their Torah still 
cannot deny their descent': the particular type of covenant the Jews made a 
424 Naudh refers here to 5 Moses (Deutoronomy) 7, 16. From the context of the formulation 
quoted by Naudh it is quite clear that according to Moses, God is meant to give Israel only those 
peoples 'to eat' that are enemies ofIsrael. The presupposition of the covenant is that Israel is the 
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centrepiece of their religion was the expression of their particular 'mindset' 
(Denkungsart), and the latter in tum was 'a function of what was then the Jewish 
brain. There is no reason to assume that today's Jewish brain would not function 
in the same way' (ibid.: 190). The notion of the identity of 'the Jewish brain' then 
and now is supported by the assumed fact of 'three thousand years of Jewish in-
breeding' (ibid.: 189) and also by the observation that for example 'Negroes in 
Northern America did not become white' (ibid.: 190).425 This proves that people's 
[physical] 'organization does not change because of a change of climate'. Naudh 
formulates a racist version of the demand for respect for cultural difference: 
We do not want to hold the Jews' lack of honour (Ehr10sigkeit) against 
them, while we would hold it against a German, whose physique is 
designed for honour (dessen Organisation auf Ehrgefiihl veranlagt ist). It is 
denied to the physique of the Jew like the drive and the fitness for work. 
Naudh suggests that in particular, the Jew 'does not know work honour 
(Arbeitsehre), .426 He concludes that because of the Jews' 'parasitical way oflife, 
to which their physical characteristics drive them', their character will not be 
affected by 'so-called emancipation' (ibid.:191). 
Treitschke (1896c) responded to Bresslau's claim that German culture was a 
'mixed culture' by restating his earlier argument: 
The intellectual work of past millennia is given to all modem peoples to lean 
on. Although our German culture (Gesittung) flows - as Bresslau is right to 
point out - from three sources, classical antiquity, Christianity and 
Germanity, it is not at all a mixed culture: we have amalgamated the 
Christian and the Classical ideals with our own essence (Wesen) so totally 
that it has become part of our flesh and blood. But we do not want the neo-
Jewish being (das neujuedische Wesen) to join these three cultural powers as 
a fourth one because whatever elements of Judaism fit in with the German 
genius have long been included into our culture (Gesittung) through the 
mediation of Christianity. We do not want this because we have experienced 
bitterly enough once before427 that the neo-Jewish spirit leads our people 
astray when it faces ours independently (Treitschke 1896c:54). 
weakest and lowest of all peoples, but the adherence to God will guarantee Israel divine support 
against attackers and oppressors. 
425 Naudh got his (18th century style) geo-ethnography wrong: if one thought of skin colour as an 
effect of climate then one ought to expect that the 'Negroes' as well as the 'Whites' in America 
should have become 'Reds'. 
426 This concept seems to be a mixture of 'work ethics' and the pride of doing productive work. 
427 Unclear reference; probably to the 'Young Germany' as subsequently discussed. 
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Treitschke again transforms criticism into support for his position. The strategy 
of his argument is to contest the meaning of the term 'mixed culture'. Treitschke 
opposes 'mixed culture' to 'amalgamations' that have happened slowly over a 
long period of time: 'mixed culture' in Treitschke's definition presupposes the 
recognizable existence of the constituting elements as distinct. This specific 
definition serves to invalidate Bresslau's critique. In the way that Treitschke 
suggests using the word, German culture is not a 'mixed' but an 'amalgamated' 
culture: the 'mixing' has proceeded so far that its elements are not 
distinguishable any more. 
A significant inconsistency manifests itself when Treitschke argues that 'we 
have amalgamated the Christian and the classical ideals with our own essence' 
(Wesen) - namely 'Germanity' - and have thereby produced 'German culture' 
(Gesittung). 'Germanity', 'our own essence' appears here as one of the three 
ingredients that make up the 'amalgam' of 'German culture' (Gesittung). The 
extra-historical 'Wesen' of 'German culture' is in this conception joined by 
classical culture and Christianity - which are less essential but rather accidental 
additions - to form 'German culture'. This reflects a contradiction in 
Treitschke's concept of the nation as both historically constituted and 
transhistorical: while in the majority of Treitschke's formulations, culture 
(understood as the result of historical developments) appears as the essence of 
the nation, in this case 'Germanity' is presented as the essence and antecedent of 
'culture} (namely being one of its three constituents). 
Treitschke argues that because the 'German genius' is already an 'amalgam' 
it should not become a 'mixed culture', too. He concedes to Bresslau that there 
are already Jewish elements in the 'German genius' but turns this into an 
argument against any further 'mixing' of culture. The Jewish elements of 
'German genius' are legitimate and beneficial only to the extent that they are not 
recognisable as such but mediated and completely amalgamated. While those 
elements that have already been added to the German amalgam are the best ones, 
those that have been rejected by Christianity are detrimental if they are allowed 
to constitute themselves independently as 'neo-Judaism', i.e. outside the 
seamless amalgam. They must not be accepted. 
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2.2.3.4 ON THE AFFINITY BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND THE JEWISH SPIRIT 
In opposition to Treitschke, Bamberger and Lazarus, both strongly patriotic 
writers, held the notion of a specific affinity between the German and the Jewish 
spirit. For Bamberger, the apparently 'German-Jewish' conflict is actually a 
'German-German' conflict because it is characterized on both sides by the same 
'bad habits' which are 'probably German': high emotionality in religious and 
cultural affairs and a tendency for indulging in prejudices and for voicing them 
out loud (Bamberger 1965:162). 'The thinking ones amongst the German Jews' 
tended not to get angry about the anti-Jewish campaigning because they 'know 
and appreciate their fellow Germans (ihre deutschen Landsleute), to such an 
extent that they understand that the anti-Jewish sentiment is merely an 
unavoidable symptom of the Germans' character - a frame of mind that they 
share and, by and large, appreciate. Furthermore, they know - or feel anyway -
that in sharing those bad German habits they also share in the responsibility for 
the anti-Semitic movement. Contrary to Treitschke's claim, Bamberger argues 
that the Jews have lived with no other people in such close communion.428 'They 
are Germanized not only on German soil but far beyond Germany's borders' 
(ibid.). The Jews' language anywhere in Europe is blended with German 
vocabulary, 'and he who talks about language talks about spirit (Geist)'. 
Bamberger points out that the Jews had maintained themselves in Germany 
throughout the ages although their lives have always been made particularly 
difficult there. This 'drives one to the assumption' (ibid.: 164) that the Jews must 
have been attracted by the Germans by 'commonalities in the fundamental 
character structure'. 'A mixture of heterogeneous and common spiritual 
characteristics' (ibid.: 165) are at the basis of both mutual attraction and 'intimate 
animosity'. Bamberger explains: 
The common trait is the fundamentally spiritual character: Jews and 
Germans are without doubt the two most spiritual nations of all times and 
places. ( ... ) The inclination towards abstract thinking, one of the 
foundations of the spiritual outlook on life, is most developed in Jews and 
Germans (ibid.). 
428 'Denn mit keinem Volke haben sie sich auch nur entfemt so eng zusammengelebt, man 
koennte sagen identificirt, wie mit den Deutschen. ' 
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As evidence he points out that nowhere except in Germany have 'the spiritual 
views of Judaism, de-nationalized in the form of Christianity', or 'Spinoza' s 
speculative philosophy', or 'the philosophizing socialists Marx and Lassalle', 
been received and embraced so thoroughly and won such a large following. Jews 
and Germans also share a 'cosmopolitan aptitude' and the ability to 'depart from 
the given state of things' (sich vom Gegebenen loszureissen). Bamberger 
concludes: 
Both possess in common the mystery of speculation, in the philosophical as 
well as the economic sense of the word, which profound term covers not by 
coincidence both these operations of the mind, the philosophical and the 
mercantile (ibid.: 165£).429 
Bamberger's argument is here excessively idealistic: the history of Jewish 
settlement and migration is certainly not a function of the mutual attraction or 
repulsion of 'national spirits'. 
Bamberger further claims that the Germans are 'the most outstanding 
merchants of the world' (ibid.: 166), held down only by 'territorial fragmentation 
(Kleinstaaterei), and 'the arrogance of Junkers, civil servants or academics' .430 
'The attack on the "merchants" in general was the logical opening of the 
campaign against the Jews', Bamberger argues. He implies that the attack on the 
Jews and their speculative-spiritual-commercial spirit is eo facto an attack on 
those Germans who - because they 'possessed' the same spiritual gifts - were 
the force behind German nation-building. 
Despite the far-reaching identity of the German and the Jewish spirit in the 
'mystery of speculation', Bamberger also recognizes differences. 'Depth of 
thinking and wealth of feeling,431 are more German, 'hot-blooded, witty humour 
429 Bamberger's remark on abstract thinking and mercantile economy as two dimensions of 
'speculation' (implying a common root) seems to echo a 'young-Hegelian' theme that can be 
found in Heine's, Borne's and (the young) Marx's writings. It also anticipates an argument of 
Marxist theory as developed much later by George Thomson (1955) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
(1978). In their version of the argument, however, 'abstract' and philosophical thinking are 
understood as effects of the specific social practices of an emerging commodity economy - the 
Greeks ofMiletos and Athens 'invented philosophy' not because they 'owned' the spirit of 
speculation but because they were at the forefront of developing commodity and money 
economy. In the young-Hegelian version of the idea echoed by Bamberger, the 'mystery of 
speculation' is simply 'possessed' by some peoples, not by others. 
430 The reference to the Kleinstaaterei serves as a reminder that the prospect of economic 
expansion was one of the main driving forces behind national unification. 
431 'Gedankentiefe und Empfindungsftille' 
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merging into frivolity,432 are more Jewish (ibid.: 166). Bamberger illustrates his 
conception of difference and affinity with two examples of Jewish-Germanness: 
Heinrich Heine represents a 'peculiar blend' of the deep and the frivolous path to 
speculative transcendence. Those who rejected Heine for being witty as well as 
deep actually acted against 'the German spirit': they' granted German citizenship 
to the totally un-German sentiment of chauvinism and ostracized the liberal 
humane and truthful spirit of our classic literature' (ibid.: 167). A contrasting 
model case of German-Jewish spiritual blending is the liberal parliamentarian 
Lasker, portrayed by Bamberger as a grave, ascetic idealist. Lasker's character is 
linked to the political framework defined by Bismarck: 
When the great realist Bismarck managed to move German politics from 
the world of German abstraction onto the concrete grounds of power, he 
enrolled into his vast project the nation's idealistic drive for great creation 
and high legislative aims. This was Lasker's great time of fighting for 
German idealism with the brightest weapons of Jewish dialectics while 
following the lead of realism ( ... ) 
Bamberger remarks in a bitter tone that only after Bismarck turned against his 
'idealistic ally' (ibid.: 168) did the majority of the nation reproach him for the 
same 'slightly abstract moral outrage (Entruestung), for which they had 
previously praised him. Bamberger's presentation ofthe two very different 
German-Jewish individuals, Heine and Lasker, suggests that both were able to 
contribute significantly to German culture and politics because they combined 
the different strengths of the two cultures: they managed to put their particularity 
into the service of their affinity. 
Lazarus also argues that there is a 'particular, deep and momentous affinity 
... between the Germanic and the Jewish spirit'. This affinity found particular 
expression in scholarly research on the Old Testament (Lazarus 1880:32) which 
blossomed in the context of German culture more than any other. Due to this 
affinity, Jews are so devoted to both reception and production of German culture, 
that 'an inner separation from it appears to them totally unthinkable and 
incomprehensible'. Lazarus argues that 
432 'sehnellbluetigen, keeken, bis zur Frivolitat gesteigerten Humor' 
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in all religions, religiosity itself (Religiositat selbst) is the ultimate and the 
deepest and what is common to all of them. It is what strives towards the 
highest in humanity (dem Hochsten im Menschenthum zustrebende) 
(ibid.:33). 
He separates Religiositat - being religious and feeling in a religious way - from 
the actual content of any specific religion and argues that every human being can 
revere the Religiositat of others irrespective of the specific content of their 
religion. He concludes from this that Jews might not directly take sides and 
interfere in confessional debates and struggles within the church, but hope for 
and support the victory of 'what will be the best of every church', namely 'taking 
sides with whatever represents the higher, more dignified, more beneficial stage 
of the religious development of humanity' (ibid.:32), trusting in 'reason and the 
future' (ibid.:33). Lazarus seems not to be aware that this is a de facto Protestant 
conception which contradicts his profession of neutrality in confessional affairs. 
The Jews 'drink daily from the wellsprings of the German spirit, one of whose 
deepest sources is Christianity' and would not therefore slander Christianity. 
Lazarus argues that the animosity between Christians and Jews is a residue of a 
conflict that goes back to the origins of Christianity: 'When, in the beginning, the 
new religious community (Glaubensgemeinschaft) split from the old one, of 
course there were animosity and bitterness.' Lazarus suggests that the animosity 
between Rome and the Reformation had the same psychological origins as the 
earlier conflict between Jews and Christians: 'And I am asking in tum, are not 
the same psychological laws valid for all times, do not the same causes have the 
same effects?' (ibid.:33f) 
Lazarus quotes Luther's formulation that the 'Papists' had treated the Jews 
like dogs not like human beings and exclaims: 'This is over!' Likewise, Jews 
also have for a long time now demonstrated that they consider Christian moral 
theory identical to their own and have no hard feelings towards Christianity: 
'Would a mother despise her own child?' (ibid.:34) 
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2.2.4 The Jewish economic spirit and the German spirit of work 
References to the economic role of the Jews tended to dominate many anti-
Jewish publications of the time and seem to have been one of the more popular 
(or populist) aspects of anti-Judaism and/or anti-Semitism.433 This includes both 
specific claims about the Jewish role in the financial economic sphere or the 
alleged role of the Jews in crises like the Gruenderkrach434 as well as 
speculations about the Jewish economic spirit in the widest sense. The topic 
figures remarkably little in Treitschke's contributions to the Streit: apart from 
one mention of Jewish 'cosmopolitan financial powers' (Treitschke 1896c:50), 
he dedicates only one sequence to the issue in the first contribution (see below), 
in the context of the discussion of the harmful Jewish influence on German 
culture. 435 Treitschke's reluctance to elaborate on 'the economic issue' in his 
subsequent contributions will be discussed later, especially in the light of the 
responses; many respondents did take the point very seriously and discussed it in 
more detail. 
Treitschke's comment on the Jews' influence on the economy shows the 
cautious ambivalence typical of much of Treitschke's discourse: 
There is no German merchant city that does not count many honest, 
respectable Jewish firms among its number. But it cannot be denied that the 
Semites (das Semitentum) have contributed a large part to the dishonesty 
and deception (Lug und Trug) and the bold greediness (frechen Gier) of the 
boom-time mischief (Gruender-Unwesen), and that they share heavily in 
the guilt for the contemptible materialism of our age which regards every 
kind of work only as business (Geschaft) and threatens to suffocate our 
people's ancient good-natured willingness to work (die alte gemuethliche 
Arbeitsfreudigkeit unseres Volkes); the Jewish usurer sits in thousands of 
German villages (Treitschke 1896a:24f).436 
In this paragraph, Treitschke distinguishes three categories of Jewish economic 
activity: 
433 This is a hypothesis that I hope to be able to examine on a later occasion. 
434 This was a principal obsession of Glagau especially. 
435 Treitschke reproaches Borne and Heine for slandering 'the country that protects them' and 
adds that such 'contempt for the German Goyim' is 'not the opinion of a single fanatic'. The 
alleged Jewish role in the 'Gruender-Unwesen' comes from their 'contempt for the German 
Goyim', i.e. Treitschke claims to be able to explain the Jews' (alleged) economic behaviour in 
terms of Volhgeist, i.e. ethno-psychological terms. 
436 Cassel remarked drily: 'It is really not fun these days to run a pawnshop' (Cassel 1880: 17). 
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~ first, honest and respectable Jewish firms in merchant cities, i.e. 
representatives of traditional merchant capital. 
~ Second, dishonest, deceitful and greedy Jews involved in the largely 
unsuccessful 'Gruender- Doom, i.e. representatives of portions of such 
capital that is being invested in new economic enterprises (typically joint 
stock companies) at high risk - so called 'speculation'. 
~ Third, the classic figure of the Jewish small town usurer who plays a role in 
the transformation of 'standische', artisanal production into modem, 
capitalist production based on waged labour. 
Treitschke discusses all three types of Jewish economic engagement in terms 
of 'spirit': the merchant capitalist is characterized by honesty and respectability, 
the 'Gruender' by greed, and the usurer 'threatens to suffocate our people's 
ancient good-natured willingness to work'. 
'Arbeitsfreudigkeit' -literally 'willingness' or 'eagerness to work' - has a 
resonance of' Arbeitsfreude' which means experiencing joy (Freude) in the 
working process.437 'Gemuethlich' (here translated as 'good-natured') reinforces 
the 'spiritual' connotation.438 Those, whose attitude has become 'Judaized', see 
work only under the perspective of 'Geschaft', i.e. of (commodity) exchange. 
Treitschke's terminology points to an idealized notion of work in an imaginary 
age when people would have been working for the sheer joy ofit.439 Treitschke is 
not able to distinguish capitalist from pre-capitalist forms of commodity 
economy; he ignores the obvious fact that medieval artisans also produced things 
in order to sell them. The grain of truth in Treitschke's statement is, though, that 
working is in many ways even less a source of 'joy' in modem times than before. 
437 The most important formulation of the concept of 'Arbeitsfreude' is by Heinrich Riehl (1861) 
(cp. Campbell 1989). Dorpalen points out that Treitschke's reference to 'gutmuethige 
Arbeitsfi'eudigkeit' relates to his concept of a harmonic but hierarchical society: as long as the 
working classes will find 'happiness' in their subordinate function - working - and do not start 
being envious of 'the few thousands' (who do the thinking, painting etc.) the continued existence 
of the social hierarchy is safe (Dorpalen 1957:242). 
438 The meaning of 'Gemueth' lies in between mind, character, nature, soul, disposition, warm-
heartedness and sentiment. 
439 It is safe to assume that the necessity to work has throughout human history been experienced 
as suffering (laborare) rather than 'joy', and it is capitalist modernity that has first opened the 
actual possibility (ironically, against itself, and as its own negation) of a human world that would 
reduce the pains of laborare to the unavoidable minimum and would make the old dream of 
doing things for the sheer joy of it a real perspective (for the many rather than for those small 
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Treitschke blames this on the domination of production by 'Geschaft'44o and 
describes this as a problem ofJalse, namely Jewish 'spirit' .441 
Treitschke's respondents commented widely on both aspects of this brief 
statement: 
~ the issue of the Jewish part in the 'Gruender-Unwesen' 
~ and what the wider issue of 'the contemptible materialism of the modem age' 
has got to do with the emancipation of the Jews. 
Manuel Joel stated that amongst the 'Gruender' there have been many Jews 
'simply because amongst the Jews there are many merchants'. He adds that some 
of them 'would be even more inclined to become presidents, senior civil servant, 
staff officer, senior postal civil servant etc.' if they only had a chance to.442 
elites who always found ways to organize for themselves leisurely anticipations of a humane 
existence); cpo Postone (1993) on Marx's take on this idea, and Campbell (1989) on Fourier's. 
440 Treitschke seems to understand capitalism as a dictatorship of 'business' over 'production'. 
Again there is a grain of truth in this: it was one of the stages of the emergence of the capitalist 
mode of production that production was subsumed under a type ofrelations (the commodity 
form) that historically has emerged from trade - however, this does not sufficiently describe its 
essence. 
441 A leader (Leitartikel) in 'Deutsche Wacht' from May 1880 is much more explicit than 
Treitschke's remarks thanks to its use of the terminology of political economy (this article, 
written either by Marr or, more probably, by NaudhINordmann - Marr seems to have been 
replaced as editor as early as April 1880, jUdging from comments in the journal- does not 
directly refer to the Streit). It is argued that 'legal equality of Jews and Christians is un-ethical 
(ethisch unfassbar) and anti-national (antivolksrechtsthuemlich), because '(t)he Jews never aim at 
the production of "useful values (nuetzlicher Werthe)" but only for profit. ... Jews as socialists ... 
have invented "capitalism" as a historical-economical point of attack in order to deflect attention 
from distribution and try to blame all hate on industry' (Deutsche Wacht 1880:435; 437t). While 
'capitalism' - a conceptual fabrication by Jewish socialists - is a 'Popanz' (paper tiger, 
smokescreen), the real 'enemy of the nation' (ibid.:438) is 'egotistic commercialism (das 
selbstsuechtige Kriimerthum)" namely the Jews. 'In earlier times' (the author seems to be 
thinking of the period of mercantilism) inviting Jews into the country was thought to be 
economically advantageous because of the money the Jews would bring with them. This was 
mistaken however because 'they do not use money productively but only for haggling 
(Schacher)' (ibid.:439). The author proposes that intermediate trade (Zwischenhandel) should be 
content with 'calculating the ... costs for transportation, storage and loss of commodities as well 
as the average interest to be charged on the stored commodity capital' (ibid.: 442), implying 
thereby that intermediate trade enriches itself by receiving much higher amounts of money and 
thus 'destroys the balance of production and consumption'. The import of foreign goods 
'tyrannizes' the domestic market, destroys national consciousness and 'promotes the international 
(das Internationale)'. The tyranny of intermediate trade reduces general wealth and therewith 
'increases the proletariat which is the greatest enemy of any state order' (,proletariat' means here 
'the poor'). The article concludes that intermediate trade 'is thus an enemy of state, nation and 
society .... Not capitalism ... but commercial capitalism ... has to be fought.' The author argues 
that only ifthe state regulated trade accordingly, the Jews could begin to 'develop', 'overcome 
their faults' and begin to participate in 'patriotic culture and greatness'. Only then they could 
'earn' the emancipation that has been granted to them undeservedly (ibid.: 443). 
442 Joel argues that the claim ofa particular Jewish materialism is disproven by the fact of Jewish 
refusal to convert when conversion would improve career choices. Reproaching the Jews both for 
not giving up Judaism and for materialist greed is therefore inconsistent (Joel1965:22t). 
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Oppenheim (1880:20) also writes that the Jews have been involved in 
'Gruendungen' merely to the extent of their share in the economy in general. He 
argues, however, that due to their relatively higher economic skills they did not 
typically belong to those who 'came closest to overstepping the mark (den Bogen 
am scharfsten spannten)'. He thus turns the stereotype of the Jewish superiority 
in business into a virtue and argues that adventurous and speculative enterprises 
were led by -less skilled and less solid - non-Jews. 
The tone of Harry Bress/au's answer somewhat differs from the former in 
expressing support for Treitschke's attack on 'the Jewish Gruender and usurers' 
(Bresslau 1965a:65). However, he adds that there are also many Christian 
Gruender, and argues that the higher proportion of Jews in the financial sphere in 
general has its cause in medieval laws that excluded them from a number of other 
occupations. 'What I miss in your elaborations, though, is any positive 
suggestion' (ibid.:66). Bresslau accuses Treitschke of discouraging 'those decent 
men who - as you emphasize yourself - work against usury to the best of their 
ability in their circles'. Bresslau seems to accept here silently Treitschke's notion 
of Jewish group responsibility, but he leaves open what its practical relevance 
should be: why for example would a professor of history have a particUlarly good 
chance to convert a 'speculator' to 'decent' banking practices just because both 
happen to be Jewish? Bresslau adds that 'not a single Jewish or Christian usurer 
or Gruender would mend his ways because of an article like yours' (ibid.:67). 
Bresslau suggests that straightforward legislation would be most effective. 
The AZ carried the translation of an article by 'Valbert' (i.e. the popular 
French novelist, Cherbuliez)443 (AZ 23.3.1880, No. 12: l77f). 'Valbert' mocks: 
When a truly German cobbler makes a pair of shoes he does not only put 
his consciousness into them but his soul, too, and even some poetry. Alas! 
Since the German cobblers allowed the deplorable propaganda of the sons 
of Abraham to corrupt them, they see in a pair of shoes only a business 
(Geschaft), because for the Jews the world only consists of business and 
calculation. 
Philippson adds that Treitschke's emotional rhetoric sits oddly with the fact that 
'since 1870, Treitschke kept preaching realism in politics' and demanded that 
'idealist dreaming' end (AZ 1880: 178). Similarly, Oppenheim (1880:20) claims 
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that the economic idealism of Treitschke's recent position brings him 'into the 
realm of Kathedersozialisten' as well as that of the 'apologists of the guild 
system (Zuenftler), against both of which Treitschke had been renowned for 
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Oppenheim suggests that work should be a 'business' rather than a 'feudal or 
state service'. He rejects the answer that 'Treitschke and the Kathedersozialisten' 
would have given: that it should be 'an ethical achievement (Leistung)'. 
Oppenheim admits that 'everything has an ethical dimension' but suggests that 
boots made by a cobbler 'who goes about his work as a business (seine Arbeit 
geschiiftlich betreibt), are probably better than boots made from 'ethical 
consciousness' . 
Oppenheim states that even if it was true that trade and business have lost 
their 'Gemuethlichkeit' ('if there ever was any') then it would be quite another 
thing to prove that the Jews are responsible for this loss. He writes that even the 
most conservative peasant has no problem seeing his produce as commodities 
'and his calculation of their prices is affected by neither the songs of the lark nor 
those of a whole forest of German poets, whom he otherwise might highly 
appreciate'. The mere fact that the product of work is a commodity does not 
make production more or less ethical. Oppenheim sees the 'ethical (sittliche)' 
critique of capitalist production as a cheap excuse for lazy people who fail to 
adopt to the standards and expectations of modem society: 
The whining about the lack of pleasantness (Ungemuethlichkeit) of modem 
production comes from the bunglers (Stuemper) who fail to produce up to 
date products and who would be saved if they could hide behind the 
privileges of a guild or a system of protective customs (ibid.:20). 
Oppenheim points out that already in the 1770s when guilds in France were 
abolished under Turgot the guild masters understood 'Gemuethlichkeit of work to 
mean police protection for the right to use force and exclusion (Zwangs- und 
Bannrechte)' (italics added). Oppenheim suggests that 'the fertile field of the joy 
of labour (Arbeitsfreudigkeit), lies in meeting the increasingly sophisticated and 
443 from the Revue des deux mondes, March 1 st 
444 Treitschke's 'Socialism and its patrons' (1874) took up arguments previously formulated by 
Oppenheim. 
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diverse demands of the consumers rather than in backwards oriented 
'reminiscences' . 
Even now the apprentices' question (Lehrlingsfrage) and some related 
issues pose numerous serious problems because the crafts have lost their 
ability to help themselves, having been spoiled and incapacitated through 
centuries of privileges and police protection. I bet ten against one that all 
those apologists of the guild system (Zuenftler) who seek their salvation in 
reactionary fraternities (Verbruederungen) and run to join Stocker and sing 
the tune of 'the evil Jews' are incompetent and unreliable workers in their 
trade .... Does Herr von Treitschke want to enlist these people for his 
Christian-Germanic brigade, too? 
Against Treitschke's revisionism, Oppenheim defends the liberal modernizing 
thrust of creating dynamic economic relations by removing ancien regime 
structures and regulations.445 
Like Oppenheim, Ludwig Bamberger warned Treitschke from deviating not 
only from religious and cultural tolerance, but also from freedom of property as 
another tenet of liberalism: 
Hopefully Herr von Treitschke, who used to profess sound economic 
principles, will not intend making concessions to the simplistic delusion 
(plumpen Wahnvorstellung) - currently coming back into fashion - that 
those who make money through their labour exploit society and do not 
through their services make society so much richer (Bamberger 1965: 164). 
Bamberger refers in his argument to the first section of Treitschke's text 'Our 
prospects' (Treitschke 1896a) in which Treitschke criticized - amongst other 
things - the anti-German current in the political debate in Russia. Bamberger 
suggests that 'the Russian Treitschkes' declared the Germans to be 'Russia's 
misfortune' just as Treitschke declared the Jews to be Germany's (ibid.: 163). 
Like the anti-Jewish agitation in Germany, the anti-German agitation in Russia 
'merely decorates ancient prejudices and passions with the tinsel of patriotic 
phraseology'. Their historical point of reference is the immigration of poor 
Germans at the time of the Reformation, who succeeded in Russia 'through skill, 
industriousness and moderation' . 
445 The most important evidence that this was indeed one of the motivations crucial to the liberal 
fight against anti-Semitism is the Declaration of the Notables that enumerates as 'the ground of 
our common life' 'respect for every denomination; equal right; equal sun in competition; equal 
recognition of merit and achievement' (see above 2.2.1.4). 
193 
The Russian people had to acknowledge these advantages of the 'intruders' 
but despised them even more for that reason. Since those times it remained 
an established truth in the thinking of the common man that the Germans 
'destroy national religion and appropriate the riches of the country'. The 
more or less learned Moscow pan-Slavists have only recently begun to 
repeat this notion with enormously pompous and cheap moral outrage and 
scholarly flim-flam (ibid.). 
Bamberger draws the analogy between Germans in Russia and Jews in Germany: 
The well-being of the Jewish Germans no more prevents that of Christian 
Germans than industrious, clever and economical Russians are prevented in 
Russia by Germans from enjoying the fruits of their work and from 
becoming cultured and wealthy (ibid.). 
Bamberger presents the conflict in both instances as based on the different 
economic attitudes of a traditional population and an immigrant group that has a 
modernizing impact on economic life characterized by industriousness, 
moderation and rationality. Bamberger states that the origin of national-religious 
prejudice is economic and strongly affirms the modem economic spirit. He 
asserts that the 'activity and wealth of the German settlers in Russia benefit 
Russian culture as a whole' (ibid.: 164) just as 'the intellectual and economic 
activity of German Jews benefits the German State and German society'. 
Bamberger's emphasis on economic attitudes indicates clearly that liberal 
opposition to anti-Semitic agitation took the latter's 'anti-capitalist' and populist 
aspects very seriously.446 Treitschke certainly did not anticipate (and even less 
hope for) any socialist side-effects of anti-Semitism. 
The anti-capitalist side of anti-Semitism that Treitschke displayed in his first 
contribution but subsequently chose not to articulate further (silently accepting 
the fierce criticism of fellow liberals such as Oppenheim and Bamberger) 
occupies much more space and is further developed in the contributions by 
N audh and Endner. 
446 In a similar if curiously reversed fashion, analyses by Social-Democrats in the following 
decades occasionally speculated that anti-Semitic agitation would indirectly (and ironically, i.e. 
against itself) further socialist consciousness amongst non-working class poor (i.e. those not 
accessible to Social-Democratic teaching) by proving itself to be an inadequate (namely petty 
bourgeois) criticism of capitalist society. Some liberals and some socialists shared the notion that 
anti-Semitic anti-capitalism would by necessity prepare the ground for a more adequate, or more 
dangerous, namely proletarian anti-capitalism (cp. Wistrich 1982:99). 
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For Naudh, it is a fact of history that the Jews invented 'Manchesterism' 
2000 years ago and that even then an anti-Jewish, anti-capitalist movement led 
by a man called Jesus struggled against it: 
Christianity with its imperative of love (Gesetz der Liebe) was the 
revolution against the Jewish principle of arrogance and exploitation and 
indeed, like every revolution, it started its struggle from within. Jesus 
confronted a Judaism which was oriented towards worldly benefits - the 
religion of Manchesterism (Manchesterthum) - with transcendental 
communism and thus was welcomed first by the poor -least, however, by 
the Jewish poor. A gospel of worldly uselessness did not really appeal to 
their tastes (Naudh 1965:185f; italics in the original). 
For Naudh, the anti-Jewish movement of the present is similarly motivated: 
Although 80 Germans might manage to be able to feed one unproductive 
Jew, the burden is distributed too unevenly over the country. In Berlin for 
example - and Berlin shows not yet the most unfortunate ratio - only 
eighteen locals (Berliner) have to sustain one Jew, who on average might 
perhaps appropriate more than is left to his breadwinners (Emahrem) 
(ibid.: 196). 
Naudh continues that out of these eighteen Berliners only five are fit for work 'at 
most', so that, according to Naudh's calculation, 'the Jew consumes at least a 
fifth of the productive power (der werbenden Kraft) of the Berliners'. 
Because of the 'infinitude of Jewish immigration (Zuschub)' which 
'accelerates progressively', the Germans will be 'helots of the Jews' in another 
twenty years. They will be 'run down (heruntergekommen) morally as much as 
economically'. Naudh concludes that 
it follows from the preceding that we can neither allow the Jews active 
participation in the affairs of the state, nor - due to their inherited hostile 
morality (Sittlichkeit) - can we tolerate them next to us in such [large] 
numbers (ibid.). 
In other words, exclusion of Jews from the state-political sphere needs to be 
complemented by exclusion from civil society.447 
Another economic aspect was emphasized by Wilhelm Endner - making the 
Jews productive:448 
447 For Naudh's practical conclusions see chapter 2.2.10.4. 
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We would not mind, if Berlin's Jewry (from Victoriastrasse just as from 
Konigstrasse) would head off and settle for example in the Tucheler or 
Lueneburger heath, if Cohn became a ploughman, Abrahamson a thresher, 
ifPhilippson would establish himself as a blacksmith, Jacobson as a 
locksmith, Levyson as a roofer, if Bresslauer became a tar-cooker 
(Theerschweler), Danziger a peat-cutter, Veilchenfeld a carpenter, 
Rosenbaum a bricklayer, if Lilienthal would be working on the street, 
Lowe, Wolf, Bar and Hirsch at the ram and so on (Endner 1965:112). 
He then made a whole list of suggestions how the Jews should accelerate their 
assimilation (ibid.: 117f).449 Endner is most adamant about the issue of taking up 
productive occupations: 
Most of all, make sure that the Jews become members of the working 
classes in the same ratio as the Germans are; that they produce instead of 
merely enrich themselves through trade. Then the - until now justified -
judgement that the Jews bleed the country white will possibly change 
(ibid.: 118; italics in the original).45o 
Endner, who writes that he finds both Treitschke's and Stocker's politics 'too 
moderate', must be understood as one of the less established, more populist and 
in that sense more 'radical' anti-Semites. Two aspects are particularly interesting 
from that perspective: for one, he rejects Bresslau's claim that the anti-Jewish 
attitude is 'basically' about race. Endner stresses that it is about cultural, 
economic and social questions no less than about race, and puts particular 
emphasis on the economic argument that the Jews are 'unproductive'. For 
448 Endner made these remarks in the context of his rejection ofBresslau's reference to the 
existence of other ethnic minorities within Germany. Endner argues that the Wends in the 
Pruss ian district of Lausitz are the remnants of an indigenous 'tribe' in an area that was 
conquered by 'Germany' moving eastward and that continued to exist as a rural community, 'as a 
solid group (in compacter Masse)' (Endner 1965: Ill). By contrast, he argues that the Jews were 
not an enclave of a surviving indigenous ethnic minority but immigrants and do not live 'as a 
solid group' but 'dispersed anywhere amongst the Germans' (ibid.: 112). Furthermore, the Wends 
are productive, the Jews are not. 
449 His suggestions included that the Sabbath should be moved to Sunday, specific Jewish 
holidays as well as ritual washings should be given up as well as any specific choice of food, 
circumcision, and membership in the' Alliance Israelite Universelle', which he holds to be a 
Jewish nationalist institution incompatible with German nationality. 
450 Lazarus (1880:27) takes up the issue that only few Jews went into agriculture even after the 
laws that had barred Jews from doing so had been abolished. He writes that this statistical fact 
does not prove the alleged Jewish unwillingness to tum to 'productive work'. One should look at 
not the absolute numbers of Jews and Christians in agriculture, but the numbers of urban 
residents moving to the countryside and then examine how many of them are Jewish and how 
many are Christian. His argument implies that in times of overall decreasing significance of 
agriculture a movement towards the countryside amongst any group of the urban population 
would be minute. 
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Endner, the 'Jewish element' is to be 'eliminated' not so much because the Jews 
constitute another race 451 but because their racial difference manifests itself in 
specific cultural-social practices, most prominently their being 'unproductive'. 
Endner also seems to hold that persons of non-Jewish (or non-'Semitic') stock 
also fall under the category 'Jews' (while 'Semites' is for him the properly racial 
category) as soon as they display (cultural-economic) 'Jewish characteristics'. 
For Endner, the problem is not 'race' but cultural- in particular economic-
behaviour, which is only subsequently articulated or explained in the language of 
'race'. 
451 This becomes clear from Endner's comparing the Jews to the Wends: the Wends are also ofa 
different 'race', but Endner has no problem with them. 
197 
2.2.5 State, nation, race, religion 
In a sense, the issues addressed in this chapter form the hard core of the Streit. 
On the one hand, as I will argue later on, conflicting constellations of the 
concepts state, nation, race, religion are at the heart of what the Streit was 
'actually' about; on the other hand, these issues attracted a large number of more 
coherent treatments including some by leading scholars of the time: the political 
analyses by Treitschke, Bresslau, Bamberger, Oppenheim and Naudh are joined 
by the more scholarly contributions in particular by Lazarus, Cohen and 
Mommsen. The statements of the latter differ in style from most of the 
journalistic pamphlet material discussed so far. Given this, the mode of the 
presentation will also slightly differ from the surrounding chapters in giving 
larger and more substantial extracts from the more theoretical passages of some 
of the contributions. 
2.2.5.1 TREITSCHKE: PATRIOTISM AS STAATSGESINNUNG 
Two thirds of the text, 'Our Prospects' from November 1879 are actually not 
about the 'Jewish question' or any domestic, social affairs at all but about 
international, or rather inter-Imperial relations. Although this part of the text is 
generally not given much attention, it contains important clues about 
Treitschke's overall political conception and allows an immediate 
contextualization of what Treitschke has to say about the 'Jewish question'. 
Treitschke makes explicit that for him both fields of discussion are closely 
related and he even seems to indicate that the 'domestic' problems (the 'Jewish 
question'; the relation of state, nation and culture) are given their importance 
through and in the 'global' context (about which he actually fills twice as many 
pages).452 
Treitschke writes about the final stage of the Balkan crisis and the outcomes 
of the Berlin Congress of June and July 1878. On this occasion Bismarck 
managed to establish himself as arbiter between England and Austria who 
opposed growing Russian influence in the Balkans after a successful Russian 
452 Treitschke himself as well as his editor found these considerations on daily affairs important 
enough to include them unabridged in the volume 'Deutsche Kampfe, Neue Folge' (Treitschke 
1896). 
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military intervention in a Serbian-Turkish conflict (Treitschke 1896a:5). 
Treitschke comments on the ill-feeling between Germany and Russia that 
originated after the Berlin conference when Russia had to sacrifice some of its 
military spoils from the Balkan war to the 'balance of powers' as brokered by 
Bismarck. Treitschke points out that the two states are allies by tradition as well 
as by mutual benefit and blames the temporary ill-feeling on the 'blind 
spitefulness' rooted in the 'mighty national passions of the Russian people' or at 
least of far-reaching influential parties among them (ibid.: 1). Treitschke states 
that the Russian Empire is in the process of giving up its aim of hegemony in the 
Baltic and is instead turning its attention southwards. Treitschke describes this 
Imperial re-orientation - without actually using these words - as a process of 
national awakening, with 'public opinion' ahead of the state's politics; the 
'passionate desire of the nation' (still 'youthful' and 'immature', ibid.:3) and the 
'propaganda of Pan-Slav ism' drove the Tsar into conflict with the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Treitschke draws an enthusiastic portrayal of Bismarck's presidency of the 
Berlin conference: Bismarck saved the Russians the largest part of their spoils 
while Britain and Austria initially aimed at annulling the results of the Balkan 
war completely so as to save the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The 
driving force behind the German position was, according to Treitschke, the wish 
to see 'the liberation of the Balkan-Christians from unbearable [Turkish] 
pressure' (ibid.:5). The driving force behind Russian popular mood is, however, 
not sympathy for the Christians of the Balkans but Pan-Slavism. Russian public 
opinion opposed the Tsar's diplomacy after the war and even called for war 
against Germany because the war-aims of pan-Slavism were not fulfilled. 
Additionally, as Treitschke notes, popular anger was fuelled by the fact that the 
newly created nation-states in the Balkans had 'constitutional forms of state' 
which Russia still lacked (ibid.:8). The twofold disappointment after the military 
triumph operated like a catalyst: 
And just like the innermost secrets (Herzensgeheimnisse) of man always 
are betrayed (sich verrathen) in anger, so the pan-Slavists' deep-rooted 
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(eingefleischter) hate of Gennans came to the fore in measureless force 
(ibid.).453 
While Treitschke seemed sympathetic to the process of Russia orienting its 
politics towards the Balkans rather than the Baltic, he is less than sympathetic to 
the more general aspects of pan-Slav ism. However, he applauds the majority of 
public opinion in Gennany for being sympathetic to the politics of the Russian 
state. Treitschke adds that only some 'isolated adherents of the old liberal 
school' and some 'dogged' progressives did not support Russia in the Balkan war 
(ibid.:9). He argues for a renewed alliance of the 'three imperial powers' 
(Gennany, Austria and Russia) conditional on pan-Slavism not becoming official 
Russian doctrine (ibid.: 11). 
Treitschke sees as the main result of the Berlin conference that Britain, a 
traditional defender of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, gave up 
this position. He takes it as a fact that the latter will be divided between the 
European powers in due course: 'In the age of the railway the ideas and projects 
of the epoch of the crusades are resurgent' (ibid.: 12). Treitschke argues that 
England and Russia as the main players should be able to come to a peaceful 
agreement because both had 'to fear a common enemy in the fanaticism of Islam' 
but 'unfortunately reason alone does not decide about the fates of peoples' 
(ibid.: 13f). Conflict is unavoidable because of on one side the 'enonnous 
expansive power of Slavdom', and on the other side the 'far more insatiable 
greed for territory of English commercial policy' looking for markets. Treitschke 
anticipates a European coalition to prevent British hegemony in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
In this context he moves to a second element of the results of the Berlin 
conference, the incorporation of Bosnia into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. 
Treitschke's assessment of this is ambivalent; he appreciates as an immediate 
benefit that the conquest has boosted national self-consciousness: 
One has started again to believe in the state and its good fortunes; one can 
hear from Vienna articulations of a healthy patriotic pride, a vital Austrian 
sense of statehood (Staatsgesinnung) more often now than since many 
years ago (ibid.:15). 
453 The formulation points to an aspect of Treitschke's method. He 'reads' events, particularly 
critical events, as the revelation of inner essence of the historical actors and illustrates his 
'reading history' with anthropological-psychological cliches. 
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On the other hand, he points out the administrative problems of governing this 
remote province, and the subsequent necessity for the Dual Monarchy to be 
engaged in Balkan politics to make Bosnia economically viable; Austria is 
becoming a 'Balkan-state'. 
Taken together, Treitschke's comments on the political situation at large 
allow for some first conclusions about his conception of state and nation. In 
keeping with his background as a supporter of 'kleindeutsche' policy - as 
opposed to pan-Germanism - he rejects pan-Slavism. The 'liberation' of 
Christianity from Ottoman rule has his sympathy, although this seems not a 
priority. As in the case of Austria, he appreciates military success as a 
contributor to 'healthy patriotism', which he defines as 'Staatsgesinnung', i.e. 
loyalty and identification with a state, which does not necessarily imply a nation-
state. In general, he seems to support the existence of Empires as long as they are 
viable economically and administratively and supported by 'public opinion'. 
Since this is not the case for the Ottoman Empire, the latter's days are numbered. 
He discerns a potential for difficulties in the case of Austria-Hungary, while 
critical difficulties are already apparent in the case of Russia. While Russia is 
characterized as a potential troublemaker because of the popularity of the 
'dreamings' and 'fairy tales' of pan-Slav ism, Treitschke speaks of England with 
hostility because of the uniquely commercial character of its politics. All in all, 
Treitschke appears here as a supporter of nationalism as state patriotism, i.e. 
nationalism as the basis of Staatsgesinnung. Economic viability is mentioned 
repeatedly as a key category, although he refers also to Christianity and the 
culture of the 'occident'. Only when a state does not manage to mobilize the 
necessary patriotic support of its citizens, as in the Turkish case, does it appear as 
a legitimate prey to destabilizing forces such as other nations' nationalisms. 
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2.2.5.2 TREITSCHKE: THE CHRISTIAN NATION 
Although Treitschke's patriotism translates as 'Staatsgesinnung', in his 
discussion of the 'Jewish Question' Treitschke refers to Germany as a 'Christian 
nation': 
The moment emancipation was gained the Jews insisted boldly on their 
'certificate' ('Schein'), demanded literal parity in everything, forgetful of 
the fact that we Germans are, after all, a Christian nation (ein christliches 
Volk) and that the Jews are only a minority amongst us. It has happened 
that the removal of Christian pictures was demanded, and even the 
celebration of the Sabbath in mixed schools (Treitschke 1896a:26). 
The concept of 'christliches Volk' blurs the boundaries between the realms of, on 
the one hand, state, citizenship and emancipation and, on the other hand, morality 
and religion.454 Treitschke rejects any challenge to the Christian character ofthe 
nation.455 His formulations suggest that the Jews make wholly unreasonable 
demands.456 
Nevertheless, Treitschke also insists that emancipation is crucial for the 
character of the German state: 
Among those who understand (unter Verstandigen), there can be no talk of 
an abolition or even of a limitation of the emancipation; that would be an 
obvious injustice, a betrayal of the fine traditions of our state, and would 
accentuate rather than mitigate the national contrast (den nationalen 
Gegensatz) which torments us (ibid.:27). 
Treitschke connects his argument here to the liberal tradition that sees in the state 
a means to 'harmonize' civil society, 'mitigating' its 'contrasts'. He characterizes 
the German nation as Christian, the German state as liberal. 
In his third contribution, Treitschke elaborates on this conception and also 
makes more explicit remarks on the Jews. He claims that the relatively higher 
increase rate of the Jewish population warrants a 'momentous change in our 
social life' (Treitschke 1896c:49). He states that 'this tribe' includes 'apart from 
454 Meyer argued in his response to Treitschke that the Sabbath is a bulwark of idealism and of 
the idea of God, and thus against atheism and materialism. Christian head-teachers who prevent 
children from celebrating the Sabbath promoted materialism (Meyer 1880a: 10). 
455 This leads him to provocative claims such as that the emancipated Jews demand 'literal parity' 
(buchstabliche Paritiit). 
456 The examples he gives, however, are quite telling: the removal of Christian pictures (from 
public buildings or state schools) seems in perfect keeping with the concept that state and public 
sphere be secular. 
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many honourable, fully patriotic people also a bunch ofumeconstructed 
Orientals' as well as 'a swarm of rootless (heimathlosen) international 
journalists', 'large cosmopolitan financial powers', 'some simply asocial 
(gemeinschadliche) elements' (ibid.:50) and criminals. Although legal 
emancipation has been 'beneficial insofar as it took from the Jews all reason for 
legitimate complaint', it also 'made the mixing of blood more difficult, which 
has always been the most effective means oflevelling tribal differences': 
The numbers of conversions to Christianity have sharply decreased, and 
mixed marriage between Christians and Jews will remain a rare exception as 
long as our people holds its Christian beliefs sacred (ibid.). 
Treitschke reaffirms his support for legal emancipation and for the mixing of 
'blood' as a means of (national) amalgamation against tribal particularisms. At 
the same time, however, he reasserts strongly the incompatibility of the two 
religions.457 
From amongst the four categories, 
~ blood/tribe/race, 
~ religion, 
~ nation and 
~ state, 
nation and state appear as historical ends, the others as either means to these ends 
or obstacles to be overcome: for the sake of nation-building, blood/tribeslraces 
should be 'mixed' and 'amalgamated'. The problem with the Jews is that their 
sticking to their old religion makes this amalgamation undesirable for the 
Christians who in tum have to stick to their (more modem) religion for the sake 
457 Meyer points out that Treitschke's complaint that since emancipation conversions have 
become more rare contradicts his earlier claim that the Jews' old religion is respected as sacred 
(Treitschke 1896a:23; Meyer 1880b:7). 
Naudh expresses 'the hope that his [Treitschke's] healthy German nature will more and 
more outgrow the liberal straight-jacket' (Naudh 1965: 199). Naudh points to a small shift in 
Treitschke's argument between the first and the second contribution, which he interprets as the 
foreboding of a more fundamental shift to come: 'He [Treitschke] acknowledges now that the 
feeling ofliving unity that is necessary for national consciousness is incompatible with a 
contradiction in the most holy questions of the mind (Gemueth), and after more consideration 
about the issue, he will further acknowledge that this contradiction of the mind (gemuethliche 
Gegensatz) is a matter of natural disposition. Therefore it cannot be overcome by baptising, 
which always remains something external ifit happens without the [natural/racial] disposition, 
contrary to the opinion that Treitschke [still] seems to hold. The spiritual (gemuethliche) and 
even the physical difference between Germans and Jews will always spoil the feeling of "living 
unity" ( ... )' (ibid.:200). Naudh suggests that Treitschke's insistence on a religious-spiritual 
difference will inevitably lead him to acknowledge biological/racial difference. 
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of nation-state-formation. The continued existence of the Jews as an ethno-
religious group is therefore an obstacle for the constitution of the nation-state. 
Treitschke continues: 
The Jews owe gratitude to the new Germany for the work ofliberation 
because the participation in governing the state is not at all a natural right of 
all inhabitants but is decided freely by every state (ibid.).458 
Treitschke complains that the Jews not only show a lack of gratitude, but even 
criticize Christian dogma (Glaubenslehre). In some cases, Treitschke claims they 
try to limit the Christian's freedom of belief 'in the name of tolerance' - for 
example when Jews complain about Christian school teachers teaching that the 
Jews crucified Jesus.459 Treitschke concludes that the beginnings of the 
'terrorism of a busy minority' must not be encouraged through 'cowardly 
patience' on the side of 'us Christians' (ibid.:51 ).460 Treitschke may be less 
concerned with the mere truth about issues such as who actually killed Jesus, 
than with the effects that questioning such truths may have on nation-building 
and state-formation. 
458 Philippson comments that Treitschke's remark that the state had the 'natural right' to decide 
who takes part in its leadership is 'nonsense' (AZ, 17.2.1880, No 7:100). 
459 Meyer points out that Treitschke refers here to an incident that happened at the Catholic 
primary school in Linz on the Rhein that is also attended by Jewish children (Meyer I 880b:9t). 
The local synagogue complained that teachers used a book that stated that Jesus had been 
crucified by the Jews. (Obviously Jesus was crucified by the Roman administration, irrespective 
of whatever one might believe was the role played by different Jewish groups and institutions. 
The Gospels do not claim that 'the Jews' are responsible for the death of Jesus [only Paul in the 
first letter to the Thessalonikans introduces this notion as a reaction to his own expulsion from 
Jerusalem]. The explanations that can be extrapolated from the Gospels are that the rich [the 
Sadducee high priests who were keen to preserve their alliance with Rome against popular 
opposition] wanted to get rid of a social rebel, and that the nationalist 'Zealots' preferred 
protecting one of their own - Jesus Barabbas - to saving the leader of a rival movement that 
made a point out of discouraging the poor from engaging in a 'national liberation' guerilla 
campaign that would end in defeat [cp. Thieme 1963 :49f].) 
The leadership of the synagogue in Linz also complained that another textbook contained 
the statement that all Jews dispersed over the earth followed the example of the biblical figure of 
Cain (AZ 23.3.1880, No 12). 
460 Philippson points out that Treitschke had argued in a way completely opposed to his current 
position only a few years before. In the context of the Kulturkampf, Treitschke had urged the state 
to break church influence on education in order to avoid a 'new religious war' and to assure that 
principles of peaceful toleration are central to education. Also in his earlier essay on 'Liberty', 
Treitschke had written that the 'moral content (sittliche Gehalt)' of Christianity had less and less 
to do with the actual church but was being represented by the (secular) people (AZ 2.3.1880, No 
9:132). 
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2.2.5.3 PATRIOTIC CRITICISM OF 'EXAGGERATED NATIONALISM' 
The rejection of Treitschke's nationalism as 'exaggerated' was something 
like the common denominator of most critical responses. The notion of 
'exaggerated nationalism' presupposes - sometimes implicitly, often explicitly-
a contrasting notion of not-exaggerated, i.e. 'healthy' nationalism or patriotism. 
A comment in the AZ (No 14, April 6, 1880:211) by Philippson who sees the 
'nationality principle' as central to the problem touches on many of the issues at 
stake in the wider discussion. He presents himself as a supporter of the 
nationality principle who has argued for decades that the Jews should assimilate 
to the German, or whatever nation they happen to live in, and that this would not 
at all affect their Jewishness. He warns, however, that the nationality principle, 
when it is exaggerated, creates hate and division, as the case of Treitschke shows. 
Treitschke argues for the extinction of all Jewish particularity because he 
interprets all Jewish particularity as national particularity. Philippson rejects this 
and holds that a degree of particularity in one's way oflife is necessary for the 
reproduction of religious particularity: any specific religion cannot exist without 
its specific institutional forms (ibid. :212) because 'religion that existed only in 
three or four abstract sentences would not persist' .461 
Philippson writes462 that 'pseudo-liberals' like Treitschke share with the 
ultra-montanists the goal of bringing down the liberal principle that legal and 
political equality override religion or confession which is a 'bulwark of the 
constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), (ibid.:225). He argues that they fail to 
formulate concrete conclusions for strategic reasons: the anti-liberal strategy is to 
deliberately repeat the attack on the Rechtsstaat again and again until the general 
public has absorbed it 'like a sponge absorbs dirty water'. However, the fact that 
'in all religions and confessions countless individuals have transcended clerical 
dogmas and forms' and 'the state in almost all civilized countries (Culturlandern) 
fights the armies of the churches' makes this an anachronistic enterprise. 
Philipps on warns that any violation of a 'great legal principle' will inevitably 
spread over the whole legal realm: 'partial violation' - such as abolition of civil 
rights only for the Jews - 'abolishes the principle as such'. 
461 This seems to be an aside on the Kantian concept of religion as promoted by Cohen (Cohen 
1965:126f; 146t). 
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Furthennore, Philippson argues that 'exaggerated nationalism' becomes 
'despotism' as soon as it suppresses the development of individuality within the 
framework oflegality (Recht). Turning against itself, nationalism mimics out of 
'passionate blindness (leidenschaftliche Verblendung), its opposite which is 
socialism.463 Philippson rejects the claim that 'modem civilization' has a 'drive 
towards leveling out all differences between human beings ,464 and warns that 
moves to undennine the rule of law (Recht) and freedom might in the future 
unite into a 'Christian-Nationalist' party, which would damage both Christianity 
and the nation. Treitschke's argument already contained such a possibility in 
nuclear fonn. Philippson ends his comment on an optimistic tone implying that 
such 'anachronistic' endeavors would be but temporary.465 
462 This is taken from the continuation of the same essay in AZ 13.4.1880, No 15. 
463 Carl Vogt (probably the famous zoologist and 'physiological materialist', former member of 
the 1848 Frankfilrt Parliament, who then held a professorship in Switzerland) also reproached 
Treitschke in a newspaper article (reprinted in the AZ, 6.4.1880, No 14:212) for 'excessive 
patriotism'. He describes him as a 'Slavonic German' who 'throws their race in the faces of the 
Hebrew Germans (der den von Hebrarn gezeugten Deutschen ihre Race an den Kopf wirft)'. 
Vogt points to two different motivations for Treitschke's anti-Judaism: firstly, Treitschke is the 
'mouthpiece of the country squires of the Brandenburg Marches (uckermarkischen 
Krautjunkertums; Uckermark is a landscape north of Berlin)'. These are people who live beyond 
their means and therefore consider the 'economical, industrious and business-minded 
(geschaftsgewandte) Jews' their biggest enemy. Secondly, Treitschke is a professor: Christian 
scholars in Prussia have lost their monopoly on the profession just a few decades ago, and 
'competition from Jews is growing because they are more versatile, faster in taking up a trend 
that is guaranteed to bring fame and they possess better means to survive the hard [unpaid] times 
of being a Privatdozent '. He adds that the Protestants in France have exactly the same role in 
academia that the Jews have in Germany. 
464 'We think it is a mistake to ascribe to modem civilization the drive towards leveling out all 
differences between human beings (Nivellirungssucht). From antiquity and medieval barbarism 
large entities had developed that contained a vast diversity of unrefined forms as well as 
delusions, superstitions and tyranny. Civilization challenges these forms and their contents in 
order to destroy them. In doing so, it calls the true essence (eigentliche Wesen) and the thought 
content (gedankliche Gehalt) of those entities to new life which naturally also take on purer and 
more subtle forms. Everywhere this process is governed by the same rules of reason (Vernunft), 
taste, the incorporation [of the particular] into the general, and into the demands of the time. 
Civilization does not thus challenge the phenomena in themselves but merely what they came to 
be under the conditions of barbarism: only the latter brought them into contradiction with 
generality. Civilization rejuvenates and refreshes the life and the vitality of these historical 
phenomena. This is what also happened and continues to happen to Judaism' (ibid.:226). 
465 While Philippson defends here the liberal concept of the state, he pointed in another article 
(No 14, April 6, 1880:210), to a more general implication of the state in anti-Judaism: he asserts 
that the 'lust for conversion (Bekehrungslust)" that can be observed in the 'most recent 
movement' against the Jews, is motivated not by religion but by the existence of the state. He 
adds that a determined attempt at Jewish conversion first emerged when Christianity became a 
state religion. On the one hand, Philippson would have argued that the liberal state differs from 
other forms of state in not tending towards any' lust for conversion', but on the other hand he 
seems to have seen the state as such as one of the roots of anti-Semitism. 
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'The Jewish question the way it occurs today is not a religious question but 
one of nationality [or], if you wish, one of race' argued Harry Bresslau (Bresslau 
1965a:53f). He derives this from Treitschke's reference to 'baptized and non 
baptized Jews' and the demand for the Jews to 'become Germans' while 
'wanting to allow [the Jews] to stick to [their] religion' .466 
In his reply, Wilhelm Endner rejected Bresslau's claim (Endner 1965:99). 
Race 'which manifests itself in physical appearance' was only one of a number 
of aspects also including customs, opinions and religion. In keeping with this, he 
claimed that in everyday parlance' Jew' referred to any person - irrespective of 
'race' - acting in a 'Jewish' way.467 The racial aspect is thus subordinate to a 
broader, cultural one. 
Ludwig Bamberger goes further than Bresslau in attempting to explain the 
meaning of the category 'race': he argues that 'exaggerated nationalism' adopts 
the category of 'race' in order to justify inequality when that inequality cannot 
anymore be justified by religion. 
As a 'historian and patriot', writes Bamberger, Treitschke should have 
studied the 'peculiar phenomena' that resulted from the 'mixing of the Jewish 
element with modem nationality (Volkswesen), (Bamberger 1965: 149f). 'This 
surviving of an artefact from time immemorial into the present' (ibid.: 150)468 
should have given the 'historian and patriot' the opportunity to study the 
'marvellous vitality based on such a strong individuality' as well as 'the manifold 
ways in which the liberated element (das vom Banne befreite Element) has 
integrated itself into the various nations'. Such examination would have thrown 
light on 'the characteristics of the German being (Wesen)' and how it deals with 
social and political tasks. It would have shown that 'the immortality of the 
unfortunate divide' (between Jews and Gentiles) 'is but a particular form (eine 
besondere Art) of that large German hereditary evil: self-destruction 
466 Bresslau adds in a footnote that he understands those to be 'Jewish' who have both parents 
born as Jews (ibid.:54) and refrains from using the concept 'Semite' as popular and imprecise 
parlance. 
467 He adds that the concept 'Semite' was introduced only to refer specifically to Jews 'of Jewish 
race' because the 'Volksmund' (vernacular; popular/folk parlance) used the term 'Jude' (Jew) 
also as a shorthand for 'Judengenosse' (a mate or friend of a Jew). Endner does not give any 
evidence for his claim about the usage of the two terms. The concepts of 'Jew' and 'Semite' 
actually might have been used in such a way - at least in the context ofEndner's political 
allegiances - or he might merely attempt to rationalize a rather loose terminology. 
468 'dies Hereinragen (literally: peeping or sticking into) eines Stueckes iiItester Zeit in die 
Gegenwart' 
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(Selbstzerfleischung) ... '. Bamberger suggests that the current anti-Jewish 
agitation is but a new instance of what he calls 'the old discord (Hader), that 
makes life difficult for the German nation.469 Treitschke, however, failed to do 
any of these. 
However, Bamberger's argument also has its ambivalence. He presents 
'Jewry' on the one hand as a 'surviving artefact from time immemorial ... 
peeping into the present', i.e. an anachronistic element that stands in opposition 
to 'modem nationality', on the other hand as a party in a conflict within the 
modem German nation. 
Bamberger sees Treitschke motivated by three factors: tactical party-political 
opportunism, Treitschke's individual psychological make-up, and the inherent 
propensity of 'exaggerated nationalism' as a political doctrine to 'degenerate' 
into hatred of anything alien both within and without the boundaries of the 
nation: 
The cult of nationality more than anything else carries within itself this 
temptation and it easily degenerates (artet aus) into making hate of other 
nations a sign of authentic conviction. From this hate of the alien beyond 
the border, it is only a [small] step to the hate of what can be found to be 
alien within one's own country (ibid.: 157). 
Bamberger argues that 'from time immemorial' people created social divisions 
with reference to 'the privileges of birth' (ibid.: 158). He quotes as an example 
the party of the 'nativists' or 'know nothings' in the USA 470 who aimed to 
restrict the civil rights of newly arriving immigrants. 
Unlike the American immigrants, however, the German Jews have settled in 
Germany since she' entered history'. Therefore, they cannot be attacked as 
immigrants. Neither, however, would it make sense to demand 
that today's large national states should be purified according to the 
principle of absolute racial purity. As a matter of fact, all civilized nations 
have been created from diverse tribes and have found and expressed their 
power precisely in such assimilation (ibid.: 159).471 
469 This seems to refer both to the religious wars and the national fragmentation before 1871. 
470 Bamberger writes 'Nordamerika'. 
471 A critique ofTreitschke's conception of nationhood is also central to JoiH's argument who 
argues similarly to Bamberger: 'All the talk about the difficulties of amalgamation is professorial 
doctrinairism anyway. We Jews living here are Orientals to the same degree that today's 
Germans are Asians. We are supposed to be aliens because our fathers allegedly lived in Palestine 
eighteen hundred years ago. Allegedly because it is well known that there were large Jewish 
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The concept of the 'Semitic race' has been taken from the 'garbage of physiology 
and linguistics'. 'The racial distinction' has been adopted in spite of its 
meaninglessness: 
It was adopted only when inequality of right could no longer be justified 
with reference to religious denomination. But the weak surrogate cannot 
replace this concrete and honest means of distinction. Being baptized or 
not, that makes sense and has power; Semitic or Germanic cannot be used 
without hitting the baptized with the un-baptized (ibid.: 159f). 
The category of race serves to perpetuate inequality after the latter's initial 
justification has stopped working. Bamberger points out that the Berlin 
Congress472 proclaimed the equality of confessions as a fundamental principle of 
modem constitutional law (ibid.: 160), a principle that Treitschke would not want 
to challenge. Bamberger suggests, however, that the discontinuation of formal 
religious discrimination has not led to equality but merely to a change in the way 
inequality is legitimized: 
(T)he impossibility of a denial of rights on the basis of religion pushes the 
struggle in Germany (bei uns) time and again onto the physiological terrain 
of the inequality of races ( ... ). 
If the racial principle were to be taken seriously and put into practice, then Jews 
- baptized or not - would have to be expelled together with second- or third-
generation descendants of Jews as well as children of mixed marriage. For 
Bamberger it goes without saying that such a monstrous endeavour would be a 
practical impossibility: his pointing to the enormous implications of invoking the 
category of 'race' at all is for Bamberger a reductio ad absurdum of the racial 
category itself.473 Bamberger brushes 'race' from the table and concludes: 
Why should one torture oneself with all these threadbare pretexts! Let us 
admit honestly: we are dealing with an ancient antipathy that has been 
communities in Europe before the emergence of Christianity. Actually these made possible the 
dissemination of Christianity in the first place. ( ... ) Is Herr von Treitschke able to tell where his 
fathers were eighteen hundred years ago? ( ... ) Does a modem nationality exclusively consist of 
individuals of the same descent? ( ... ) Are the English not a great nation because they are a mixed 
people, are they not perhaps a great nation for that very reason?' (Joel 1965:20) 
472 Treitschke had written about this congress in his original contribution at length and very 
positively (Treitschke l896a:5). 
473 It was then not conceivable that anybody might possibly find these practical implications quite 
reasonable (as was the case only a few decades later). 
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handed down from generation to generation for centuries and has become a 
fact of nature so much that in many people even the strongest logic cannot 
challenge the power of habit (ibid.: 161). 
This antipathy' originated essentially from the conflicts of religious confessions'. 
Once people have learned that 'there are many homes in the house of God', 
religious antipathy is 'destined to disappear', and so 'the racial divide' will 
finally be overcome by 'humanity and education'; 
until then one has to take into account the undeniable fact of a sentiment 
which is unable to take account of itself (eines ueber sich selbst unklaren 
Gefiihls). 
Bamberger's position is based on the conceptual distinction between 'modem 
nationality' and 'the cult of nationality', the latter of which easily 'degenerates' 
into racism. Modem, well-measured nationalism and the exaggerated 'cult of 
nationality' appear as completely distinct entities as the latter's inherent racism is 
merely a 'threadbare pretext' for religious discrimination in a time when religion 
has ceased to appear as a legitimate discourse in itself: a case of misleading 
packaging of an anachronistic and outdated product. 
Bamberger does not only fail to acknowledge the modernity of the discourse 
of race, but also to hint at any reason why religious discrimination has 
(supposedly) become anachronistic. Religious belief and its specific forms seem 
to constitute an independent reality whose development does not need to be 
explained historically. In Bamberger's account, they seem to change and 
disappear spontaneously: people somehow 'learned' to tolerate each other's 
beliefs, and the contradiction 'is destined' to disappear. The slow but finally 
victorious march of 'humanity and education' remains unexplained. Despite his 
suggestive formulations, his general conception does not allow Bamberger to 
address the crucial questions why 'religious antipathy' had to take on the 
disguise of 'racial divide', and why we should expect the discourse ofrace to 
disappear. 
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2.2.5.4 LAZARUS: THE NATION AS A PRODUCT OF THE NATIONAL SPIRIT 
It is of obvious significance that the title of one of the first public responses 
to Treitschke's first article474 was, 'What does national mean? '. It was given with 
the intention of promoting self-clarification amongst the Jewish community and 
was widely circulated in its printed version. Lazarus argues that the German Jews 
are Germans and engages for this purpose in a detailed discussion of the concept 
ofthe nation.475 
Lazarus compiles a comprehensive list of categories that he argues are not in 
themselves elements of a sufficient definition of the nation: 
~ Forms a/settlement, morals and customs (Wohnung, Sitten und Gebrauche) 
are not crucial parameters that define a nation because they are not generic 
within any single nation, and the same forms of settlement, morals and 
customs can be found in the contexts of different and unrelated nations. 
~ Territorial separation and community are 'the basis of political unity' but 
members of different nationalities can share the same territory while 
members of the same nationality can be found living on different territories. 
One territorial unit could contain several state structures and one nation-state 
could consist of different non-continuous territories. Most importantly, 
though, territorial borders change and 'depend on subjective opinion 
(Ansicht)'. Lazarus argues that 'the separation of nations (die Scheidung der 
Volker) is for themselves not in doubt (ist ihnen selbst zweifellos), but the 
borders of the country are object of endless struggles'. Lazarus claims that 
while the state (in its territorial and political borders) is contingent, national-
ethnic (Volks-) boundaries are fixed and self-evident. 
474 Possibly, as Lazarus himself later claimed (Lazarus 1887), the very first one. 
475 Lazarus draws on contributions published in the 'Zeitschriftfiir Voelkelpsychologie and 
Sprachwissenschafi' which he co-founded in 1859, an involvement that is the basis of his 
academic acclaim and because of which his contribution to the 'Antisemitismusstreit' carried 
particular authority. When the discipline of 'Voelkerpsychologie' was newly created it had to 
define its objects of research, namely 'Voelker' (Lazarus 1880:7). Lazarus draws on an article 
published in the fourth volume of the 'Zeitschriftfiir Voelkelpsychologie and 
Sprachwissenschaft' by R. Boekh who argues language is the most significant category defining a 
nation. In the subsequent section of his lecture, Lazarus elaborates on Boekh's approach using a 
programmatic essay by himself and the co-editor, Steinthal, published in the first issue of the 
'Zeitschrift' from 1859. 
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~ Citizenship (Staatsangehorigkeit) does not define a nation because only 'in 
earliest times (in den iiltesten Zeiten)' did the borders of states coincide with 
the boundaries of nations (ibid.: 8f). 
~ The same is true about religion (ibid.:9). 
~ Descent (Abstammung) is 'not at all the true mark' of nationality since no 
nationality in Europe is 'of pure descent'. Nations emerge either through 
mixing oflines of descent or through their splitting up.476 
While all of the above are elements of nation-formation, Lazarus singles out 
language as the most important 'objective element of the formation of national 
unity' (ibid.: 12). Language 'connects all members of a nation to a spiritual 
(geistige) community' (ibid.: 10). The importance of language is underlined by 
the fact that language was created 'in the first human community through the 
need for mutual understanding and continued [in tum] to create the conditions for 
this understanding'. The child 'develops the ability of thinking in the language of 
the family first'. Communication and exchange lead to the development of 
'manifold forms of the inner unity of the person (mannigfachen Ausbildung des 
innerlich Einen)'. 
However, Lazarus does not stop at a definition of the nation as a community 
of language. The main thrust of his argument is based on his refusal to 
acknowledge that what he calls 'objective' categories are in the last instance at 
all definitive. The question 'what is a nation (Volk)' ought not to be answered 
with 
a classification of the human species in the style of natural history (in 
naturgeschichtlicher Weise gemachte Eintheilung der Menschenart) 
according to its varieties (Varietiiten)477 and its less and less numerous 
differences and forms (Formungen) ( ... ) (ibid.: 11). 
Such an approach might be appropriate for the classification of plants by a 
botanist who has to ask what degree of similarity is necessary to group two plants 
476 In April 1880, the 'Deutsche Wacht' published a detailed critique of Lazarus's text, 'What 
does national mean?' which is signed 'N.' (probably NaudhINordmann; Deutsche Wacht 
1880:386). The text argues against Lazarus that every school boy knew 'that "national" is derived 
from "nascor" and refers to the innate (Angeborenes)'. He claims that Lazarus wants to 'sidestep' 
this obvious fact and gives the sarcastic advice that Lazarus should better ask 'What does people 
(Yolk) mean' because 'with the concept Volk it is possible to operate more by sleight of hand 
(mehr Taschenspieler-Tricks zu spielen) than with the simple concept national'. 
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into the same family. The concept of the nation, however, cannot be conceived in 
such a way because it 'is not based on the physical, zoological aspect, but on a 
spiritual (geistigen) one'. Lazarus accepts that language is the most important 
'objective element of the formation of national unity'. The objective elements in 
themselves, however, do not make a nation. 
Lazarus differentiates' content' and 'form' of consciousness (ibid.: 12). 
'Content' is constituted by sentiments, notions, concepts and the feelings 
attached to them, 'form' by 'the moving of these contents through [the faculty of] 
consciousness or [in other words] the combination of their elements'. All 
elements of 'national consciousness (Volksbewusstsein)' - religion, customs 
(Sitte), constitution - are 'thought content (Gedankeninhalt)'. Form as well as 
content oflanguage are subject to 'national specificity 
(Volkseigenthuemlichkeit),; form, though, is affected by national specificity 'in a 
finer, more tender and more intense way' than content is. Words are the unity of 
idea (Vorstellungsinhalt) and 'thought form (Gedankenform)" while 'movement 
of thought (Gedankenbewegung), is represented in inflection (Wortbeugung) as 
well as syntax (Satzbildungsmitteln). 
Language not only contains the world-view (Weltanschauung) of a people, 
but also represents the perceptive activity itself (ist auch das Abbild der 
anschauenden Thatigkeit selbst) (ibid.). 
At this point of his argument, Lazarus employs a conceptual mindlbody dualism 
that separates 'material' or 'objective' from 'spiritual' or 'subjective' aspects, the 
latter of which transform and transcend the former: 
The true nature and the essence (eigentliche Wesen) of nationality can only 
be understood as residing in the spirit (aus dem Geiste). ( ... ) Spirit, freedom 
and history intervene in the natural distribution of the human species 
according to races, tribal groups, tribes, clans, families. They separate what 
by nature would belong together and mix and assimilate what by nature 
would be different. Spiritual community and difference are therefore 
independent from genealogical community and difference. The concept of 
the nation (Volk) is grounded on spiritual, historical constellations 
(Verhaltnisse) intervening into naturally given differences; and what makes 
a nation a nation are not objective conditions such as descent or language 
477 'Variety' was then a synonym of 'race'. 
213 
as such but the subjective ideas of the members of the nation who are 
joined in considering themselves a nation (ibid.:12f). 
Lazarus concludes that the researcher can determine human beings' belonging to 
race and tribe with the same objectivity with which a natural historian classifies 
plants. Talking about the nation, however, is different: 'we ask human beings 
which nation they belong to' (ibid. 13 ; italics added). Although the nation is not 
independent from material conditions, it 'does not have anything that could be 
called - except by analogy - a body (Leib)'. It is a 'spiritual creation of the 
individuals who constitute it; they are not a people, they constantly create it' 
(ibid.; italics added). 
The nation is the first product of the national spirit. The individuals do not 
create it as individuals but only by overcoming (aufheben) their isolation. 
The awareness of this self-transcendence (Selbstaufhebung) and of the 
[individuals'] dissolution into a general national spirit (Volksgeist) 
expresses itself in the notion of the people. The national spirit creates the 
notion and with it also the actuality of the nation (und damit auch die Sache 
Yolk) (ibid.). 
Lazarus rejects a 'scientific' - in other words: a positivistic - approach and 
advocates what could be called a 'hermeneutical' or 'interpretive' approach: 
We do not have to develop out of an examination of objective givens our 
own definition of the nation as a discrete, objective concept as if 
corresponding to a concrete object, but we have to interpret (erHiutem) the 
existing subjective definitions that the nations implicitly give of themselves 
(ibid.). 
Every individual nation has an individual conception of itself which 'will always 
base itself on objective conditions such as descent, language, public life 
(Staatsleben) and so on', and which in tum is an aspect of its particular actuality 
as a nation (ibid.: 14). However: 
the crucial issue, namely the light in which the self-consciousness 
illuminates itself, is the subjective, free act of self-awareness 
(Selbsterfassung) as a whole and as a people. 
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Lazarus concludes that 'the subjective community (Zusammenhang) in the spirit 
(Geiste) of a nation' is 'based on, developed and experienced' through the 
nation's 'history in the widest sense' - or else, 'common destiny': 
Insofar as an individual - or an individual with his family - over 
generations participates in history passively and actively, the subjective 
bond of belonging (Band der Zugeh6rigkeit) grows. Illness and famine 
when they hit a country do not ask after religion, descent or language but as 
common destiny (Geschick) they unite the minds (Gemuether). The 
blessings of peace and the burdens, sorrows and sacrifices of war are 
shared by all, and all share as well the virtues that war has demanded and 
strengthened (gesHihlt). Fighting shoulder to shoulder, the men (Manner) 
grow hearts fit for the unity of the historical deed. Even separate and 
hostile tribes proceed towards national unity. Will- that most personal, 
most character-forming element of the human mind (Gemueth) - alone the 
will ofthe tribes decides [the outcome of history]. In the German Reich, the 
will alone, proven in deed, has made those, who less than a decade ago had 
fought each other as mortal enemies, a unity. Not the least, as we Germans 
know best, the common history of intellectual life joins the individuals and 
tribes to the unity of the nation (ibid.: 14f; italics added). 
Shared subjects and levels of education (Bildung), mutual support in exploring 
the same things and exchange in exploring different things, 'in short: the flow of 
spirit and intellect [Geist] forming the inner life creates in everybody - according 
to the extent of their participation - the consciousness of their national-spiritual 
unity' (ibid.: 15). 
Similarly, while it is an objective anthropological fact that 'nature' has 
'planted into our hearts the inclination to join a defined group of fellow 
creatures' ,478 it has left open for the individual humans to decide what kind of 
group to join or to build: 'The motives for acting so (die Gruppierungsmotive) 
have been left open to us and we see them change through all ages' (ibid.:16). 
The 'natural underpinnings (Unterlagen) of human sociability (Geselligkeit), 
- spatial community, language, exchange of means of subsistence, geographical 
and hereditary influences - constitute an 'intertwining of interests and customs to 
which higher relationships can easily attach themselves'. They do not, however, 
constitute 'the bonding of minds (kein Band der Gemuether)' which is the basis 
of the nation: 
478 ' ... uns in eine geschlossene Gruppe unserer Mitgeschoepfe hineinzustellen'; Lazarus quotes 
from a text by Gustav Ruemelin. 
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Not every birthplace is a home (Heimat), not every land of the fathers is a 
fatherland. Through the community of state and law I can be chained to 
people whose language I do not understand, whose customs (Sitte), culture 
(Bildung) and belief are alien to me. Human freedom again stands above 
all these individual powers of attraction (einzelnen Anziehungskriiften). I 
can break away from it all, join strangers (Fremden) and talk to King 
David's ancestress (Ahnfrau): Your people be my people and your God be 
my God.479 The concept of the nation is not objectively defined but also 
depends on sUbjective sentiment (Empfindung). My nation are those whom 
I consider to be my nation, whom I call my people, to whom I know myself 
joined by unbreakable bonds (unlosbare Bande) (ibid.: 16f). 
Lazarus makes a distinction between a more emphatic concept of the 'nation' 
(Yolk) and a more casual one. He presents the emphatic concept in a formulation 
by Ruemelin: 480 
Our mind (Gemueth) ( ... ) will always feel a silent longing (Sehnsucht) for 
a full, unitary community of life (nach einer vollen einheitlichen 
Lebensgemeinschaft). It will aim at the ideal of a central group that 
encompasses all matters of life (die zentrale, alle Lebensziele 
umschliessende Gruppe), the pivot and focus of all particular motives for 
getting together (in dem alle einzelnen Gruppierungsmotive ihren Halt- und 
Sammelpunkt finden), in which we have a complete sense that these are 
our people (die Unsrigen), the kin (Angehorigen) by whom we stand, with 
whom we endure, whose fate (Geschick) we share, from whom to part 
would be an intolerable thought. 
Our German word 'Yolk' in its deeper meaning refers to this ideal aim of 
the universal group (Universal-Grupp e) of the full community of life, 
without though excluding those less perfect forms that are constituted by 
the individual main characteristics (ibid.: 17). 
On the other hand, 'we have to accept' that there is also a more casual use of the 
term: this usage refers to every group that wants to distinguish itself from its 
neighbours with reference to descent or language, or, on the other hand, 'every 
multitude (Menge) that is governed by a state' as a people or a nation. 
Paradoxical statements such as that 'the Belgian people consists of two peoples' 
follow from confusing the two ways of using the term people (ibid.: 17f). 
Lazarus goes on to integrate 'objective' and 'subjective' elements into a 
comprehensive definition of the ideal concept of the nation (ibid.:18): 
479 This is an allusion to the Book of Ruth. 
4RO Gustav Ruemelin was a 'longtime liberal' who embraced Malthusian population control policy 
and celebrated rural life (Sheehan 1978: 197). He was the chancellor of the university of 
Tuebingen. 
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A country large and fertile enough to feed a dense, numerous population, 
fit to defend itself against all its neighbors, varied enough to warrant a 
multiple development of economic and intellectual life; on this soil, a 
linguistically unified population that works it and has struggled for it and 
knows itself united in common deeds and sufferings; this multitude 
protected and ordered through a unified state sprung from its womb 
(Schoss) intertwined with its interests and memories; based on secure 
statehood, the flowering and cultivation of all those ideal goods of 
humanity and of intellectual, moral (sittlichen) and religious life [growing] 
in free and manifold forms, including contradictions and struggles that 
strengthen a sense of community spreading in sovereignty and 
reconciliation - this is what it means to be a nation.481 
For Lazarus, the prevalence of nation over race is part of the prevalence of spirit 
over matter, and the victory of a 'subjective' concept of the nation over an 
'objective' one is part of the struggle of 'idealism' over 'materialism'. He 
opposes his idealist concept of the nation, that has the 'national spirit' transcend 
its material conditions and actually make the nation, to racial conceptions of the 
nation: 
This blood- and race-theory is in its entirety a product of a general coarsely 
sensualist-materialist world-view (grobsinnlichen Materialismus der Welt-
und Lebensanschauung ueberhaupt). Those who - on the one hand - argue 
for a revival of ideality (Idealitat) are critically wrong if they do not - on 
the other hand - recognize that materialism has to be fought lock, stock and 
barrel (auf der ganzen Linie) and replaced by a higher and purer world 
view (Lebensansicht) (ibid.:21 f). 
Lazarus writes that the idea of culture being determined by blood is inconsistent 
with subscribing to 'the victorious power ofthe idea' (ibid.:22). He sees 'the 
arousal of racial or tribal hatred' as a necessary accompaniment of materialism. 
481 Lazarus' text - be it a unique intervention or just mirroring a general trend of thinking - shows 
how much the contemporary discussion of the nation in the social sciences is rooted in the 19th 
century. It would be worthwhile exploring how this strikingly contemporary sounding definition 
was received throughout the last third of the 19th century, whether it was preceded by or 
paralleled by similar formulations, and especially whether Ernest Renan's lecture from 1882 and 
Otto Bauer's Nationalitiitenfi'age (1907), which seem to echo it, were directly influenced by it. 
Alfred Leicht writes in his book on Lazarus (Leicht 1904: 191) that Renan's lecture (1882) was 
consciously based on Lazarus' lecture, a copy of which Lazarus had sent to Renan. Renan also 
sent a copy of his lecture to Lazarus. Although Renan failed to mention Lazarus, the close affinity 
between both texts was observed by contemporaries who urged Lazarus to complain (which he 
didn't bother doing). 
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Racial hatred is 'the lowest [form of] antagonism (Widerwillen)' .482 Although 
the actuality of race and tribe (Stamm) are not denied, they are but aspects of 
matter and have no role to play in the realm of spirit and sociability. Bringing 
race and tribe as points of reference into the realm of spirit and society means 
undermining the human effort to spiritualize existence. 
Although for Lazarus commonality of religion is one of the 'objective 
elements' that constitute the material substratum of a particular nation, he rejects 
the idea that anyone religion as such could have a national character: there is no 
such thing as a 'German religion'. Therefore he rejects Treitschke's claim that 
Judaism 'was not German' (ibid.): Judaism is just as much (or as little) German 
as Christianity is (ibid.:25): 
Today, every nationality comprises several religions, every religion several 
nationalities. ( ... ) Individual-civil, political and national activity (die 
individuell buergerliche, die politische und nationale Tatigkeit) of any 
human being, including the Jew, is independent from religion (ibid.:26).483 
Lazarus adds that Judaism in particular was a religion that 'neither grants 
anything to any power nor demands anything from any power (Macht) or 
dominion (Herrschaft)" and concludes from this that it 'can never come into 
conflict with the state'. Lazarus supports this claim with a discussion of a text 
that he argues is crucial to Jewish religious and state theory, the book 'Mar 
Samuel,484 according to which 'the law of the country's government, or of the 
empires, is the law for the Jew'. Lazarus argues that this formulation is based on 
4H2 Lazarus suggests that it is the form common amongst animals: he suggests that animals hate 
each other 'for no reason but their difference'. However, 'living in a peace-breathing human 
habitat (friedensathmenden Menschenwohnung), dog and cat learn how to get along'. 'A human 
being (Mensch), however, in whom the feeling of humanity has not yet arisen or is already 
stifled, sees an enemy in every human being who is different.' Lazarus's argument is based on a 
dualism of a bestial-material natural substratum on which - and in opposition to which - humans 
develop spirit and sociability. The power of spirit over matter is so strong that it even extends to 
animals when they are being domesticated by human beings. 
483 Lazarus anticipates and rejects the possible counter-argument that only the Jews constitute a 
community of belief and tribe (sind Glaubens- und Stammesgenossen) at the same time. Against 
this he argues that also the Germans, the English, the Dutch and the Danes share 'tribal' 
background as well as Protestant religion (sind germanische Stammes- und protestantische 
Glaubensgenossen). Furthermore, for the actual life of a French Jew it does not make a difference 
whether or not there are Jews in Abyssinia, and neither do (Christian) Germans become less 
German because Christianity might be spreading amongst the Iroquois. The relation of a group of 
people to the particular state they inhabit is not necessarily affected by the existence of another 
group of people of the same tribe or religion (or both) in another state. 
4H4 Mar Samuel (180-253) was a Babylonian writer (Belke 1977 :LXX). Belke comments that 
Lazarus overstretches the meaning of the sentence in a quasi-Protestant direction. 
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a notion that has been pivotal to Judaism from its very beginnings: the belief that 
God commands the fate of the world, and so every legitimate government is ipso 
facto legitimised by God. Lazarus claims that his own understanding of 
nationality is in keeping with a line of traditional Jewish thought that 'has never 
been challenged': since German Jews have become German citizens, they share 
the fate of the German nation, are therefore Germans and accept the German 
state as legitimate. 
Lazarus adds that the Germans have only recently become 'a nation in the 
genuine, true sense of the word' (ibid.:27), a process in which the Jews have 
fully taken part. In a footnote, Lazarus underscores the participation of Jews in 
the German-French war of 1870-71. He concludes: 
Whatever we do we do as Germans. When we earn fortunes on the world 
market - something people like to point out so much - then we increase the 
wealth of the [Gern1an] nation (ibid.:27). 
Lazarus concludes that 'the heightening ofthe national feeling (Nationalgeflihl) 
is a serious issue ... for the German as well as for any other people' (ibid.:27). 
One cannot contribute to this aim by arousing antagonism (Widerwillen) in one 
part of the population against another one, in particular not by 'alarming the 
imagination with a strong fear of facts that are - not facts at all'. 
Central to Lazarus' conception is the categorical distinction between 
'material' - as it were: corporeal- aspects of the nation, as the worldly 
'intertwining of interests', and 'spiritual' aspects. Language is the mediator 
between both, standing with one leg in the material world (warranted by its 
practical, functional aspects) and with one leg in the realm of self-consciousness, 
freedom, human will and the making of history. While the material world 
constitutes races, tribes, clans, etc, only the spiritual world - the 'bonding of 
. d ' . . 485 mm s - constitutes natIOns. 
485 In a review of new pamphlets on the 'Jewish Question', Philippson (taking up the formulation 
in the title of a pamphlet he is reviewing) suggests replacing the discussion of 'what does national 
mean' with the more pragmatic one, 'what does alien (fremd) mean' (AZ 5.10.1880, No. 40). He 
argues that anyone who is born in a country to parents 'who belong to this country (die diesem 
Lande angehoeren), and who has been raised and educated there and in its language 'is not alien'. 
This 'high and holy right' is unaffected by anyone's definitions and discussions of the concept of 
'nationality' . 
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2.2.5.5 TREITSCHKE'S RESPONSE: ... BUT THE NATIONAL SPIRIT IS NOT IRRELIGIOUS 
'Unfortunately', responds Treitschke to Lazarus, he has to disagree. He 
concedes that 
the essence of nationality is to be found not merely in descent 
(Abstammung) or language, but in the unquestioned and lively 
consciousness of unity (Treitschke 1896c:57). 
But he reproaches Lazarus for not dealing with the problem how such 
'consciousness of unity' would be possible amongst people who hold differing 
religious sentiments: 
That living consciousness of unity that constitutes nationality can not usually 
be formed amongst people who think in fundamentally different ways about 
the highest and most sacred questions of emotional life. 
While different denominations are a lesser problem, different religions can 
coexist in one nationality 'only as a transitional state' and only as long as one 
religion 'clearly forms the rule' while believers of other religions are 'a minute 
minority'. Treitschke also rejects Lazarus's claim that 'today, every nationality 
includes several religions': 
I am not a follower of the doctrine of the Christian state, because the state is 
a secular order and has to exert its power with impartial justice also against 
non-Christians. But without doubt we Germans are a Christian nation (Volk) 
(ibid.:57f). 
Treitschke argues that Christianity is intertwined (verwachsen) 'with every fibre 
of the German people', while Judaism is 'the national religion of a tribe that 
initially was alien to us' (ibid.:58). Art, science, 'even disbelief, and 'all healthy 
institutions of state and society' of the German people have been 'fertilized' by 
Christianity, whereas 'the Germans never had any part' in the development of 
Judaism, and vice versa. Judaism remained restricted to the 'Jewish tribe' 
because it was 'more suitable for defence than for proselytizing'. Treitschke 
rejects Lazarus's disconnecting religion and nationality also with reference to 
other nations: 'The most cultured (bestgesitteten) nations of the present, the 
Western European nations, are all Christian nations (Volker),. Treitschke 
concludes: 
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Just imagine that one half of our nation would renounce Christianity: no 
doubt, the German nation would have to fall apart. Everything we call 
German would fall to pieces. 
Treitschke reproaches Lazarus for not distinguishing between 'religion' 
(Religion) and 'denomination' (Konfession) and argues that while different 
denominations can co-exist within one nation, different religions cannot. 
Crucial to this step in Treitschke's argument is the ambivalent use of the 
concepts Staat, Nation and Volk and their relation to each other. He argues first 
that the state should be beyond religion as a 'secular order', although this is 
followed by the assertion that in the case of Germany 'all institutions of the state' 
are essentially Christian in their spirit. Also, all Western nations are 'Christian 
nations'. Nation and Volk seem to be used as synonyms in this context. The 
argument that all German state institutions are Christian seems to presuppose that 
national culture informs486 (and - to some extent - precedes) state institutions. It 
follows from this that the initial (normative) statement - the state should be 
secular - is contradicted by the subsequent (positive) statement that the state is 
always informed by religion as one crucial constituent of nationality. The 
normative claim for the nation-state's secular character necessarily stands in 
contradiction with its actual constitution that involves a particular religion. 
This contradiction affects the guarantee given by Treitschke that the (secular 
but Christian) state 'has to exert its power with impartial justice also against non-
Christians' : 
Just because a tiny minority of Jews lives amongst them, the Christian 
peoples of the West have not become mixed Christian-Jewish peoples. They 
might grant that minority all civil rights and complete freedom of religion; 
but despite having granted emancipation to the Jews they remain entitled and 
obliged to remain in the upright stance of their Christian culture (in dem 
angehobenen Gange487 ihrer christlichen Gesittung) and to preserve the 
Christian character of their institutions (ibid.:S9f). 
It is the tiny number of the Jews that makes their claim to cultural equality 
beyond legal emancipation appear so 'monstrous': it is Lazarus's 'principal 
486 Informs, not necessarily determines 
487 1 am not clear about the exact meaning of 'angehobenen Gange'. Obviously it expresses some 
kind of superiority; 'Gang' could either be 'pace', 'movement' or 'stance'. The imagery could 
either be that Christians - further ahead in evolution - walk upright while Jews tend to stoop, or 
that Christians walk 'in a faster pace' than Jews. 
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mistake' that he ignores 'the modest status of exception that befits the Jews in the 
Christian cultural world' (ibid.:60). 
Treitschke writes that not the state but the Volk is Christian. The question is 
then: how could the Volk be Christian and the state be not Christian, but at the 
same time the state be a national state, i.e. based on the Volk? In other words: is 
the secular nation-state - a central project of liberalism - not a contradiction in 
terms? This is a question that Naudh will ask. 
2.2.5.6 COHEN: AMBIVALENCE ABOUT NATIONALITY IS IMMORAL 
Hermann Cohen attacks four aspects of Lazarus' position, which effectively 
h . .. 488 amounts to a compre enSlVe reJectIOn: 
);> the suggestion that the link between nationalism and religion is rather loose; 
);> the suggestion that race is of little relevance to the nation; 
);> the suggestion that nationalism should be linked with and, as it were, 
balanced out by universalist ideals; 
);> the suggestion that diversity is a value. 
Cohen asserts that 'a nation that wants to found and to reinforce its existence 
as a state needs to take care of its religious foundation' (Cohen 1965: l30). All 
(potential) members of the nation have to participate in its religious foundation, 
'confessional differences related to history and tradition' (ibid.: 130f) 
notwithstanding.489 However, Cohen rejects the idea 'that religious form was a 
matter of no political relevance and should not be the concern of the state' as 'a 
flawed liberal slogan (Schablone), which unfortunately has been taken on board 
by many Jews' (ibid.). 
Against Lazarus, Cohen holds that 'the German people, and that includes us 
Jews, breathe out of the culture of Christianity'. Cohen agrees with Treitschke's 
claim that 'the co-existence of several different religions can only be a transitory 
488 Cohen regrets 'to admit' (Cohen 1965: 133) that his statement has been caused and motivated 
by Lazarus's claim that 'there is no German religion' and that Judaism is just as German as 
Christianity is. 
489 Cohen seems to be following here Kant's argument that it is essential for the state that there is 
religion, but the subtleties of differing confessions (G1aubensarten) should not be the state's 
concern (cp. 'Der Streit der Faku1taten', Abschnitt 1,II: 'Allgemeine Anmerkungen: Von 
Re1igionssekten', Kant 1975:30-33,44-67). 
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state' and can only last 'if one religion is the rule and the followers of the other 
religions are the exception and by far a minority' (ibid.: 134). However, this is not 
an argument that can reasonably be used in support of anti-Semitism: 
Christianity, which is in the 'world-historical' process of 'struggling for that 
purer form' of religion, can easily accommodate a minority that holds 'a belief so 
pure and free of all paganism' as the Jews. 
The concept of the 'coexistence of several different religions' does not sit 
comfortably with Cohen's Kantian definition of the term, that recognizes only 
one (universal) religion, ifmany different 'Glaubensarten'. In this context, a 
multiplicity of 'Glaubensarten' is held never to be a problem for the state as long 
as all of them can be interpreted in the sense of the generic concept of Religion. 
In the present passage, however, Cohen's stressing the 'purity' of Judaism 
implies that a less 'pure' religion (more precisely: 'Glaubensart') would 
constitute a problem. Furthermore, the formulation by Treitschke that Cohen 
approves of clearly implies that the 'minority' believers do not enjoy equal 
cultural currency, while Cohen argues for the equality in value of Judaism and 
Protestant Christianity in the' struggle for that purer form of religion'. Admission 
to the national community appears here as a reward for 'purity' from 
heathendom, in other words: compatibility with Protestantism. 
Cohen underpins his discussion of the concept of 'race' with a 
methodological critique: he accuses Lazarus of both empiricism and one-sided 
idealism. Cohen is not interested in asking (as Lazarus does) whether race is 
empirically a constitutive element of nations as they actually exist: he 
acknowledges that Lazarus' discussion is valid in the context of an empirical 
account of the actuality of existing nations. However, Cohen subscribes to a 
normative concept of nationality that differs from that formulated by Lazarus: 
'without hesitation' Cohen affirms that racial unity of a nation (Volk) is desirable 
and 'to a certain minimal extent necessary' (ibid.: 134). Similarly, 
OO' the ideal politician (oo.) will say: I aim towards a more intimate (innigere) 
and higher unity for my nation (Volk) than what the statistician is able to 
abstract from the given empirical material. I aim towards a representation 
of my people that respects its physical characteristics and develops its 
racial type most magnificently. This wish and this ideal measure for the 
evaluation of national processes and misfortunes are natural and legitimate 
(ibid.: 135). 
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Cohen refuses to limit the theoretical argument merely to approximate to a given 
reality but argues that it should project a potential state of things that could 
become real under ideal conditions. This ideality consists for Cohen in a state 
that would allow the inherent racial characteristics of any nation fully to develop. 
A racial ideal should serve as the natural and legitimate touchstone for national 
politics. Cohen adds that 'Treitschke did not say: the Jews are Semites and are 
therefore not allowed to retain German citizenship, but he said the opposite', 
namely he urged them to become more German rather than less. 
Cohen rejects Lazarus' rejection of racialism as 'vulgar materialism 
(grobsinnliche Materialismus)' and argues that the concept of race is compatible 
with an overall idealist conception: 
Whoever appreciates and loves the bodily substance of a national soul (die 
leibliche Substanz einer Volksseele) in and for its particularity, is not 
therefore a materialist. 
With this remark, Cohen implies that Lazarus' conception is one-sidedly idealist, 
while for Cohen (arguing dialectically) a soul appears to be necessarily linked to 
a material substratum. The bodily equivalent of the 'national soul' is the 'racial 
substance'. Cohen adds that' ... whoever loves his nation with natural 
spontaneous love, does not have to fear shrivelling (verschrumpfen) into a 
narrow-hearted cosmopolitan (engherzigen Weltbuerger),. 
Cohen also takes issue with Lazarus' formulation that 
... we aim at a Germanity that is free of any felony (F elonie) against 
received (angestammte) traditions as well as against universal human 
principles (allgemeine menschheitliche Prinzipien) (ibid.: 136; cp.: Lazarus 
1880:36f). 
Cohen rejects both sides of this statement. Developing and extending traditions is 
more important than keeping 'received' ones; more crucially, however, he also 
rejects the obligation to respect 'universal human principles': 
It is not necessary to recommend this advice too dearly to the hearts of us 
Jews; if this was only possible to say without ridiculous embarrassment and 
clumsy indiscreet intrusiveness (Zudringlichkeit), I should suggest that 
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spontaneous cultivation of pure Germanity (naturwuechsige Pflege des 
puren Deutschthums) would be to the benefit of all of us. 
'As we are human beings', we 'feel and think differently from what Lazarus 
suggests'. Cohen asserts that 'we have to love our nation (Vaterland)' not 
because it is 'worth loving,490 but 'because it is our nation' (ibid.: 137; italics in 
the original). He asks sarcastically 'what would the English or French Jews say' 
ifthe German Jews loved Germany (in Lazarus' words) 'because we think that it 
struggles most fervently for the fulfilment of a universally human ideal'? Cohen 
rejects all universalistic and liberal rationalizations of patriotic love - such as 
those advocated by Lazarus - and asserts straightforwardly: 
We all love our nation (Vaterland) because it is our maternal soil 
(Mutterboden), because we love our home (Heimath), because we consider 
Palestine worth at most a journey; because in the homeland (Vaterland) our 
German mother-tongue is spoken: first word I babbled, sweet first mother-
word!49! Because we are just humans, and every human being wants to 
have a homeland (Vaterland) (ibid.: 137). 
Instead of Lazarus' search for good, rational and universalistic reasons to love 
one's nation, Cohen puts forward the notion that patriotic attachment is in itself 
reason enough being an anthropological universal.492 In an almost ironic sense 
there is a rationalist edge in Cohen's rejection of rationalizing one's patriotism. 
Cohen looks for a universal concept of patriotic love. Should all members of all 
nations in the world try to find equally good and convincing reasons for loving 
their respective nations, trouble was looming. The members of a nation for 
example that can reasonably claim 'that it struggles most fervently for the 
fulfilment of a universally human ideal' (as Lazarus suggests is the case with the 
Germans) might easily feel superior to the members of a nation that can only 
490 Cohen quotes Lazarus (I 880:37): 'Burke once said in the English parliament: if we are 
supposed to love our nation (Vaterland) then it must be worth loving (liebenswuerdig)'. Lazarus 
uses this formulation in the context of his argument that the German nation is more committed to 
humanist ideals than any other nation, i.e. it is as long as it maintains this commitment-
particularly 'worth loving'. 
491 'Erster Laut den ich gelallet, suesses, erstes Mutterwort!' Cohen paraphrases the folk-song 
'Muttersprache' (mother tongue) by Max von Schenkendorf (1783-1817, born in the Eastern 
Prussian town ofTilsit). The first verse of the song goes: 'Muttersprache, Mutterlaut,l wie so 
wonnesam, so traut!! Erstes Wort, das mir erschallet,! suI3es, erstes Liebeswort,l erster Ton, den 
ich gelallet,! klingest ewig in mir fort.' 
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claim that it is good at cooking or pearl-diving. Except within a strictly 
relativistic framework (which neither Cohen nor Lazarus embrace), this would 
inevitably result in a hierarchy of good or not so good reasons to love one's 
country. Some nations must obviously be more worth loving than others. Here is 
an inevitable source of conflict. Cohen's argument implies that being proud of 
striving for particularly universalist ideals actually brings in particularism 
through the back door. Patriotism without specific reasons is in this sense less 
dangerous than an 'enlightened' patriotism that has learned how to enrol 
humanity in its services. This element of Cohen's rejection of Lazarus's idealism 
is almost a 'critique of ideology' . 
Cohen demands that German Jewry's 'evil, slippery ambivalence' about 
patriotism 'has to be rooted out (beseitigt) completely' (ibid.: 137). Together with 
the religious Jewish question (the converging of Protestant Christianity and 
Judaism to the 'purer form of religion'), the racial question (,insofar as it is a 
question at all that poses itself to human consideration') will solve itself 
automatically (ibid.: 138). Cohen admonishes the Jews not to be deceived by the 
'malicious or obscure' character ofthe anti-Semitic attack into a general rejection 
of the category of 'race': 
We have to acknowledge that the racial instinct (Racen-Instinct) is not at 
all straightforward barbarism, but it is a natural, nationally legitimate 
desire. It only becomes barbarism when it degenerates into the political or 
national exclusion of those fellow citizens who do not have, nor want to 
have, another nation (Vaterland). In itself, it is a spontaneous 
(unwillkuerliches) and healthy (gutes) psychological motive, and indeed it 
can be developed into a useful corrective and regulative that is worth 
considering; never, though, must it be given validity as a moral (sittliche) 
norm (ibid.: 138). 
The 'racial instinct' is for Cohen an aspect of the general human longing to 
belong to a nation. The thrust of his argument is that the German Jews should 
channel this longing unequivocally into the desire to become Germans - by any 
means. He claims that 'all of us wish we simply had the German, the Germanic 
appearance' (das Deutsche, das Germanische Aussehen). Therefore it is just a 
matter of time until physical assimilation will have happened. The important 
492 The chain of five reasons - all introduced by 'because' - is largely tautological and of a 
rhetorical character - quite unusual in the context of Cohen's usually rather sober, neo-Kantian 
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point, however, is that 'it has to become the most holy of desires to assimilate 
(uns einzustimmen) to the natural tone (Naturton) of the people with whom we 
want to amalgamate (des Volkes, zu dem wir verschmelzen wollen),. The Jews 
are therefore obliged to strive to rid themselves of any particularities 
(Absonderlichkeiten): 
Ifwe take pride in our tribe (Stamm) as a constant feature of our living 
religion, this must under no sentimental excuse - except for defence - be 
played down as an innocent private obsession (Privatliebhaberei). National 
ambivalence (DoppelgefUhl) is not only an immoral, but an impossible 
thing (ibid.: 139; italics in the original). 
Cohen asserts that the reprehensible 'hybrid (Missgewachs)' of national 
'ambivalence (DoppelgefUhl)' is the exclusive product of a 'transitional period in 
which even the best of the Jews still count just for a Jew' (ibid.). In other words, 
it is nothing but an indication that surrounding society has not yet completely 
conceded emancipation. Cohen admits that the necessity of defence justifies 
temporary expressions of 'tribal' attachment, but the temptation has to be resisted 
'to tum the excitement of the time of defence into a permanent attitude for the 
time of peace'. The point is not to let this temporary necessity seriously interrupt 
the process of assimilation, but to keep in mind that 'complete and unconditional 
Germanization (rueckhaltlose, unbedingte deutsche Naturalisierung) in no way 
inhibits Israelitic religion'. 
Cohen accepts Lazarus' claim that 'true culture' lies in 'diversity' 
(Mannichfaltigkeit) (although he adds that universal human unity is equally 
important) but claims that this is only so 'from a bird's eye perspective'. For 
'human beings from blood and flesh, who want to found a state down here' 
seeking 'to unite themselves into a unity of state and people (zu einer Staats- und 
Volkseinheit)" diversity might be an 'illicit burden (unerlaubte ... Zumuthung), . 
Cohen contrasts 'humanity' and its 'ends' which are mere 'concepts of 
philosophy of history' to 'national unity (Volkseinheit)' which is 'a moral task 
(eine sittliche Aufgabe)' (ibid.:141). Aiming towards ever more intense 'unity of 
being and consciousness' is a 'duty' (Pflicht). On these grounds, Cohen rejects 
Lazarus' notion that it is a 'permanent task of the Jews' to take part in all 
discourse. 
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particular national cultures as a distinct element promoting universalism. The 
only task of the Jews is, according to Cohen, 'the preservation of monotheism' 
until the 'purer form of Christianity' has been attained. 
For diversities other than this one, I have no time and I cannot grant 
asylum. The morality (Sittlichkeit) of a people (Volk) is a national one, or 
at least it aims at being national. Within a national collectivity 
(Gemeinsamkeit) there can be individual morality, but no particular 
morality is desirable that would be substantiated (substantiierte) in any 
religious groups or sects (ibid.). 
Cohen insists that the Jewish reaction to the anti-Semitic attack should be not to 
deviate from the path of assimilation that they have already gone down quite far 
(ibid.: 142). Once legal emancipation will have been fully translated into 
respective administrative policy, 'odd behaviour (Anstossigkeiten des 
Benehmens), will gradually disappear and render the question of 'race' an 
irrelevancy. Whether or not one 'sticks to a certain particularity of mores 
(Besonderheit der Sitten)', emancipation and more generally, the political and 
state sphere, matter (ibid.: 146f): 
For belonging to a state is not something external or mundane; it demands 
the whole innermost man. One has to love its institutions as one loves those 
of religion; ... service to one's state must count as holy, like service to 
God.493 But let the natural traits of the nation (Volk) -love of which lives 
in you no less [than in gentile Germans] as soon as your cultural 
consciousness has reached maturity - grow and develop without se1f-
censure or restraint (zu rechter Unbefangenheit in euch lebendig werden) in 
all aspects of your way oflife - including the nation's pleasures as well as 
its warfare. Even when you maintain your belief in positive difference, you 
must not lose sight of the fact that the foundations of your religiosity oblige 
you to hope and struggle for amalgamation (zu verwachsen) into national 
unity (Volksgemeinschaft) with the Christians (ibid.: 147).494 
Differences of positive religion are to be tolerated, but are irrelevant in social and 
political matters. Religiosity in a more fundamental and general sense, which is -
or should be - shared by Jews and Christians alike, is the spiritual foundation of 
493 'Seinem Staate dienen zu k6nnen, muss als heilig gelten, wie Gottesdienst.' 
494 This passage is from the concluding section of Cohen's text that consists of three admonitions, 
two addressed to specific groups within Jewry (Orthodox and Reform Jews) and one towards 
Jewry in general. The passage quoted here is addressed to the Orthodox Jews which might 
explain its massive emphasis on the relevance of the state. The parallel sequence that is addressed 
to the Reform Jews emphasizes the relevance of religion (see chapter 2.2.6). 
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the' ethical (si ttliche), order of the state. As his drawing a parallel between state 
service and service to God suggests, Cohen's (neo-Kantian) ethical-religious 
approach gives to the state a spiritual halo no less than Treitschke' s approach 
does. Although Cohen is explicit about the disgust he feels about Treitschke, the 
demand for the Jews 'to become Germans' has a strong supporter in Cohen. 
2.2.5.7 NAUDH: THE UNITY OF STATE AND CHURCH AS A DEFENCE OF GERMAN 
NATIONALITY AGAINST JEWIFICA TION 
Naudh reminds Lazarus that he 'could have learned' from Hegel's 
'Philosophy of History' that 
'religion stands in the closest connection with the principle of the state 
(Staatsprincip): the concept of God is the general foundation of a people.' 
He could also have learned this from the disintegration of European 
Turkey, where a population using the same language cannot live within the 
same state because some are Muslims and the others are Christians ... 
(Naudh 1965:200; italics in the original).495 
Naudh reflects on the relation of church and state in the specific context of 
modem - national - society: 
Since nationality has come back to life within the peoples, the talk about 
the separation of state and church has lost its meaning (ibid.: 194). 
Naudh seems to imply that the separation of state and church had a meaning as 
long as 'nationality' was not the hegemonic principle of social cohesion. Having 
Germany in mind, he might refer here to the time from the Reformation until 
1871. Naudh adds that 'for us, anyway' (i.e. today), all Christian denominations 
have 'the essence of Christianity' in common, implying that this has not 
necessarily always been so. 
Religion is the supreme expression of the morality (Sittlichkeit) of a people 
and God is the embodiment of its consciousness of right 
(Rechtsbewusstsein). ( ... ) Right, morality (Sitte) and religion originate from 
the same source. ( ... ) Church and state are not hostile to each other 
495 Naudh is probably quoting from 'Vorlesung ueber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, 1830, 
section Bc), "Das Material seiner [des Geistes] Verwirklichung''', Hegel 1955: 127. If this is what 
Naudh quotes, he is misquoting: Hegel does not leap (like Naudh does) from 'state' to 'people' 
but explicitly talks here about states not peoples. 
229 
(einander fremd) but exert the same task in different spheres. In the sphere 
of the state lie the deeds: these, though, have first been thoughts and had to 
negotiate with mind (Gemueth) and conscience (Gewissen), which lie in 
the sphere of the church. It is better and safer that the church educates 
conscience than that the state punishes deeds. The church does work in 
advance of the state in the world of thoughts, while the state merely needs 
to catch up with what might have escaped the church (ibid.: 194f). 
Naudh makes here a statement on the relation of state and (national and religious) 
culture that is crucial to the debate. For him, church and state differ in the 
functions they exert in society but together with 'Sitte' and 'Rechtsbewusstsein' 
they emanate from the same 'source'. Naudh seems to suggest that 'Sitte' and 
'Recht' are not cosmopolitan categories (as in Kant) but emanate from the 
'Volksgeist' (Hegel) or 'the general national character', a notion that reflects 
influences from Burke, Savigny, romanticism and the 'historische Rechtsschule '. 
Although arguing for the common origin of church and state, Naudh is not a 
religious thinker. For individuals with a 'will to freedom' the church is neither a 
good nor a bad thing but simply irrelevant. For society as a whole, however, it is 
relevant as a complement to the state, integrating 'thoughts' and 'deeds'. Naudh 
argues that 'the church rules only those who need it' and that 'the mere will to 
freedom' as well as 'the consciousness of not needing it any more' are sufficient 
for liberating oneself from it (ibid.: 195). One does not have to fight the church: 
one either needs it or one ignores it (on the individual level). Naudh concludes 
that those who choose to fight the church must be motivated by either the 
intention 'to replace one church with another church' or by 'profane secret 
agendas'. This goes against the liberals who fought the influence of the church 
on the state: what the latter actually wanted was to replace the synagogue for the 
church. 
For these reasons we have to agree completely when Herr von Treitschke 
says, 'the Jews are our misfortune', but we can only regret that he has not 
much earlier been engaged with us in the attempt to prevent this misfortune 
(ibid.: 193). 
Naudh suggests that 'nationality and liberalism are strict opposites' and considers 
the name of the National-Liberal party 'paradoxical'. He suggests that this party 
was too dependent on the approval of the Jewish press and so it is no surprise 
that 'it had to end as a sacrificial animal on the altar of Judaism (Judenthum)'. 
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National-Liberalism did not understand that the equal participation of 'two 
elements of such different morality (Sittlichkeit) as the Germans and the Jews' 
would necessarily prevent the 'healthy development of a state' (ibid.): 
State freedom (staatliche Freiheit) can only be national. It can only mean 
the freedom of a people to live and to develop according to its natural 
characteristics (ibid.: 194). 
Naudh suggests that 'the Jews' dragged the National-Liberal party into the anti-
Catholic 'Kulturkampf because the doctrine of the separation of state and church 
was instrumental in removing the most important obstacle for their achieving 
hegemony. 'Church influence on the state', Naudh argues, is 'the best protection 
for the Germans', while the separation of state and church actually meant making 
the state Jewish. 
When Naudh mentions 'natural characteristics' he understands these, 
differing from Treitschke and the other interlocutors, in an unequivocally racial 
sense. Naudh argues for example that the lack of a sense of 'honour' that gives 
the Jews an advantage in competition with Aryans in civil society is grounded in 
their physical 'organization' which has been kept identical through millennia of 
'in-breeding' . 
Naudh also rejects Treitschke's notion that intermarriage was one possible 
strategy to achieve 'amalgamation': 
Products of racial mixing would not share the characteristics of both 
parents to equal degree, but would be predominantly Jewish by far, as 
experience from animal breeding shows without doubt that constancy and 
hereditary predominance are directly relational to the duration of how long 
a race has propagated through pure in-breeding (ibid.:193). 
Anyway, Naudh finds that intermarriage on a larger scale is unlikely. Only a 
'German girl' who was desperately poor would be able to overcome the moral 
repulsion at the 'unnatural obscenity (widematuerliche Unzucht)' of marrying a 
Jew. Because the Jews regard marriage -like everything else - a mere matter of 
money, no (male) Jew would be interested in a German girl if she is poor 
(ibid.: 192). The likelihood of the reverse case of an impoverished German man 
marrying a rich Jewish woman is negligible, and apart from that, there are only 
'rare cases of pathological deviation (krankhafter Verirrung)'. 
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Naudh adopts the discourse of 'race' to explain and 'naturalize' phenomena 
that he holds can be observed in society, while Treitschke claims to have 
observed the same phenomena (specifically Jewish economic practices and a 
generic 'disgust' of Christian Germans for Jews) without adopting the 
terminology of 'race' explicitly. 
On the other main topic that Naudh is discussing, his dissent seems also to be 
one of degree rather than of principle: while both Treitschke and his liberal 
critics stick to the quintessential liberal principle of the separation of church and 
state, they all - including Naudh - agree on the necessity for some kind of 
cultural-moral cohesion that underpins the state while not being part of the state: 
national culture. Further, everybody - including the Jewish authors - seems to 
agree that this culture is - in the German case - more or less Christian. While 
Naudh differs in emphasizing the common origin of state and religion in national 
character and its' Sittlichkeit', his notion of a division o flab our between state 
and church is not incompatible with the conceptions held by Treitschke as well 
as his critics. 
The partly critical and partly affirmative way Naudh relates to Treitschke 
also mirrors that of some of the other contributors. Like Bresslau,496 N audh 
expresses the hope that Treitschke will recognize where the 'true nature' of his 
overall political framework is rooted. Obviously, the definition of what exactly 
this truth is, is different: while Bresslau and others oppose liberal patriotism to 
illiberal nationalism, Naudh claims that nationalism is incompatible with 
liberalism, and denies any consistency to the patriotic, National-Liberal 
argument. For Naudh, religion is constitutive (although not exclusively) of 
national culture to such an extent that religious difference by necessity 
undermines national unity and the viability of the national state. Although all the 
liberal contributors to the debate see the national state as rooted in some form of 
national culture, they tend to accord less relevance to religion in this context. 
Naudh challenges this assumption and claims that the national community cannot 
tolerate contradictions within national culture. Naudh implies that the mistaken 
liberal belief that minor contradictions would not undermine the nation is 
496 Cpo chapter 2.2.1.2 (Bresslau 1965a:56t) 
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motivated by the particularist interests of a small selfish section of society: the 
'ethno-class,497 of the capitalists/Jews who stand behind the liberal creed. 
2.2.5.8 MOMMSEN: THE COSTS AND THE PAINS OF BECOMING A NATION 
Mommsen argues that the nation has been created by 'the sentiment of the 
larger community' (die Empfindung der grossen Zusammengehorigkeit) 
(Mommsen 1965b:212), although there might still remain a feeling of 'closer 
sympathy' (based on memories and feelings) towards the 'so called closer 
compatriots' (den sogenannten engeren Landsleuten) on the level of 'the various 
German tribes (Stamme),. The nation is based on solidarity between and 'in a 
certain sense, amalgamation' of those tribes. The 'diversity' (Mannichfaltigkeit) 
of their skills and characteristics should be a cause of enjoyment and is also 
functional for the necessities of a large state. Mommsen implies that 'the status 
ofthe Jews within our people' is not essentially different 'from that of the 
Saxons or Pommeranians' . 
Mommsen quotes the French anthropologist Jean Louis Armand 
Quatrefages,498 who had argued that only some central German states were of 
mainly Germanic descent while the Prussians were mainly Slavonic. This 
difference has become irrelevant, however, once they have marched together on 
the battlefield: 
Anybody who is really familiar with history will know that transformation 
of the nationality - a gradual development with numerous and manifold 
transitions - is not a rarity. Historically as well as practically only the 
living is everywhere in the right. Just as the descendants of the French 
colony in Berlin are by no means Frenchmen born in Germany, so their 
Jewish compatriots are nothing less than Germans (ibid.:213). 
In this paragraph Mommsen formulates 
).- a general historical law, or definition: nationality is not a stable phenomenon 
but changes in the course of historical development, 
497 With this I mean that Naudh's argument evokes the existence of a group of concrete people 
who are at the same time both an economic class (in Weber's sense of the word) and an ethnic 
group. 
498 Quatrefage's work was based on craniological research (Mendes-Flohr; Reinharz 1980:287). 
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~ a more general aphorism: 'Historisch wie praktisch hat eben ueberall nur der 
Lebende Recht ',499 
~ and two historical examples: the French colony in Berlin and the German 
Jews. 
Mommsen argues that the present is neither determined, nor can be validated, 
by the past. The particularisms of the past have to disappear and give way to the 
new social form, the patriotic order which is 'in the right' against the residues of 
the past because it is constituted by 'the living' and sails with the winds of 
progress and historical dynamic. The notion that the present is in the right against 
the past gives it legitimacy and superiority. Mommsen's point is that the origins 
of a group of persons do not and cannot - or rather, ought not - determine the 
present status of its members. As this is true - by definition - of the legal status 
of citizens, Mommsen formulates here a fundamental element of liberal thought. 
However, the formulation omits that the actual social status of the empirical 
individual in society is - to a greater or lesser extent - indeed determined by the 
past: society is as much the present as it is the past in crystallized form. In the 
structures as well as the specific dynamics that together constitute society the 
past does exert some degree of power over the present; even the particular 
achievements, talents or productivity of the (present) individual owe more to the 
totality of achievements and sufferings that have happened in the past than the 
individual might be able to realize. 
On closer inspection, Mommsen's throwaway remark reveals a crucial 
paradox of his (i.e., the liberal) concept of history and the nation. The new order 
- the present social order as well as the present form of state - preserves the 
memory that it has been born out of the struggle against the particularisms and 
injustices of the old order, pointing to the latter's historicity. At the same time, 
however, the order that rules in the present claims to be 'in the right' not only 
against the past ('historically') but also against competing claims in the present 
('practically,).50o This implication of Mommsen's conception of history is crucial 
499 The untranslatable 'eben' marks this as a universally accepted, indisputable statement. 
500 Not only is the meaning of the word 'praktisch' obscure, but it would be difficult to say who 
exactly 'der Lebende' is. In reality, there are many different Lebende and they all claim to be 'in 
the right'. A singular and non-antagonistic subject der Lebende that hat Recht only exists in the 
bourgeois imagination that finds that (completely) bourgeois society exists as a perfect (natural, 
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to his view of J ewishness as particularism and his demand it must disappear just 
as much as 'Saxonianism' is disappearing. The question needed to be raised 
whether the anachronistic element, the remainder marginalized by progress, may 
not to some extent be in the right against the victorious present: if only as a 
reminder of the historicity of the present and its finite, contingent character.501 
After this programmatic statement, Mommsen discusses the situation of 
Jewry in modem as opposed to ancient times. The 'essential difference' (der 
wesentliche Gegensatz) is that 'the old world did not know what we call today 
the national state' (ibid.:213). 
( ... ) in antiquity one did not conceive of citizenry (Staatsbuergerthum) as 
homogeneous and roughly coextensive with linguistic area, the concept 
that is now fundamental to any politics (welches heute den Grund jeder 
politischen Gestaltung bildet). 
Because of the non-national character of the state in antiquity, the Jews managed 
to maintain 'a certain national identity' (nationale Geschlossenheit) 'even beyond 
the demise of their state'. 502 Although they tended to use the prevailing world 
languages and were immersed in the respectively valid standard of education and 
culture (Bildung), their best writers were 'totally Jewish, conscious 
representatives of Jewry' (ganz und voll Juden und bewusste Vertreter des 
Judentums) (ibid.:214). Mommsen argues that such a phenomenon does not exist 
anymore: 
as it were) 'equilibrium' where the only remaining form of conflict is 'competition' (which in the 
classless society of burghers becomes a peaceful mechanism that merely helps distributing the 
wealth that has been produced collectively by all productive members of society, 3rd and 4th 
[possibly even 15t and 2nd] estates in harmonious unity). 
501 The cynicism ofMommsen's 'positivist' (or 'presentist') remark becomes apparent if 
contrasted with Ferdinand Freiligrath's famous poem from July 1848, 'The Dead [speak] to the 
Living (Die Todten an die Lebenden), (first published by Karl Marx in 'Neue Rheinische 
Zeitung' and subsequently widely disseminated as a leaflet, despite being banned in Prussia) in 
which the revolutionaries who had been shot on the Berlin barricades in March 1848 spoke to 
those who survived them (Dressen 1999: 128-130). Freiligrath makes very clear that the dead are 
'in the right' against those who (between April and July 1848) squandered the historical chance 
to topple the Prussian monarchy that had been opened up by the revolutionaries: 'Und Allesfeig 
durch euch verscherzt was trotzig wir errungen! '. 
502 Mommsen silently identifies here 'the state in antiquity' with the Greek and Roman examples 
which have been either city-states or Empires. His formulation 'even after the demise of their [the 
Jews'] state', however, presupposes that at least the Jews had a national state back then. Because 
he does not develop this, it is not clear whether Mommsen is aware of this inconsistency; he 
might perhaps have thought of the ancient Jewish state as an exception - a national state avant la 
lettre. 
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All eminent works created by Jews in modern times are of the culture of 
the nation, of which this particular Jew is a member. ( ... ) the German 
Israelite stands in the middle of German literary life just as the English 
Israelite in the middle of the English one. 
Mommsen concedes that Graetz's 'Talmudic history scribblings (die 
talmudistische Geschichtsschreiberei von Graetz), are an exception but marginal 
to Jewish literary life. 
The failure to grasp the difference between modern and ancient conceptions 
of state, nationality and culture is 'the reallocation of that delusion which 
recently has gripped the masses', and of which Treitschke is the 'prophet'. 
Mommsen now addresses Treitschke's original pamphlet directly: 
What does it mean that he demands that our Jewish compatriots become 
Germans? They are Germans already, just as I am, and just as he is. He 
may be more virtuous than they are; but do virtues make a German? 
Mommsen argues that even if certain defects were actual characteristics of fellow 
citizens 'ofthis or that category' this would not warrant 'removing them from the 
ranks of the Germans' (ibid. :215). Mommsen stresses that 'it must not at all be 
denied' that the peculiarities of 'the persons of Jewish descent living among us' 
(ibid.:216) are stronger (and are also felt to be stronger) than 'those of other 
tribes and even nations'. This is a result of 'the millennial suppression of German 
Semites by German Christians' which has been 'equally pernicious for either 
side' - although hatred of the Jews may have at the same time also provoked and 
developed the talents of German Jews. Mommsen rejects both the cult and the 
fear of the Jews that he sees as reciprocal (ibid.:217). Both are 'most simple-
minded confusions'. In the case of the Jews as elsewhere, 'light and shadow are 
mixed'. 
Central to Mommsen's argument is his re-appropriation of a formulation 
famously coined by him in his 'History of Rome' , which Treitschke had quoted 
in his most recent statement: 
Without doubt the Jews are an element of tribal decomposition in Germany 
just as they once were an element of national decomposition in the Roman 
state. This is why in the German capital, where the tribes actually mingle 
more thoroughly than anywhere else, the Jews hold a position for which 
they are envied in other places (ibid.). 
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Mommsen likens 'national decomposition' - to which the Jews contributed in 
the Roman Empire - to 'tribal decomposition' - to which the Jews now 
contribute in the German Empire. The building of Rome, which was not a nation 
state, was based on the decomposition of nations; the building of Germany, 
which is a nation state, is based on the decomposition of tribes. 'Processes of 
decomposition are often necessary, but they are never pleasant'. Mommsen 
proceeds here to the key statement of his argument: 
I am not so estranged from my homeland, however, that I would not 
painfully feel [the loss of] something I used to have and that my children 
will miss. But the happiness of children and the pride of men 
(Kinderglueck und Mannerstolz) do not go together. A certain amount of 
mutual grinding down [of their peculiarities] (ein gewisses Abschleifen der 
Stamme an einander) on the part of the tribes is demanded unconditionally 
by the current situation (durch die Verhaltnisse unbedingt geboten), i.e. the 
formation of a German nationality that is not identical with any particular 
tribe (Landsmannschaft). The big cities, and first of all Berlin, are its 
natural protagonists. I do not consider it at all a misfortune that the Jews 
have been active in this direction for generations. It is my opinion that 
Providence, much more than Herr Stocker, has understood very well why a 
few percent ofIsrael had to be added to form the Germanic metal (ibid.). 
Mommsen formulates here a programmatic view of the process of nation-
building, within which framework he defines the role of the Jews. He invokes the 
transition from tribal particularism to national statehood as a necessary and 
welcome historical process of progress that involves both gain and loss. On the 
side of loss is the 'happiness of children', on the side of gain is the 'pride of 
men'. This characterizes the nation building process as one of maturing and 
growing up. 'Mannerstolz', the 'pride of men', underlines that this is imagined as 
a male affair. The trope of 'growing up' presents the process as natural and led 
by objective, not arbitrary forces and legitimizes the loss of the 'happiness of 
children'. A second element of the imagery is taken from the productive 
processes of handicraft or industry. Like fine wooden fumitures, the tribes have 
to 'grind down' their edges and the rough surfaces of their particularity; like a 
solid metal, they have to be smelted and amalgamated in a determinate ratio. 
Only as an ironic aside against the clerical Jew-baiter Stocker, does Mommsen 
refer to 'Providence' as the subject of this process: the one who does the smelting 
and who knows the correct formula. The liberal historian does not need 'divine 
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Providence' to refer to - the objectivity of the historical process itself is authority 
enough. 
The notion of the loss of the 'happiness of children' connects the artisanal 
metaphor of the 'grinding down' to the notion of 'growing up'. It is implied that 
growing up is a process of adaptation and subordination to an adult world. The 
grown up man is allowed - perhaps even expected - to have melancholy and 
nostalgic feelings about the lost 'happiness of childhood', but these have to be 
mastered for the greater benefit of adult manhood. The building of the nation is 
imagined as the growing up of a boy: the grinding down of the childish 
particularities of the tribes 'is demanded unconditionally by the current 
situation'. The pre-national (tribal) memory has to be mastered and sublimated to 
regional folklore. The man (and likewise, the nation) who is not able to control 
and sublimate his (and likewise, its) tribal memory and master his (its) 
melancholia reveals his (its) immaturity. He will not be able to hold his own in 
the modem world. As for the Jewish question, the conclusion is: it might be 
'painful', but a few percent of Jews have to be in that national melting pot to help 
making that Germanic metal nice and strong. 
2.2.5.9 TREITSCHKE: ... RIGHT ALL ALONG 
In his response to Mommsen, Treitschke holds that the Jews promote 
'homeless cosmopolitanism (heimathloses Weltbuergerthum)' and rejects 
Mommsen's claim that the Jewish contribution to the 'decomposition of the 
German tribes' was beneficial to the process of German nation-building. Those 
'elements of Jewry' who 'do what they can to destroy the Germans' national 
pride and pleasure in the fatherland' are 'hostile to all German being (allem 
deutschen Wesen feindlich), (Treitschke 1965b:228). 
Treitschke also reaffirms his view that religion mattered in the political 
debate. While Mommsen - according to Treitschke - disregards the relevance of 
religious difference, Treitschke states that 'maturing civilization (die reifende 
Cultur) will lead our deeply religious people (Volk) back to purer and stronger 
ecclesiastical (kirchliches) life'. Treitschke sees therefore polemics by Jews 
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against Christian theology as 'attacks on the foundations of our morality 
(Gesittung)' (ibid.). 
The main point in Treitschke's response is the claim that Mommsen 
confirmed Treitschke's central contention: 
I have acknowledged that many of our Jewish fellow citizens have long 
become good Germans, and I have merely regretted that others still keep 
themselves principally in a distance from our national life. Mommsen 
responded: 'the Jews are Germans as much as he and me', but then 
proceeds emphasizing that some of these 'Germans' fancy themselves in a 
national-Jewish segregation (Sonderleben). Alas, he says in other words 
exactly the same as what I say. I believe, though, that my expression was 
more accurate (ibid.). 
Since Mommsen - according to Treitschke - does not disagree in substance, 
Treitschke asserts that Mommsen merely 'finds my intervention in the Jewish 
question inopportune'. However, articulating freely 'a social problem that all the 
world feels to exist' is more appropriate than keeping politely silent about it. 
Treitschke's strategy of defence against Mommsen consists of three 
elements: 
~ first, he shows that Mommsen's argument is inconsistent in itself. He exploits 
Mommsen's failure to distinguish clearly enough a normative claim to legal 
equality from an account of actual (socio-cultural) equality or difference, 
while both Treitschke and Mommsen presuppose that legal equality would or 
should reflect (or rather, be a reward for) actual (socio-cultural) equality. 
~ Second, Treitschke points out disagreement on the relevance of religion for 
nation-building and on the actual distribution of power between Jewish and 
Christian Germans. Here Treitschke merely repeats unwarranted claims about 
the power of the Jews. 
~ Third, Treitschke claims that Mommsen and himself agree in substance while 
his own position differs merely in being more straightforward and honest 
than Mommsen's. Playing down the disagreements, he reduces the thrust of 
Mommsen's criticism to the tactical question of whether Treitschke's 
intervention has been 'opportune' or not. The overall effect of Treitschke's 
response is the implication that Mommsen lacks the courage of his opinions. 
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In this reply, the two faces of Treitschke's attitude are as clearly pronounced 
as in his original contribution: a nationalism that demands complete social and 
spiritual assimilation is intertwined with a phantasmagoric vision of a deeply 
hostile and immensely powerful Judenthum. The way the latter is pictured makes 
assimilation appear neither possible nor really desirable; these two basic 
elements of Treitschke's position constitute an unresolvable contradiction to each 
other. 
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2.2.6 The relationship between Christian and Jewish religion 
Treitschke discusses religion almost exclusively under the aspect of its 
relevance for the state (cp. the previous chapter). Only when Lazarus and Cohen 
used what they saw as the close affinity between Judaism and Christianity as 
evidence for the cultural affinity between German Christians and Jews, did 
Treitschke respond with some remarks on the issue. However, even these were 
more of historical than of theological character. 
In a long and detailed discussion supported by a substantial number of 
references to other authors, Lazarus argues that Christianity is both historically 
and theologically closely related to Judaism, and also that there is a close affinity 
between Judaism and the concept of the modern state. The starting point for both 
strands of Lazarus' argument is the destruction of the Temple, the 'enormous 
defeat' (Lazarus 1880:44) for the Jewish people. The Jews were lifted 'out of the 
ashes of the Temple on Zion' (ibid.:44f) by a 'Phoenix' which was the 'ideal 
concept of humanity' of Christian religion as first formulated by its Jewish 
founders. What distinquished the Christians amongst other groups of Jewry was 
that they 'deliberately withdrew from the [Jewish] national struggle' and thus 
arrived at a position where they were able to reformulate the original Jewish 
concepts of monotheism and of the unity of a single humanity (expressed in the 
image of one universal flock led by one shepherd). These two central motives 
that are common to Judaism and Christianity are also pivotal to the Jews' relation 
to the state (especially the modern state). 503 Lazarus rejects Christian polemics 
against the Talmud - he mentions Eisenmenger, Pfefferkorn and Rohling - as 
misleading because they one-sidedly over-emphasized the formalistic 
characteristics of the Talmudic literature and ignored that there is now a 'new 
503 Lazarus gives a long quote from declarations agreed on by the first and second Israelitic 
Synods, the first of which took place in 1869 in Leipzig, the second in Augsburg (Lazarus does 
not mention the year). These stress that Judaism respects and embraces the 'principles of the new 
society and the Rechtsstaat' (ibid.:45) and emphasises that they go back to the same universalist 
principles of humanity and equality. The second Synod emphasised that 'the consciousness of 
humanity as a whole (das Gesammtbewusstsein der Menschheit), is increasingly filled by 'true 
knowledge of God (wahre Gotteserkenntnis), and 'pure morality (reine Sittlichkeit),. It 
interpreted these as an approximation to the aims that always have led Judaism on its path 
through history (ibid.:46). Lazarus adds to this some quotes taken from Goethe, the ethnologist 
Pescheland, the philosopher Lotze and finally Ernest Renan, all of whom testify to the affinity of 
Judaism to Christianity and the principles of the modern state. 
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Rabbinism' that has overcome many defects of the old one (ibid.:50f)504. Lazarus 
points out that a mother does not have to die 'after she has given birth to a child' 
(ibid.:40), a metaphor for his rejecting a mechanistic concept of historical 
progress according to which an older historical form was not legitimized to 
continue to exist alongside a newer historical form. In the same mould, Judaism 
ought to continue to exist even after having' given birth' to Christianity. 
Judaism's motherly function is hereby to remind Christianity that it is not yet 
what it might or should become: 'Judaism (Judenthum) as the mother of 
Christianity will advance the education of Christianity through its criticism' 
(ibid.:41). Lazarus argues that it is a 'genuinely Christian conviction' (ibid.:22) 
that Jews are not inferior. To support this claim, he quotes several long passages 
from Luther's writings.505 Luther's later anti-Jewish statements can be explained 
by his disappointment about the Jews not converting to the 'purified' religion of 
the Reformation.506 
Treitschke holds507 against the concept of a close affinity between Judaism 
and Christianity that after 'the Jews crucified Jesus', Christianity 'overcame' 
Judaism: 
Every young spiritual (geistige) power that is victorious against an older one 
is itself the offspring of its adversary. The greatness of the Christian doctrine 
that originated from a Semitic people lies in its having overcome Semitism 
(Semitenthum) and having become the universal church (Weltkirche) 
(Treitschke 1896c:61f). 
Treitschke concedes that Christianity originated from Judaism but insists that its 
specific identity lies in its difference from the defeated precursor - whom it has 
to continue fighting in case it should signal a recovery. Treitschke argues in not a 
theological but a secular historical-philosophical way. His interest is less with the 
504 Lazarus argues that the modernist spirit of the first Israelitic Synod in Leipzig had been shared 
by all participants irrespective of their allegiance to one of the strands within Jewry including the 
Orthodox Jews who embrace and appreciate 'the whole of the development' of Jewish thinking, 
'only perhaps a bit more than they themselves would know' (ibid.:54). Amongst others, Lazarus 
quotes Ernest Renan's praise of the Talmud and Judaism in general for its rationalism: a religion 
that links its adherents through the praxis of observing rules in everyday life, rather than through 
dogma, is a 'reasonable' religion. 
505 Luther's works, Erlanger edition vol. 29 pages 47f; 74 
506 Lazarus emphasizes that Luther demanded the Jews be given equal economic rights so that 
they would not be driven to usury: one should allow the Jews 'to participate in trade and 
production so that they could gain reason and space enough to dwell with and around us (mit 
lassen werben und aerbeiten, damit sie Ursach und Raum gewinnen, bei und umb uns zu seyn)' 
(ibid.:24). 
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actual content of the two religions and their theological differences but with 
Judaism and Christianity as 'spiritual powers' (geistige Machte), i.e. as historical 
agents in a vaguely Hegelian sense. For Treitschke there is less continuity 
between Judaism and Christianity than the life and death struggle between two 
actors the second of which overcomes the former (again in a Hegelian sense). 
While Treitschke's view has the merit oftaking the actuality of the Christian-
Jewish conflict more into account than for example Paulus Cassel's integrative 
theology seems to do,508 Treitschke simply takes the positivity of historical 
victory as evidence of truth, reason and legitimacy. 
Treitschke's view of antagonism and rupture between Judaism and 
Christianity was shared by Naudh who reformulated it in a language that 
included the rhetoric of 'race' as well as a social-economical dimension. Naudh 
argues it was a 'mistake' of Christianity to refer to 'the Jewish legend' - as if a 
historically independent actor 'Christianity' had existed then and had arbitrarily 
chosen to 'refer to' some aspects of Judaism. Naudh seems to see the actual 
content of religion as consisting of 'legends' that are chosen by movements 
which in tum are essentially social-economic in nature (cp. above the quote by 
Naudh in 2.2.4; Naudh 1965: 185f). He denies the originality of central aspects of 
Judaism: not even monotheism was specifically Jewish but it was generally 
Mediterranean. While Moses 'brought his God from Egypt' (ibid.: 186), 
monotheistic elements could even be found in the concept of 'fate', as for 
example in the Iliad. 509 The essential difference beween Judaism and Christianity 
became apparent in the course of its evolution: Christianity mostly 'developed 
within the peoples of the Aryan family' among whom he includes Greeks, 
Romans, Celts, Germanic and Slavonic peoples. He adds that within these 
peoples, Christianity actually is more pervasive than the Christian church, 
because the church carries too much 'Jewish ballast': he names fanaticism and 
507 The following quotes are from Treitschke's comments on Paulus Cassel. 
508 However, Cassel's job was to convert Jews, which prompted some Jewish commentators to 
reject his 'support' as unwelcome. The fact that Treitschke attacks so aggressively a converted 
Jew whose business is to convert more Jews to Protestantism (he accuses Cassel of 'quarrelsome 
offensive racial arrogance' [handelsuechtiger, beleidigender Rassenduenkel] [ibid.:60]) seems to 
be motivated by ill-feeling towards the converted. 
509 Although 'monotheistic elements' do not make monotheism, this observation is not wrong, but 
it merely illustrates the interconnectedness of all ancient mediterrannean cultures irrespective of 
'race' (or rather, of the grammatical structure of the 'Semitic' or 'Indo-European' languages 
people used). 
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intolerance as the after-effects of the Jewish influence on the church. 
Nevertheless, despite the Church, Christianity is the 'expression of Aryan 
conscience and idealism' while it never really managed to 'win over' the Jews. 
Among all contributors, Hermann Cohen was the one who paid most 
attention to the actual content of the two religions.510 He writes that Treitschke's 
position most significantly differs from other anti-Jewish texts in having thrown 
up (again) the issue of religion (Cohen 1965:125). The thrust of Cohen's 
argument is the assertion of commonality between 'Israelites' and Christians, 
while rejecting at the same time the pressure on the former to convert. He relates 
that the (anti-Catholic) 'Kulturkampf had been criticized for lacking in 'positive 
religious thought' (ibid.: 130) and asserts the necessity to discuss religion - in its 
own terms - in the context of national history. He stresses that 'the German 
people' has been and will remain 'a religious one' and that 'national history 
(vaterHindische Geschichte)' since the 16th century had been driven by the 
'religious spirit of the German people'. 
The pivot of Cohen's argument is his opposition of two alternative pairs of 
concepts, 'religions' vs 'denominations (Konfessionen)' (as used by Treitschke) 
and 'religion' vs 'forms of religion (Glaubensarten)' (as used by Cohen drawing 
on Kant). 
Cohen asserts that 'the distinction between religion and denomination' is 
central to Treitschke's argument. Treitschke constructs a close affinity between 
the two Christian denominations as mere Konfessionen within the same religion 
(downplaying the brutality of their actual mutual history)511 while at the same 
time excluding Judaism as 'the religion of an alien tribe'. This construction rules 
out the possibility that Judaism could amalgamate together with the Christian 
confessions into what in the 'messianic-humanistic' conception had been 
510 Cohen asserts that his profession as a teacher of 'German philosophy' obliges him to 'confess' 
(Cohen 1965: 126). Since his teaching is intrinsicaIly related to religious issues, he feels he has to 
legitimate himself before the 'Protestant men who not only granted me citizenship but also the 
religious trust to be teaching as one of them amongst their number'. Cohen will argue not as a 
representative of a 'Jewish party' but as a 'representative of philosophy at a German university 
who confesses to Israelitic monotheism'. Although this is 'painful (peinlich)' to him, he will also 
have to criticize (entgegentreten) 'in some points' his co-religionists (Glaubensgenossen). 
Nevertheless, Cohen confesses to the moral obligation to take sides with the 'co-religionist who 
is threatened in his belief (ibid.: 145). 
511 Meyer holds against this view that the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism 
have been no less murderous than those between Christianity and Judaism (Meyer l880b: l7f). 
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envisaged as 'a purer form of Christianity' (ibid.). This possibility, however, is 
just what Cohen argues for. 
Cohen introduces Kant's distinction between Religion as a universally valid 
and unitary concept and 'forms of religion' (Glaubensarten)512 as the historically 
specific, diverse and contingent 'vehicles' of Religion (ibid.: 126f). Cohen asserts 
that 'Israelitic monotheism' and 'Protestant Christianity' are different as vehicles 
only, but are identical as Religion. Therefore it is possible that they eventually 
will converge into 'a purer form of religion' . 
Cohen's argument interconnects Israelitic and (Protestant) Christian theology 
with the concepts of modem ethics and the modem state. In the center of this 
web of connections sits Kant's critical philosophy that mediates these elements 
with each other and - being in tum crucial to German national consciousness as 
Cohen understands it - with German national history. 
Cohen names 'the spiritual character of God (Geistigkeit Gottes), and 'the 
messianic promise (Verheissung), as the two defining features ofIsraelitic 
monotheism. These two notions concern the nature of God as well as the 'moral 
ideal of a human species being (sittliche Ideal des Menschengeschlechts)' 
(ibid.: 127). Cohen emphasizes that the Prophets already had a universalistic 
concept of the Israelitic God as a father-like shepherd of all of humanity, not 
merely of the people ofIsrael. 'One issue though failed to come to full 
expression in this deepening (Vertiefung) of the concept of God (Gottesidee)' 
(ibid.:128), asserts Cohen: this 'one issue' has been contributed by Christianity 
which drew on 'the Greek spirit'. 
The idea that God has become Man (Menschwerdung Gottes) has 
internalized (verinnerlicht) the notion of the relationship between Man and 
God. As the dogmatic form of the humanization of God, it realizes the 
cultural-historical mission of humanizing religion (ibid.: 128). 
Without this 'mission' having been fulfilled, the 'autonomy of the moral law 
(Sittengesetz), the freedom to submit under its unconditional imperative 
(unbedingte Sittengebot)" would be inconceivable. 'The idealistic concept of 
morality (Sittlichkeit), ( ... ) the holy of holies of Kantian teaching (Lehre) ... 
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which we Germans appreciate as the ultimate treasure of national wisdom against 
all modem peoples' , is rooted in the enthusiasm and rigorism of the ethics of the 
Prophets. Even the Kantian concept of the free will is anticipated in the Talmud, 
when it is stated that 'everything is in God's hand except the fear of God' 
(ibid.: 129). However, 'the derivation of the Sittengesetz from the concept of 
legislating reason (gesetzgebende Vemunft)' which is fundamental to Kant's 
concept of autonomy cannot historically be understood 'without the 
Christological form of human ising the divine'. 
'This kind of Christianity is shared by all modem Israelites, whether we be 
aware of it or not'. However, there is no need for the Israelites to convert since 
'we know that - the necessity to humanize the moral (des Sittlichen) 
notwithstanding - a core of the old God of the Prophets has to remain exempt 
from humanization'. In this aspect, which is 'not only cosmological', 'all 
Christians are Israelites'. Matters are even, as it were: the Christians will always 
remain Israelites just as much as 'modem Israelites' are Christians. In Cohen's 
theological-philosophical-historical argument, there is neither a necessity to 
convert, nor any fundamental obstacle for both 'Glaubensarten' to converge in 
the future. 
After these more general considerations, Cohen turns more specifically to the 
German situation. He argues that the religious development of the Jews, and in 
particular that of the German Jews 'proceeds in the historical tendency of 
German Protestantism [italics in the original]' (ibid.: 131): 
For the first time since the apogee of Jewish spirit in the Arab-Spanish 
period, the Jewish tribe has developed again a universal eulturallife within 
the German people (italics in the original). 
Cohen mentions that Jews were amongst the first to embrace Kantian philosophy 
and that they 'realized their religious development through participation in 
German culture, so manifesting their being Germans' .513 The 'deep commotion 
512 Cohen quotes (without reference) a footnote from Kant's 'Perpetual Peace (First Supplement: 
On the Guarantee ofa Perpetual Peace)' (Kant 1971:114). Reiss translates 'Glaubensarten' with 
'confessions' . 
513 In an aside on Felix Mendelssohn, Cohen plays down the relevance of conversions. He asserts 
that Felix Mendelssohn did not care much about his lewishness and seems not even to have been 
aware of his grandfather'S (Moses Mendelssohn) relevance; however, it was not conversion to 
Christianity but his (Jewish) 'religious blood' turning him 'towards oratorio not opera' that 
enabled him to direct Bach's Matthaeus Passion. 
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of the mind' when listening to Bach is not a mere matter of aesthetics. 
Commonality in being touched by Bach's music and poetry 'is commonality in 
religious feeling - as far as such commonality is necessary ... in a modern 
civilized people (in einem modern en Culturvolk)' (ibid.: 133; italics in the 
original). With Kant's philosophy and Bach's music, Cohen refers thus to two 
crucial instances of German (Protestant) culture that exemplify his concept of 
Religion as transcending the differences of Glaubensarten. Jewish Germans have 
been crucially involved in their development. 
In Cohen's conception, religion and nationality are closely intertwined. 
Although the nation remains central to his argument, he asserts that the' Jewish 
question' is essentially a religious question. He argues that 'the backwards trend 
in religion (die religiose Rueckwiirtsbewegung [italics in the original]) is the real 
determining cause ofthe attack that we are suffering in the new Empire (Reich), 
(ibid.: 144). He pleads that dealing with the Israelitic religion 'as a religion' 
seems the best and most honest way of contributing to 'the solution of the Jewish 
question in a national sense'. Cohen admits a decline of religiosity amongst 
Jews,514 but holds that it is declining less than amongst Christians. 'If we are to 
amalgamate into the German people', which presupposes a 'community of 
religious foundation' (ibid.: 146), religiosity as (each group's) 'specific 
contribution to the national community' has to be 'preserved and cultivated': 
Nation needs Religion, and in whichever vehicle (Glaubensart) it might come, 
Religion needs to be cherished and furthered in the interest ofnation-building.515 
The 'backwards trend in religion' that underlies the anti-Jewish campaign is 
514 Cohen contrasts the accusation of Jewish 'frivolity' in religious affairs with the activity 
'without any state support' of reformed Jewish communities, who are 'seen as suspect by those 
parts of the community who, protected by the state, stick to the old forms' (italics in the original). 
515 Cohen rejects Lazarus' conception that nationality consists in a common SUbjective 
appropriation of a number of objective factors, including descent, language and statehood, but not 
including religion (cp. chapter 2.2.5.4). For Cohen, religion (in the sense of religiosity) is as 
much an objective factor as the others in Lazarus' list. Furthermore, every single one of Lazarus' 
objective factors is neither necessary nor sufficient, while they all are overruled by 'objective 
conviction (Ueberzeugung) of commonly existing religious foundation' (ibid.: 149) as it defines 'a 
modem civilized nation (modemen Culturvolkes)'. This 'conviction' is for Cohen not a mere 
subjective feeling or opinion but an 'emotional entity (ftihlbar Ding)', i.e. also an objectivity. The 
common experience of (objective) religiosity can easily make up for the lack of any of the other 
'criteria' from Lazarus' list, including 'common descent'. Cohen asserts that this common 
religiosity exists between Christian and Jewish Germans, denials by 'spiteful or bigoted 
(gehiissige oder bomirte) people' notwithstanding, and it 'will grow and blossom to the greater 
honour of the German name and to the best of German morality (Sittlichkeit), (ibid.). 
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therefore anti-national. In the same vein, he admonishes the Reform Jews516 
against mistaking a denigration of (Jewish) religion as a proof of 'being German' 
and demands: 
Respect and learn to understand your Israelitic monotheism, preserve it in 
your mind (Gemueth) and make it the religious guidance (Richtschnur) of 
your existence that all human beings need: then you will feel as one with 
what modem culture (Bildung) calls the spirit of Christianity, and the 
differences in the form of catechism will not disturb that commonality of 
religious foundation that is necessary for a unified and spiritually 
harmonious national community (eine einheitliche, im Gemuethe 
harmonisirte Volksgemeinschaft) (ibid.: 147). 
Since the identity of Protestant spirit and that of modem Judaism is 'the most 
effective glue (Bindemittel) for an intimate national amalgamation (innige 
nationale Verschmelzung), he also urges his Jewish readers to show 'respect and 
piety' towards Christian religious dogma (ibid.: 148).517 
516 This argument parallels his address to the Orthodox Jews stressing the relevance and ethical 
gravity of the state (cp. previous chapter). 
517 Philippson (AZ 16.3.1880, No II: 162-4) points out that Cohen is ambivalent about whether 
Protestantism is already the higher form of Christianity that would allow Judaism to 'dissolve 
into it', or 'not yet'. Nevertheless, Philippson remarks sarcastically, Cohen seems to see himself 
already there, ahead of the field. He holds against Cohen that any 'higher unification' with 
Judaism is not immediately imminent because Protestantism itself is divided into many sects and 
subdivisions (ibid.:163). Philippson accuses Cohen of 'wishful thinking' in this context. In 
particular he takes issue with his formulation that Christianity needs to take 'a purer form' (ibid.: 
164). He suggests that Cohen uses the concept 'form' to make the necessary process appear easier 
and more imminent than it actually is: he argues that form corresponds to and follows from 
essence (except in the case of 'empty' forms that simply collapse and disappear) and concludes 
that Christianity needs 'a purer essence' rather than just 'a purer form'. 
Against the claim the Jews constituted a danger for Christian religion, Bamberger holds that 
'surprisingly few' Jews had a part in the critique of religion (Glaubenskritik) of the 
Enlightenment, while Fichte (whom Treitschke quotes as 'one of the most pure and powerful 
representatives of Germanic essence (Wesen)') predicted the imminent replacement of Christian 
religion by reason (Yemunft). He concludes that although the Germans were without doubt a 
Christian people (Yolk) as Treitschke claimed, they were less Christian than others. Bamberger 
quotes Treitschke himself pointing to growing disbelief amongst large sections of the German 
people (Bamberger 1965: 174). In a similar vein, Joel, 'being a teacher of religion' himself, states 
that he shares with Treitschke the 'pain' about the fact that 'large sections (breite Schichten) of 
the people fell prey to disbelief. However, the sources of disbelief in Germany are not Jewish: 
Joel points to Hegel's 'so called pantheism' that is a 'disguised atheism'. Hegel's students, 
including the 'young Germany', are 'men idolizing themselves (sich selbst vergoettemde 
Menschen),. Joel names Feuerbach, Moleschott and Yogt, none of whom were Jewish. 
Schopenhauer, 'a fanatic of atheism', not only was not a Jew but hated the Jews as 'the Swiss 
Guard of theism' (Joel 1965:17). He argues that Strauss, Hartmann and 'mickel-Darwin' have 
been more influential than the 'occasional tactlessness' of any Jewish writers. This leads Joel to 
point out a contradiction in Treitschke's argument: 'You present yourself as a pious and 
ecclesiastically minded man. I am indeed the last person who would not find that worth 
applauding. But why then do you accept the arguments of atheism against the Jews? A really 
pious and ecclesiastically minded Christian, who is pious not merely out of raison d'etat, cannot 
talk dismissively about the Semites.' He argues that being Christian necessarily means allowing 
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that the 'Semitic spirit' and the 'Germanic spirit' are mutually compatible; after all, the 
'Germanic spirit' is not anymore the spirit of Arminius but has 'organically assimilated' 
(Semitic) Christianity. Joel denies that there is a general tendency in modem Jewish literature to 
dismiss Christianity. On the other hand, however, '(i)n the most noble books by Christian 
scholars ( ... ) one will find the most dismissive comments whenever Jews and Judaism are the 
issues.' Joel argues that it is only natural that sometimes anger is also expressed on the side of the 
Jews: 'What function does Jewry have other than serving as a foil? (Wozu ist denn das Judentum 
da, wenn nicht, urn als Folie zu dienen?) ( ... ) You are preaching us tolerance? Is this not 
mockery? (Sie predigen uns Toleranz? 1st das nicht ein Hohn?)' (ibid.:24f). 
Treitschke (1896a:25) adds that he finds any critique of Christian religious affairs from the 
part of Jews particularly inappropriate and a 'busy-body' intervention in what should be none of 
their business. Against this claim, Meyer points out that even the ultra-montanist press has 
acknowledged that Jews in official positions - Lasker is being mentioned as an example - have 
always remained neutral in Christian religious affairs, such as in the consultations on the 
legislation concerning Catholic cult (Meyer I 880b:8f). 
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2.2.7 The nationality of the German Jews 
In his reply to Treitschke's first article, Manuel Joel stated sarcastically that 
he found himself 'sympathetically touched' by Treitschke's observation that 'the 
nation underwent a deep soul-searching' and 'without mercy pronounced 
judgement on itself. However, 'the nation', according to Treitschke, located the 
evil only in the Jews, 'making them a scapegoat'. Instead of judging itself 
harshly, 'the nation' only judges 'a small fraction of the nation and at that one 
whose belonging to the German nation Treitschke even wants to deny' (Joel 
1965: 13). This process, writes Joel, can hardly be described as self-criticism of 
the nation because the 'self-criticism constitutes the criticized part of the 'self 
as 'not-self. 
Joel adds that the Jews are 
a nationality that was defeated almost 2000 years ago [ ... ] whose 
descendants nationally belong to the most diverse peoples and show the 
most diverse languages and customs (Sitten), who do not have anything in 
common but the same religion and who are meant to be marked 
(bezeichnet) and preserved (bewahrt) by force as a separate body 
(Sonderkorper), abscesses in the national organism through such [i.e. such 
as Treitschke's] 'just and moderate' assessments of their 'undeniable 
weaknesses' (ibid.: 15). 
Joel's comment pinpoints Treitschke's ambivalence about the nationality of the 
German Jews: they are accused of fancying themselves wrongly as non-Germans 
when they actually ought to feel German like their fellow-compatriots, while at 
the same time they are also accused of dressing up as Germans when they are 
actually aliens. 
Treitschke's second contribution (Treitschke 1896b) is almost exclusively 
concerned with the issue of the German Jews' nationality. Treitschke targets 
especially Heinrich Graetz 
because reflecting on the thoughts of this writer will give me the welcome 
opportunity of showing to the readers with utmost determinacy what this 
debate is essentially about (urn was es sich in diesem Streit eigentlich 
handelt) (Treitschke 1896b:30). 
Treitschke implies clearly that the Streit is 'essentially' about nationality. 
250 
The long section on Graetz begins with a confession of methodological 
relativism (or rather 'cultural insiderism,)518: you have to belong to a 'great 
people' in order to understand it,519 only Jews can understand Jews, and only 
Germans can understand Germans. Treitschke does not want to challenge what 
Graetz has to say about Jewish history - German history, however, falls outside 
Graetz's proper domain. Graetz's misjudgements of German issues cannot 
surprise Treitschke who concedes that some of Graetz's bitterness and injustice 
is 'understandable' (ibid.) since he has to deal with 'so much sadness' in his 
History of the Jews. 
However, Treitschke continues: 
Weare allowed to demand two things from him: his polemics against the 
religion of the overwhelming majority of his German compatriots should 
not completely overstep the limits of moderation, and he should speak with 
some respect and reserve of the people whose mild legislation protects him. 
This formulation betrays the ambivalence that is fundamental to Treitschke's 
argument. On the one hand, he demands that Graetz show 'moderation' when 
talking about the religion of his 'German compatriots' - implying that the 
demand for moderation follows from Graetz being a fellow-citizen himself. On 
the other hand, he demands that he show 'respect' for those same 'compatriots' 
who 'protect' him with 'mild legislation'. If the Jews were full citizens or 
'compatriots' they would not need to be 'protected' with 'mild legislation' .520 
Treitschke argues that Graetz does not meet 'these modest demands'. He 
quotes Graetz dismissing Christian influences on Jewish religious life (such as 
the impact of Schleiermacher' s writings; ibid. :41 )521 as well as e.g. the liberal 
politician, Gabriel Riesser: 
518 A phrase used by Werner Sollors in 'Beyond Ethnicity' (1986), quoted by Paul Gilroy 
(1995:3). 
519 Treitschke makes here a back-handed acknowledgement of Graetz's approach as a historian: 
'Because every great people (Yolk) can only be justly evaluated out of its own essence (aus 
seinem eigenen We sen hera us), a historian who looks at German things from a specifically 
Jewish perspective must inevitably perceive some things oddly and one-sidedly' (ibid.:39). This 
seems to imply that the not so 'great' peoples can also be understood by outsiders. 
520 The formulation that gives away the mischievous intent is 'mild legislation' which can only 
refer to specific legislation that protects the Jews from being discriminated against; Treitschke is 
not talking about solidarity between equal citizens. 
521 Treitschke takes particular offence at Graetz's (actually quite perceptive) comment that 
Friedrich Schlegel's novel 'Lucinde' is a sibling ('Zwillingsschrift') ofSchleiermacher's 
'Speeches on Religion' (both 1799). While the Protestant Treitschke un surprisingly holds 
Schleiermacher's theology in highest esteem (in contrast to Graetz who is conservative in 
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Herr Graetz freely admits that he does not regard Germany as his 
fatherland; he portrays the excellent (trefflichen) Gabriel Riesser as the 
peculiar example of a Jew who 'completely merged into his fortuitous 
place of birth (in seinem zufalligen Geburtslande vollstandig aufging), 
(ibid.:41f). 
Treitschke claims he did not object to Graetz 'admonishing his tribal fellows to 
"take pride in their ancestry'" but accuses him of not granting the Germans the 
same right. He expresses his disagreement with Graetz's claim that the greatest 
German poet was Lessing and disagrees even more when Graetz continues that 
'Borne was more than Lessing' .522 
Treitschke takes issue in particular with the following formulation by 
Graetz:523 
The recognition of the Jews as full members [of society] is already widely 
accomplished; the recognition of Judaism (Anerkennung des Judenthums), 
however, is still heavily disputed (ibid.:44). 
Graetz's formulation 'Anerkennung des Judenthums' could be understood in 
different ways. Treitschke claims that' Judaism as religious community has long 
been recognized' and concludes that Graetz can only refer to the recognition of 
Jewry 'as a nation within and next to the German nation' (italics added). Since 
Treitschke's claim is factually not true, his conclusion is also not tenable. He 
(mis-)reads Graetz's demand for recognition as a religious community as a 
demand for national emancipation524 which he strongly rejects: 
religious affairs), both authors agree on condemning 'Lucinde' as the lowest piece of writing they 
can think of: Lucinde was the most radical expression of early Romanticism's attack on 
traditional morality and gender conceptions, as Schleiermacher revolutionized the Protestant 
discourse on religion. 
522 Treitschke writes: 'So we have the pleasure of admiring in Borne the very greatest son of 
German soil, but we are immediately interrupted in this pleasure when the author expressly 
declares that Borne was not at all a German but a Jew' (ibid.:43). Graetz replied that his remark 
that 'Borne was more than Lessing' meant that Borne contributed more to (national) liberation 
(Graetz 1965b:51). 
523 This is the last sentence of the last chapter in volume eleven (Graetz 1870:582). Graetz 
discusses here the popular movements in February and March 1848 that he writes regularly 
demanded the emancipation of the Jews. The last two sentences are: 'Die Freiheit ist fUr sie [die 
Juden] errungen, sie selbst scheinen als Wachter derselben eingesetzt; die Erringung der 
Gleichheit und Bruederlichkeit steht noch bevor. Die Anerkennung der Juden als vollberechtigte 
Glieder ist bereits so ziemlich durchgedrungen; die Anerkennung des Judenthums aber unterliegt 
noch schweren Kampfen. ' 
524 Meyer rejects Treitschke's interpretation of Graetz's remark that 'Judenthum' still remains 
officially to be recognized (ibid.:32-3). He points out that there has only been a petition to accept 
the 'Day of Atonement' (Versoehnungstag) as a public holiday, which the Imperial Chancellor 
has rejected (not to speak of the Sabbath). Judaism as a religious cult (Cultus) is formally 
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To such a claim every German who holds his Christianity and his ethnicity 
(Volksthum) holy cannot but respond instantly: never! Our state has never 
seen in the Jews anything but a religious community and under no 
circumstances can give up this legal concept - the only one tenable 
(ibid.:44f; italics in the original). 
Treitschke makes here three points: 
).> one, the Jews are not a nationality but merely a religious group; 
).> two, Germans who hold their Christianity and Volksthum 'holy' (which is by 
implication what they ought to do) can not accept the claim of a group of 
fellow-citizens for recognition as a distinct nationality; 
).> three, neither can 'our state'. 
Since the Germans and the 'we' that constitute 'our state' are the same 
people, the German people simultaneously hold their Christianity and Volksthum 
'holy' and form a (liberal, bourgeois) state that does recognize religious 
minorities but not national minorities. By the look of this argument, the only 
problem with the Jews seems to be that some of them (Graetz and his readership) 
allegedly claim that Jewry constituted a separate nationality: 
Our old culture is rich and tolerant enough to bear many strong 
contradictions: the followers of that church that thinks of itself as the only 
one that guarantees salvation (die allein se1igmachende) live together 
peacefully with heretics, and so we can accept with equanimity that some 
of our fellow citizens silently consider themselves the chosen people. If 
however this racial arrogance (Rassenduenkel) steps out onto the 
marketplace, if Jewry even claims recognition for its nationality, then the 
recognized only in Alsace-Lorraine, Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg, Hessen and Nassau but not 
in Prussia. In Prussia only the local communities (Synagogengemeinden) but not the religious 
community as a whole (Religionsgenossenschaft) are recognized - to the effect that Jewish 
priests, teachers, etc. do not share the privileges in taxation and public protocol that their 
Christian colleagues enjoy. Meyer argues that this is what Graetz was referring to, while nobody 
ever demanded recognition of a Jewish nationality. 
Graetz himself rejects too Treitschke's interpretation of his claim that the 'recognition of 
Judenthum' (Jewry or Judaism) is still to be gained: 'Every impartial reader reads in this that 
Jewish religion or doctrine is not yet recognized, that Judaism is not recognized as a religion or 
confession, that Jewish clergymen (Geistliche) here and there are not on an equal footing with 
Christian ones. You however insinuate that I was talking about Jewish nationality, as if I wanted 
Jewish nationality to be recognized. But is Jewry/Judaism (Judenthum) identical with [Jewish] 
nationality?' (Graetz 1965b:51; italics in the original). Graetz denies the ambivalence that might 
be found in his formulation 'recognition of Judenthum' and claims that Treitschke's 
interpretation is 'malicious'. Treitschke's interpretation of the particular quote is indeed at least 
one-sided, and Treitschke might have misinterpreted it wilfully. On the other hand, there are 
'proto-nationalist' tendencies in Graetz's writing that seem to be contradicting his claim to 
'German patriotism'. Perhaps against Graetz's intentions and unawares, there is a contradiction in 
his argument that Treitschke knew how to exploit. 
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legal ground (Rechtsboden) on which emancipation is founded collapses 
(ibid.:45). 
Although Treitschke had previously argued (cp. chapter 2.2.2) that German 
national culture is young and not yet self-conscious enough to afford the luxuries 
of the liberal mind, in this sequence he seems confident enough to grant a free 
reign to the marginal peculiarities of Catholicism, assorted heretics and Jews - as 
long as these oddities take place 'silently'. However, should the 'racial 
arrogance' of the Jewish minority insist on coming out of the closet, Treitschke 
recommends 'emigration and foundation ofa Jewish state' somewhere else, 
which could then search for national recognition: 'On German soil there is no 
space for a double nationality'. 525 
Treitschke concludes: 
I ask now: can a man who thinks and writes like that be considered a 
German himself? No, Herr Graetz is a stranger (Fremdling) on the soil of 
his 'accidental place of birth' , an Oriental who does not understand or wish 
to understand our people (ibid.:43f). 
Treitschke turns the formulation that Graetz made with reference to Gabriel 
Riesser against Graetz himself to the effect of his virtual disenfranchisement. 
Taking advantage of an ambivalence in Graetz's argument between the 
democratic demand for emancipation without enforced assimilation and 
intimations of a 'proto-Zionist' nationalism, Treitschke portrays Graetz one-
sidedlyas a Jewish nationalist and anti-German, anti-Christian separatist who 
would claim 'Germanness' for himself only for tactical advantage. Treitschke 
suggests that Graetz attempted to 
525 Treitschke adds that 'until the most recent past the Jews did not participate in the millennial 
effort of German state-formation'. Nor did they contribute to the formation of German culture in 
any significant way: 'At the time they started to have significance in state and literature' of 
Germany, they found 'the foundations of Germanic culture (Gesittung)' ready made and had to 
assimilate individually in order to achieve something. While many did so, 'Herr Graetz and his 
kind move into other directions' (ibid.:46). Treitschke adds here a third motive, that of historical 
merit: the Jews did not contribute significantly enough, so they do not deserve to be recognized 
as a second nationality on the same 'soil'. This seems to imply that early involvement in the 
building of the national state would have earned them recognition. Treitschke concludes: 
'However, our public opinion is finally beginning to be watchful. In only a few years to come, it 
will be strengthened enough so that derogatory speeches about the 'ancient Germanic rabble 
(germanischen Ur-mob)', as they can be found now in the Jewish press, will be as inconceivable 
in Germany as they already have been in England for a long time' (ibid.). 
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prove with continuous spiteful invective that the nation of Kant was really 
educated to humanity only by the Jews, that the language of Lessing and 
Goethe became sensitive to beauty, spirit and wit only through Borne and 
Heine (1896a:24). 
Graetz replies that Treitschke quoted his writings out of context and selectively. 
He points out that he spoke more favourably of the beginnings of Christianity 
than even Reimarus, Goethe, Strauss or Renan ever did (Graetz 1965b:48).526 
Treitschke's claim that his portrayal of Graetz was representative of the spirit 
of the German Jews (when it was hardly even representative of Graetz himself) 
was rejected unequivocally by those German Jews who replied to his 
intervention. A formulation by Lazarus makes the essential point: 
526 Graetz argues that when he said that many converted Jews 'joined the enemy camp' he was 
referring not to Christianity but to the camp of Jew-haters (ibid.:49). 
Graetz defends his deriding the German nation by pointing out that the eleventh volume of 
his work had been written before 1868: 'The glorious victories, the unity that was accomplished 
through ingenious leadership and Germany's ascendancy took place after that date' (ibid.). 
Having made this compliment in Bismarck's direction, Graetz asserts that for the English 
translation that was currently in the process of being published he cut his earlier condescending 
remarks on the German nation 'which had been true before 1870, but became untrue after that 
date' (Graetz 1965b:50). He stresses that his presentation of the relation between Christianity and 
Jewry in his 'History of the Jews' represents a balanced account and is actually sympathetic to 
early Christianity, ifless so to its later development (ibid.:28). He refutes Treitschke's indictment 
of a 'deadly hate' (Todhass) in his writings against 'the most pure and powerful representatives 
of German being (Wesen)' and asserts that he merely argued that one could have expected 'a 
powerful assertion of humanity' with respect to the Jews from 'two men of the first rank' like 
Goethe and Fichte. However, both made anti-Jewish remarks. 
Philippson who had been on the editorial board of the publishing house that had published 
the first ten volumes of Graetz's History points out (AZ 13.1.1880, No 2) that the eleventh 
volume had been rejected by the (liberal) publisher who did not want to take responsibility for 
Graetz's style and was particularly critical of Graetz's rejection of religious reform. Philippson 
stresses that the decision was taken because the book should not be published in a place that 
could be seen as representative of German Jewry (ibid.:21) and adds that large sale numbers do 
not necessarily mean that all buyers agree with everything the author writes. Philippson 
concludes that 'both Treitschke and Graetz are partisan and romantic historians (als 
Geschichtsforscher Parteigiinger und Romantiker), keen on having particular views and tending 
towards speculation (zu Hypothesen geneigt).' Philipps on sees their dispute as a personal affair 
that is of no relevance to the Jews in general. In a supplement to the AZ 10.2.1880, No 6 a very 
angry letter by Graetz can be found followed by a response which reasserts that Graetz is 'unable 
to understand the modem times'. The author of the response indicates that the conflict with 
Graetz was about the 'unification of Judaism (Judenthum) with the life of nation and state, [which 
means] the sincere entry [of the Jews] into the life of culture' (page 2 of the supplement). 
Joel cautiously defended Graetz (he remained the only contributor to the debate to do so) 
(Joel 1965:24): 'Graetz has the wrongs of his virtues'; it is only passion for his subject that leads 
him to the occasional overstatement. In his comment on Treitschke's reply to Graetz, Naudh 
claims sarcastically that he has to 'acknowledge' that Graetz's text helped Treitschke clarify his 
views (Naudh 1965: 199). 
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Gentlemen, we are Germans, nothing but Germans. When talking about the 
concept of nationality, we belong to only one nation, the German one 
(Lazarus 1880: 18). 
Similarly, Seligmann Meyer holds that the Jews cannot become Germans because 
they are Germans anyway. He mentions the Jews' achievements and 
contributions to German national history and adds that the Germanic tribes 
migrated from 'the East' just like the Jews did. He rejects Treitschke's claim that 
Graetz 'hated' Christianity, adding, however, that the Jews were not responsible 
for Graetz anyway (Meyer 1880a: 10). Oppenheim calls Graetz an 
indiscreet and zealously one-sided man (taktlosen und zelotisch 
einseitigen Manne), the benefit of whose great scholarship is spoiled (urn 
ihren ganzen Segen gebracht) by the absurdity of his conclusions. 
However, this is not a problem of the Jews: 
The Jews are as little responsible for Herrn Graetz as the kingdom of 
Saxony for the confusions of Herrn von Treitschke. 
Ludwig Bamberger also remarks that Treitschke's implicit claim that the German 
Jews are not 'good German patriots' is supported merely by 'some formulations 
by Graetz' (Bamberger 1965:153).527 
With reference to Treitschke's article, Lazarus states that 'basically we 
[German Jews] should keep silent'528 and just wait until 'what is called once 
more the Jewish question' has run out of steam (Lazarus 1880:5). 'For us as 
Jews' there is no such thing as a 'Jewish question' but merely a 'German 
question', namely the problem of the Germans achieving the humanity that 
consists in granting humanity to others. For 'the Jews as Jews' there is nothing to 
527 Bamberger writes: 'Does strict historical method ( ... ) allow the apodictic characterizing of the 
basic structure of the general state of things with reference to a single peculiar phenomenon [i.e. 
Graetz's writings]?' (ibid.). 
528 Topic and purpose of the speech reflect the circumstances in which it was given: as Lazarus 
mentions at the beginning of the speech, the lecture was 'by invitation only' (Lazarus 1880:5). 
Because Lazarus intended to contribute to self-clarification amongst the Jews instead of 'entering 
the field of struggle', 'only Jews were invited'. Lazarus proposes self-clarification 'with the calm 
of scientific contemplation' (ibid.). He argues that the excitement 'which recently has again been 
directed against the Jewish religious community (Glaubensgenossenschaft), is based on the 
assumption that they constitute a distinct group 'opposed to the whole of the population of the 
country', i.e. that the Jews constitute 'a nationality different from the German one'. For this 
reason, Lazarus concentrates in his contribution on the 'scholarly' (wissenschaftliche) discussion 
of the concept of 'the nation'. Lazarus uses 'Yolk' and 'Nation' as synomyms. 
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do in this affair. However, 'we are Gennans, [and] as Gennans we have to talk'. 
'On our cheek bums not the red of anger of the Jew but the red of shame of the 
Gennan' (ibid.:6). 
Lazarus asserts that the Jews of Gennany are German in all the ways that he 
described in his contribution (cp. chapter 2.2.5.4) -language, country, state, 
culture, fate - except one: descent (ibid.: 19). But the Gennans do not share 
common descent anyway since many non-Jewish Gennans are also of only partly 
Germanic descent. All groups that constitute today's Gennans, including the 
Jews, have immigrated at some point earlier or later in history. The Jews came 
'searching for a home (Heimat) and a home is what they found' (ibid.2l). They 
have been united with the other groups through 'seven generations of ( ... ) 
common fate'. Lazarus ends his speech on a particularly patriotic tone and a 
reference to the two attempts on the life of the Kaiser that had happened in 
1878.529 
Lazarus' speech shows a strong sense of Jewish identity - after all, it is 
dedicated to 'self-clarification' amongst Jews and was first given to a Jewish 
audience. Nevertheless, it also strongly emphasizes the German nationality of the 
Gennan Jews. Hermann Cohen articulates - stronger than Lazarus - his 
reluctance to accept the fact of being addressed and being obliged to reply as a 
Jew: those replying to Treitschke tend to feel strongly and painfully the fact that 
responding as a Jew means giving recognition to the appellation as a Jew. 
Cohen writes: 'So after all, we arrived again at the point of having to confess [to 
being Jewish]', which is the wording of the first sentence of his response to 
Treitschke and Lazarus. Cohen stresses that he would have preferred not 'having 
to confess' (Cohen 1965:124).530 
Echoing Treitschke, Cohen refers to the historical experience of a specific 
generation. As Treitschke invoked the generation that had fought for national 
529 'Today we are not lacking the art of the prophetic word but its bloodcurdling power. If as 
monstrous a deed of moral degradation (Verwilderung) as the attempts on the most honorable 
head of the nation (auf das ehrwuerdigste Haupt der Nation) would have happened back then [in 
the times of the prophets], sounds of enormous power would have arisen, whose ringing we 
would still be hearing today like we still today hear the penetrating call of Jeremiah and Isaiah. 
Perhaps somewhere in a German mind (Gemuethe) a spark of that ardour might still be glowing 
under the ashes of the centuries; it might light up - even if less bright - and illuminate for us the 
path of justice and clemency and be to the benefit (Segen) of the whole German people: may God 
bring that to pass!' (ibid.:57f) 
530 He writes he feels obliged on two levels: on a general (patriotic) and a personal (professional, 
academic) level. 
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unification, Cohen invokes those who had fought for emancipation and 
assimilation. 'We, the younger generation (Wir Jiingeren)' had been allowed to 
hope to be able to assimilate into 'the nation of Kant' ('in die "Nation Kants" uns 
einzuleben'). There had been hope that 'moral politics (sittliche Politik)' and 
'historical understanding (historische Besinnung)' would level out differences 
and would allow German Jews to express their 'patriotic love' and their pride to 
contribute to the nation's tasks without second thoughts ('mit unbefangenem 
Ausdruck') (Cohen 1965:124). This hope has now been shattered because 'one of 
the leaders of the national party' has chosen 'to raise the race issue against us' . 
Cohen underlines that this attack did not come from 'forces inimical to 
civilization' (kulturfeindlichen Kreisen) but from a man 'to whom we, the 
younger generation (wir Jiingeren), owe so much in understanding and 
inspiration' (ibid.: 125). Cohen's argument underlines how closely national 
unification and Jewish emancipation/assimilation had been felt to be the same 
process, which is reflected in reverse in the particular weight carried by a 
nationalist attack on emancipation. Without using the word, Cohen implies that 
Treitschke is guilty of treason. 
Cohen adds several very polemical remarks on Graetz, whose student he had 
been (ibid.: 140) and whom he associates with 'the Palestine faction' (die Partei 
der Palastinenser)53I (ibid.: 139). He reproaches Graetz for a 'perversity of moral 
judgement' and asserts that 'there is nothing sound (nichts Gesundes)' in the 
direction he saw Graetz going (ibid.: 140). Cohen warns about 'being only 
excited and touched by Jewish tribal issues' and ignoring the 'pride and dignity 
of the German spirit'. Significantly, Cohen asserts that 'the same fallacy' 
underlies also Lazarus' position, although the latter is formulated more 
abstractly. 
Philippson agrees with Cohen that the Jews 'should become more German' 
but reproaches Cohen for directing this demand only at the Jews. The Christian 
Germans also have to become more German (AZ 9.3.1880, No 10: 148f); alluding 
to ultra-montanism, he asks rhetorically: 
531 This seems to be a word for what would now be called 'proto-Zionists'. 
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Does not a large part of the Germans adhere to religious convictions that 
put the church higher than the nation, in particular a church that has its 
gravitational point beyond the mountains? 
Further, many Germans still swear by their being Saxonian, Bavarian or 
Austrian. In their professions, though, Christians and Jews follow the same ends 
and tendencies irrespective of their different religions.532 He also reproaches 
Cohen for failing to say what the Jews should do in order to become more 
German. 
Apart from Joel's, only one contribution refuses to engage in discussing 
whether or not the German Jews are German enough in the first place, that by 
Oppenheim. Oppenheim points to two contradictions in Treitschke's position. 
The first contradiction is that Treitschke accuses the Jews of threatening to 
destroy German culture while on the other hand writing that the 'hard German 
heads' (ibid.:18; cpo Treitschke 1896a:27) cannot become accustomed to alleged 
Jewish values. The second contradiction is that Treitschke accuses the Jews of 
not wanting hard enough to become German, while on the other hand accusing 
them of 'insisting on their certificate (Schein)', i.e. on emancipation. Oppenheim 
writes that 'either of these would be bad' but both accusations are 'fortunately 
wrong': the struggle for or defence of emancipation, assimilation to German 
culture and German national consciousness are three sides of the same process. 
Oppenheim points out that since emancipation the German Jews have become 
involved in all areas of the public sphere beyond their share in the population, 
and he suggests that Treitschke resents precisely their involvement and, by 
implication, their assimilation rather than their alleged separatism 'because Jews 
who swear on Treitschke's colours (Fahne) are rare indeed'. He thus suggests 
that Treitschke's concern is with the specific political convictions of the Jews, 
not any lack of Germanness. 
532 Philippson had argued similarly in an immediate response to Treitschke's first article (AZ 
9.12.1879, No 50). He stated that he agreed with Treitschke's demand that the Jews should 
become Germans, but added that this demand should apply to all Germans, not just the Jews. He 
points out that there still existed political parties 'in which the particularistic feeling outweighs 
the national (dem deutsch-nationalen noch voransteht)'. The Jews however tended not to belong 
to those parties. Even the Jews in Poland 'faithfully adhere to their German sovereign' although a 
stronger adherence to the Poles would give them advantages and stop their being mistreated by 
the latter. 
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2.2.8 The long-standing hatred of the Jews as evidence of their evil 
nature 
One supporting piece of anti-Jewish evidence used by Treitschke is the 
longevity of anti-Jewish attitudes. Treitschke states that 'since the time that 
Tacitus complained about the odium generis humani' (Treitschke 1896a:28)533 
there has always been and there will always be 'an abyss between occidental and 
Semitic being (Wesen)', and some Jews will always be merely 'German-
speaking Orientals'. Assimilation will never be complete. In this vein, he grants 
that, the Jews being 'a cosmopolitan power', 'a specifically Jewish education' 
has 'a historical right to existence'. The 'abyss' between West and East, 
however, needs to be 'mitigated' by a more moderate and tactful behavior on the 
side of the Jews. 
Any claim about the 'eternal' character of an 'abyss' between Jews and non-
Jews obviously stands and falls with the validity of references to authorities from 
past times. Therefore, several respondends found the Tacitus-quote worth 
discussing in some detai1.534 The question of what exactly Tacitus meant needs to 
be examined as well as how different authors used Tacitus's evidence. 
Graetz and Cassel pointed out that Tacitus wrote that the Christians, not the 
Jews had been 'convicted of hate of the human species' (odio humant generis 
convicti sunt) under Nero (Graetz 1965a:27; Cassel 1880:24). Cassel suggests 
that Treitschke might have mixed up Annales 15.44 with the fifth book of 
Historiae535 that has a much more clearly anti-Jewish tendency. Naudh (Naudh 
533 Treitschke is here not quoting literally; see the exact quotation in the following. 
534 To the present day, historical reflections on whether there was 'anti-Semitism' in the Roman 
Empire or the European Enlightenment continue to carry considerable weight in the wider 
discussion. The Berliner Antisemitismusstreit was not an exception in this. 
535 The first thirteen chapters of Historiae, book 5 deal with Judaea. The thrust of Tacitus' 
attitude here is clearly that the Jews have no 'religiones' (holy customs) but only the 'superstitio' 
that consists in the (for Tacitus) abstractly monotheistic belief (,Iudaei mente sola unumque 
numen intellegunt'). Tacitus opposes the Jews' 'mos absurdus sordidusque' (grotesque and ugly 
customs) to the 'festos laetosque ritus' (festive and happy rites) of a gentile local cult. He 
suggests that the Jews' purely spiritual (,mente sola') 'superstitio' produces an anti-social, anti-
state and anti-patriotic mindset: this is the meaning of 'most disgusting' (taeterrima gens, 
sordidus mos) in this context. Tacitus interprets the Jewish religion thus as a social institution and 
evaluates it from the perspective of the necessities of the Imperial state. Although there is without 
doubt an element of continuity in anti-Jewish sentiments and reasoning from antiquity to the 
present, in particular insofar as the relation of the Jews to the state is concerned, the claim of an 
uninterrupted essential continuity is untenable. Anti-Jewish attitudes cannot have been 
continually the same because there have not been two continually existing unchanging parties -
'the Jews' as well as 'the non-Jews' (and their institutions such as the state or the church) - that 
could constitute such a relationship. 
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1965: 181), who claims an uninterrupted continuity of' Jew-baiting' 
(,Judenhetze', in quotes in the original) from Exodus through classical and 
medieval to modem times, also quotes a passage from Historiae (5,8) as 
evidence of Tacitus' anti-Jewish attitude. 536 
In his response to Graetz, Treitschke reasserts his view that the very long 
history of anti-Jewish attitudes rules out the possibility of a 'complete 
amalgamation of Jewry and the occidental peoples' (Treitschke 1896b:36). He 
brings up the Tacitus-quote again and asserts that the Romans at the time saw the 
Christians as just another Jewish sect: the Christians were accused of 'hate of the 
human species' as Jews. Roman anti-Christianism represented nothing but a 
specific case of anti-Judaism.537 Treitschke claims that 'almost all writers oflate 
antiquity' (ibid.:37) agree in their 'hatred of Jews,538 and concludes: 
Whoever has at least an elementary grasp of our discipline, must concede 
straight away: it is totally inconceivable that a struggle of two thousand 
years should know only cruelty, tyranny, greed on one side, on the other 
side only suffering innocence. The question cannot be denied: why did so 
many noble and highly gifted nations vent the base and - I do not avoid the 
word - diabolical drives slumbering in the depths of their souls exclusively 
on the Jewish people? The answer is simple. Since its dispersion over the 
whole of the world, Jewry existed in an unresolvable inner contradiction; it 
suffered the tragic fate of a nation without state. The Jews always wanted 
to live under the protection of Occidental laws, take advantage of the busy-
ness of the Occident and yet claim to be a strictly separate (abgesonderte) 
nation. Such an attitude always had to provoke new struggles because it 
stands in such fierce contradiction to the hard necessity of the unity of the 
state (zu der harten Notwendigkeit der Staatseinheit) (ibid.:37£). 
536 Naudh quotes Tacitus calling the Jews a 'deterrima gens'. Actually the text reads 'taeterrima 
gens', a 'most disgusting people' (,deterrima' is not a Latin word). 
537 Treitschke refers to Annates 15:44, a notoriously difficult passage; it is impossible to assess 
this here as a problem in its own right. Tacitus refers to the 'Chrestianos'; it is unclear whether 
this means 'Christians' because there seems to have been also another similarly sounding Jewish 
sect (followers of a Jew called Chrestos) at the time in Rome. My feeling is that Treitschke has a 
better reading of Tacitus - whoever the 'Chrestianos' were, there seems to be an anti-Jewish 
sentiment involved that is shared by Tacitus. The aristocratic republican Tacitus can be expected 
to dislike any religious sect that would separate itself from the official Roman imperial doctrine, 
something that would have been interpreted as 'odium generis humanae': a refusal to adapt to the 
ruling ideology - if it is 'universalist' like the pax Romana ideology was - would have been 
interpreted as directed against humanity. Neither the 'ethnic' background of the adherents of such 
cults nor the theological subtleties would have been relevant for Tacitus. 
538 As the alleged quintessence of anti-Jewish attitudes 'throughout all of recent history (neuere 
Geschichte), Treitschke quotes a line by the Roman writer Juvenal stating that the Jews despise 
Roman law and 'teach, follow and fear' only Jewish law (Treitschke 1896b:38). 
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Treitschke states that 'cruelty, tyranny, greed' cannot be the sole motivations of a 
two thousand year long struggle: the 'other side' involved in this history cannot 
be innocent. Treitschke takes for granted, however, that there has been a 
continuous 'struggle' between two 'sides' whose identity through history has 
been uninterrupted. Treitschke presupposes 'occidental history' as one 
continuing historical process539 whose main protagonist - 'the occidental 
peoples' - faces an eternally unchanging enemy, 'the Jews'. 540 
Treitschke does not merely state that hatred of the Jews has 'always been 
there' but also gives what he thinks is the reason: Jewry suffered for two 
thousand years 'the tragic fate of a nation without state', an account that seems 
taken from Treitschke's own historical experience.54l Being a 'nation without 
state' the Jews had to preserve their distinctiveness in terms of religion and 
culture which had to bring them into 'fierce contradiction to the hard necessity of 
the unity of the state'. It is telling that Treitschke - who puts great emphasis on 
the Christian character of the German nation - sides with Tacitus - a 
representative of Roman Imperial raison d'etat - against the persecuted 
Christians and excuses the Imperial point of view with the assumption the 
Romans might have seen just another Jewish sect in the Christians. Treitschke 
could not declare more explicitly whose side he is on and why: the decisive 
category is 'the hard necessity of the unity of the state'. 
In his second reply, Graetz insisted that Tacitus referred exclusively to 
Christians not to Jews. He argues that in Nero's time, the Christians in Rome 
were 'almost exclusively gentile Christians', i.e. converted Greeks and Romans 
rather than from Jewish background (Graetz 1965b:47). Jews at the time were 
not generally 'unpopular (missliebig)" while actually many (state-loyal) Romans 
practised Judaism which therefore was not an 'ethnic' but a religious category. 
Graetz concludes that Treitschke's 'drawing ethnographic conclusions from 
539 This specifically 19th century idea of a temporal unity of a historical entity called 'Europe' or 
'Occident' from the Greek city states to the present is what Samir Amin (1989) described as 
'Eurocentrism' . 
540 If the Roman Imperial elite disliked the Jews then because of their significant success in 
making proselytes, i.e. because of their not being a static, limited 'ethnic group'. 
541 It is more than tempting to see in this analysis - perhaps the most sympathetic thing Treitschke 
ever has to say about the Jews - a projection from Treitschke's own account of the history of the 
German people. 
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(single) ill-disposed sentences by Roman writers is rather unhistorical' 
(ibid.:4 7).542 
Cassel's reply follows a completely different strategy. He brushes aside the 
historiographical subtleties and argues that everything Tacitus held against the 
Jews was just as true of the Christians no matter what Tacitus actually intended 
to say. He argues that Jews and Christians find themselves on the same side 
opposed to the arrogance of the Imperialist aristocrat Tacitus and he suggests 
they should acknowledge that. He argues that 'thanks to God' the 'Semitism' of 
the apostle Paul has brought 'all the sins of the Orient to Rome' (a formulation 
borrowed sarcastically from Juvenal) (ibid.:26) so that 'the Jordan now flows 
into the Tiber'. While Treitschke identifies with Tacitus' invocation ofImperial 
raison d' etat, Cassel suggests a Semitic/Christian alliance of Mosaic law and 
apostolic teachings against a 'pagan-modem frenzy of licentiousness (heidnisch-
modemen Unzuchtstaumel), - just the way things might have been in Tacitus' 
times. 
542 Graetz's rebuke does, however, not quite get to the point that Treitschke was making. 
Treitschke had quoted Tacitus as evidence that writers in classical antiquity generally despised 
the Jews, which is part of his 'no smoke without fire' type of argument: because the Jews have 
been persecuted for such a long time, there must be a reason for it and therefore they should 
continue to be persecuted. However, while Graetz's response refers to how things really were, 
Treitschke's argument was on how Tacitus saw them. In the light of the further sources that 
Graetz is quoting, Josephus and Dio Cassius, it looks like Graetz is probably right on the 
historical facts, but Treitschke seems to be right on reading an anti-Jewish sentiment in Tacitus 
(although wrong on exactly what kind of anti-Jewish sentiment that was). 
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2.2.9 Emancipation, assimilation and the concept of rights 
On several occasions, Treitschke rej ects the idea of challenging the legal 
emancipation of the Jews in the German state. The principal formulation is the 
following (in the context of his response to Graetz, Treitschke 1896b:38): 
Today the unfortunate struggle (unselige Kampf) is settled, civil equality 
(biirgerliche Gleichberechtigung) of the Jews has long been achieved in all 
civilized states (Culturstaaten), and in all of Germany I do not know one 
reasonable (verstandigen) politician who would want to overthrow this 
accomplished deed. The German Jews enjoy unrestricted freedom of 
worship; nobody interferes with their old customs and traditions nor with 
their distinct cosmopolitan scholarship (eigenthiimlichen kosmopolitischen 
Wissenschaft); civic life (der biirgerliche Verkehr) even widely respects 
their Sabbath although this is undeniably for us Christians a very 
inconvenient institution. With emancipation achieved, however, the old 
Jewish claim to separate nationhood has also become totally obsolete. In 
the present century of national state formations, the European Jews can 
have a role that is peaceful and conducive to morality (der Gesittung 
foerderliche) only if they decide to dissolve into (aufzugehen in) the 
civilized peoples (Culturvolkem), whose languages they speak - as far as 
religion, tradition and tribal characteristics (Stammesart) allow this to 
happen. 
In this crucial paragraph, Treitschke makes four distinct statements: 
)0> All Culturstaaten have granted' civil equality'. Since by implication this is 
part of what makes them 'civilized', one ought not attempt to challenge this. 
)0> Although the fact that the Jews enjoy the same civil equality as other groups 
seems in principle to be grounded in universalist liberal values, Treitschke 
still mentions some of what seem to him particular characteristics of the 
Jews: Treitschke mentions that the Jews continue to stick to their 'peculiar 
cosmopolitan scholarship' and to the Sabbath which is for 'us Christians' 
very 'inconvenient'. The fact that Treitschke finds it necessary to mention 
these things in the context of his adherence to universal liberal rights 
underlines that these rights do not go without saying: the universality of civic 
rights includes even Jews - despite their 'peculiar' and 'inconvenient' 
characteristics. 
)0> 'With emancipation achieved', Jews have traded in and forsaken the right to 
make claims to separate nationhood. Treitschke demands 'aufzugehen' in the 
'Culturvolker' as the only option for the Jews now that they have accepted 
264 
the terms of trade of emancipation. By implication, everything short of an 
active policy of dissolving Jewish separate identity counts as Jewish 
nationalism. 543 
~ Nevertheless, there is a limit to the degree to which the Jews can have a 
positive role in modem European history (which is characterized as a history 
of nation-state building): the limit is their ability to assimilate. Their culture 
as well as 'Stammesart' does not allow for complete assimilation, and thus by 
implication neither for a completely positive role in modem history. A 
residue of ethnic characteristics will remain unassimilable and alien to the 
world of modem European nation-states. 
Treitschke's position on this issue is deeply ambivalent. First, he claims that 'the 
unfortunate struggle' - namely the conflict between 'the hard necessity of the 
state's unity' and the Jews' claim to both equality and difference - 'has been 
settled' with the achievement of legal emancipation. However, the remainder of 
the paragraph implies that struggle and conflict continue. The exhortative (and 
also discretely threatening) tone of Treitschke's discourse in these sentences 
clearly has a 'pragmatic' dimension: urging the Jews to make 'a decision'. The 
case that Treitschke claims has been 'settled' is actually not settled at all. 
Treitschke's ostensible defence of (legal) emancipation is contradicted by his 
pointing to the insurmountable limits of assimilation due to 'religion, tradition 
543 It is in this context that Treitschke attacks Heinrich Graetz as a representative of those who 
maintain an anachronistic claim to separate Jewish nationhood (cp. chapter 2.2.7). 
Treitschke writes later in the same text: 'Our state ... has granted them [the Jews] civil equality 
only in the expectation that they will make an effort to assimilate to their fellow citizens (dass sie 
sich bestreben wuerden, ihren Mitbuergern gleich zu sein)' (1 896b:44f). Also on two later 
occasions in the Streit Treitschke rearticulates his understanding of the issue of emancipation in 
similar terms. In a 'response to a students' solidarity address (Huldigung), (from November 19, 
1880), Treitschke states that for him Jewish emancipation 'was indeed grounded in the nature of 
the modern state. But the difficult process does not end with formal emancipation: the point is 
that the Jews become Germans inwardly, too (dass die Juden auch innerlich Deutsche werden), 
(Treitschke 1896f:120; italics added). 
In a response to Mommsen (Treitschke 1896g:123-125; dated November 19,1880 [the same 
day that Mommsen' s letter in the Nationalzeitung appeared] but published on the 21 S\ Treitschke 
rebuts the accusation of holding anti-Jewish attitudes: 'The core of my considerations on the 
Jewish question consisted in the sentence: 'what we have to expect from our Jewish fellow 
citizens is simply: they should become Germans and feel simply and straightforwardly German'. 
I do not share the pessimistic opinion of my colleague Mommsen that everywhere in the world 
'Jewry constitutes an effective ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition' (Roman 
History 1ll:550). Rather, I hope that in the course of the years, emancipation will be followed by 
inner amalgamation and reconciliation.' In this letter Treitschke presents himself as standing 
firmly in the liberal tradition of emancipation. 
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and tribal characteristics (Stammesart),. If assimilation cannot be complete, 
neither can equality. Treitschke's claim that the struggle is over is part of the 
struggle that is far from over. In Treitschke's view, emancipation has been 
granted to the Jews as an advance instalment - thanks to the self-forgetful 
tolerance of the 'Culturvoelker' - while the Jews still have to deliver their part. 
They still have to decide to 'dissolve into' the latter, as far as it is possible for the 
alien 'tribe' that they are. Treitschke admits that 'a part of the German Jews has 
long taken this necessary decision' to assimilate, but he claims that another 'very 
influential part of our Jewry' has no such intentions. 
It was left to Treitschke's interlocutors, however, to spell out in more 
theoretical language what concepts underpinned the controversy about the 
meaning and implications of Jewish emancipation. Manuel Joel comments on 
Treitschke's formulation, 'the moment emancipation was gained the Jews 
insisted boldly on their "certificate'" (Joel 1965:23; Treitschke 1896a:26).544 
Playing on the double meaning of 'Schein' (certificate, document/ appearance, 
illusion), Joel rebukes: 'So the certificate [oflegal emancipation] was meant to 
remain an illusion 7' Joel argues that this peculiar formulation throws light on 
Treitschke's understanding oflegal emancipation: emancipation is received in 
the form of a certificate the use of which one can insist on more or less 'boldly'. 
Exchange etiquette545 as Treitschke seems to understand it demands the Jews not 
to make too much use of their right, which led Joel to making the pun on the 
double meaning of Schein: a certificate that one is expected to use only discreetly 
or partially is not actually worth its nominal value - this form of emancipation is 
illusionary. 
Joel remarks sarcastically that human rights cannot be 'granted' (geschenkt) 
to the Jew because 'the Jew is anyway some kind ofa human being (der Jude ist 
544 'Kaum war die Emancipation errungen, so bestand man dreist auf seinem "Schein".' 
545 The exchange character of emancipation is implied in the notion that one receives a 'Schein' 
on whose cashing in one has to insist. Nadyr (1879:26) points out that Treitschke alludes in this 
formulation to Shakespeare's character Shylock. He writes that in his 'The Merchant of Venice' 
Shakespeare turned Paulo Maria Secchi (the merchant in the source used by Shakespeare) into the 
Jew Shylock in order to demonstrate the effects of denying the nobility of human beings. He 
emphasizes that Shakespeare had no anti-Jewish intention. Graetz quotes Gregorio Leti's 'Vita de 
Sixto Quinto' that gives as origin of the Shylock myth an anecdote from the 16th century, in 
which a Christian demands a pound of flesh from a Jew after winning a bet (Graetz 1965b:49). In 
another pamphlet Graetz pointed out that the original theme of the Shylock myth did not contain 
any opposition of Jewish and Christian ethics at all. Its early literary manifestations seem to be 
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sozusagen auch ein Mensch)' (Joel 1965:25). This implies the rejection of a 
notion of rights as something subject to any form of trading or dealing. This issue 
was further elaborated by Philippson, Cohen and (mock-) 'Borne'. 
Philippson writes that 'all those who currently act as enemies of the Jews 
intend to withdraw (wieder aufheben) emancipation (Gleichberechtigung), (AZ 
12.10.1880, No. 41:641). If some of them (such as Treitschke) claim not to have 
such an intention they contradict their own argument. 'Those who try to keep 
themselves covered (welche mit der Sprache so we it nicht heraus wollen), resort 
to the tactic of claiming that emancipation (Gleichberechtigung) is not actually a 
(universal) right (Recht) and that the state had the liberty to grant, or not to grant, 
civil and political rights. They portray emancipation as a gift given as an act of 
tolerance. Philippson states that Treitschke was the first to put forward this 
argument and quotes a pamphlet by a person called Brake as a more recent 
publication that translates or explicates what had been merely implicit in 
Treitschke's argument. Brake writes: 
The granting of civil rights (Biirgerrecht) and religious freedom 
(Cultusfreiheit) to the Jews has certainly not been the self-evident 
(selbstverstandliche) acknowledgement of their natural and human rights 
but merely a declaration of the positive will of the state in a specific case. 
Therefore the state has also not renounced (verzichtet auf) its inalienable 
sovereign right (Hoheitsrecht) in every single case to decide anew and on 
its own about the admission of any new religious community and its 
compatibility with the state's general purposes and the overall culture of its 
subjects (Unterthanen) as they exist (quoted ibid.:641). 
On the face of it, Brake (and, as Philippson argues, likewise Treitschke) does not 
deny the existence of universal rights tout court, but claims that Jewish 
emancipation simply does not fall into this category. He argues that the state has 
granted emancipation to the Jews only because their religion is not too different 
from the Christian religion and because their number was (then) small enough as 
not to endanger 'the unity of the moral (sittlich) and religious foundations of our 
population'. Emancipation is based on these conditions. Brake concludes that the 
state has the duty both to consider itself to be Christian as long as the majority of 
its population is such, and to guarantee toleration to the Jewish minority. 
based on opposing the strictness of Roman law to the notion of mercy that is Mosaic as well as 
Christian (Graetz 1880). 
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Philippson holds against Brake that conditional emancipation means failure 
to acknowledge the concept of individual liberal rights at all and is as such 
dangerous and in opposition to the 'Rechtsstaat'. He admits that a state has a 
right to allow (or deny) religious freedom (Cultusfreiheit) and he further grants 
that it is debatable whether and when the state has the right to grant or not grant 
naturalisation to a person who was not born within the territory of that state 
(Fremdhiirtiger). However, he holds that under no circumstances can a state deny 
civil and political rights to somebody born within the country to parents who 
were also born there. Further, the state has a duty not to allow religion to have 
any impact on a person's possession of rights: 
Humanity has progressed. Human society has developed. Legal concepts 
(Rechtsbegriffe) have become clear (haben sich gekHirt), and legality 
(Recht) has assumed a large and far-reaching power. However much the 
sophists tease their brains (klugeln), whatever the crooked lawyers 
(Rechtsverdreher) ruminate (spintisieren): what has generally been 
acknowledged as right (Recht) has to persist and will persist (ibid.:643). 
It should be noted that Philippson describes civil rights in very specific terms 
(civil and political rights are automatically the property of everybody born within 
a specific territory by parents who also have been born there) but still declares 
these very specific RechtsbegrifJe as the irreversible expression of the evolution 
of the progress of humanity. 
Cohen also asserts that the anti-Jewish campaign at least implicitly intends to 
withdraw legal emancipation: 
If one 'deliberately' decides to grant emancipation, one is na'ive to 
complain about the falling number of conversions. However, if one is 
already working towards the logical conclusion that emancipation should 
be reversed, one must not continue to complain that the Jews are not 
willing to become Germans (Cohen 1965: 143). 
Cohen takes issue with the political voluntarism implicit in Treitschke's 
formulation, that every state decides 'deliberately (nach seinem freien 
Ermessen)' about who has 'the right to participate in its leadership'. However, 
unlike Philippson he does not refer to 'natural and human right' (see above) in a 
strict sense. He argues that legislation is the 'emanation (Ausfluss) of the general 
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national morality (Gesittung)'. While the nation can expect the emancipated to 
show gratitude for emancipation, it does not have the right to demand gratitude: 
[The state's] freedom of deliberation has its limits not in so called natural 
law (which is a rather vague concept) but in the respective nation's concept 
of the - moral law (Sittengesetz) (ibid.) 
Cohen equates here 'general national morality (Gesittung)' with the 'nation's 
concept of the - moral law' (Sittengesetz; the dash as in the original), reconciling 
the Kantian positing of a universal Sittengesetz with a nationalist perspective, in 
which the particular view ofthe Sittengesetz taken by a nation is decisive. 
Cohen suggests that making participation conditional on a particular positive 
confession will provoke 'lies and pretence'. Therefore 'sittliche' administration 
of the state has to be based on 'a religious ground that is independent from 
contested dogmas', i.e. on Religion rather than any particular Glaubensarten. In a 
typical Kantian move, Cohen asserts: 'it is through such moral insight (sittliche 
Einsicht) that the state's deliberation gains its freedom' (ibid.: 144).546 
A quite different perspective was taken by the anonymous author of a 
pamphlet who masqueraded (or rather, ironically pretended to masquerade) as 
Ludwig Borne547 and elegantly adopted the latter's radical-liberal language. 
'Borne' repeatedly points out that he has said it all fifty years ago, so that the 
continuity ofthe adopted identity is meant to indicate an identity of the debate 
across the different contexts: for 'Borne', the earlier 'Rep Rep' movement and 
the current anti-Jewish movement are from one cloth. 
'Borne' bases his polemic - perhaps most straightforwardly among all 
respondents to Treitschke - on Enlightenment liberal thought. First, he ridicules 
the failure of Treitschke and his like to differentiate between feelings and rational 
considerations about state and society: 
You do not love the Jews. It is bad for the Jews that even educated 
Germans are subject to the relentless government of their hearts. Even to be 
just, the German needs to love ('Borne' 1880:6). 
546 Cohen adds that Treitschke's conception that excludes the Jewish Glaubensart is basically un-
religious in the Kantian sense of Religion. This is also why Cohen does not want to appeal to 
Treitschke (whom he never actually names but refers to as 'the editor of the Preussische 
Jahrbuecher'): 'from the point of view of general religiosity no words can be found to express 
adequately the disgust (Entruestung) at [Treitschke' s] attitude (Gesinnung)' (ibid.: 142t). 
547 Ludwig Borne had been born as Loeb Baruch 1786 and died 1837. 
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He suggests that Treitschke failed to emancipate himself (or rather, his reason) 
from the 'relentless government' of the heart, which is presented as a lack of 
education. 'Borne's' sarcastic remark that 'even to be just, the German needs to 
love' implies that issues of justice are (or should be for men of education) of a 
different categorial order from issues of love - a crucial distinction which 
allowed Enlightenment liberals not to like (let alone love) the Jews but still to 
argue (or even fight) for them to receive 'justice' .548 By implication, Treitschke's 
emphatic and irrational rhetoric is un-political and as such not part of a modem, 
bourgeois liberal discourse. 
'Borne' continues his line of argument with a simile: 
The storm and the sun had an argument about who was more powerful. The 
storm tried to snatch away a coat from a wanderer - in vain; the more it 
blew the more the wanderer wrapped himself into the coat. The sun came 
out in its light and mildness - the wanderer took off the coat. The Jews are 
such wanderers, Rabbinism is such a coat, you are the storm - but the sun 
has started to shine! (ibid.:l0) 
The sun, obviously enough a symbol of the Enlightenment, 'has started to shine' 
and thus makes the old coat of Rabbinism (which might have been useful in the 
past, but not anymore in these modem times) anachronistic and superfluous. 
Significantly, the storm and the sun compete about reaching the same goal -
snatching away the coat. The storm against which the coat is a defence does not 
reach this goal, while the sun does because it removes the actual reason for 
wearing a coat. The simile used by 'Borne' on the one hand makes the realistic 
and farsighted point that not authoritarian hostility but actual social and political 
improvement (sunshine instead of storm) will (or rather, would) almost casually 
and effortlessly overcome antiquated forms of consciousness (the old coat); on 
548 'Borne' hits here a remarkably contemporary problem. His sarcastic remark can also be 
applied to the rhetoric of present day 'anti-racism' that often exhorts us to 'like' and to be 
'friends with' or even 'love' foreigners - evidence of a post-liberal lack of trust in the persuasive 
power of the discourse of human rights or legal equality and in stark contrast to Kantian ethics 
whose specific achievement it had been to search for ethical categories that are not dependent on 
the vagaries and precariousness of liking, loving and befriending (while ipso facto liberating the 
categories of love and friendship from the burden of having to be ethical). Unfortunately, the 
ersatz-rhetoric of post-liberal anti-racism never works: one can not be friends or in love with 
whole groups of the population (such as 'foreigners'). Liberal Enlightenment universalism that 
has not been transcended and critically preserved in an emancipatory sense must regress into 
naive pre-political concepts. 
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the other hand, however, it displays some wishful thinking: 'the sun has started 
to shine!' (note the exclamation mark) was hardly the watchword of the day in 
1879. 
Taking up his previous argument that justice does not need to be based on 
love for the Jews, 'Borne' adds an attack on the 'world of commerce' and its lack 
of morality: 
I do not have to defend the world of commerce. I profoundly hate its 
Jewishness (Judenthiimlichkeit) - that manifestation of the demon of 
money, this heightened (aufgestiegene) fury of greed, this bodily devil of 
gold - whether it comes in Hebrew, Muslim or Christian shape. 
He adds that even if the Jews are more successful in commerce than the 
Christians this merely means that they are more clever, not that they are 
responsible for the phenomenon as such (ibid.). 'Borne' seems to be taking up a 
current manner of speech in an ironic way in order to undermine its implicit 
claims: if the devilish 'fury of greed' comes in 'Hebrew, Muslim or Christian 
shape' and has not been initiated by Jews, it is of course not very' Jewish' at all. 
In the body of his pamphlet, 'Borne' discusses the concept of 'civil rights'. 
He rejects the notion that 'human rights and civil rights, as well as religious and 
political toleration' are so different from each other that 'one could have claims 
to the one while not to the other'. He argues that Treitschke uses this conceptual 
distinction as a secondary legitimization or a smokescreen for a dislike of Jews 
that is ultimately motivated by economic factors: 
Basically you have always been a hater of the Jews, but intellectually you 
have made progress: now you try to justify your hostility. You do not hate 
the Jews because they deserve it (weil sie es verdienen); you hate them and 
then you try to prove as well as you can that they deserve it. And you hate 
them - because they earn (wei 1 sie - verdienen) (italics in the original) 
(ibid.: 13£).549 
He argues that what Treitschke wants to offer as 'human rights' - i.e. human 
rights without civil rights - are merely 'animal rights', namely the right to 
physically reproduce: 
549 This paragraph is taken from Borne's text 'Der ewige Jude' (1821); the original formulation is 
quoted in Claussen (1994: 117). 
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Only civil rights (Burgerrechte) are human rights (Menschenrechte): for 
man (Mensch) becomes man only in civil (burgerliche) society. This is 
where he is born, and he is born a citizen (Burger). This is the principle of 
England, France and any free state.550 
'Borne' argues that a meaningful conception of 'human rights' must be 
embodied in 'civil rights'. Ultimately, the two concepts are identical because 
'man' only exists in society, i.e. as a citizen: ' ... denn der Mensch wird erst in der 
burgerlichen Gesellschaft zum Menschen'. 'Man' outside society would be an 
animal, and the 'rights' that such a creature could lay claim to would be not more 
than the 'rights' that animals have, i.e. strictly speaking no rights at all. 551 
In the next sentence, 'Borne' shifts his argument by stating that one becomes 
a citizen only when coming of age (mundig) - not when (literally) being born.552 
This seems to imply that for example minors - who are not citizens - are eo facto 
also not humans: one comes of age when the intellectual powers are 'fully 
developed', which is presumed to coincide with the bodily powers 'appearing 
mature'. 'Borne' mocks the fact that the Jews are being denied citizenship 
'because nature had condemned them body and soul to eternal childhood' 
(ibid.: 14) and suggests sarcastically that immature Christians should also be 
treated as children and be denied citizenship. While for him, citizenship was the 
same as human rights, he accused Treitschke of reducing citizenship to 
membership in a civil corporation. He points out that in Treitschke's 
550 Also this fonnulation is taken from 'Der Ewige Jude' (1821); the original formulation is 
quoted in Sterling (1969:87). 
551 This argument that equates Man with citizen is a two-edged sword: on the one hand it is 
inclusivist as it claims that nobody who is born within the boundaries of society can be denied 
full membership of that society, i.e. nobody can be given human rights without civil rights being 
included in the package. On the other hand it is exclusivist as it implicitly denies the humanity of 
all human beings who - for whatever reason - are not actually members of 'society'. This is 
particularly relevant in the colonialist context as the equation of man and citizen implies that of 
bourgeois society and human society: the 'savages' cannot be considered humans if Man 
becomes Man only in civillbourgeois society. 'At home' it implies that categories of people who 
are for varying reasons not considered full citizens (strangers, women, children, propertyless, 
paupers, handicaped) lose also the safety-valve of the 'human rights'. Bourgeois society created 
the distinction between human and civil rights not without reason; the concept of 'human rights' 
- as a promise, reminiscent of Catholic universalism - seems to make sense only in its specific 
difference to the rights of a citizen. (Hannah Arendt [1951] argued of course that the history of 
the refugee problem in the 20th century teaches that one tends to lose the human rights in the 
instance that one would need them, namely after losing the rights of the citizen). 
552 I understand that' Borne' argues that one's attaining civil rights (on reaching maturity) is one's 
moment of 'birth' as a citizen, i.e. as a Man. His equating of human rights and civil rights leaves 
him with the contradiction that before actually attaining civil rights, human beings are 'Men' only 
in an incomplete sense. This is at the core of his sarcasm: by being excluded from full equal 
rights, the Jews are being treated as if they were permanent minors, i.e. not fully human beings. 
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understanding, only in death do all members of society become equal in their 
human and civil rights: 'the shroud is your toga [i.e. the sign of being a citizen], 
and you tum into social beings only in your graves'! (ibid.)553 'Borne' argues that 
the enemies of the Jews only adopted the language of religious toleration after 
they ceased caring about religion anyway; what they do care about is that' Jewish 
haggling (Schacher) does not outperform Christian haggling': for 'Borne', 
economic competition is at the heart of anti-Jewish attitudes. The language of 
religious toleration, however, is compatible with, and ineffective against a more 
modem form of Jew-hatred that is no longer bound up with religious forms of 
consciousness.554 
553 'Das Leichentuch ist eure Toga, erst im Grabe bekommt ihr Gemeinwesen!' 
554 Nadyr similarly sees the anti-Jewish campaign as 'scapegoating' the Jews for the faults of a 
political system that produces economic downturn despite the monetary benefits from the military 
victory of 1871 (Nadyr 1879: 11) He sees in Treitschke' s professed fear that the 'trouser selling' 
Jewish youth are bound to dominate the commercial and public spheres in Germany the cause of 
his hatred of Jews: the fear that his descendants would fail to compete with the descendants of the 
Jews. 
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2.2.10 The riddle of Treitschke 's intentions 
ONE ASKS ONESELF: WHAT DOES HERR VON TREITSCHKE WANT? 
(JOEL 1965:25) 
The preceding chapters have been predominantly about how Treitschke and 
his respondents used a number of crucial political, social and historical concepts 
in differing (or not so differing) ways. This final chapter of the text analysis 
looks at what seem to have been Treitschke's specific intentions. In the first 
section, I will analyze and compare those passages of Treitschke's text in which 
he makes explicit statements about what he wants to happen about the 'Jewish 
Question', or rather: what he wants readers to think he wants to happen. In the 
second section, I will discuss the detailed comments by Bresslau, Bamberger and 
Mommsen on the question 'what does Treitschke want'. Three aspects ought to 
be distinguished: 
~ intentions that are openly articulated as such in Treitschke's discourse; 
~ implications of the text which might or might not be intended by Treitschke; 
and 
~ wider implications ofthe argument or of the categories used by Treitschke 
(and the other contributors) that are implicated in the specific reality that 
these categories refer to: modem bourgeois society and the national state. 
The second and especially the third kind of implications will be discussed further 
in Part Three. 
2.2.10.1 TREITSCHKE' S PERSPECTIVE 
In the last section of his first contribution (Treitschke 1896a) Treitschke 
makes specific suggestions as to how the Jews should behave in the face of 
Germany's developing into a proper nation-state. He points towards examples 
such as 'Jewish societies against usury which silently do much good', the 'work 
of understanding Israelites who have recognized that their fellow-Jews (ihre 
Stammgenossen) must adjust to the customs and ideas of their Christian fellow-
citizens' (to whom, as the implication goes, such things as 'usury' are completely 
alien) and concludes: 
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Much remains to be done in this direction. It is not possible to change the 
hard German heads into Jewish heads. The only way out therefore is for 
our Jewish fellow-citizens to make up their minds without reservation to be 
Germans, as many of them have done already long ago, to their advantage 
and ours (Treitschke 1896a:27). 
Treitschke presupposes as self-evident that 'German heads' and 'Jewish heads' 
cannot co-exist next to each other and that the latter have to adapt to the 
former555 . He sounds confident here that this process is under way and merely 
needs to be continued consistently. 
Treitschke's tone changes slightly when he discusses the remaining 
obstacles: the Jews 'who talk so much about tolerance' should 
become truly tolerant themselves and show some respect for the faith, the 
customs and the feelings of the German people which has long ago atoned 
for old injustice and given them human and civil rights. 
The lack of this 'respect' on the side of 'a section of our commercial and literary 
Jewry' is the 'ultimate reason' for the present anger. This anger, Treitschke 
concludes, might not be 'a pleasant sight' but it is merely the accompaniment of 
'boiling up new ideas' and thus finally not a bad thing: 
May God grant that we come out of the ferment and umest of these restless 
years with a stricter concept of the state and its obligations and with a more 
vigorous national consciousness. 
The anti-Semitic movement is aphenomenon of the more general and 'essential' 
process of bringing about the maturing of Germany into a modern nation state, to 
which it is necessary but merely instrumental. This implies that anti-Semitism 
will disappear once this process is successfully completed. 
In the concluding section of his third contribution (Treitschke 1896c), 556 
Treitschke develops the one point in his original contribution that he claims has 
been 'strangely ignored' by all commentators although he had intended it to be 
the main issue: his (self-)criticism of the 'complicity (Mitschuld) of the Germans 
in the power of Jewry (des Judenthums)' (Treitschke 1896c:61): 
555 cpo chapter 2.2.2.2 
556 Treitschke's response to Bresslau, Lazarus and Cassel 
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We have allowed ourselves to be misguided by the great words of tolerance 
and Enlightenment towards some mistaken decisions on schooling that now 
threaten to damage the Christian education of our youth ( ... ). Tolerance is a 
wonderful thing but it presupposes that one already has a firm religious 
conviction oneself. ( ... ) It is the duty of the state to take utmost care that our 
school pupils are not taught indifference towards religion under the cover of 
tolerance (ibid. :61 f). 
Since Treitschke sees toleration and legal emancipation as benevolence that the 
victorious party can afford to show only after a decisive and final victory, any 
doubts about the finality of the victory would be reason enough to call toleration 
and emancipation into question. Such doubts seem to be raised for Treitschke by 
the lack of religious enthusiasm on the side of' our youth'. Treitschke' s intention 
of 'German self-criticism' - as it had previously been expressed in the first 
sentence of the first essay - is shown here to be not just a phrase: it seems that 
Treitschke would be happy to 'grant' all liberal rights to the Jews ('a wonderful 
thing') were it not for a lack of 'firm religious conviction' on the Christian side. 
For Treitschke, tolerance - which necessarily includes a degree of relativism -
goes together with indifference unless indeed very 'firm religious conviction' is 
warranted. 557 
Treitschke adds: 
The state could also give more protection against the tyranny of usury, 
which is committed by the unclean classes (Schichten) of Jews and 
Christians in a sad competition (ibid.:62).558 
After the criticism of the lack of determination on the side of the state, 
Treitschke turns to a respective criticism of society: 
However, the attitude of the nation itself is always more important than all 
the measures taken by the state. Our carefreeness and slowness could learn a 
lot from the economic virtues of the Jewish tribe. Instead, though, we have 
been only too receptive to the weaknesses and illnesses of the Jewish 
557 If one thinks like Treitschke that society can afford tolerance only conditional on general 'firm 
religious conviction', one would hardly ever get to the point of being able to grant toleration in a 
modern society as the latter does not typically produce 'firm religious conviction'. 
55R This is all Treitschke suggets in terms oflegal-practical steps. 
Mommsen appeals to Treitschke to distance himself publicly from the anti-Semitic petition 
hoping Treitschke could be cleared of this affair 'because we are proud of having such a teacher 
and such a man amongst us' (Mommsen1965:223). Treitschke lauded subsequently both the 
'moderate parties' and the government for keeping silent on the issue of the Antisemitenpetition. 
He disqualifies the anti-Semitic contributions in the Grenzboten as 'aberrations' for which 
Bismarck (to whom this publication is generally close) was not responsible (Treitschke 
1965a:225). 
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character (Wesen). Our cosmopolitanism was beneficial to theirs, our thirst 
for dispute wallowed in the scandal-loving outpourings of the Jewish press. 
( ... ) Most of all, though, Jewish pride (Ubermuth) has been spoon-fed 
(grossgezogen) by the unfortunate disunity of our clerical life, by the 
compulsive mocking and materialism of so many Christians. In the 
frivolous, infidel circles of Jewry it is a strongly held belief that the huge 
majority of educated Germans have long broken with Christianity.559 The 
time will come, though, and perhaps it is close, when urgency will teach us 
again to pray, when modest piety will regain its proper place next to the 
pride of education. In the last instance, every grave social question leads the 
serious observer back to religion. The German Jewish question will not 
come to a rest completely ( ... ) before our Israelite fellow citizens will be 
convinced through our attitude that we are a Christian people (Volk) and 
want to remain so (ibid.:62f). 
This concluding paragraph shows that Treitschke's attack on the Jews is also an 
effort at disciplining potentially unruly or disloyal Germans of whichever 
religious background. The 'Jewish question' appears here as a mere symptom of 
what counts for Treitschke as a crisis of German society in general. Jewish 
'pride' (Ubermuth) is presented as an indicator for the lack of Christian identity 
on the side of the Germans - with all its implications for civil obedience and 
state loyalty ('Staatsgesinnung'). In this section of the text, the underlying logic 
seems to be: disciplining the Jews helps disciplining the Germans. 
In December 1880, Treitschke dedicated the last section of his end of the 
year- review in Preussische Jahrbucher to the 'Jewish Question' (Treitschke 
1965a:225-227). He notes that 'no politician of any influence' would even think 
about a revocation of legal emancipation, while no reasonable practical 
suggestions have been put forward that would help solving the' Jewish question'. 
Treitschke concludes: 
It is solely up to civil society (biirgerliche Gesellschaft), and in particular to 
the Jews themselves, to overcome gradually the existing discontent 
(Verstimmung) that cannot be denied anymore (ibid.:226). 
Treitschke establishes that 
~ nobody currently considers taking back emancipation 
559 Cassel (1880:22f) argues that 'the Jews have lost their pious Semitic spirit amongst the 
Germanic heathens' (not the Germans have lost their piety through the influence of Jews). He 
asserts that only after emancipation, many Jews 'have been infected by the frivolous spirit of our 
century' (ibid.:23). 
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~ no options exist for the state and the political sphere to address the 'Jewish 
question' and to challenge the particularism of Jewish 'tribal consciousness' 
and its 'provocative' manifestations 
~ the 'Jewish question', however, undeniably exists and its discussion is 
legitimate (although preferably this should happen without rousing too much 
passion). 
From this he concludes that the problem has to be solved by 'civil society' - i.e., 
not the state. Without indicating, however, how 'civil society' in general should 
be responding to the issue, he puts the responsibility on the Jews. This is 
followed by the claim that there are, however, no signs that the Jews were ready 
to undertake any steps towards solving the 'Jewish question'. The Jews respond 
even to moderate critique with 'angry diatribes' (ibid.:226f); they mobilize Jews 
in the foreign press 'against their fellow Germans', exert' open terrorism' against 
supporters of the anti-Semitic petition, and 'indeed conspire to damage Christian 
fellow citizens whom they dislike'. In the meantime, Jews continue to publish 
pamphlets that scorn Christian theology. 
This catalogue of offences - unreasonableness, treason, terrorism, conspiracy 
- that owes a lot to traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes, is followed by a 
conclusion that contradicts the earlier affirmation of emancipation: 
Is it not obvious that this slippery slope will necessarily lead one to call 
into question once more emancipation? For the strongest argument of the 
enemies of emancipation used to be that 'the Jews are and remain a nation 
of their own; if we grant them full civil rights they will form a state within 
the state'. If Jewry continues to go down the road that they entered recently 
we will witness the emergence of this state within the state, and then we 
should hear the Christians shout (und dann miisste sich unter den Christen 
unfehlbar der Ruf erheben): away with emancipation! (ibid.:227) 
Unless those Jews who feel themselves to be 'good Germans' manage to prevent 
'their coreligionists' from 'dangerous arrogance (Oberhebung) and separation 
(Absonderung)" Treitschke warns, 'our soil might perhaps come to witness 
savage eruptions of uncanny hatred that would not do any credit (nicht zur Ehre 
gereichen wiirden) to the Germans, Christian or Jewish alike.' 
One year and a month after his remarks in the same publication had triggered 
the' Berliner Antisemitismusstreit', Treitschke relates that (anonymous) enemies 
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of the emancipation had said that the fact of a separate Jewish nationality 
inevitably would make emancipated Jews a 'state within the state'. He argues 
that recent developments in the behaviour of the Jews confirm this earlier anti-
emancipation argument and anticipates that - as long as the Jews do not change 
their ways - there will 'inevitably' come a scream from among the Christians 
calling for the abrogation of emancipation. Treitschke uses here rhetorical 
techniques very similar to those adopted in his first contribution: the reference to 
anonymous skeptics and in particular to an alleged 'scream' invoke the notion of 
the author as a detached observer. Treitschke suggests that 'the Jewish question' 
consisted in the particularistic consciousness and arrogance of the Jews. While 
German-Christian society has granted them emancipation against the warnings of 
the skeptics, the Jews frustrated the optimistic expectations of their benefactors. 
While at the moment the state is still well advised to remain patient, it is the 
assimilated Jews' responsibility to speed up the process of assimilation and to 
overcome the annoying anomaly of emancipated but not wholly assimilated 
Jews. Unless the Jews manage to disprove the growing and - as Treitschke 
implies -legitimate discontent on the side of Christian Germans, they might 
provoke not only the loss of legal emancipation but also the possibility of new 
pogroms. Choosing formulations that obscure any agency on the side of the 
majority of society, Treitschke describes all reactions to Jewish faulty behaviour 
as quasi-automatic or natural reactions. Treitschke argues that 'savage eruptions 
of uncanny hatred' would not 'do any credit' to either Christian or Jewish 
Germans; given Treitschke's dramatic invocation of an anti-Christian hate-
campaign, there is also a clear enough intimation - or even threat - of an anti-
Jewish pogrom in Treitschke's conclusion. 
Treitschke conc1udes:56o 
My pronounced intention has been to remind the fully Germanized Jews 
(die gut deutschgesinnten Juden) that the attitude of some of their co-
religionists does not meet what any great nation has to demand from its 
citizens (Treitschke 1965b:228). 
560 In his 'Response to Herro Th. Mornrnsen' (Treitschke 1965b) published in the same issue of 
the Preussische Jahrbuecher; Treitschke indicates that he received Mommsen's contribution after 
having completed the editing of the journal's December edition. 
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2.2.10.2 BAMBERGER: ON THE NEED FOR BOURGEOIS ORDER 
Bamberger concedes that Treitschke intended making a constructive patriotic 
intervention and acted with 'the best intentions' (Bamberger 1965:151). 
Treitschke's pamphlet is not an anti-Semitic harangue (Brandschrift). Its effects, 
though, proved to be 'deplorable' (beklagenswerth) because the anti-Semites 
were able to appropriate it (ibid.: 151). Bamberger acknowledges that Treitschke 
ruled out both reversal of emancipation and expulsion of the Jews and argued for 
a politics of 'reconciliation'. Moreover, Treitschke's 'demands' would have been 
received favourably had he only pointed out that the actually very small number 
of Jews in Germany cannot be of decisive influence on any social issue, and had 
he opposed the agitation of those who 'search for new legitimation for old 
unreflected ill feeling (fur alte unreflectierte Misgefuhle nach neuen 
Rechtsgriinden zu suchen), (ibid.: 152). In fact, however, Treitschke' s 
'conciliatory' conclusions follow from 'a chain of unreasoned assertions each of 
which actually works against the intended effect' (ibid.:153). Treitschke's 
inconclusively argued accusations 
cannot but make the accused believe that Treitschke is one ofthose 
persecutors who choose plausible pretexts according to time and 
circumstances in order to justify their own feeling of dislike which has 
become second nature to them. Should there still be many Jews in 
Germany who do not think of themselves as Germans, then Treitschke' s 
indictment would only reinforce their feeling of alienation (Fremdheit) 
(ibid.:154). 
Bamberger suggests that, if the tone and manner of persecution are more 'spiteful 
and cynical' in Germany than in France or England, it cannot lie 'in the nature of 
the persecuted' but only 'in the nature of the persecutors' (ibid.:155). Bamberger 
asserts that Treitschke provided the anti-Semites with 'a whole torrent of most 
equivocal catchphrases (bedenklichsten Stichworte)': 
This proceeding that contradicts its professed intention [of reconciliation] 
can obviously be explained by the fact that in the author himself the inner 
drives of a certain intellectual tendency have been stronger than those 
undoubtedly good intentions. He himself stands most of all under the 
domination of the hereditary antipathy, and where he wants to be doctor he 
is patient (ibid.). 
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Bamberger sees that Treitschke's position is inherently contradictory. However, 
he understands the contradiction as one between an adequate side (liberalism) 
and an anachronistic side (illiberalism; hereditary antipathy): Treitschke's 
outlook minus its anachronistic aspects would equal the liberalism shared by 
Bamberger. 
Bamberger argues that not only (nor predominantly) have Jews criticized and 
polemicized against German culture and its representatives, but polemical 
criticism has been characteristic of German culture itself. He enumerates a long 
list of German writers who attacked Luther, Goethe, Hegel or Fichte, and 
includes in the same breath Richard Wagner, 'who cannot admit that Felix 
Mendelssohn was a German composer' (ibid.: 156), and Eugen Diihring, for his 
attack on Helmholtz. For Bamberger the anti-Semitic persecution is part and 
parcel of a longer tradition of German-German discord. He suggests that 
Treitschke 'attributes the severe criticism of German character (Wesen) and 
German personalities to some Jews in particular' whom he sees 'only as tolerated 
guests violating the rules of hospitality (Gastrecht),. While criticism of German 
characteristics is actually intrinsic to the German character, Treitschke 
misrepresents it as an expression of a Jewish lack of gratitude. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Bamberger's contribution is his 
comment on Treitschke' s concern with religion: 
Herr von Treitschke, who fights socialism, takes the position of those who 
hope to be able to fight the evil at its root by restoring religion. If the 
restoration of religion is [indicative: ist] feasible, this approach would be 
legitimate [subjunctive (irrealis): hiitten recht] insofar as socialist ideas are 
undeniably linked to irreligious ones. The instinct of the ruling classes of 
England, France and America has established a form of church life 
(Kirchlichkeit) necessary for respectability, that is essentially based on the 
awareness of that link between religion and order (Ordnung). This is not 
the place to discuss whether something similar or better can be successfully 
developed in Germany. However, should it be attempted, the Jews certainly 
will not stand in the way. They have no particular interest in the realization 
of the big socialist redistribution of wealth (der grossen socialistischen 
Vermogenstheilung). Only, they find one could use other means of 
reinforcing Christianity than arousing hate and contempt of the Jews 
(ibid.: 174f). 
No other commentator related Treitschke's support for anti-Semitism so directly 
to the most prominent aspect of Treitschke's publishing at the time, the struggle 
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against' socialism' .561 Bamberger sees here the principal concern of Treitschke' s 
politics, and this is also the only passage of the text where he signals some 
agreement. 
Bamberger claims that 'the Jews' stand - with Treitschke as well as 
Bamberger - on the side of the defence of order and property and are opposed to 
socialist redistribution. He concedes that the restoration of religion is a possible 
means towards that shared goal although he does not clearly argue for or against 
the use of this weapon.562 He seems indifferent to any aspect of religion other 
than its socially stabilizing function. His main point is, however, that neither the 
principal political goal- fighting off socialism - nor one of the possible weapons 
- restoring religion - necessitate anti-Jewish agitation: quite the contrary, it puts 
off a potential ally. 
2.2.10.3 MOMMSEN: ON PATRIOTIC DUTY 
'The point is', Mommsen writes, to get 'from confusion and disunity towards 
secure principles of practical agency'. It is the duty of every individual German 
to 'prove whether we are a free people able to govern itself as well as its moods 
and to improve on mistakes that have been made' (Mommsen 1965b:218). 
Mommsen links here the concepts of 'freedom' and self-control to an ethical 
argument. He makes the German 'people' appear as a moral personality that has 
to give evidence of its (maturity for) freedom. Such evidence would, for 
example, consist in being able to discuss 'the idiosyncrasies (Besonderheiten) of 
the particular nations and tribes with moderation and forbearance (mit Mass und 
Schonung), as it is demanded by the necessity of national peace. 'All potential 
truth and goodwill [of strong critique of tribal idiosyncrasies] notwithstanding' 
(ibid.:219), its unavoidable generalizations cause bitterness and would not lead to 
improvement anyway. 'In this above all consist the grave wrong and the 
immeasurable damage done by Herr v. Treitschke'. Mommsen repeats that 
561 Bamberger, too, had just published an anti-Social-Democratic pamphlet, 'Germany and 
Socialism' (1878). 
562 His ambiguity about this manifests itself in the flawed grammar of his formulation that mixes 
a realis if-clause and an irrealis main clause: 'Wenn es ausftihrbar ist, Religion 
wiederherzustellen, hiitten sie jedenfalls insoweit recht...'. However, I am quoting from the text 
reprinted in Boehlich (1965), so that it cannot be ruled out that this is a misspelling. I have not 
been able to locate the original publication. 
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Treitschke's articles 'certainly have been meant benevolently' and 'are certainly 
based on much truth' but: 
The sentiment of difference between that part of the German citizenry 
(Biirgerschaft) [sc. the Jews] and its large majority had been held down so 
far by the strong feeling of duty on the side of the better part of the nation 
that drew the consequences of knowing that equal duty asks for equal 
rights. Now however this sentiment found itself proclaimed by Herr v. 
Treitschke to be the 'natural reaction of the Germanic popular feeling 
against a foreign element', to be 'the eruption of a deep and long 
suppressed anger'. These have been the words of Herr v. Treitschke, the 
one man amongst all her writers to whom the German nation owes most 
gratefulness during her recent grave crises, whose pen was, and still is, one 
of the best swords in the struggle against the old hereditary enemy of the 
nation - particularism - a struggle that has been turned around but not yet 
completed (ibid.). 
Mommsen stresses that he does not hold Treitschke responsible for the effects of 
his interventions (ibid.:220) which he argues Treitschke cannot have intended. 
'The question however remains: what did he intend?' Mommsen leaves this 
question unanswered and resumes discussing the (unintended) effects of 
Treitschke's intervention. Mommsen reproaches Treitschke for 'preach(ing) civil 
war' because 'every Jew of German nationality could not but understand the 
article as saying that he [Treitschke] views them as second class citizens, at best 
as a reformable punishment battalion (besserungsf:ihige Strafcompagnie)' . 
Treitschke 'might have intended a merely Platonic civil war; but unsurprisingly, 
it took the same tum that Platonic love tends to take.' Treitschke's intervention 
deepened the gap and made 'rabble of all classes fall eagerly on the defenceless 
prey' while even 'the better ones' ended up 'confused and wavering in their 
attitude'. Mommsen's text conveys his anger about Treitschke's intervention 
which he sees as detrimental to what he implies had been both men's common 
political concern in the past: the process of German nation building. Mommsen 
rules out, however, that Treitschke might simply have intended what he 
effectively did: promoting anti-Semitism. The behaviour of the old comrade and 
colleague remains a mysterious and inexplicable disappointment for Mommsen. 
Mommsen expresses the hope that anti-Semitic agitation will soon give place 
to a return of tolerance. He argues that 'tolerance of the synagogue ... goes 
without saying' and demands 'the more essential (wesentlichere) tolerance of the 
peculiarity (Eigenartigkeit) of the Jews which is not their responsibility (die von 
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ihren Tdigern nicht verschuldete) but given to them by fate' (ibid.:221). 
Mommsen seems to find 'tolerance against religion' not threatened even by the 
anti-Semitic agitation. Tolerance against 'peculiarity', however, does not go 
without saying but seems to be a property of the educated classes. In the 
formulation used by Mommsen before (ibid.:219), 'the strong sense of duty of 
the better part of the nation' has to 'hold down' the 'sentiment of difference' held 
by the not so good parts of the nation. 
Mommsen asserts again that there is a 'particularity (Sonderstellung) of 
German Jewry in good things as in bad (im Guten wie im Bosen)' (which he 
leaves unexplained) but insists that these have to be discussed 'in a way that is 
acceptable to the reasonable Jew (verstandige Jude)'. Mommsen reaffirms that 
the nation has the duty to protect the Jews' equality both legally and 
administratively: 'And this duty, which we first of all owe to ourselves, is by no 
means dependent on good conduct of the Jews' (ibid.:224). Mommsen defends 
here the abstract universality of legal equality as irrespective of the particular 
actuality of individual subjects or groups of subjects. Then, however, he shifts 
from a statement about the state and citizenship (where the Jews are to be 
defended as equals) to one about civil society: 
But we cannot defend them from the sentiment of strangeness and 
difference held still today by the Christian German against the Jewish 
German which - as is shown by the current situation once more - carries 
a danger for them just as for us: the civil war of a majority against a 
minority, even as a mere possibility, is a national calamity. This is 
though, in part, the fault of the Jews. Today the word 'Christianity' might 
no longer mean fully what it used to mean; nevertheless it is the only 
word which still defines the entire international civilization of our day 
and in which millions and millions of people recognize themselves as 
intrinsically united on our highly populated globe. It is possible to remain 
outside these boundaries and yet live within the nation, but it is difficult 
and dangerous. He whose conscience - be it positive or negative - does 
not permit him to renounce his Judaism and accept Christianity, will act 
accordingly and will accept the consequences; deliberations of this kind 
belong into the private chamber, not into public debate (ibid.:224). 
Mommsen goes on to state that 'it is a notorious fact' that many Jews are kept 
from conversion not by conscience 'but by quite different emotions which I can 
understand but not approve of. He quotes the existence of numerous 
'specifically Jewish societies' that are not concerned with strictly religious 
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issues: '1 would never join a philanthropic institution obliged by statute to 
support nobody but people from Holstein' .563 Mommsen takes up here again his 
argument made earlier treating the Jews as just one of the many German 'tribes'. 
However, he admits a small difference: 
And while I respect the endeavours and achievements of these societies, I 
view their separate existence only as an after-effect of the times of 
medieval system of protection (Schutzjudenzeit). 
Respect notwithstanding, these societies are characterized by Mommsen as 
anachronistic: 
If those after-effects are to disappear on the one side, they will have to 
disappear on the other side as well; and on both sides there is still much 
to be done. The admission into a large nation has its price. The people 
from Hanover, Hesse and we from Schleswig-Holstein are in the process 
of paying it, and we do feel that we are giving up a part of our selves. But 
we make this sacrifice to our common fatherland. The Jews, too, will not 
be led by another Moses into the Promised Land; whether they sell 
trousers or write books, it is their duty to do away with their particularity 
as far as they can do so without offending their conscience and with a 
firm hand tear down all barriers between themselves and their German 
compatriots. 
Mommsen mirrors the bifurcated structure of Treitschke's argument who defends 
legal emancipation and does explicitly not demand the state to 'solve' the 
'Jewish Question', but envisages the necessity for civil society to find such a 
solution. Mommsen does not refute, but he re-articulates Treitschke's argument 
about civil society including the demand for the Jews to 'become Germans'. His 
argument distinguishes here three groups of persons - or put more abstractly: 
three positions of agency - in German society. The first group or position is 'we' 
which refers back to 'the nation'. 'We', 'the nation' have 'the duty' to defend the 
legal equality of 'the German Jews' (or, 'the Jewish Germans': the second group) 
but cannot defend 'them' against the 'Christian Germans' who appear to form a 
third group. Although it is also implied that all three' groups' together form the 
nation and will suffer together a 'national calamity' if anti-Semitic agitation 
prevails, the development of the argument implies that the entity referred to as 
'we' is the nation in a more substantial sense than the totality of the three 
563 Mommsen was born in the North-Western German state of Holstein whose annexion by 
Prussia from Denmark in 1866 marked one of the major steps towards German unification. 
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'groups' is. It is evident from the context that 'we' refers to the liberal members 
of the educated classes who show a strong patriotic commitment. The statement 
that an anti-Semitic 'civil war of a majority against a minority' would be a 
'national calamity' that would affect the Jews just as much as 'us' seems to have 
the secondary meaning that it brings into danger the liberals and their parties in 
particular - which was at the time already a clearly visible threat and must have 
been obvious to Mommsen: the anti-Semitic campaign also signalled the end of 
the cohabitation of liberalism and Bismarck's state. 
The two statements that 'we' have to defend the Jews but that the Jews are 
themselves 'partly' to blame for the problem that 'the Christian Germans' form a 
noisy rabble, marks the Jews as contributing to the trouble and 'the nation' as a 
worrying and worried, fatherly concerned instance.564 As far as the defence of the 
Jews coincides with liberal self-definition - namely in the realm ofthe state and 
citizenship - the nation 'owes' this engagement to itself and its principles; the 
defence of the Jews as abstractly equal citizens goes without saying. Beyond this, 
however, 'the nation' is regrettably not in a position to offer much help: there is 
nothing that 'we' could possibly do in order to change or alleviate 'the sentiment 
of strangeness and difference held still today by the Christian German against the 
Jewish German'. The subsequent statement on the concept of 'Christianity' gives 
indirectly a reason for this. Although its religious content seems less than 
relevant in the modern world, the concept 'still defines the entire international 
civilization of our day' and in it 'millions and millions of people recognize 
themselves as intrinsically united on our highly populated globe'. While 
Treitschke defined the German nation as intrinsically Christian, i.e. non-Jewish, 
Mommsen defines 'the entire international civilization' as such. The fact that 'the 
nation' is unable to defend 'the Jewish Germans' against the 'sentiment' of 'the 
Christian Germans' seems to imply that 'the nation' is intrinsically part of that 
global Christian 'civilization', in other words: it is Christian, although 'merely' 
in a cultural, not (anymore) in a strictly spiritual-religious sense. While behind 
Treitschke's claim that the nation-state needs to 'have' a religion sits the horror 
of particularism and social atomization, Mommsen seems to imply that a world 
564 Cpo Ghassan Hage's (1998) concept of the liberal 'white worrier' in the context of Australian 
'multi-culturalism' . 
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order of (nation-) states needs a unified global 'civilization' to avoid general 
carnage - both of which are fully justified fears. 565 
Non-converted Jews, although formally equal citizens, place themselves 
'outside these boundaries', i.e. outside global civilization. Mommsen argues that 
it is 'possible' but 'difficult and dangerous' to do so. He implies that Jews 
obviously know that; if some of them take such a risky decision they can be 
assumed to have urgent enough reasons. Mommsen names two possible reasons, 
only one of which he finds legitimate: one is religion, a private affair that ought 
to take place exclusively in the 'private chamber'. The illegitimate reason is 
Jewish particularism and (proto-) nationalism. 566 Mommsen's position is clear: 
difference and particularism are acceptable and do not put into question equal 
rights even if one places oneself outside the allegedly global civilization of 
Christianity. Nothing of that sort, however, should ooze out of the private 
chamber into the public realm. Particularism in public is an anachronistic left-
over of the feudal past. The precarious process of nation-building rests on the 
readiness of all citizens to sacrifice public particularisms and restrict their 
idiosyncrasies to the private chamber - although it may hurt. 
2.2.10.4 NAUDH: SOME PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS 
Joel pointed to the contradiction between the massiveness ofTreitschke's 
argument and its rather thin conclusions. He suggests that the only consistent 
conclusion from Treitschke's argument would be the revocation oflegal 
emancipation, a conclusion that 'an elegant author' leaves for others to formulate 
(Joel 1965:25).567 Naudh actually makes such practical suggestions which he 
565 In its most basic structure, both forms of this argument are a continuation of the line of 
thought begun by Hobbes, the war-like society of competing individual producers needs either a 
Leviathan to keep it from destroying itself or a more sublime alternative that prevents a full-
blown Leviathan from becoming unavoidable. The better disciplined and regulated 'civil society' 
is i.e. the more 'civilized' -, the less ruthless a Leviathan is needed (cp.: Dressen 1999). 
Spinoza for example knew from the Dutch experience that circumstances permitting, the 
Leviathan can stay in the cupboard (cp. Smith 1997). 
566 Although Mommsen avoids using the actual term, his allusions are clear enough; he ridicules 
Graetz's historiography as 'talmudistic scribbling of history' (talmudistische 
Geschichtsschreiberei) (ibid.: 214). 
567 Philippson wrote that the German Jews can be optimistic because the Jew-haters do not have 
any practical suggestions to offer (AZ 23.3.1880, No 12: 178). 
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supports with a gloating reference to two speeches by Napoleon. 568 He underlines 
triumphantly that these come from the 'birthplace of the "rights of men'" and the 
'glorious principles of 1789'. 
According to the translation used by Naudh, Napoleon calls the Jews a 
'contemptible (verachtliche) nation', that needed to be treated as 'a distinct 
people, not a religious sect' (ibid.: 196) since they form 'a nation within the 
nation' (ibid.: 196f). The Jews, the 'robber barons (Raubritter) of modem times, 
veritable swarms of ravens (Rabenschwarme), 569 appropriate whole villages. 
Since they are 'no real citizens' they must be treated according to state law not 
civil law. Collective measures would be legitimate because 'whatever evil Jews 
do, does not stem from the faults of individuals but from the basic character of 
this people' (ibid.: 197). Naudh also quotes from the Napoleonic law of March 
17, 1808, that contained mostly business regulations intended to cancel as well as 
prevent particular types of financial claims of Jewish creditors (ibid.: 198).570 
Naudh is gloating about being able to quote Napoleonic law that he uses as 
the model for his own list of anti-Jewish measures. Naudh additionally suggests a 
halt to immigration, a ban on Jewish entry to all state or communal office and the 
Jews' removal from such posts (in exchange for compensation), the abolition of 
active and passive vote, expropriation of real estate (also with compensation), 
ban from the stock exchange and from running public bars (Schankgewerbe), 
homogeneous distribution of all Jews over the country and a numerus clausus to 
the effect that surplus numbers of Jews have to emigrate. All discriminations are 
meant to apply also to 'baptised Jews' and to descendants from mixed marriage 
into the third generation 'at least'. Two ofNaudh's suggestions are only 
indirectly targeting the Jews: all newspaper articles have to be signed by the 
actual author, and the advertising business (Inseratenwesen) has to become a 
state monopoly.57! 
568 He refers to speeches held by Napoleon on April 30 and May 7, 1806; Naudh quotes from the 
journal 'Reichsbote'. 
569 Popular bird mythology seems to differ in English and German vernacular. German ravens 
(Raben) are held to be thieves (like the magpie in both German and English) but they act in 
swarms, not alone (as the magpie). 
570 All Jews were made liable to obtain annually a licence for doing business and their freedom of 
movement was restricted. 
571 In the context of his rejection ofa 'mixed culture', Endner actually suggests the 'elimination 
(Ausmerzung)' of the 'Jewish element' from the 'German body' (Endner 1965: 114). What 
precisely Endner meant by this is not clear. 
288 
2.2.10.5 BRESSLAU: ON THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE JEWS 
Not unlike Mommsen, Bresslau writes that when he first read about the 
recent anti-Semitic agitation he felt no urge to intervene. The statement by 
Treitschke, however, with whom he used to stand in 'friendly-collegial 
relations', sharing 'essentially a common standpoint in political affairs' (Bresslau 
1965a:53), was one he could not leave unanswered. He expresses the wish to 
convince Treitschke of the inaccuracy, unfairness and harmfulness of his 
intervention, while stressing that he is not' an unconditional apologist of our 
Jewry (Judenthums), (ibid.:73). 
Bresslau states that it has always been 'popular to look for a scapegoat', and 
that in Germany the Jews tend to form a 'convenient whipping boy' .572 
Treitschke, however, given his academic and political position, could be 
expected not to repeat' accusations heard a hundred times before': instead he 
should 'say what should happen in order to solve' the' Jewish question'. Bresslau 
writes: 'I miss such positive suggestions'. 
You reject abolition or restriction of our emancipation as impossible and 
unworthy, but finally you restrict yourself to moral exhortations and for the 
lack of any other suggestion you put the solution of the problem into the 
hands of the Jews themselves, whom you call out to be Germans. 
Bresslau points out that although Treitschke did not deny that the German Jews 
were in the process of becoming Germans, his intervention contributed 'to make 
the barriers that still exist between Germans and Jews higher and stronger' 
(ibid.:75). 
Bresslau points out repeatedly the lack of a 'positive suggestion' about how 
to solve the 'Jewish question' and then formulates his own proposals in the 
concluding section of his contribution. His argument focusses on changing the 
public image of the Jews. He argues that representations of the Jew are most 
often modelled on their 'lowest elements' and that these representations are 
responsible for the generally held prejudice about the Jews: 
The Jews that are presented in literature or on stage are either noble and 
good characters, who, though, are presented as exceptions, or they are junk 
dealers, peddlers and usurers whose language triggers the laughter, and 
572 He denies, however, that anti-Jewish agitation is generally shared throughout Germany. 
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whose mean behaviour triggers the moral outrage of the multitude 
(ibid.:75). 
Against this cliche, 'every single Jew ... has to conquer his civil and social 
position anew ever and ever again', and even then is seen as a mere exception 
(ibid.:75f).573 
Christians are rather unfamiliar with the great mass of the urban Jewish 
population who live in quiet civil industriousness (in stiller biirgerlicher 
Arbeitsamkeit) without either the pompous luxury of the financial 
aristocracy or the rotten dirt of the existence of usurers and peddlers. ( ... ) If 
one could succeed in assembling the concept of the Jew (den Begriff Jude) 
from the characteristics of that middle class (Mittelklasse) without being 
influenced by those higher or lower exceptions (Ausnahmen nach oben und 
nach unten), I reckon the so-called Jewish question would be significantly 
closer to its solution (ibid.:76). 
A man like Treitschke, 'so extraordinarily gifted with the talent of the word', 
could make an essential contribution to such a project. 
Bresslau deals with the problem of anti-Jewish sentiment as a case of 
prejudice. He seems to suggest that the search for 'scapegoats' is a universal, 
quasi-natural reaction to social crisis, while the question of who in particular will 
be the scapegoat is based on prejudice, which in tum is a result of false or 
selective representations of social reality. He suggests that misleading 
representations of the Jew should be changed. Bresslau suggests a (counter-) 
strategy of media representation that would de-emphasize the Jewish poor as 
well as the very rich and make the public image of Jewry consciously middle-
class. However, Bresslau does not indicate how he thinks his 'positive 
suggestion' to change the public image could be implemented.574 
In his reply to Treitschke's reply Bresslau concludes that despite 
disagreements on a number of issues (Bresslau 1965b:95), 'there can be no 
disagreement between us about what is evil and mean and therewith worth 
fighting' within Jewry. Bresslau assures Treitschke of his co-operation in this 
573 Bresslau tells about his experience with a man who was 'highly educated and very favourably 
minded' towards himself who still made him the 'questionable compliment' that he was 'not 
really a Jew' 
574 It needed to be asked how could writers, journalists and scholars be persuaded to make the 
image of Jewry more middle-class? Which social dynamic would possibly be the basis of such a 
shift? Apart from that, it is questionable whether a uniformly 'middle class' image of German 
Jewry would stand comparison with social reality. The imagery of 'stiIIe buergerliche 
Arbeitsamkeit' seems one-sided and (at least to some extent) liberal wishful thinking. 
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fight, adding, however, that 'this fight cannot be fought in public' (italics in the 
original) and that the offer of co-operation is conditional on Treitschke 
supporting the Jewish 'defence of our honour that is being slandered' and 'the 
defence of our fatherland that some want to take away from us (ibid.:95f). After 
and despite legal emancipation, a 'social excommunication' of 'German Jewry as 
a whole' is being attempted. Bresslau demands that Treitschke declare himself 
clearly in support of emancipation of those Jews who are, or want to be, proper 
Germans: 
I may hope that we in turn can also trust on the support of my colleague in 
this just struggle of defence ( ... ); and I am sure that when the leaders of this 
(the anti-Semitic) movement still continue pretending to the German people 
(dem deutschen Volke vorzuspiegeln) that Heinrich von Treitschke was their 
ally, it does not happen with his consent (ibid.:96). 
Judging from the context, Bresslau does not seem to be sarcastic. 
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3. Conclusions 
3.1 The Berliner Antisemitismusstreit: the bones of contention 
As suggested in the presentation and discussion of the text material (Part 2) 
the Streit was a dispute about ten interrelated, and to varying degrees 
overlapping, questions. In the following I will briefly review what these were and 
then examine what tied these issues, or fields of contention, together into one 
discursive event, the Streit. 
• The question o/the origin, extent and meaning o/the current anti-Jewish 
campaign (cp. chapter 2.2.1) 
Treitschke formulated the positions that triggered the Streit in the context of 
his analysis of the growing precariousness of international relations. The 
continued existence of the kleindeutsche nation-state is the overriding value 
underlying his analysis. The international situation makes enforcing national 
cohesion, including religiosity and Sittlichkeit, more urgent and this is the 
framework for his discussion of anti-Semitism. 
Treitschke claims anti-Semitism is a 'symptom' of a general anti-liberal 
trend. While he expresses ambivalence about the demotic elements of the anti-
Semitic movement, he strongly welcomes the 'deeper' reality that the symptom 
is said to refer to. Treitschke's position on the concept of the nation is 
complicated by a tension between on the one hand his reference to Volksgeist as 
a central analytical category, on the other hand his elitist and hierarchical 
conception of society: he celebrates ethnos but demonizes demos. 
While earlier forms of jew-baiting (especially the events of 1819) are 
dismissed as 'medieval', liberal rejection of anti-Semitism is denounced as 
merely reversed Jew-baiting, equally anachronistic and illegitimate. The current 
anti-Jewish campaign is characterized as a legitimate and considered reaction 
against the negative (side-)effects of Jewish emancipation. Treitschke 
emphasizes that the' Jewish question' is more acute and of a different character 
in Germany than in neighboring countries and it cannot be suppressed easily: 
anti-Semitism is an authentic expression of a general anti-liberal tendency of the 
Volksgeist (although articulated in different ways by members of different social 
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groups). While he rejects some specific articulations of anti-Semitism, he 
welcomes the general tendency. 
Graetz, Meyer, Bresslau and Joel reject Treitschke's interpretation of anti-
Semitism as a 'symptom' ofa change in the Volksgeist. They assert that the anti-
Semitic movement is a marginal phenomenon and merely a product of 
demagoguery and manipulation, in particular by enemies of Bismarck, of the 
Empire and of National Liberalism. Naudh supports Treitschke but differs in two 
significant aspects. He identifies current anti-Semitism with all previous forms of 
Jew-hatred and argues that there has been an uninterrupted continuity of 'eternal' 
anti-Semitism since the times of Moses. Further, he defends the more populist 
forms of anti-Semitism against Treitschke's bildungsbiirgerlich elitism and-
elaborating on a remark made by Treitschke himself - develops a nationalist-
populist criticism of the bourgeois concept of Bildung. 
Bamberger and Oppenheim, like other liberal commentators, agree with 
Treitschke's view that anti-Semitism is a partial aspect of a wider anti-liberal 
agenda. Bamberger suggests that it originates within the educated class and is 
less significant in the lower classes, but despite being a minority view should not 
be underestimated. Oppenheim goes as far as calling anti-Semitism a 'pretext'. 
He holds responsible the triumph of Realpolitik and the brutalization of political 
culture, partly as an effect of the experience of warfare. Although he warns that 
civilizational progress can be reversed, he remains all in all optimistic. Cassel 
adds a different perspective with his remark that Jews are 'begrudged' the 
benefits of emancipation because society as a whole does not enjoy liberty. 
While Cassel denounced anti-Semitism as an 'exuberance' of nationalism, in 
the Declaration of the Notables it was argued that anti-Semitism is parochial, 
particularist and threatens national unity. All those who can make beneficial 
contributions should be integrated and assimilated into the nation. Out of all the 
documents, the Declaration is the one that most unequivocally asserts the link 
between the defense of Jewish emancipation and that of the liberal socio-
economic order. Mommsen asserted that the success of national unification has 
created anti-Semitism as its 'deformed child' which is now threatening its 
'parent', national unity. Although he shows himself confident that national unity 
will survive this (self-incurred) backlash, it does grave damage to the nation. 
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• The question a/the allegedly specifically German character a/the 'German 
Jewish question' (cp. chapter 2.2.2) 
It is a peculiar characteristic of Treitschke 's argument (as far as I can see, 
shared by no other anti -J ewish writer of the time) that he does not just claim that 
there is a 'Jewish question' but a specifically German 'Jewish question'. 
Treitschke argues that on the one hand the weakness and belatedness of 
German nation building, on the other hand the numbers and specific 
characteristics of the Jews that live in, and are migrating to, Germany constitute 
the German 'Jewish question'. The Jews immigrating to Germany are 'Jews of 
the Polish branch'. They are numerous, rise easily into positions of power and 
are less assimilable than the 'Spanish Jews' of Western Europe. Instead of 
assimilating, they became more arrogant and stubbornly idiosyncratic the more 
influential they were thanks to legal emancipation. Treitschke's argument 
culminates in the notion that the history of the 'Spanish' Jews is a 'history of 
freedom' like that of the 'occidental' nations, while that of the 'Polish' branch of 
Jewry is not. This lack of a 'heroic' history makes the latter unassimilable to 
German culture. 
Few respondents (Cassel, Rii/f) defended the legitimacy of migration. Most 
(Bamberger, Lazarus, Graetz, Neumann) denied that there is clear statistical 
evidence that would support Treitschke's claim and asserted the loyalty and 
Germanity of the majority of German Jews, and even that of the 'Germanic' Jews 
in Poland (Riilf, Bamberger). Lazarus and Graetz ridiculed the notion that a 
numerically small minority like the Jews could 'corrupt' the moral fibre of the 
German nation. Treitschke's claim ofa correlation between Jewish willingness to 
assimilate and the differing ethnicity of Jews of the 'Spanish' and the 'Polish' 
branch was rejected unanimously and with detailed historical argument. Bresslau 
in particular refuted Treitschke's ethnic interpretation with a socio-historical 
explanation. 
The one aspect of Treitschke's argument here which was not challenged was 
his claim that German national unity is singularly precarious and needs to be 
actively defended. 
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• The question of how to define German culture, Jewish culture, and the 
concept of a 'mixed culture' (cp. chapter 2.2.3) 
Treitschke suggests that unless the Jews 'become Germans', Germanic 
civilization is in danger of being replaced by 'German-Jewish mixed culture'. 
Although he does not demand formal religious conversion, he demands the Jews 
should completely assimilate culturally. He names as evidence for a Jewish lack 
of determination to assimilate the failure of Jews to make first rank contributions 
to German culture; they are prominent only in inferior practices such as 
journalism. 
Treitschke's argument here is based on two presuppositions: 
~ becoming German is a cultural issue. One crucial aspect of culture is 
economic behaviour while religion - as opposed to 'religiosity' - is 
secondary; literature and journalism are exemplary because they are cultural 
and economic at the same time; 
~ the Jewish failure to assimilate threatens the unity and purity of German 
culture. 
No contributor challenged the validity and necessity of assimilation as such, 
except Nadyr who countered that the German Jews are already too 'Gemanized'. 
Lazarus, Bresslau and Oppenheim held against Treitschke that the Jews 
contributed significantly, and saw this contribution as evidence of a commitment 
to German culture and nation. Treitschke replied with a discussion of Heine; he 
acknowledges Heine's merits but attributes them to his Germanness: they have, 
as it were, been achieved only despite Heine's Jewishness. 
Bamberger and Lazarus challenged the concept of 'pure culture' and argued 
that the potential of any culture depended on its ability to assimilate. Bresslau 
also asserted that German culture is a 'mixed culture' resting on Germanity, 
Christianity and classical antiquity. He supported Treitschke's demand for the 
Jews to 'become Germans', but asserts that they are more clearly in the process 
of becoming Germans than for example Catholic ultra-montanists. 
Lazarus suggested that the concept of historical progress that underpins 
Treitschke's position needed to be re-articulated. He argues that progress consists 
in growing diversity. The earlier stage within a development ought not to have to 
disappear but ought to co-exist with subsequent stages, as in the case of Judaism 
and Christianity. The 'permanent vocation of the Jews' was the furthering of 
296 
difference while at the same time being a particular embodiment of the 
generically human. 
Naudh also defends diversity against universality, but the thrust of his 
contribution is to accuse liberalism of ignoring the value of diversity. Liberal 
egalitarianism tries to distract from the danger that unassimilable Jews constitute 
for German particularity. He rejects the notion that German culture is a 'mixed 
culture' because Greeks, Romans and Germans are 'of the same tribe'. Up to the 
present moment, Semitic influences have been irrelevant to Germanic culture. 
Jews have to be excluded from both state and society because their parasitical 
and un-ethical character is a racial trait which can not be overcome by 
assimilation. 
Treitschke also rejects the notion that German culture is a 'mixed culture'. 
Differing from N audh, he claims that German culture has 'amalgamated' 
Germanic, Christian and classical elements to the effect that they no longer 
constitute a 'mixture' of distinct elements. Treitschke admits that German culture 
is an 'amalgam' but does not want that amalgam to befitrther mixed with 'neo-
Jewish' elements. 
While most respondents engaged in a defense of (some remaining) Jewish 
difference against Treitschke's demand for complete assimilation, Bamberger 
and Lazarus complemented this by making a point about the affinity of the 
German and Jewish 'spirits': the Germans are the people Jews have been most 
strongly attracted to out of all peoples, and the high level of emotion in the Streit 
itself is evidence of this. Both Jews and Germans are inclined towards 
spirituality, cosmopolitanism, abstract thinking and speculation (both in the 
intellectual and commercial sense). Lazarus emphasizes that - differences in 
dogma notwithstanding - there are strong affinities in morality (Sittenlehre) and 
all essential aspects of religiosity. Bamberger stresses that given the fundamental 
affinity, the remaining differences of character and temperament are beneficial 
for German culture and politics. 
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• The not;ons o/the Jewish economic spirit and the German spirit o/work (cp. 
chapter 2.2.4) 
Treitschke held (in his first contribution) that the Jews, in their appearance as 
speculators and usurers, characterised by dishonesty, deception and greed, were 
about to destroy what Treitschke thought were the traditional, pre-capitalist 
ethics of the German people, its 'good-natured willingness to work', i.e. not for 
utility and money profit only. Treitschke quoted the disproportionate Jewish 
involvement in the Griinder-boom as evidence. The 'anti-capitalist' undertones 
of Treitschke's remarks sparked a strong reaction from Philippson, Oppenheim, 
Bamberger and the Declaration o/the Notables, to the effect that Treitschke did 
not come back to this line of reasoning. Treitschke's adoption of what 
Oppenheim denounced as a quasi socialist argument was the only aspect of his 
argument that Treitschke straight away abandoned. Oppenheim defends the 
notion of work as business against any alternative notion of work as an 'ethical' 
or state service. The Declaration asserts the link between the demand for 
religious equality and that for 'equal sun in competition'. Bamberger asserts that 
successful businesses do not exploit society but make it richer and likens 
Treitschke's anti-Jewish stance to the Pan-Slavonic campaign against the 
(economically successful) German minority in Russia (which had been criticized 
by Treitschke himself). Joel and Oppenheim stressed that Jews were not involved 
in the Griindungen beyond the extent of their share amongst business-people. 
Bresslau supports Treitschke's attack on Jewish speculators but points out that 
the Jews' higher share in the financial sectors has specific historical reasons not 
of the Jews' own choosing, 
The 'straightforward' anti-Semites Naudh and Endner, however, took up the 
economic argument and developed it in more detail. As with Treitschke, the 
racial, ethnic-cultural and economic arguments are closely intertwined in their 
comments. For Naudh, Christianity was a revolution against 'Manchesterism' 
and utilitarianism as invented by the Jews two thousand years ago. Contemporary 
Germans are the 'breadwinners' for unproductive Jews who have become so 
numerous - especially in Berlin - as to overburden the Germans. Naudh 
demands a halt to Jewish immigration, while Endner suggests (in addition) 
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resettling the Jews in remote and uncultivated parts of the countryside and 
making them embrace productive occupations. 
• The question of how state, nation, race and religion should relate to each 
other (cp. chapter 2.2.5) 
This question is - quantitatively and conceptually - at the centre of the Streit. 
No participant in the Streit questions the validity of nationalism and the notion 
that the nation-state is the form of state adequate to and characteristic of modem 
society. Lazarus and Cohen are most explicit in arguing that the building of 
nations and nation-states is a crucial civilizational and ethical endeavour for 
humanity; Cohen goes as far as declaring the nation as significant as religion. 
All contributors emphasize that the nation ought to create unity as well as the 
consciousness of unity, i.e. national consciousness. However, Phillipson and 
Bamberger in particular emphasize that 'exaggerated' nationalism can 
'degenerate' and become exclusionary. For them, 'exaggerated nationalism' 
overlaps with socialism and threatens the liberal-capitalist social order. In the 
case of pan-Slavism, Treitschke, too, rejects a variation of (quasi-racial) 
nationalism because it undermines rather than strengthens 'healthy patriotism'. 
Cohen warns that nationalism must not become a 'moral norm' and must not 
exclude those from the nation who do not have, or do not want to have, another 
nation (such as, it is implied, the German Jews). 
The relationship between race, tribe and nation is one ofthe salient points in 
the Streit. Treitschke, Bamberger and Mommsen argue that nations are 
constituted by the amalgamation of tribes. In the process - a crucial aspect of 
historical progress - the nation's tribal constituents have to lose to a large extent 
their particular characteristics. However, Mommsen also emphasizes that it is 
important that their differing particular characteristics go into the national 
amalgam. Only Naudh seems to disagree with the basic theory that the nation is 
constituted through an amalgamation of different elements. While Treitschke 
deplores the decrease of conversions and intermarriage as a negative side-effect 
of emancipation, Naudh argues intermarriage is not a means of assimilation at all 
but helps further Jewish domination. Cohen holds that a degree of racial unity of 
the nation is necessary and that the nation ought to develop 'its racial type'. Only 
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Cohen and Naudh (neither of whom subscribes to a strict dualism of mind and 
body) reject the conception formulated by Lazarus (and silently shared by all the 
others) that national spirit ought to overcome and transcend racial-cOJporeal 
matter. Unlike Naudh, however, Cohen argues for assimilation, implying that 
'racial type' is in itself already the result of historical development: national 
'spirit' and racial/tribal 'body' overcome each other in a more dialectical way, 
resulting in a new national spirit/body. He also holds that although 'racial 
instinct' is 'natural', it must not be allowed to degenerate into a principle of 
exclusion of those 'who do not have, nor want to have, another nation'. 
Lazarus also entertains some kind of a dialectical tension between what he 
calls the 'objective' and 'subjective' elements of the nation. While language (not 
race) is the most important objective element in the formation of a nation, the 
nation is constituted by a subjective, spiritual as well as historical constellation 
that intervenes in objectively given conditions. Although not independent from 
material conditions, the nation is 'a spiritual creation of the individuals who 
constitute it'. The national spirit is in turn, however, a product of common 
history and destiny (which are at least partly objective elements). Despite his 
insistence on the relevance of 'objective' factors, Lazarus rejects the reference to 
'race' because it means undermining the human effort to spiritualise existence. 
Naudh embraces a static concept of 'race' that the 'national spirit' cannot 
overcome. Bamberger argues that the category of 'race' has been adopted only to 
further legitimise an injustice that used to be justified on grounds of religion. The 
discussion of 'race' is but a pretext for the continued and anachronistic existence 
of an ancient antipathy. 
A second bone of contention is the relationship between religion and nation. 
Treitschke writes that the Germans are a 'Christian nation', while the German 
state - as a modern state - is secular. However, the Germans ought to 'preserve 
the Christian character of their institutions'. Treitschke and Cohen agree that 
different religions can only temporarily coexist in one nationality and with one 
religion ruling over the other(s). Philippson and Lazarus argue that politics are 
beyond religion, and the Jews ought to maintain their religious particularity. 
Cohen rejects this as a 'flawed liberal slogan' and argues that all members of a 
nation ought to participate in that nation's religious foundation. However, Cohen 
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also rejects Treitschke's notion that Judaism is the religion of 'an alien tribe': for 
Cohen common religiosity is what matters, while the difference between Jewish 
and Christian religious form is unproblematic: also, the German Jews 'breathe 
out of the culture of Christianity'. Naudh argues that religion is the supreme 
expression of morality (' Sittlichkeit') and as such pivotal to the national 
character of a people. Like Cohen and Treitschke, he rejects the idea that politics 
are unaffected by religion. Unlike Cohen, however, he does not distinguish 
between religiosity and religious form which brings him to a different 
conclusion: under the condition of modernity - where the state is based on 
nationality to which religion is crucial - the separation of state and church is 
meaningless. 
All contributors advocate Jewish assimilation except Naudh who does not 
believe that assimilation is possible. Treitschke's position is ambivalent: he 
advocates assimilation but the way he portrays the Jews and their culture seems 
to suggest implicitly the conclusion (drawn by Naudh explicitly on the grounds of 
'race') that the Jews cannot assimilate to the German nation. 
• The question of the relationship between Christian and Jewish religion (cp. 
Chapter 2.2.6) 
Treitschke as well as Lazarus and Cohen discuss the question of the 
relationship between Christian and Jewish religion under the perspective of what 
it means for national unification, although Cohen includes more strictly 
theological arguments in his discourse than Treitschke and Lazarus. Cohen and 
Treitschke insist - against Lazarus - that religion is central to nation-building, 
while Cohen disagrees from Treitschke on the definition of religion, employing a 
(Kantian) distinction between specific 'religions' and 'religiosity'. While 
Treitschke emphasizes that both Christian denominations can come together in 
the nation because they share the same religion - excluding the Jews from this 
possibility - Cohen asserts that adherents of all forms of religion 
(Glaubensarten) can come together as long as they share Religion in the sense of 
(ethical) religiosity. 
While Treitschke and Naudh see Christianity as a departure and a progressive 
development away from Judaism, Lazarus and Cohen maintain that Christianity 
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added a new element to the evolution of religion without making the continuing 
existence of Judaism redundant or anachronistic. Lazarus argues for maintaining 
religious difference despite national amalgamation, Cohen argues for only 
temporary religious difference until a higher synthesis of Judaism and 
Protestantism is achieved. All authors rely on a concept of progress: while 
Treitschke argues that Judaism is already sublated and overcome - i.e. rendered 
anachronistic - in Protestantism, Cohen expects this to happen in the future. 
Lazarus holds growing diversity itself for a sign of progress. For Naudh, even 
those elements of Judaism that were absorbed into Christianity are evil and need 
to be eliminated: Christianity came into its own only in its successful history 
within the 'Aryan peoples', not, however, in its futile attempts to win over the 
Jews. 
• The question of the nationality of the German Jews (cp. Chapter 2.2. 7) 
There is a general agreement in the Streit that the Jews were and are obliged 
to 'become Germans' as part of the 'barter', as it were, emancipationfor 
assimilation. Treitschke claims they did not yet do so sufficiently (with which 
some of the interlocutors also agree) and casts doubt on whether they are actually 
capable of complete assimilation. Here lies a fundamental fault-line which runs 
not only between Treitschke and his liberal critics, but also through Treitschke's 
argument itself when he demands, on the one hand, assimilation, but on the other 
hand denounces it as an impossibility. With the second face of his discourse 
Treitschke comes close to Naudh's unambiguous position. 
Treitschke explicitly chooses a polemic against Graetz as his vehicle for 
demonstrating that the anti-Semitism dispute is essentially about the question of 
nationality. Instrumental to this choice is the argument about the differing 
evaluation of the heritage of German-Jewish culture. Judging from the 
formulations quoted by Treitschke, Graetz's writing vacillates between a (so to 
say, 'proto-Zionist') Jewish nationalist sentiment and a democratic perspective 
on German culture that emphasizes the failure of German Enlightenment writers 
to support unequivocally the cause of Jewish emancipation. Treitschke 
straightforwardly rejects paradigmatic figures of German-Jewish culture (with 
the exception of Gabriel Riesser) as well as German non-Jews who were 
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supportive of the Jewish cause (Lessing). Through selective quotation he 
constructs an exaggerated portrayal of Graetz as a Jewish nationalist and claims 
that Graetz's attitude is representative for that of the German Jews of the time. 
Joe! points out the contradictory character of Treitschke's accusing the Jews 
of fancying themselves as non-Germans when they ought to assimilate, and at the 
same time of being aliens who only masquerade as Germans for tactical reasons. 
Joel is also the only author who defends Graetz against Treitschke's (as well as 
Cohen's and Philippson's) verdicts. 
Lazarus, Cohen and Meyer unequivocally assert that the German Jews are 
Germans. Lazarus, Bamberger and most strongly Cohen regret having to respond 
'as Jews' at all. Philipps on reproaches Cohen for directing the demand to become 
(more) German at the Jews when it should be directed at all Germans. While 
rejecting the notion of a Jewish nationality, all respondents nevertheless assert 
and defend some sense of Jewishness - other than a sense of Jewish nationality-
that would be compatible with assimilation. 
Apart from Joel, only Oppenheim rejects the notion that the Jews lack 
Germanness. For him, the Jews' defending their emancipation does not 
contradict but is evidence of their determination to assimilate to German 
nationality and culture. 
• The question whether there has been a long-standing hatred of the Jews that 
can be used as evidence of their evil nature (cp. chapter 2.2.8) 
Treitschke supports his claim that complete Jewish amalgamation is 
impossible with the further claim that the 'abyss' between Jews and Gentiles is 
'thousands' of years old and especially made permanent by the fact that the Jews 
are a 'nation without a state'. This brings them inevitably into conflict with any 
existing state's endeavors to protect its cultural-political unity. The conclusion 
has to be for the Jews to act with discretion and modesty in order not to provoke 
any escalation of this unbridgeable contradiction. In this context Treitschke 
refers affirmatively to the Roman state's persecution of the Christians as these 
were then seen as just another Jewish sect. 
Cassel points out that this contradicts Treitschke's repeated invocations of 
Christianity. It clearly shows that for Treitschke religion is subordinate to raison 
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d'etat. Graetz responds on the level of historical facts, trying to disprove the 
existence of official Roman anti-Judaism. The crux of Treitschke's argument, 
that Jewish (or rather, any) cultural particularism has by necessity to be overruled 
by 'the hard necessity of the unity of the state' is in this context not challenged 
by any respondent. 
• The question o/the link between emancipation and assimilation and the 
concept o/rights (cp. chapter 2.2.9) 
Treitschke's remarks on legal emancipation are highly ambivalent. On the 
one hand, he endorses 'civil equality' as a general mark of 'civilization', which 
has to be paid for, however, with complete assimilation. On the other hand, he 
implies that the Jews' 'tribal characteristics' do not allow complete assimilation 
to happen, which in tum means that emancipation can never be 'complete'. 
Joel and Philippson endorse a natural law conception of civic rights, while 
'mock-Borne' claims that civil and human rights are inseparable because they 
emerge together within the context of (bourgeois) society. Philippson interprets 
Treitschke's position in the light of a formulation by another anti -J ewish 
pamphletist who argued - in historicist-positivist fashion - that civil rights for 
the Jews are rooted in the 'positive will of the state' and the 'overall culture of its 
subjects', not in the individualistic concept of universal natural law. Philippson 
qualifies the natural law position by stating that the state cannot deny civil rights 
to anybody 'born within the country to parents who were also born there'. 
'Borne' asserts that rights are formulated irrespective of individual merit. He 
strongly endorses the necessity of assimilation but argues that only general social 
and political progress can deliver it. 
Cohen rejects the unmediated concept of natural law and argues that the 
action of the state is, or ought to be, rooted in how the particular nation 
conceives of the universal 'moral law' . By insisting on how the universal is 
articulated in a specific national culture Cohen attempts to mediate the two 
concepts of 'right', the universal and the positive, historically relative. 
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• The question of what Treitschke had intended, and what the interlocutors 
suggest should be done (cp. chapter 2.210) 
Treitschke's 'demand' is quite simply that the Jews give up their remaining 
reservations about 'becoming Germans'. The anti-Semitic movement (which is 
the German people's response to the lack of respect on the side of the Jews) 
should help the Germans reaching 'a stricter concept of the state and its 
obligations' and 'a more vigorous national consciousness'. Not the state but only 
civil society can solve the 'Jewish Question' caused by the arrogance of the 
Jews. Inasmuch as the Germans have been indulging in tolerance, Enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism and relativism (endangering their own 'firm religious 
conviction'), they are complicit in the 'power of Jewry'. Only a strong 
reassertion of Christian conviction and the overcoming of clerical disunity can 
create a situation in which the Germans will be able to 'afford' being tolerant. 
The German nation demands from the Jews nothing it would not demand from 
all its citizens. If the Jews, however, continue acting as if building a 'state within 
the state' and frustrating German expectations of their assimilation, they may 
provoke not only the reversal oflegal emancipation but also anti-Jewish 
pogroms. 
Direct responses to these aspects ofTreitschke's discourse were few. Naudh 
argued straightforwardly that the Jews are 'a distinct people, not a religious sect' 
and form 'a nation within the nation'. They need to be treated as a foreign, 
conquering nation; not individual Jews, but the Jews as a people are evil, and 
specific legislation dealing with them is necessary. In the first place it ought to 
restrict economic freedoms and freedom of movement. Similarly, Endner 
demanded resettlement and 'productivization' of the Jews. 
Bresslau reproached Treitschke for having failed to make any specific 
suggestions for how to solve the 'Jewish question': Treitschke merely repeated 
old accusations that would help making the existing barriers higher and stronger. 
Bresslau agrees about what is 'evil and mean' within Jewry and what needs to be 
fought. However, this fight can only be fought together if Treitschke lends his 
support to defend Jewish honour. Bresslau's own practical suggestion is that 
representations of Jews in literature or on stage be modeled on the middle class 
normality of German Jewry. 
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Mommsen reproached Treitschke for having violated a specific duty that the 
'better part of the nation' has towards nation-building: the duty to hold down 
'sentiments of difference' felt by other members of the nation. Mommsen holds 
that it is crucial to the process of the nation's maturing towards self-government 
that its representatives are able to discuss the 'idiosyncracies' of 'particular tribes 
and nations' within the nation with 'moderation and forbearance'. The nation 
owes to itself the protection of the Jews' religion and peculiarity, irrespective of 
their conduct. However, Mommsen warns that the state cannot do more than to 
warrant legal equality: 'we' - i.e. the national-liberal elite - cannot defend the 
Jews from popular hostility based on a sense of difference. Since Christianity 
still defines international civilization, the Jews' refusal to convert remains a 
dangerous and difficult personal choice. His only practical suggestion is that in 
order not to provoke a civil war that would endanger the Jews as well as national 
unity, Jews need to understand their obligation to practice their religion in 
private, not in public. They ought to give up all not strictly religious communal 
Jewish institutions that could be interpreted by others as expressions of an 
anachronistic national particularism. 
Bamberger's position is in this respect not very different from Mommsen's. 
He holds that Treitschke acted with the best patriotic intentions, but these were 
frustrated by Treitschke's assertions about the detrimental influence of the 
German Jews and his failure to reject the anti-Semitic agitation. Treitschke's, and 
more generally the anti-Semites' indictments can be expected to reinforce 
separatist sentiments on the side of the German Jews wherever such sentiments 
still exist. They damage the process of nation-building. Bamberger's argument 
rests on a distinction between Treitschke's good (liberal) intentions and an 
anachronistic, anti-Jewish 'intellectual tendency'. Bamberger appreciates 
Treitschke's concern with restoring Christian religion as a bulwark against the 
threat of social-democracy, but has reservations as to whether it is feasible to 
defend bourgeois order with the help of religion. However, Bamberger insists it 
should be done without attacking the Jews since they are allies of order and 
respectability, not of disorder and socialism. 
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3.2 Dissent and consensus 
The discussion and analysis of the mUltiple and complex differences between 
the positions held in the dispute has also produced a sense of a consensus shared 
by all involved - a consensus on what there is that needs, deserves or can be 
discussed, and what does not need to be discussed. 
Foremost, of course, there is a consensus that the nation-state is the form of 
state most adequate to modem society, and that this form of state and society 
needs to warrant its cohesion through some form of national culture, including a 
sense of morality. Furthermore, there is a general sense that morality is in some 
way implicated with religion. However, opinions vary whether national culture 
implicates a shared (positive) religion or merely general religiosity: 
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RELIGION vs RELIGIOSITY DISSENT 
Conceptions of 'culture' are as if on a sliding scale, with one extreme being a 
monolithic, racial concept of culture, a majority opinion that culture is based on 
an 'amalgam', and the opposite pole holding that culture is, and ought to be, 
'mixed' and open-ended. Those who think that culture is an 'amalgam' think, or 
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at least seem not to reject, that there is a point when enough 'mixing' has taken 
place, i.e. when the amalgam is a quasi 'pure' culture. 
There is very little opposition to the notion that immigration by 'Eastern 
Jews' challenges the sense of who the members of the nation are. The dissent is 
about whether or not the immigrants are numerous enough to cause a problem. 
The movement that refers to itself with the neologism 'anti-Semitic' is 
understood by National Liberals (with the exception of Treitschke) as a threat to 
national unity: the nationalism of the anti-Semites is dangerous because 
'exaggerated' (which echoes, however, Treitschke's rejection of pan-Germanism 
and pan-Slavism), although criteria for what exactly constitutes 'exaggerated' 
nationalism are impossible to establish. 'Exaggerated' nationalism turns on the 
nationalist endeavor itself. It is in this sense that anti-Semites apppear as 
'enemies of the Reich' and of National Liberalism. 
There is a consensus that some groups are 'too different' to be included in the 
nation. It is unclear, however, where exactly the threshold of difference is which 
members of the nation ought not to trespass. The defenders of the Jews argue 
either that the Jews are less different than the anti-Semites claim, or that despite 
their being different they are not numerous enough to do much damage, and also 
that they constitute not the only (or not even the most pressing) problem: other 
groups (Catholics, socialists) are more different as well as more numerous, i.e. 
more dangerous. 
Furthermore, there is a general consensus (excluding only Naudh and 
Endner) that 'spirit' ought to prevail over 'matter'. The adoption or 
condemnation ofthe demand for 'racial unity' is dependent on whether reference 
to 'race' is deemed to be compatible with a general framework of idealism 
(Cohen, Treitschke) or whether it means succumbing to 'materialism' (Lazarus). 
There is a clearly articulated clash of opinions between, on the one hand, 
Treitschke's concern about the 'Jewish' (i.e. modem capitalist) threat to the 
Germans' 'good-natured willingness to work' and, on the other hand, the support 
for market-capitalism and utilitarian ethics. 
There is a consensus that there is progress in the evolution of religion, but 
there is dissent about whether each step invalidates all previous ones, or whether 
the remnants of earlier stages in the development remain valid and legitimate, or 
will remain valid only until a perfect synthesis will have been reached. 
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There is a consensus that 'the particular' needs to feed into, and to be 
overcome by the quasi-universal (the nation), and that the universal and the 
historically relative need to be mediated. Civic rights as well as political forms 
and institutions need to be mediated with historically specific national-cultural 
traditions. The dissent is over which side in this process ought to prevail. 
All in all it seems that the contradiction between Treitschke's 'undoubtedly 
good intentions' and their adverse effects are connected in ways that the liberal 
critics of anti-Semitism are not able to pin down. The suggestion by the priest 
and converted Jew, Paulus Cassel (a Conservative rather than a Liberal), that a 
society in which revoking Jewish emancipation is publicly being considered 
indicates that there is a more general lack of liberty in that society, was not 
considered worthy of discussion by anyone. 
The Streit is crucially about the inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies 
inherent in the nation-form. As long as state and society are constituted in the 
form of 'the nation', some degree of cultural homogeneity tends to be enforced 
which means there is inevitably some form of (more subtle or more open) 
pressure towards socio-cultural assimilation. If a relevant minority appears not to 
be assimilating to the extent that they are expected to, representatives of the 
established national culture tend to draw one of three conclusions: 
)P> the members of the minority are prevented from assimilating by circumstance 
(the classic position taken by Enlightenment figures such as Dohm and 
Humboldt that is echoed by Mommsen, Bresslau and other liberal critics of 
Treitschke to the extent that they admit that the Jews are sti111acking 
Germanness ); 
)P> they are unwilling to assimilate (the dominant theme of Treitschke's 
contributions); or: 
)P> they are unable to assimilate (the 'racist' position held by Naudh and Endner, 
by Treitschke sometimes). 
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These three interpretations have different practical implications but work 
towards the same political end, the consolidation of nation-building. Treitschke 
endorses anti-Semitism because he expects it will accelerate the assimilation of 
the German Jews (objective One) and strengthen national consciousness of all 
Germans (objective Two). The tension in his argument between whether or not 
he believes Jewish assimilation to be possible implies that objective Two can still 
be achieved independently from objective One: if inclusion does not work, 
exclusion will. Mommsen, Cohen and others do not want objective Two to be 
realized without objective One. Treitschke's liberal critics oppose anti-Semitism 
primarily because they think it weakens national unity. Statements that reject 
anti-Semitism for other reasons than its adverse implications for nation-building 
are few and far between. 
A discussion of liberalism needs to differentiate between the presuppositions 
of the liberal 'world view' and the more practical propositions ofliberal politics; 
they do not necessarily - and perhaps not even typically - come in a package. 
Invocations of progress, civilization, 'industry and liberty' and social harmony 
can in practice mean very different things. A look at the beginnings of the 
political concept of liberalism in the context of the French Revolution shows that 
it is best characterized - in the modem context - as the predominant centrist 
position in opposing simultaneously reaction and (revolutionary, democratic or 
socialist) radicalism. The advent of modem class society as shaped by industrial 
capitalism led to a redefinition of the liberal notion of social harmony and how it 
was to be secured. 
German National Liberalism - to which Treitschke, Bamberger, Mommsen 
and Oppenheim adhered - emerged from the experience in 1848 that the liberal 
vision of society being transformed without extreme and sudden political change 
was impossible to realize unless in a coalition with the traditional ruling classes, 
because democratic populism was ready to take advantage of any power vacuum 
caused by a defeat of the aristocracy. The National Liberal conception entrusted 
the Prussian state with the destruction of traditional power structures in the 
German Einzelstaaten without allowing a power vacuum to emerge. Although 
Prussia was not bourgeois in political form and appearance, it would be able to 
do that - so they thought - because Prussian society and bureaucracy were more 
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modem than those of most Einzelstaaten. The emergence of unexpectedly strong 
popular democratic forces in 1848/49 that only the Prussian 'warrior state' was 
able to defeat shaped the National Liberal outlook. Its vacillation reflected the 
Janus character of the Prussian state and society, and it could accommodate a 
range of positions, from Treitschke's emphasis on the importance of the state as a 
'sittliche' force to the 'Manchester' liberalism of Bamberger and Oppenheim. 
National Liberals assumed that the modernizing dynamic of national 
unification would quasi automatically transform and modernize non-bourgeois 
political forms. Therefore, a 'realpolitische' alliance with the representatives of 
such forms (Bismarck in particular) could seem to be legitimate and oflong-term 
benefit to the liberal cause. In the context ofliberal Realpolitik the principle of 
the Rechtsstaat was repeatedly violated, as in the cases of the Kulturkampf, the 
regulations concerning national minorities (such as in Alsace-Lorraine) and the 
Sozialistengesetze. At the same time, enmity towards state-led social policy was 
equivocal amongst National Liberals some of whom advocated moderate state-
socialist reform (as also pre-1848 petty bourgeois liberalism had entertained the 
notion of state-supported social harmonization). The continued existence of 
opposition within liberalism to 'English conditions' or 'Manchester capitalism' 
on the grounds that they undermined the harmony of national unity constituted an 
important ideological bridge between liberal and anti-Semitic nationalism. 
The claim that a particular state is 'a nation state', or that the society, whose 
political form this state is, is 'a nation', is a claim about the congruence of a 
political and an 'ethnic' entity, whereby 'ethnicity' means 'culture' in the static 
(as opposed to dynamic and relational) sense of the word. The claim of 
nationality must be made sufficiently plausible through the existence or the 
creation of some ethnic-national 'culture', i.e. the (attempted or successful) 
reification and fetishization of society's actual culture - the ensemble of lived 
relationships between people - which is always fluid and contradictory, never 
fully and consistently 'national'. 'National culture' helps stabilize in turn the 
citizens' loyalty to the state and the unity and coherence of society, although 
denying that ethnicity is indeed relevant for its national cohesion can at times be 
a defining feature of the national culture of a society; this tends to occur in cases 
when a competing nationalism (from within or without the national context) is 
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articulated in strongly ethnic-cultural or racial terms (such as in the cases of 
Renan's statement on nationalism in the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine, or 
Lazarus' statement in the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, or indeed Habermas' 
position in the West German Historikerstreit in the 1980s). 575 
The German state of 1871 was founded before a strong national 
consciousness became common currency amongst most of the population. The 
founding of the state was therefore followed by a strong effort of 'internal nation 
building'. Its bearer was less the Reich - given its federal structure - than the 
dynamic of economic unification and modernization of society. When industrial 
and agrarian crisis set in (in the 1870s), the relevance of the state inevitably 
increased as a force that could - in the national framework -lessen some of the 
phenomena of crisis. To the same extent, however, that the crisis increased the 
importance of the state it also undermined some of its credibility and strength 
(which relied in the first place on prosperity and economic security); the more 
precarious the latter became, the more national coherence had to be increased 
through emphasis not on material but on national-cultural values. 
Despite the extent of secularization that is characteristic of the process of 
modernization, cultural and moral values were in the 19th century (and arguably 
still are) impossible to conceive of without reference to religion. In the context of 
Enlightenment liberalism, the toleration of religious difference was connected to 
the expectation that a reformed, rational and universal form of religiosity would 
emerge that would underpin modem civilization, morality and legality. The 
toleration of traditional, positive (especially revealed) religion was understood to 
serve, or at least not to obstruct, the pursuit of modem, rational religiosity. 
This tension was exacerbated by the fact that in the age of confessionalization 
of (Christian) religion in Europe, positive religion functioned more than ever 
before as a form of political ideology and was implicated in the process of early 
modem, i.e. pre- (or proto-)nationalist state formation. The emergence of the 
modem concept of religiosity (that tends to reduce positive religion to mere 
'vehicles of religiosity') is paralleled by the clericalization of religion and the 
increased importance of the socially ordering function of clerical control and 
575 Cpo for example Fine 1994 
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hierarchy. However, religious belonging -like that from descent or ethnicity-
has never been coextensive with state territory, and the more religion served as a 
unifying force in the service of national state and society, the more it also 
became a divisive force. 
The modernizing Prussian state that was not (yet) a national state was not 
(yet) committed to enforcing assimilation and cultural homogeneity, either: most 
Prussian governments before 1848 found the continued existence of a separate 
Jewish community more beneficial than its abolition. Only the modern sovereign 
nation state (as it constituted itself unequivocally first in the American and 
French revolutions) made the abolition of '[e]states within the state' a matter of 
explicit policy. Emancipation of the Jews as individuals was in this context the 
flip side of overcoming the existence of 'the Jews' as a separate corporate group 
or 'nation' (in the pre-modern sense of the word). Humboldt (1809) translated 
the concept of emancipation of the Jewish individuals as formulated in France 
twenty years earlier into the concept of the 'amalgamation' that still was a 
keyword for Treitschke, Mommsen and their contemporaries. Liberals in the 
period between the anti-Napoleonic wars and 1848 tended not to profess much 
sympathy for the Jews whom they considered anachronistic, unenlightened and 
alien to the emerging 'culture' of the German nation that they were working 
towards. It was only in the middle of the 1840s that Jewish emancipation became 
an unconditional part of the liberal program. 
Taking their clue from the Catholic reaction to the French Revolution, 
opponents of the new order depicted the Jews as the latter's instruments or even 
its (hidden) conductors. At the same time, in terms of the enlightenment 
discourse on emancipation, Jews were attacked as anachronistic and backward 
elements that hindered modernization and the formation of the liberal national 
state and society. Insofar as the new order meant the capitalist transformation of 
economic relations, Jews were construed as embodiments of, or else as stumbling 
blocks to it. Insofar as it meant the nationalist transformation of political 
relations, Jews were construed as modernizing destroyers of traditional loyalty, 
or else as alien to the new unity of the nation. 
For the 'anti-Semitism of the industrial age' the nation and the capitalist 
mode of production had become familiar and quasi natural aspects of current 
social relations. The Jews could be accused for any unwelcome aspect of their 
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normal workings as well as their malfunctioning. They were said to be 
obstructing their harmonious functioning as well as to have ushered them in in 
the first place. Anybody's notion of what constituted a healthy and desirable 
extent of capitalist modernity implied a complementary notion of what was 
excessive capitalist modernity - greed, materialism, usury, speculation, 
mammonization, predatory capital. The strategy of blaming that excess on 'the 
Jews' fitted into socialist or liberal just as well as into conservative or reactionary 
frameworks. 
As is evident from the literature, the illiberal assertions of the liberal 
Treitschke (and also, to a lesser extent, those of his colleague, Mommsen) have 
thrown up the question about where Treitschke belongs in the larger historical 
narrative. Meinecke, Herzfeld and Ruggiero (quoted above in chapter 1.4.3) 
shared the judgement that Treitschke's thought and politics are part of the history 
of liberalism. The analysis of Treitschke's position in the context of his work, in 
the context of German 19th century history and in the wider context of the 
development of European liberalism confirms this judgement. The illiberal 
elements of liberal politics and thinking reflect liberal society's own 
contradictions. 
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3.3 The illiberal implications of liberal society 
THE LIBERAL JEWS HAD TO EXPERIENCE AT LAST 
THE HARMONY OF SOCIETY WHICH THEY CONFESSED TO 
AS THE HARMONY OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
(AdornoIHorkheimer1997: 169j!1971: 152P6 
DESPOTISM CAN DO WITHOUT FAITH BUT FREEDOM CANNOT .... 
How COULD SOCIETY FAIL TO PERISH IF, WHILE THE POLITICAL BOND IS RELAXED, 
THE MORAL BOND WERE NOT TIGHTENED? 
(Tocqueville 2002 [1835J:280j)577 
POLITICS THAT ARE STILL SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH 
[AN EMANCIPATED] SOCIETY OUGHT NOT, THEREFORE, TO PROPOUND THE 
ABSTRACT EQUALITY OF MEN EVEN AS AN IDEA. 
INSTEAD, THEY SHOULD ( ... ) CONCEIVE THE BETTER STATE OF THINGS AS ONE IN 
WHICH PEOPLE COULD BE DIFFERENT WITHOUT FEAR 
(Adorno 1978:103).578 
The problem of difference and separation, but also the interdependence of 
state, society, its culture and the individuals who are their members, needs to be 
discussed in order to get to the problem of why Treitschke, a National Liberal, 
welcomed and endorsed anti-Semitism, and why the liberals who criticized him 
nevertheless had to concede a significant extent of consensus between 
themselves and him. 
For Treitschke, the Jews are a 'misfortune' because they threaten the 
precarious unity of national state and national society as mediated by national 
culture. Even those who explicitly invoke the concept of 'race' present racial 
difference as dangerous not in itself but because it refers (like a shorthand) to 
differences of cultural, religious, moral and economic behaviour. Whether such 
differences are considered to be 'immutable' (i.e. racial) or merely to be 
changing very slowly (over periods of thousands of years), is in practice of little 
relevance. Even the most radical racists are indeed concerned about the power of 
socio-cultural practices to corrupt the (allegedly immutable) racial essence. 
576 Adorno and Horkheimer in 'Dialectic of Enlightenment ': 'Die Harmonie der Gesellschaft, zu 
der die liberalen Juden sich bekannten, mussten sie zuletzt als die der Volksgemeinschaft an sich 
selbst erfahren' (translation amended). 
577 Tocqueville in 'Democracy in America' (vol. 1, part 2, chapter 9) 
578 Adorno in 'Minima Moralia' #66. 'The German word here rendered with 'state of things' is 
Zustand. 
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Treitschke's opponents fail to reject his position conclusively because their 
thinking and their politics are rooted in the same dialectic of nation-state and 
civil society. 
A state or a society that demands loyalty and 'identification' from its 
members (i.e. not merely the payment of tributes or taxes) tend to demand that 
ethnic or religious minorities should assimilate or convert. Although this is not 
an exclusive characteristic of modem state and society, it is evident that the 
relevance of such processes immensely increased in the course of the 19th century 
and after. The increased relevance of cultural identification in the modem context 
gave the issue of lew-hatred an equally increased and qualitatively new 
significance. 
Most theories of the relationship of modem state and society assert in one 
form or other the separation of state, nation and culture as a given fact, or at least 
as a fair possibility that is worth working towards: the notion of 'constitutional 
patriotism' (Habermas) proposes for example nationalism (patriotism) be 
contained within the constitutional-political realm so that its 'cultural' and 
societal base remain non-national. The notion of 'cultural nationalism' (such as 
in Otto Bauer [1907]) rests on the complementary suggestion that nationalism be 
allowed to spread in the realm of culture but ought to, and indeed could, be 
prevented from influencing the non-national (or rather 'multi-national') state. 
Both conceptions assume - from opposite angles - that the state superstructure 
could reside in majestic independence above society and its culture. They fatally 
overestimate the possibilities of the practical separation of state and society, 
respectively state citizenship and membership in society and 'the cultural 
community' . 
Any kind of liberalism has to be concerned about the ability of the state to 
function as a guarantor of the rule of law and - if necessary - of liberal reform. It 
has therefore to provide for all that is necessary for the state to persist and 
function. The state has to demand loyalty, but loyalty cannot be based on merely 
abstract citizenship. It is hard to see either how membership in the state on the 
one hand, and in the 'cultural community' on the other hand could be strictly 
separate, or, how the state could be fully separate from religion as long as 
religion remains an integral part of civil society, both as something handed down 
and as a constantly reproduced response to the social need for some form of 
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(transcendent) resolution of suffering that society fails (immanently) to resolve: 
'you can sooner build a city in the skies than see a state endure without religion', 
as the anti-Semitic 'The German Guard, Monthly for National Cultural 
Interests,)579 asserted (quoting a formulation by Plutarch). 
Religious difference that is firmly locked away in the 'chamber' of the 
private is easy to tolerate. When, however, as is the case with Treitschke, a strict 
public-private divide is rejected because the public realm is understood to refer to 
inner values (morality linked to religiosity) toleration becomes precarious. 
Treitschke articulates a contradiction that might appear as a departure from 
liberal theory but is intrinsic to liberal society. If this is the case, the real scandal 
is not Treitschke's position but the reality of liberal society itself, and it turns out 
to be a decisive weakness of liberal political thought that it presupposes 
conceptually the existence of separations that at the same time it presupposes not 
to exist. 
The modem state assumes direct, unmediated authority over the individual, 
challenging and transforming traditional community. The legitimacy of this 
authority is supported by the claim that the state is the political embodiment of a 
new form of community that (logically, not necessarily temporally) pre-exists the 
state. This new form of community, the nation, is supposed to 'speak' through 
'its' state as it also speaks through 'its' culture. The open-ended and dynamic 
character of actual culture is contained and partially denied by the claim that it is 
the expression of an imaginary entity - the national community - that is an 
abstraction from culture in its actual diversity: the claim that culture is 'national 
culture' is based on a fetishistic reversal. 
State politics of toleration were and are always framed by discriminatory 
measures that warrant the superiority of the hegemonic creed. As Rage writes, 
the Christian variety (such as expressed in the English Toleration Act of 1689), 
the variety practiced in the Muslim empires (as derived from the Shari 'a 
prescriptions about the treatment of Christians and Jews as dhumma, 'those to be 
protected'), the liberal policies of the 19th and the 'multi-cultural' policies of the 
late 20th century all have this in common (Rage 1998:80). 'Where we empower 
579 'Die Deutsche Wacht, Monatsschrift fUr nationale Kulturinteressen - Organ der antijiidischen 
Vereinigung', July 1880 (1880:629). The quote is taken from an article on Stocker's Christlich-
Soziale ArbeiteJpartei. 
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an agent to be tolerant, we empower him equally to be intolerant' (Preston King 
quoted ibid.:85) because' ... when those who are intolerant are asked to be 
tolerant, their power to be intolerant is not taken away from them.' 
In his' Anti-Semite and Jew', Sartre writes that 'there may be detected in the 
most liberal democrat a tinge of anti-Semitism; he is hostile to the Jew to the 
extent that the latter thinks of himself as a Jew' (Sartre 1965:57). Sartre sees 'the 
anti-Semite' and 'the democrat' as complementary forces: 'the former wishes to 
destroy him [the Jew] as a man and leave nothing in him but the Jew', while the 
latter 'wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing in him but the man'. 
'The anti-Semite reproaches the Jew with being Jewish; the democrat reproaches 
him with willfully considering himselfa Jew' (ibid.:58; italics in the original). 
Sartre argues that 'the democrat' aims 
to persuade individuals that they exist in an isolated state ... in order to 
plunge [them] into the democratic crucible whence [the individual] will 
emerge naked and alone, an individual and solitary particle like all the 
other particles (ibid.:56f). 
Sartre's image of 'the democrat' is intended as a polemic, but his notion of the 
'democratic crucible' is still too optimistic: it fails to show that the 'crucible'-
where the often mentioned 'amalgamation' takes place - does not produce 
'abstract individuals' but nationals. 
Modem society as we know it constitutes the individual twofold, as an 
'abstract' and a 'concrete' individual. To the same extent to which GesellschaJt 
is always underpinned by some form of GemeinschaJt, the 'abstract individual' is 
always underpinned by a more specific identity whose 'characteristic role is to 
structure and limit the choices the individual makes' (Poole 1991:94). This 
becomes most visible in situations in which the individual is called upon to 
sacrifice a degree of his or her liberty (ultimately, life) for the 'common good' 
that could not be motivated or rationalized by recourse to a purely 'abstract' 
identity only. So far, no liberal society (and no liberal set of ideas about such a 
society) dared rely on the purely 'abstract identity' of its citizen-individuals only. 
One of the crucial points in this context is which characteristics of an 
individual ought to be relevant for how this individual will participate in state 
and society, and which (cultural) characteristics are irrelevant (i.e. purely 
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'private'), and whether the line between the two is solid, precarious or perhaps 
not existent at all. 
The separation-but-mutual-dependence of state and civil society (the state's 
re-creating society and society's determining the shape of the state) produces a 
characteristic no-win-situation: if you declare you are not different from your 
fellow-citizens someone will show you are (which is - fortunately - always true); 
if you declare yourself different someone else will tell you that you ought to 
grow up now and become an equal member of society. A society where one can 
be 'different without fear' would be one where (,concrete') difference would not 
be over-determined by being the carrier of social structure, by not being the 
'border guards,58o of social divisions. Difference needs to be emancipated from 
being carrier and signifier of social domination; 'concrete difference' freed from 
having to be 'abstract difference,581 would be a different kind of difference. Only 
the assimilation of the human world as it currently exists to the humane world 
that does not yet exist would create a situation where giving up the hard shell of 
given identity would lose the odour of treason that is founded in the hunch that 
assimilation today inevitably means assimilation to a false state of things. 
It can be concluded from the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit that liberalism -
as it implies acceptance of the nation state - has been unable to consistently 
refute and indeed immunize itself against anti-Semitism.582 Modem political 
thought relied almost universally on the state as the guarantor of liberal progress 
and modernization, and a modem state that would not invoke some form of 
national culture to warrant its cohesion has never convincingly been conceived 
let alone practically realized. If it can be agreed 
~ that the persistence, as well as more specifically the reform, of liberal society 
depends on the existence of a state; 
~ that a state in the modem context can only be a nation state in which the 
construction of a national culture mediates between state, society and 
individual; 
580 This concept is from Armstrong (1982), quoted in Yuval-Davis (I997:56). 
581 I use the words 'concrete' and 'abstract' in analogy to their use in Marx' concept of 'concrete' 
and 'abstract' labour (cp. Postone 1996). 
582 The same is of course equally true of all forms of socialism that are based on acceptance of the 
nation state. 
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~ that national culture consists of inseparably interwoven assumptions about 
morality, social behavior (including 'the economy') and religion; 
~ that religious and other cultural difference is being tolerated only on the 
condition that it is hidden away in the private realm, but that at the same time 
the public realm cannot do without invocations of religiously informed 
culture; 
then 'the better state of things ... in which people could be different without fear' 
must within this framework perpetually remain a utopian dream. 
From this perspective Treitschke's liberal anti-Semitism, in combination 
with the ambivalence of his liberal-patriotic critics and the brutal frankness of the 
confessing racists who translated Treitschke's ambiguity into support for their 
cause, can - against the intentions of all of the above - be put to work for the 
critical understanding of the limits of liberal society.583 
583 I have in mind here a remark by Leo Lowenthal: 'I wrote my PhD thesis on Franz von Baader, 
the most conservative philosopher imaginable around the tum from the 18th to the 19th century. 
And still today 1 am deeply impressed by the actually critical elements in conservative theory, 
which basically criticises and discloses whatever is bad about liberalism (was schlecht ist am 
Liberalismus) .. .' (Lowenthal 1990:301, from an interview with Matthias Greffrath). 
320 
4. Appendices 
4.1 Treitschke's 'Our prospects' (November 1879)584 
Among the symptoms of a great change in mood in the German nation, none 
appears so strange as the violent movement against the Jews. Until a few months 
ago, the notorious 'reverse Hep-Hep call' was still dominant in Germany. About 
the national shortcomings of the Germans, the French, and all other nations 
everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody dared to speak in 
just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the Jewish 
character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and a religious persecutor 
by nearly all of the newspapers. Today we have already come to the point where 
the majority of the Breslau voters - obviously not in wild excitement but with 
quiet deliberation - conspired not to elect a Jew to the [Prussian] diet under any 
circumstances. Anti-Semitic societies are formed, the 'Jewish Question' is 
discussed in noisy meetings, a flood of anti-Semitic pamphlets appears on the 
market. There is only too much of dirt and brutality in these doings, and it is 
impossible to suppress one's disgust when one notices that some of these 
incendiary pamphlets obviously come from Jewish pens. It is well known that 
since Pfefferkorn and Eisenmenger there were always many former Jews among 
the most fanatical Jew-eaters. But is there really nothing but mob brutality and 
business envy at the bottom of this noisy activity? Are these outbreaks of a deep, 
long-suppressed anger really only a momentary outburst, as hollow and 
irrational as the Teutonic Antisemitism of 1819? No - the instinct of the masses 
has in fact clearly recognized a great danger, a serious sore spot of the new 
German national life; the current word 'the German Jewish question' is more 
than an empty phrase. 
If the English and the French talk with some disdain of the prejudice of the 
Germans against the Jews we must reply to them: 'you don't know us; you live 
in happier circumstances which make the rise of such "prejudices" impossible'. 
584 This is the closing section of Treitschke's article in Prellssische Jahrbuecher from November 
1879 which provoked the ensuing debate. This translation by Helen Lederer appeared (without 
date) as part of the series 'Readings in Modem Jewish history' (containing all of Treitschke's 
major contributions to the Berliner Antisemitismllsstreit as they were re-published as a brochure 
in 1881), edited by Ellis Rivkin and published by the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of 
Religion, Cincinnati, Ohio. The translation is reprinted here with the kind permission of the 
Hebrew Union College. 
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The number of Jews in Western Europe is so small that they cannot have any 
noticeable influence upon the morality of the nation. But our country is invaded 
year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths from the 
inexhaustible cradle of Poland, whose children and grand-children are to be the 
future rulers of Germany's exchanges and Germany's press. This immigration 
grows visibly in numbers and the question becomes more and more serious how 
this alien nation can be assimilated. The Jews of the Western and Southern 
European countries belong mostly to the Spanish branch which looks back on a 
comparatively proud history and which always adjusted comparatively easily to 
the Western way oflife. In fact, the great majority of them have become good 
Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, as far as can be expected from a people of 
such pure blood and such distinct peculiarity. We Germans, however, have to 
deal with Jews of the Polish branch, which bears the deep scars of centuries of 
Christian tyranny. According to experience they are incomparably more alien to 
the European, and especially to the German national character. 
What we have to demand from our Jewish fellow-citizens is simple: that 
they become Germans, regard themselves simply and justly as Germans, without 
prejudice to their faith and their old sacred past which all of us hold in 
reverence; for we do not want an era of German-Jewish mixed culture to follow 
after thousands of years of German civilization. It would be a sin to forget that a 
great number of Jews, baptized and unbaptized, Felix Mendelssohn, Veit, 
Riesser and others, not to mention the ones now living, were Germans in the best 
sense ofthe word, men in whom we revere the noble and fine traits of the 
German spirit. At the same time it cannot be denied that there are numerous and 
powerful groups among our Jews who definitely do not have the good will to 
become simply Germans. It is painful enough to talk about these things. Even 
conciliatory words are easily misunderstood here. I think, however, some of my 
Jewish friends will admit, with deep regret, that recently a dangerous spirit of 
arrogance has arisen in Jewish circles and that the influence of Jewry upon our 
national life, which in former times was often beneficial, has recently often been 
harmful. I refer the reader to The History of the Jews by Graetz. What a fanatical 
fury against the' arch enemy' Christianity, what deadly hatred just of the purest 
and most powerful exponents of German character, from Luther to Goethe and 
Fichte! And what hollow, offensive self-glorification! here it is proved with 
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continuous satirical invective that the nation of Kant was really educated to 
humanity by the Jews only, that the language of Lessing and Goethe became 
sensitive to beauty, spirit, and wit only through Borne and Heine! Is there any 
English Jew who would dare to slander in such manner the land which guards 
and protects him? And this stubborn contempt for the German goyim is not at all 
the attitude of a single fanatic. There is no German city which does not count 
many honest, respectable Jewish firms among its merchants. But it cannot be 
denied that the Jews have contributed their part to the promoting business with 
its dishonesty and bold cupidity, that they share heavily in the guilt for the 
contemptible materialism of our age which regards every kind of work only as 
business and threatens to suffocate the old simple pride and joy the German felt 
in his work. In many thousands of German villages we have the Jewish usurer. 
Among the leading names of art and science there are not many Jews. The 
greater is the number of Semitic hustlers among the third rank talents. And how 
firmly this bunch of litterateurs hangs together! How safely this insurance 
company for immortality works, based on the tested principle of mutuality, so 
that every Jewish poetaster receives his one-day fame, dealt out by the 
newspapers immediately and in cash, without delayed interest. 
The greatest danger, however, is the unjust influence of the Jews in the press 
- a fateful consequence of our old narrow-minded laws which kept the Jews out 
of most learned professions. For ten years public opinion in many German cities 
was 'made' mostly by Jewish pens. It was a misfortune for the Liberals, and one 
of the reasons of the decline of the party, that their papers gave too much scope 
to the Jews. The present weakness of the press is the necessary reaction against 
this unnatural state of things. The little man is firmly convinced now that the 
Jews write everything in the newspapers and he will not believe anything they 
say any longer. Our newspapers owe much to the Jewish talent. The acuteness 
and nimble quickness of the Jewish mind found the arena of the press always a 
congenial field. But here, too, the effect was two-edged. Borne was the first to 
introduce into our journalism the peculiar shameless way oftalking about the 
fatherland off-hand and without any reverence, like an outsider, as if mockery of 
Germany did not cut deeply into the heart of every individual German. To this 
was added that unfortunate busybody 'me too' attitude, which has to have a hand 
in everything and does not even refrain from passing jUdgment on the inner 
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affairs of the Christian churches. What Jewishjoumalists write in mockery and 
satirical remarks against Christianity is downright revolting, and such 
blasphemies are offered to our people as the newest acquisitions of 'German' 
enlightenment: the moment emancipation was gained the Jews insisted boldly on 
their 'certificate', demanded literal parity in everything, forgetful of the fact that 
we Germans are, after all, a Christian nation, and the Jews are only a minority. It 
has happened that the removal of Christian pictures was demanded, and even the 
celebration of the Sabbath in mixed schools. 
If we consider all this - and much more could be added - then the noisy 
agitation of the moment appears only as a brutal and spiteful but natural 
reaction of the Germanic national consciousness against an alien element 
which has usurped too much space in our life. It has at least the one 
involuntary merit of having liberated us from the ban of a tacit falsehood. 
It is already a gain that an evil which everybody sensed but which nobody 
wanted to touch is now discussed openly. Let us not deceive ourselves: the 
movement is deep and strong. A few jokes about the words of wisdom from the 
mouths of Christian-Socialist soap box orators will not be sufficient to suppress 
it. Even in the best educated circles, among men who would reject with horror 
any thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance, we hear today the cry, 
as from one mouth, 'the Jews are our misfortune! ' 
There can be no talk among the intelligent of an abolition or even a 
limitation of the Emancipation. That would be an open injustice, a betrayal of 
the fine traditions of our state, and would accentuate rather than mitigate the 
national contrasts. What made the Jews of France and England harmless and 
often beneficent members of society was at the bottom nothing but the energy 
of the national pride and the firmly rooted national way oflife of these two 
nations which look back on centuries of national culture. Ours is a young 
nation. Our country still lacks national style, instinctive pride, a firmly 
developed individuality; that is the reason why we were defenseless against 
alien manners for so long. But we are in the process of acquiring these 
qualities, and we can only wish that our Jews recognize in time the change 
which is now occurring in Germany as a necessary consequence of the 
foundation of the German state. In some places there are Jewish societies 
against usury which silently do much good. They are the work of intelligent 
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Israelites who have recognized that their fellow-Jews must adjust to the 
customs and ideas of their Christian fellow-citizens. Much remains to be done 
in this direction. It is not possible to change the hard German heads into 
Jewish heads. The only way out therefore is for our Jewish fellow-citizens to 
make up their minds without reservations to be Germans, as many of them 
have done already long ago, to their advantage and ours. There will never be a 
complete solution. There has always been an abyss between Europeans and 
Semites, since the time when Tacitus complained about the odium generis 
humani. There will always be Jews who are nothing else but German-
speaking Orientals. There will also always be a specifically Jewish education; 
and, as a cosmopolitan power, it has a historical right to existence. But the 
contrast can be mitigated if the Jews, who talk so much about tolerance, 
become truly tolerant themselves and show some respect for the faith, the 
customs, and the feelings of the German people which has long ago atoned 
for old injustice and given them human and civil rights. The lack of such 
respect in many of our Jewish fellow-citizens in commerce and literature is 
the basic reason for the passionate anger in our days. 
It is not a pleasant sight, this raging and quarreling, this boiling up of 
unfinished ideas in our new Germany. But we cannot help our being the most 
passionate of all nations, although we called ourselves phlegmatics so often. 
New ideas never broke through in our country other than under bad convulsions. 
May God grant that we come out of the ferment and unrest of these exciting 
years with a stricter concept of the state and its obligations and with a more 
vigorous national consciousness. 
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4.2 Synopsis of the main contributions 
Treitschke 1896a: Our prospects 
a) Introduction: 
1. 19f: A general impression about the mood of 'the nation' 
2. 20f: A first interpretive statement about this mood: it is directed against 
'effeminate philanthropy' 
b) Main argument: 
3. 21f: Description of emerging anti-Semitic activities; the emergence of 'a 
German Jewish question' ('eine deutsche Judenfrage') 
4. 22f: The specific character of the problem in Germany (as opposed to in 'the 
West'): immigration not of 'Spanish' but of Polish Jews 
5. 23 - 26: The main argument: the demand for the Jews to assimilate and the 
necessity for Germany to defend herself against Jewish 'Geist' 
c) Concluding part: 
6. 26f: Reference back to section 3: these arguments legitimate the nation's 
anti-Semitic mood 
7. 27f: Reference to the concept of the state; the weakness of the German nation 
(as compared to France and England) necessitates a specifically German 
unequivocal stance on the Jews 
Lazarus 1880: What does 'national' mean? A Lecture 
a) Introduction 
1. 5-7: The occasion and the purpose ofthe lecture 
b) The academic discussion of the concept of the nation 
2. 7-18: On the concept of the nation 
3. 7-11: The concept of the nation according to Boeckh 
4. 11-15: Additional arguments concerning descent, language and spirit 
5. 15-18: The nation according to Riimelin 
c) On Treitschke 
6. 18-22: Descent does not define the nation; the talk about blood has to be 
rej ected as materialist 
7. 22-25: Judaism and Christianity 
8. 26-28: Judaism, the state and national economy 
9. 28-31: The Jewish contribution to German intellectual life 
10.31-34: Jewish and German religious thought 
11. 35f: The logic of generalization 
12. 36-40: German nationality as an unfinished project and the world-historical 
role of the Jews 
13. 40-44: Cultural diversity as a value in itself 
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14.44-56: The proximity of the ideals ofJudaism to those of Christianity and the 
modem state 
d) Conclusion: 
15. 56f: Self-criticism as a Jewish virtue 
j) Appendix: 
16.57-60: on the statistical data on Jewish immigration and emigration in Prussia 
Cohen 1965: A Confession in the Jewish Question 
a) Introduction: 
1. 124-126: ambivalent feelings about the necessity to 'confess' 
b) Main argument: 
2. 126-130: The Kantian 'scientific' concept of religion; commonality and 
difference between Israelites and Christians 
3. 130f : The relation of nation, state and religion 
4. 131-133: The affinity of Judaism to German Protestantism 
5. 133- 39: A critique of Lazarus' concepts of nation and race 
6.139-142: A critique of Lazarus' celebration of diversity 
7. 142- 44: The need for a 'sittliche' administration of the state as the root of 
legal emancipation of the Jews 
c) Conclusion 
8. 144-149: The relevance of religiosity for national unity 
Treitschke 1896b: Herr Graetz and his Judaism 
a) Introduction: 
1. 29f: Nothing to take back 
b) Refutations of the refiltations: 
2. 30-34: The statistical argument and its limited relevance 
3. 34-36: The argument about the differences between two Jewish branches 
4. 36: The Tacitus argument 
b) Restatement of Treitschke 's rejection of Jewish 'national arrogance ': 
5. 37f: The Jewish dispersal, persecution, emancipation and assimilation 
6. 39-43: Graetz's arrogance against the Germans 
c) Conclusion: 
7. 43-46: recognition of Jewish nationality is impossible 
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Bresslau 1965a: On the Jewish question. Letter to Herr Professor Dr. Heinrich 
von Treitschke 
a) Introduction 
1. 52-53: Bresslau shows respect for and disappointment with Treitschke 
b) Main argument: 
2.53-54: Meaning of the concept 'Jew' 
3.54-58: Origins of the current campaign in the Catholic press 
4.58-61: On the differing ethnic background of the Jews in Germany and 'the 
West' 
5.61-65: The culture of Germany and the Germanness of the German Jews 
6.65-68: The role of the Jews in economy and culture in Germany 
7.68-72: The role of the Jews in the German press 
c) Conclusions: 
8. 72-76: the Jews are developing into Germans, a process that should be 
supported through positive suggestions, not sabotaged 
Naudh 1965: Professors on Israel. Von Treitschke and Bresslau 
1. 180-3 The historical continuity of anti-Jewish attitudes as either active 
hatred or passive disgust 
2. 183 f : The concept of' Bildung' ignores individuality and nationality 
3. 184 f: The liberal concept of' equality' ignores racial difference 
4. 185f : Christianity's relation to Judaism 
5. 186-8: There is not a threat of mixed culture but of a loss of culture 
6. 188-91: The Jews are an unproductive parasitic race having an immoral 
covenant with God 
7.191-3: The Jews' greater racial purity makes them dominate every other race 
they mix with 
8. 193-195: The complementary relation between church and state 
9. 195-9: Because the Germans cannot afford to feed too many unproductive 
Jews, legal-economic measures are to be taken following the example of 
Napoleon 
10. 199-202: Additional remarks on the impossibility to reconcile nationalism 
with liberalism 
Treitschke 1896c: Some further remarks on the Jewish Question 
1) 47: Introductory remark 
On Bresslau: 
2) 47-51: The origin of the anti-Semitic movement in the context of Jewish 
emancipation 
3) 51-53: The differences between the two 'Jewish branches' and Jewish 
emancipation in the French revolution 
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4) 53 f: The Jews and the press 
5) 54-57: The Germanness of German culture 
On Lazarus: 
6) 57-60: The relevance of religion - in particular Christianity - for nationality 
and statehood 
On Cassel: 
7) 60f: Christianity is not Jewish but has overcome Judaism 
Conclusions: 
8) 61-63: the Germans make themselves complicit in the degeneration of society 
unless they re-emphasize their Christianity 
Bamberger 1965: Germanity and Jewry 
a) Introduction: 
1. 149f: Emancipation, assimilation and German self-destruction 
b) On Treitschke's intervention in particular: 
2. 150-6: Treitschke's declared intention of patriotic reconciliation is 
contradicted by a fundamental anti-Jewish sentiment 
3. 156f: Anti-semitism is a covert form of struggle against liberalism 
c) Main theoretical argument: 
157-62: The concepts of nationality, indigenousness, tribe and race 
4. 162f: The Germanness of the German Jews 
5. 163f: The analogy of anti-German sentiment in Russia; its basis in the foolish 
assumption that those who get rich exploited society 
6. 164-6: The mutual attraction of Jews and Germans is based on common 
inclination to spirituality and commerce 
7. 166-8: The specificity of the German-Jewish spirit; Heine and Lasker as two 
model types of German-Jewish hybridity 
8. 168-70: The incompleteness of Jewish emancipation in Germany 
9. 170-5: The concept of the 'purity' of culture and the critique of religion 
d) Conclusions: 
10. 175-9: Relevance and effects of anti-Jewish sentiment and agitation 
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Mommsen 1965b: 'Another Word about Our Jewry' 
a) Introduction: 
1. 210f: The current debate as a suicidal tendency of nationalism; invocation of 
the community of the generation that accomplished national unification 
2. 212f: The ethnic diversity of the German nation; its not exclusively Germanic 
character 
3. 213f: The concept of the modem nation state as opposed to the ancient non-
national state; the Jews in the modem German state are Germans as for their 
nationality in the modem sense 
b) Main argument: 
4. 215f: The building of a unified German nation is still in the process; the anti-
Semitic campaign endangers this process by setting up a paradigm of 
disintegration and exclusion 
5. 216-8: The Jews in their Jewishness are necessary and beneficial for the 
Gelman nation because they are an element of decomposition of the tribal, 
pre-national order, i.e. conducive to the new national order 
c) Concluding part: 
6. 218-21: A discursive reflection on the actual if unintended disintegrative 
effects of Treitschke's text; the moral duty for civil peace while the process 
of nation-building is still incomplete 
7. 221-5: Practical conclusions: the case of the 'Antisemitenpetition'; the legal 
rights of the Jews and their obligation to contribute to breaking down barriers 
within the nation 
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4.3 The authors of the contributions to the 'Berliner 
Antisemitismusstrei t ' 
Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896, born in Dresden, Saxony) was at the 
time of the Streit a member of the Reichstag (since 1871), a professor of history 
and (what today would be called) political science at Berlin University (since 
1873), and (since 1866) the editor of the Preussische Jahrbiicher. His outlook 
has been presented in chapter 1.4. 
Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903, born in the Prussian province of Poznan), 
president (since 1869) of the Second Israelitic Synod (later renamed 'Verein 
deutscher Juden') (Langer 1998:307) was the first representative of 'the 
leadership of the established community' (Ragins 1980:29) to respond to 
Treitschke.585 Lazarus was 'a devoted German patriot' but had at the same time 
'an active interest in Jewish communal affairs' (ibid.). Lazarus' first published 
text ('On the ethical legitimacy of Prussia in Germany' ['Ueber die sittliche 
Berechtigung Preussens in Deutschland'], 1850) had been a 'hymnic defence of 
Prussia' (Belke 1971 :XLVII) in which he argued that Prussia's cultural 
superiority warranted its political hegemony. The fundamental characteristic of 
'Germanic national spirit' was the drive to assimilate all previous history into a 
harmonious synthesis. The' German national spirit' constitutes the most 
successful amalgamation of the Germanic spirit with Christianity, and the 
Pruss ian state, dubbed 'the state of intelligence', was its most adequate 
manifestation (ibid. :XL VIII). 
Lazarus' academic standing was based on his having founded in 1859 
(together with Steinthal) the 'Journal for psycho-ethnography and linguistics' 
( 'Zeitschrift for Volkerpsychologie und SprachwissenschaJt ,).586 Lazarus defined 
585 In his 'An die deutschen Juden' (fourth edition, 1887), Lazarus claimed that his speech 'What 
does national mean' (given on December 2, 1879, at a general assembly in the Hochschulefiir die 
Wissenschaft des Judenthums), was the first public reaction against the anti-Semitic current 
(Lazarus 1887:3). In 'An die deutschen Juden' Lazarus defended his support for a coalition 
government that included anti-Semites because it was necessary that the left-liberal Freisinnige 
party be opposed because it was 'unpatriotic'. Lazarus rejects criticisms of his support of the 
right-wing coalition by downplaying the danger of the anti-Semites' influence on government 
policy with the comment: 'a state that has climbed the ethical height (sittliche Hohe) of the 
German Reich cannot possibly fall back behind that height' (ibid.: 19). 
586 I translate Volkelpsychologie with 'psycho-ethnography' because it is concerned with the 
'souls' of peoples, not with ethnographic aspects of the psychology of individuals. 
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the central category of the new discipline, Volkelpsychologie, the 'objective 
spirit (objektiver Geist), or 'all-spirit (Gesamtgeist)'. Although Lazarus borrows 
the word from Hegel, the concept seems not to be exactly Hegel's: by 'objective 
spirit' Lazarus means 'all intersubjective (iiberindividuellen) articulations and 
objectivations of spirit (des Geistigen) in a community (Gemeinschaft), and it is 
an empirical concept. Lazarus was closely associated with Dilthey in the l850s 
(Belke 1971 :L).587 'Objective spirit' (or Volksgeist or Gesamtgeist) precedes the 
individuals who are not creators, but carriers of pre-existing 'objective spirit'. 
Belke evaluates Lazarus positivization of Hegel's conception as an expression of 
the 'general longing for the concrete' that characterized the intellectual climate 
of the 1850s and 60s (ibid.:LV).588 She notes that Lazarus was apparently not 
aware that his case for 'diversity' in his contribution to the Streit contradicted his 
own advocacy of Pruss ian and Protestant supremacy and his view of Catholicism 
as a 'retarding element' in German history (ibid.:LXVIII). 
It was a crucial element of 19th century thinking that religious forms evolve 
and progress like other historical forms. Traditional Judaism did not share this 
notion (Liebeschiitz 1967: 132). The conservative historian Heinrich Graetz 
(1817-1891) (who tought at the Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau) 
significantly broke with Jewish tradition on this issue: for Graetz the 
historicization of Judaism seemed the key to finding a way of being Jewish in the 
modem world without 'submitting' to liberal reform-Judaism which he saw 
would not help to emancipate but would rather dissolve the Jewish community. 
Influenced by Hegel and the German historicist tradition, Graetz aimed to 
challenge the liberal idea of Judaism as a 'modem religion of reason': reform as 
proposed by liberal Jews was harmful as well as unnecessary for the Jews in 
order to be part of modem society. While accepting the idea of slow and gradual 
development of religious forms (he considered the Talmud to be a mere 
587 Dilthey seems to have rejected Lazarus' Volkelpsychologie as too static and positivist, i.e. less 
'historicist' than his own understanding of the Volksgeist (ibid.:LVII). Lazarus and Steinthal 
emphasized that they thought of the Volksgeist not as a 'mystical metaphysical substance' 
(ibid.:LIX). 
588 The Volkelpsychologie as founded by Lazarus and Steinthal is influenced by Comte's 
psychological sociology and more especially by the similar conception developed by Johann 
Friedrich Herbart in about the same period. Herbart emphasized the mutual determination of 
individual psyche and society (while he described society as ifit was an individual 'soul' writ 
large) and the central importance oflanguage and tradition (cp. Belke 1971). 
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transitional stage and not a definite authority) Graetz defended the unity of the 
religious and the national (ibid.: 143). He aimed to defend Judaism as it had 
developed historically against what he saw as the imposition of religious forms 
taken from other contexts (Protestantism) much the same way as for example 
Ranke defended German political forms against the imposition of French-
republican conceptions. Graetz's thinking presupposed the notion of a Volksgeist 
evolving through history that needed to be defended against sudden and non-
organic challenges (although Graetz hesitated using the word because he was 
aware that it tended to signal an attitude hostile to Jews) (ibid.:151). 'His interest 
in theological problems was limited' (ibid.: 152): his concern was the 
continuation of a 'Jewish existence' that maintained Jewish particular 
characteristics - including but not primarily religion - that was secular, i.e. (at 
least implicitly) national in character. Liebeschiitz concludes that Graetz's 'view 
of the future of the messianic people had ... taken on the bourgeois forms of his 
century and his environment' (ibid.). Graetz was also decidedly German-Jewish 
and had no high opinion of Polish-Russian Jewry (nor of their language, Yiddish, 
nor of Chassidism): for Graetz, Judaism owed its re-emergence - from 
Mendelssohn's times onwards - to the German Enlightenment (ibid.: 154).589 
The quotes that aroused Treitschke's anger were from the eleventh volume of 
Graetz's monumental 'History of the Jewish people' (1870) in which he made 
abundant use of the (derogatory) term 'Deutscher Michel' implying that the 
failure of the Germans to achieve political liberties were due to their national 
characteristics (ibid.:153). The second edition of the book (1900) was toned 
down significantly. 
Ludwig Bamberger (1823-1893) was born in Mainz, a place which at the 
time still had Jacobin and Francophile political traditions. The young Bamberger 
was a republican and supported a centralized German state modelled on France 
to be established by revolutionary means, but rejected Prussian hegemony 
(Weber 1978:244). He played a decisive role in an early split between liberals 
589 Meyer suggests that Treitschke read the eleventh volume of Graetz's work just weeks before 
he wrote his Our Prospects, and sees the latter as directly triggered by the former. He writes that 
'Graetz and Treitschke were remarkably alike in the manner of their historiography' (Meyer 
1986: I). For example, reference to 'Jewish blood' is 'a racial element which is as prominent in 
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and republican democrats (April 1848) which won him the nickname 'the red 
one' and an invitation by the local communist Arbeiterbildungsverein to become 
a member (ibid.:245). Holding observer status as a journalist, he came to the 
conclusion in June 1848 that the Frankfurt Parliament would not bring about any 
change and he suggested mobilizing the population. Subsequently he advocated 
careful social reform and propagated a Proudhonist Volksbank project (spring 
1849; Jansen 1998:207). Bamberger took part in the Reichsverfassungskampagne 
(May 1849) but dissolved his corps and fled to Switzerland on arrival of the 
Prussian troops in the Palatinate, partly to escape reprisals by the remaining 
insurgents for his premature capitulation (ibid.:247), partly because he was 
sought for high treason by the state. In this period, Bamberger strongly rejected 
the stirring of cultural-nationalist emotion (such as by Mazzini or Kossuth) and 
praised 'the healthy and simple logic of the Declaration of the Rights of Man' 
(Jansen 1998:210). Subsequently Bamberger lived in London, Antwerp, 
Rotterdam and Paris where he became a multiple millionaire and could retire 
from business in 1866. Politically he turned from democrat to Manchester 'left-
liberal' with no sympathies for state-led social reform (ibid.:249). The influence 
of Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim (with whom he edited the official journal of 
the 'Deutscher Nationalverein', the 'Deutsche Jahrbiicher fur Politik and 
Literatur'; Pulzer 1997:8) convinced him that only Prussia could effect the 
creation of a unified nation state and the ending of Kleinstaaterei. In 1859 
Bamberger advocated in a widely read pamphlet (' Juchhe nach Italia', first 
published anonymously) that German unification should be modelled on the 
example given by Cavour: Prussia ought to take advantage of the situation to 
push Austria out of the German League and to annexe the smaller German states. 
His new position was - and remained - that there was no social basis for an 
alternative process of unification. Bamberger joined the Progress party (like 
Oppenheim), returned from exile back to Mainz in 1868 (Weber 1978:250) and 
became a member of the Zollparlament. He argued that since the battle of 
Koniggriitz (1866) the idea of a union including Austria was reactionary, but he 
was also critical of kleindeutsche over-affirmation of Pruss ian power politics as 
represented by Treitschke. He was convinced that the 'thousand year old culture 
Graetz ... as in Treitschke' (ibid.:6). Graetz refers to the Jews as Stamm, Volk and Rasse 
interchangeably (ibid.: I 0). 
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of the German people will absorb Prussia' (ibid.:251) once a unitary (i.e. not a 
federal) state allowed Prussia to dissolve all the smaller dynasties. This state 
would then inevitably evolve into a republic. He described Bismarck as the 
'executor of the economic and national desires of the bourgeoisie' (quoted ibid.). 
As an expert on France, Bamberger worked as an advisor and publicist for 
Bismarck during the German-French war when he was instrumental in securing 
liberal support for the Prussian cause. He was amongst the supporters for the 
annexation of Alsace Lorraine and characterized the Paris Commune as 'a horde 
of clowns and cannibals (eine Horde kannibalischer Possenreisser), (ibid.:259). 
At the time of the Streit Bamberger belonged to the left wing of the National 
Liberal party (Langer 1998:317) 
A short, but very influential reaction to Treitschke's comments was the 
'Declaration of the Notables' that was published on November 14,1880 in the 
liberal Nationalzeitung (Langer 1998:319)590. Its 75 signatories included Johann 
Gustav Droysen, Rudolf Gneist, Werner von Siemens, RudolfVirchow, Max 
Weber Sr., the mayor of Berlin, Max von Forckenbeck (who seems to have 
initiated it [Hamburger 1968:34]) and Theodor Mommsen. 591 Mommsen 
published on 20.11. 1880 (in the same pUblication) a letter that confirmed that 
the Declaration had been primarily targeted at Treitschke, and slightly later a 
detailed response to Treitschke, 'Another word on our Jewry' . 
Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) was a student of Johann Gustav Droysen 
and influenced by the latter's conception of history for which the search for 
unchanging 'laws of necessity' is a crucial aim (Hoffmann 1988:88). As a 
national-liberal, nation-building was a central concern for Mommsen. He 
commented in 1865 on the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein (where he 
was born): 
590 The Declaration is documented with the list of signatories in Liebeschiitz 1967 :341 f. It was 
published one week before the Prussian Diet debated the petition that demanded curbing Jewish 
emancipation (the Antisemitenpetition). 
591 Like several others of the group who published the Declaration, Mommsen was also amongst 
the founding members of the 'Defence League against anti-Semitism (Verein zur Abwehr des 
Antisemitismus), (founded in 1890) which demanded (in the words of its long time president, 
Georg Gotheim) 'complete amalgamation (vollkommenen Verschmelzungsprozess),. Due to this 
orientation, the Abwehrverein was not necessarily welcomed by most Jews (Brenner 1993). 
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If the great dream of 1848 should come true, then every means, including 
force, will be justified. Necessity and the nation both speak in the 
categorical imperative, and as the nation-state can heal every wound, it is 
also entitled to inflict every wound (quoted in Minogue 1967:72). 
In August, 1870, Mommsen published an open letter in Italian newspapers 
asking readers to support the German war effort of 'defending the freedom of the 
continent against the common tyrant' (France) (Deuerlein 1970:230). In a letter 
from December 1877 Mommsen wrote: 
Whoever lives within another nation has to assimilate to it, and the 
resistance (Widerstreben) to do so is as wrong as the hesitation 
(Zuruckweichen) of those who let them get away with it (quoted in 
Hoffmann 1988:120). 
In a letter to Treitschke, Hermann Grimm (a colleague of Treitschke and 
Mommsen at Berlin university) wrote that Mommsen had remarked to Grimm 
that 'as a chapter in your [Treitschke's] History it [Treitschke's text] would have 
been good and legitimate, but not as a journal article'. Grimm concluded that 
Mommsen would fully agree with Treitschke's articles if only he would take the 
time to 'sit down quietly behind closed doors' to read them (quoted in Hoffmann 
1988:120). Mommsen confirmed in a related letter to Grimm that he agreed with 
his suggestion that 'we all share the basic attitudes' but insisted that 'the sun is 
reflected differently in a chamber pot and in a silver shield': ' ... on issues like 
this one, everything depends on how one says something, not what one says' 
(Hoffmann 1988:126f). 
Mommsen exerted political influence on the German educated classes most 
importantly through his major work, 'Roman History' (1854_85)592 which was 
widely read and understood as having political-normative implications. He saw 
the formation of the Roman Empire as a process of 'national decomposition' in 
the course of which 'the Greek and the Latin nationality find a peace with each 
other' that is based on 'the rubble of second rate peoples (Volkerschaften), 
(Hoffmann 1988: 89). Greek and Latin elements are the 'positive' elements of the 
new citizemy, while the Jews and others form the 'parasitical' Hellenistic-
Oriental population of Rome. Julius Caesar faced the task of amalgamating the 
592 The first three volumes were published between 1854-56, a fourth volume was never written, 
volume five appeared in 1885. 
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two principal 'nations', Greeks and Italians, that were destined to rule the 
Empire. The 'Barbarian' nations had to be destroyed, while the Jews - that 
'peculiar, flexible but enduring people (merkwiirdige nachgebig zahe Yolk)' -
played the part of 'as it were' a third party (Mommsen 1857:529f).593 
Already then we find the distinct (eigenthiimliche) antipathy of the 
Occidentals against this so thoroughly Oriental race and its foreign 
opinions and mores. Nevertheless, this Jewry (Judenthum) - although it 
was not the most pleasant trait of the nowhere pleasant picture of the 
miscegenation of peoples (V6Ikermengung) of the day - was a historical 
element that developed in the natural course of things. 
Caesar (like Alexander before him) protected the Jews' 'particular cult 
(eigenthiimlichen Kult)' against the hostility oflocal Greek as well as Roman 
clerics. He did 'of course' not intend to establish Jewry as a third nationality of 
equal weight but wanted to take advantage of two characteristics of the Jews: 
first, their indifferent behaviour against any state (the Jew - unlike the 
Occidental- had not been given the 'Pandora's gift of political organisation'), 
second, their tendency to adopt any nationality to a certain extent in order to 
'wrap up (urnhiillen), their 'national particularity (Eigenthiimlichkeit),. 
Therefore the Jews were as ifmade for a state that was built on the debris 
of one hundred destroyed polities and that needed to be fitted with an - as 
it were - abstract and synthetic (von vornherein verschliffenen) nationality. 
Already in the old world, the Jews/Judaism (Judenthum) were/was a 
powerful ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition and for 
this reason a particularly legitimate member of the Caesarian state whose 
polity was nothing but cosmopolitanism, whose nationality 
(Volksthiimlichkeit) was nothing but humanity (ibid.).594 
593 Theodor Mommsen, 'R6mische Geschichte' volume 3, book 5, chapter 11 Berlin 1857 
(second edition) 
594 Hoffmann points out that the notion of the Jews as 'ferment' or 'Gaerungsmittel' being 
instrumental to the development of Western civilization was already developed by Moses Hess in 
his 'Europaeische Triarchie' (1841) (ibid.). 
The first three volumes of 'Roman History' formed a narrative that culminated in Caesar's 
epoch, while volume five - written in a very different style - presented in thirteen chapters the 
histories of separate provinces in the Imperial time. Perhaps the most famous chapter is that on 
'Judea and the Jews' that discusses the Jewish defeat by Rome in 70 AD as a result of the failure 
of the Jews to be integrated into the Empire. Mommsen emphasizes that while under Caesar 
relations were good, the subsequent combination of clerical restoration and a sentiment of 
Jewish-national exclusivity prevented any Jewish state-political development. Tendencies for 
secular statehood that could have controlled clerical rule were defeated by anti-secular popular 
movements (the Pharisees) (Hoffmann 1988: 106). After the death of Herod the Pharisees 
achieved the abolition of monarchy and imposed Roman direct rule based on Jewish clerical- i.e. 
not political- self-government. As a result of the failure to develop secular political opposition to 
Roman imperialism, opposition to the combined rule by Rome cum 'self-rule' by the clerical 
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The fact that Treitschke used Mommsen's formulation, and thus associated 
Mommsen's view of the Jews with his own and that ofthe anti-Semites, seems to 
have been what prompted Mommsen to responding: Mommsen's contribution is 
dominated by the effort to dissociate the notion of the Jews as pictured in his 
'Roman History' from anti-Semitism.595 
Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) was born in Coswig (Anhalt) and studied at 
the 'Jewish Theological Seminary' at Breslau with Zecheriah Frankel ('the 
founder of Conservative Judaism') and Heinrich Graetz (Fischoff 1969: 107). 
After two years of studies he turned towards liberal Judaism in the vein of 
Abraham Geiger and studied philosophy in Breslau and Berlin. His publication 
'Kants Theorie der Erfahrung' (1871) gained him a post in 1873 at Marburg 
university where he became professor in 1876. He was the first Jewish ordinary 
professor in Germany and held this professorship until 1912 (Hackeschmidt/Sieg 
1994:161). Although he was 'affiliated with various Jewish organizations, 
particulary those concerned with education' his interest in Judaism arose only 
after 1880. 
Cohen adhered to the notion of a close affinity between Protestantism and 
Judaism that he adopted from left-wing Hegelianism, in particular from Heinrich 
Heine's 'On the history of religion and philosophy in Germany' (1836). 
hierarchy was clerical-fanatical messianism. Mommsen emphasizes that the Judaism of the 
Diaspora developed differently because the Jews in the Hellenistic world remained central to 
Hellenic civilization; they enjoyed privileges but were also victims of popular riots (ibid.: 1 08). 
Mommsen's main point is that the Hellenic Jews did not completely assimilate because the 
existence of the clerical state in Palestine and its 'cult of the temple' maintained their national 
identity as a religious identity. Mommsen compares the role of the Temple to the role of the 
Vatican in the present: the Roman state had to defend itself by crushing clerical-theocratic 
fanaticism just as the German Reich had to defeat ultra-montanism in the Culturkampf 
(ibid.: 1 09). Hoffmann points out that the Roman Empire was not the secular quasi-modem state 
that Mommsen imagined it to have been, and the Jewish community of Palestine had little in 
common with the Catholic church in 19th century Germany (ibid.: 112). Still, Mommsen's 
interpretations of Jewish history in the Roman context are extremely interesting as they illustrate 
his general political-historical conception, and (in the 1885 version, if much less so in the 1856 
version) show remarkable attention to the internal dynamics of Jewish society. 
595 In his lectures on Politics, Treitschke paraphrased Mommsen's argument exactly in the sense 
Mommsen insisted his remarks on the Jews should be understood (Hoffmann 1988:98). 
Treitschke might in the context of the Streit have deliberately twisted Mommsen's argument in 
order to use it as support for the anti-Semitic discourse. Liberal defence of the Jews was 
henceforth vulnerable to pointing out the embarrassing fact that Mommsen himself had provided 
a formulation that subsequently became a central anti-Semitic slogan (Hoffmann points to 
references by Lagarde, Tritsch, Ah1wardt, Hitler and Gobbels; ibid.: 1 02). 
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According to Heine, Luther had managed to suppress the 'gnostic-dualistic 
elements of Christianity' by having recourse to the Hebrew Bible, which opened 
the space for the development of German idealism (Liebeschiitz 1967:215). 
Luther had, in Heine's and Cohen's understanding, also created therewith the 
condition for Jewry in the 19th century to liberate itself from the Talmud. Cohen 
published - shortly before the Streit - a hostile criticism of Lazarus' 'Ethics of 
Judaism' (ibid.:214). 
Cohen supported 'the idea that the political unity of the nation needs to be 
firmly based on the spiritual, on the humanitarian content of religion' 
(Liebeschiitz 1967:217). He saw his position as the continuation of the earlier 
liberal tradition that had 'understood [the formation of] the nation state and the 
ethics of German classicism as one undivisible task' (ibid.). 'Cohen remained an 
ardent German nationalist all his life' (Fischoff 1969: 114); during World War I 
he argued in a widely read pamphlet that German and Jewish cultures were 
identical and that therefore Jews everywhere ought to support the German cause 
(ibid.: 115). He was also a steadfast opponent of Zionism (ibid.: 129). In his later 
years, he became known as an advocate of universal manhood suffrage and a 
theorist of the 'sozialer Rechtsstaat' and 'ethical socialism' (Hackeschmidt/Sieg 
1994: 160). 
Before Cohen published his response to Treitschke, he had sent him two 
letters that remained without answer (except that Treitschke in his second 
contribution made some dismissive and polemical remarks that seemed to be 
directed at Cohen's letters). Cohen's public statement against Treitschke seems 
to have been the first reflection Cohen ever published on the relationship of 
Judaism and German nationality (Fischoff 1969:112). 
Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim (1819-1880) was a National-Liberal who 
published widely on law, politics and economics. In 1844, when he was a 
lecturer at Heidelberg University (where Ludwig Bamberger was one of his 
students), Oppenheim published a celebrated volume on international law, and in 
1850 a 'philosophy of law and society'. In 1848 he belonged to the democratic 
left around Arnold Ruge and took part in the civil war in Baden, first supporting, 
then to the left of, Brentano. He spent eleven years in exile in Switzerland, 
Belgium and England. Subsequently he became a member of the Progress party 
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and from 1866 was a leading National-Liberal supporter of Bismarck 
(Hamburger 1968:267). He was one of the main contributors to the journal Die 
Gegenwart that had been founded in 1871 as a liberal discussion journal trying to 
bridge the divisions between the competing liberal parties. In 1872 Oppenheim 
published a controversial essay 'On the history of stock-market fraud 
(Borsenschwindel), at a time when the 'Griinderzeit' was still generally seen as a 
time of economic boom. In his influential text on 'Kathedersozialismus' 
(1873)596 he argued that trade unions were a corrupting influence on workers and 
academic theorists of (state-)socialism were a threat to academic freedom 
(ibid. :268). 
His polemic against 'Stocker and Treitschke' was Oppenheim's last longer 
publication - he died on March 29, 1880. Significantly, a large part of the 
obituary on Oppenheim (Braun-Wiesbaden in Die Gegenwart, April 1880) dealt 
with Treitschke and the Berlin movement. The obituary argued (reflecting views 
formulated by Oppenheim in the last weeks of his life) that religious as well as 
racial hatred are 'signs of barbarism, lack of culture or a regress in culture' 
(ibid.). Braun-Wiesbaden found it 'incomprehensible' that racial hatred can be 
formulated with reference to the national state since it had seemed that only some 
'backward' countries in South East Europe would host such 'stupidity and 
passions'. He notes that 'we have to discover' that 'amongst us, too, the 
Germans, the people of poets and thinkers, and even in the metropolis of the 
German Reich and of German intelligence, there still exist remnants of the 
waning Middle Ages which poison the air and threaten to draw us down onto the 
same level as that Jew-eating mob in Bucharest and Jassy,597 (ibid.:228). Braun-
Wiesbaden relates that Oppenheim had observed in the last conversation they 
had had that every war 'destroys an amount of economical, moral (sittlichen) and 
intellectual (geistigen) cultural capital and leaves behind a certain degree of 
brutalization (V erwilderung)' amongst the victorious no less than the defeated. 
This is where Oppenheim saw the deeper cause of the current jew-baiting. 
596 This publication drew together several articles published since 1871 when Oppenheim first 
coined the term 'Kathedersozialisten'. 
597 Jassy lies in Romania. 
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Ludwig Philippson (1811-1889), a rabbi in Bonn, was the editor of the 
Allgemeine Zeitung des ludenthums, Ein unparteiisches Organfiir alles jiidische 
Interesse. In the period under investigation, the liberal Allgemeine Zeitung 
published numerous articles, comments and reviews (particularly of pamphlets 
and brochures) on the anti-Jewish agitation.598 
Seligmann Meyer (1853-1925) was a rabbi in Berlin (Boehlich 1965a:244) 
and the editor of the journal 'liidische Presse'. 
The historian Harry Bresslau (1848-1928) saw himself as a student of 
Droysen (Liebeschiitz 1967:206). He was involved in a number of Jewish 
institutions but believed in the possibility of assimilation: 'the continued 
existence of Jewry was not a concern of his' (ibid.:207). As late as in 1878 
Bresslau had closely co-operated with Treitschke in an election committee that 
aimed to replace a Progress candidate in Berlin by a candidate friendly to the 
government (ibid.:208). As Liebeschiitz comments, Bresslau's letter to 
Treitschke is 'sober like the positivistic scholarship of which Bresslau became a 
master' (ibid.:212). 
Manuel Joel was a (moderately conservative) rabbi in Breslau - he was the 
successor of the more liberal Abraham Geiger (Liebeschiitz 1967: 143) - and 
published in 1870 a 'pioneering work' on the Jewish sources of Spinoza's 
'Theological-Political Treatise' (Smith 1997:xii). 
Paulus Cassel (1821-1892, born in Silesia as Selig Cassel) was a Protestant 
theologian (he converted from Judaism in 1855) and worked for the Protestant 
ludenmission. He had briefly been (1866-7) a Conservative member of the 
Prussian diet. From 1868 to 1891 he was a priest at the Christuskirche in Berlin 
(Hamburger 1968:219). 
Salomon Neumann (1819-1908, born in Pomerania) studied medicine at 
Berlin and Halle and became a general practitioner in Berlin in 1845 (Regneri 
598 Most of these were unsigned or leader comments. It is assumed here that they were written by 
the editor, Philippson. 
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1998: 132), He was - along with his lifelong friend Virchow - one of the 
democratically inclined members of the medical reform movement (ibid.:133) 
and a pioneer in social and health statistics. Neumann was a liberal599 but close to 
the reformist workers association Arbeiterverbriiderung and later also to Social 
Democracy. He was also one of the founders of the Hochschulefiir die 
Wissenschaft des Judentums (ibid.: 134). The initial publication of Neumann's 
refutation of Treitschke's claims about Jewish immigration ('The fable of Jewish 
immigration') in the summer of 1880 had little impact. Its second edition from 
November 1880, however, received a positive review in the Vossische Zeitung 
(November 12), was referred to by Vir chow in the debate in the Prussian diet on 
the Antisemitenpetition (November 20) and then by Mommsen in his' Another 
word ... ' (later in the same month) (ibid.: 146). Treitschke was then forced to write 
a review (Treitschke 1965c) and publicly acknowledge that a Jewish immigration 
from Poland and Russia did not exist at the time. 
Moses Aron Nadyr, the author of a 'letter from a Polish Jew' to Treitschke, 
introduces himself as a rabbi, apparently from Western Prussia; nothing else 
seems to be known. 
Another contribution ('Borne and Treitschke, Open letter on the Jews' 
[1880]) is by an author who masquerades (or rather, ironically pretends to 
masquerade) as Lob Baruch (Dr. Ludwig Borne) and elegantly adopts Borne's 
radical-liberallanguage.6oo 
Naudh (apparently a synonym for Nordmann) was the author of one of the 
most emblematic texts of racial, anti-Christian anti-Semitism, 'The Jews and the 
German state' (first published 1862 or earlier). He succeeded Wilhelm Marr in 
April 1880601 as editor of the extreme but influential journal Die Deutsche 
599 Neumann was a city councillor of Berlin but it is not clear from Regneri's account whether he 
was a member of one of the liberal parties. 
600 Ludwig Borne had been born as Loeb Baruch in 1786 and died 1837. 
601 According to comments in the publication. 
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Wacht, Monatsschrift fiir nationale Kulturinteressen - Organ der antijiidischen 
T7 .. 602 
r eremzgung. 
Nothing seems to be known about the anti-Semite, Wilhelm Endner 
(Boehlich 1965a:244). 
602 The bound edition of the first year's issues (Berlin 1880) shows on the cover a different 
subheading: 'Monthly for national development (Monatsschrift fUr nationale Entwickelung),. 
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4.4 The response of Social Democracy to anti-Semitism 
1875 was the year the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was founded, 
promising to become a consistent and nation-wide parliamentary force. Although 
in theory anti-liberal, it was in practice expected to be an ally for the 
democratically inclined wing of liberalism (Massing 1949: 18) - obviously an 
alarming scenario for the conservative elite just a year after the electoral nadir of 
the Conservative party at national elections. Although there seem not to be any 
statements from the (then illegal) party specifically referring to the Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit, a brieflook at the party's position to the more general anti-
Semitic agitation of the time is an illuminating and necessary complement of an 
analysis of the liberal position. 
'The Stocker movement was for the Social Democratic Party a matter of life 
and death' (ibid.: 170). They sensed the conservatives were planning to transform 
the labour movement into a 'state-socialist' auxiliary against liberalism.603 A few 
days after the anti-Semitic riots on New Year's Eve of 1880 in Berlin, the Social 
Democrats discussed the issue in a mass meeting and seconded a resolution 
resisting 'any curtailment of the civic equality constitutionally guaranteed to the 
Jews' (Massing 1949:170; Wistrich 1982:94).604 
603 The anti-Semites aimed to speak at trades union meetings (taking advantage of the ban of the 
SPD) to present their ideas of social reform. They tried to exploit remnants of guild ideology 
amongst trade unionists. However, the workers' hatred of the government prevented the anti-
Semites from gaining any ground. When during the elections in 1881 Bismarck leaked the 
suggestion that the ban of the party could be lifted if the Social Democrats were prepared to co-
operate with the Stocker movement they declined (ibid.: 171). 
604 Although rejection of the anti-Semitic movement was unequivocal amongst Social Democrats, 
the occasional use of anti-Jewish stereotypes did occur; in Der Sozialdemokrat of January 1881 
for example the phrase 'the Judaized outlook of the Imperial Chancellor' can be found (Wistrich 
1982:97). The author points to the ennobling of the banker Bleichroder and sarcastically remarks 
- against the anti-Semites - that one should not only deplore 'circumcised Jews' but also the 
'uncircumcised Jews', i.e. the capitalist establishment including the Christian-German state. It is 
difficult to determine whether such remarks were understood by readers as polemic against anti-
Semites (which is probably how they were intended) or as a confirmation of an anti-Jewish 
stereotype. The problem of course resembles that of interpreting Marx's notorious piece 'On the 
Jewish Question' which was reprinted with an interpretive introduction in the same journal in the 
same year. Bernstein wrote a preface that aimed to explain why Marx's intentions had been 
opposed to those of the anti-Semites. The background to this was that in 1872, the Lassallean 
'Neue Social-Demokrat' (then edited by Hasselmann who was excluded from the party in 1880 
because of 'anarchism') had already printed some de-contextualized extracts - the most 
controversial passages from the second part of Marx's essay - in a polemic against Bernstein and 
the (Marxist) Eisenachers. The Lassalleans tried to make the point that 'even Marx' had been an 
anti-Semite in order to deflect from and legitimize their own practice of using anti-Semitic 
cliches against Marx and the Eisenachers. These two re-publications of Marx's essay were 
probably of more consequence than its initial publication. If - as is generally agreed - the 
Marxists were far more immune to anti-Semitism than any other socialist tendency, Marx's 
344 
Der Sozialdemokrat remarked in January 1881 that 'liberal indignation at 
anti-Semitism was misplaced' because it was itself a product of National 
Liberalism's chauvinistic 'arrogance' (Wistrich 1982:97).605 Amongst the 
leadership of the party there were two lines of thinking about the anti-Semitic 
movement. Engels found the phenomenon 'contemptible' but saw it as a merely 
temporary creation by the government as an 'electoral manoeuvre' (ibid.:98). 
Bernstein insisted against Engels that the movement did have deeper roots 
amongst civil service, petty bourgeoisie and peasantry and urged taking it more 
seriously - which he did as editor of Der Sozialdemokrat (ibid.:99). He also 
introduced, however, the notion that anti-Semitism was a phenomenon of popular 
discontent that might in the future feed into socialist revolution. Bernstein's 
quasi-sociological interpretation of the causes of anti-Semitism did not, however, 
diminish Social Democracy's opposition to it. 
The growing exclusion of anti-Semitic positions from the Social Democratic 
discourse seems to have been partly a reaction to the anti-Semitic movement, 
partly an element ofthe general shift towards a Marxist paradigm to the 
detriment of state-socialist as well as 'anarchist'606 ideas. Both trends were 
helped by the anti-socialist legislation of 1878 which brought home to Social-
Democratic workers and intellectuals the reactionary character of the German 
state, the demagogic character of 'Christian-Social' agitation and the necessity of 
securing autonomous organization on the basis of solidarity and democratically 
accountable party structures.607 While in the mid 1870s even leading Marxists 
like Bebel and Bernstein had still paid their respect to Diihring, for example 
notoriously difficult essay seems (in the late nineteenth century context) not to have influenced 
readers in an anti-Semitic direction (even though some of its formulations, if taken out of context 
and read without knowledge of the text by Bruno Bauer to which they are a polemical response, 
can be read as anti-Semitic; cpo Hirsch 1980; 1982; Arendt 1973:64; Claussen 1994: 107f). 
Johann Most, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic workers who first humiliated 
Stocker in his attempt to build a 'Christian Social Workers Party', was himself expelled from the 
party in 1880 for having come under the influence of the anti-Semitic 'anarchism' ofEugen 
Diihring. Most later became a leading figure in the anarchist movement in the USA (Massing 
1949:219). 
605 It pointed out that Social Democracy also asserted the civil rights 'of those who help to 
prosecute them', i.e. Jewish liberals who failed to oppose the anti-socialist laws (such as 
Bamberger). 
606 In this context, 'anarchist' referred to individualist, anti-intellectual, elitist/anti-democratic 
'direct action' tendencies. 
607 All these together must have had a decisive effect in undermining Lassalleanism. 
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(Wistrich 1982:49), by around 1880, tolerance of anti-Semitic and 'anarchist' 
positions had vanished.608 
608 Wistrich notes that the last overtly anti-Semitic reference he found in Del' Sozialdemokrat was 
from August 1882 (Wistrich 1982:48;362). 
The Diihringians' attempt to have Engels' attacks on Diihring condemned by the party 
conference in 1877 backfired and led to their defeat, to the effect that Diihring's philosophy (a 
radical but unhistorical brand of anti-religious, anti-state positivist rationalism) lost influence on 
the grounds of being anti-Semitic. Engels' Anti-Diihring was published as a book in 1878 after 
having been serialized in the Vorwaerts and been discussed on the party conference in 1877 
(Wistrich 1982:49). Engels refers to Diihring's Jew-hatred as a 'superstition' and 'popular 
prejudice ... inherited from the middle ages' (ibid.:50). With this he managed to stigmatize Jew-
hatred, but also prevented a discussion of the specific modernity of anti-Semitism. Engels' own 
leanings towards a 'positivization' of Marxism - of which the Anti-Diihring bears evidence-
might have made him blind for the fact that Diihring also was a thoroughly modern thinker, 
promoting a trivialized version of Enlightenment rationalism and sociological positivism, not 
based on romantic dreamings ofthe Middle Ages. It seems that anti-Semitism in the socialist 
movement was brushed away by the Marxists rather than overcome, which might have helped it 
re-emerge in some sections of the movement after 1900. A consistent criticism of Diihring's 
nationalism and racism is absent from Engels's book. 
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